kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/fs/btrfs, branch fs-current

Merge tag 'for-7.2-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux

2026-07-14T16:10:27+00:00

Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: - fix root structure leak after relocation error - fix optimization when checksums are read from commit root, fall back to checksum root during relocation - in tree-checker, validate length of inode reference in items - validate properties before setting them - validate free space cache entries on load - transaction abort fixes - fix printing of internal trees as signed numbers - add error messages after critical lzo compression errors * tag 'for-7.2-rc3-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: print-tree: print header owner as signed btrfs: decentralize transaction aborts in create_reloc_root() btrfs: tree-checker: validate INODE_REF's namelen btrfs: lzo: add error message for invalid headers btrfs: fallback to transaction csum tree on a commit root csum miss btrfs: fix root leak if its reloc root is unexpected in merge_reloc_roots() btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages btrfs: fix transaction abort logic in btrfs_fileattr_set() btrfs: validate properties before setting them

btrfs: print-tree: print header owner as signed

2026-06-30T00:02:03+00:00

When dumping a tree block, btrfs_header::owner is printed as unsigned, which can result in numbers that are hard to read, e.g.: BTRFS info (device loop0): leaf 8908800 gen 16 total ptrs 28 free space 1676 owner 18446744073709551607 For the above output, 18446744073709551607 is (s64)-9, the root id of data reloc tree. Despite those predefined root ids that are already negative, existing subvolume trees will not have any negative values, as subvolume trees can only utilize the lower 48 bits, so there will be no output change for existing subvolumes, thus no extra confusion. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: Sun YangKai Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba

btrfs: decentralize transaction aborts in create_reloc_root()

2026-06-30T00:02:02+00:00

Decentralize transaction aborts in create_reloc_root(), so that it is obvious which call failed and what caused the transaction abort. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn Signed-off-by: David Sterba

btrfs: tree-checker: validate INODE_REF's namelen

2026-06-30T00:02:02+00:00

[BUG] A crafted btrfs image can trigger the following crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd1dc42884000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 1034 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-custom+ #383 PREEMPT(full) 46af0a92938a63be7132e0dfd71e62327c51d5c2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x10 Call Trace: read_extent_buffer+0xe4/0x100 [btrfs 3cf0785dd58fec8c5ff84633b772f17ce1f92a8f] btrfs_get_name+0x15e/0x1e0 [btrfs 3cf0785dd58fec8c5ff84633b772f17ce1f92a8f] reconnect_path+0x165/0x390 exportfs_decode_fh_raw+0x337/0x400 ? drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0xb0/0xb0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x10 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [CAUSE] TThe crafted image has the following corrupted INODE_REF item: item 9 key (258 INODE_REF 257) itemoff 11544 itemsize 4106 index 2 namelen 4096 name: d\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000 The itemsize matches the namelen, but the namelen is 4096, way larger than normal name length limit (BTRFS_NAME_LEN, 255). Meanwhile the memory of the @name is only 255 byte sized, this will cause out-of-boundary access, and cause the above crash. [FIX] Add extra namelen verification for INODE_REF, just like what we have done in ROOT_REF checks. Now the crafted image can be rejected gracefully: BTRFS critical (device dm-2): corrupt leaf: root=5 block=30572544 slot=14 ino=259, invalid inode ref name length, has 4096 expect [1, 255] BTRFS error (device dm-2): read time tree block corruption detected on logical 30572544 mirror 2 Reported-by: Xiang Mei Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/aik0hEV6ehKx6Ldv@Air.local/ Acked-by: Weiming Shi Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi [ Rebase, add a Link: tag, add an simple cause analyze ] Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba

btrfs: lzo: add error message for invalid headers

2026-06-30T00:02:02+00:00

Inside btrfs we always pair -EUCLEAN error with an error message to indicate which data is corrupted. However there are 3 cases inside lzo decompression where there is no error message for corrupted headers. Add those missing error messages to show exactly where the corruption is. Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba

btrfs: fallback to transaction csum tree on a commit root csum miss

2026-06-29T23:59:20+00:00

We have been running with commit root csums enabled for some time and have noticed a slight uptick in zero csum errors. Investigating those revealed that they were same transaction reads of extents that were just relocated, but the extent map generation was long ago. It turns out that relocation intentionally does not update the extent generation (replace_file_extents()), but must write a new csum since the data has moved, so we must account for this with commit root csum reading. Luckily this is a short lived condition: after the relocation transaction the commit root will once again have the csum. So we can add a generic fallback to the lookup to try again with the transaction csum root. Fixes: f07b855c56b1 ("btrfs: try to search for data csums in commit root") Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov Signed-off-by: David Sterba

btrfs: fix root leak if its reloc root is unexpected in merge_reloc_roots()

2026-06-29T23:59:13+00:00

If we have an unexpected reloc_root for our root, we jump to the out label but never drop the reference we obtained for root, resulting in a leak. Add a missing btrfs_put_root() call. Fixes: 24213fa46c70 ("btrfs: do proper error handling in merge_reloc_roots") Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba

btrfs: reject free space cache with more entries than pages

2026-06-29T23:59:04+00:00

When loading a v1 free space cache, __load_free_space_cache() takes num_entries and num_bitmaps straight from the on-disk btrfs_free_space_header. That header is stored in the tree_root under a key with type 0, which the tree-checker has no case for, so neither count is validated before the load trusts it. The load loops num_entries times and maps the next page whenever the current one runs out, going through io_ctl_check_crc() -> io_ctl_map_page(), which does io_ctl->pages[io_ctl->index++]. But pages[] is allocated in io_ctl_init() from the cache inode's i_size, not from num_entries: num_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE); io_ctl->pages = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS); So if num_entries claims more records than the pages can hold, io_ctl->index runs off the end of pages[]. The write side never hits this because io_ctl_add_entry() and io_ctl_add_bitmap() both stop once io_ctl->index >= io_ctl->num_pages; the read side just never had the same check. To trigger it, take a clean cache (num_entries = here), set num_entries in the header to 0x10000, and fix up the leaf checksum so it still passes the tree-checker. The cache inode has i_size = 65536, so num_pages is 16 and pages[] is a 16-pointer (kmalloc-128) array. The load now tries to read 65536 entries, io_ctl->index walks up to 16, and pages[16] is read past the array: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800c833a80 by task kworker/u8:3/58 io_ctl_check_crc (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:420 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:565) __load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:655 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:820) load_free_space_cache (fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c:1017) caching_thread (fs/btrfs/block-group.c:880) btrfs_work_helper (fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:312) process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork free-space-cache.c:420 is io_ctl_map_page(), inlined into io_ctl_check_crc() at line 565, which is why that is the frame KASAN names. The out-of-bounds slot is then treated as a struct page and handed to crc32c(), so the bad read turns into a GP fault. Add the missing check to io_ctl_check_crc(), which is where both the entry loop and the bitmap loop end up. When num_entries is too large the load now fails like any corrupt cache: __load_free_space_cache() drops it and rebuilds the free space from the extent tree, so a valid cache is never rejected. Reported-by: Weiming Shi Fixes: 5b0e95bf607d ("Btrfs: inline checksums into the disk free space cache") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAPpSM+RMPByMCKXvM5QFKToxsyNccfuFLWMdD0mfd0wh2Ja62w@mail.gmail.com/ Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba

btrfs: fix transaction abort logic in btrfs_fileattr_set()

2026-06-29T23:58:52+00:00

There's no need to abort the transaction if we failed to set or delete a property, as we haven't done any change. However we need to abort if we set a property or delete a property and then fail to update the inode item, as that would leave the inode's state in subvolume tree inconsistent. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba

btrfs: validate properties before setting them

2026-06-29T23:58:43+00:00

We set the xattr and then attempt to apply the property. If the apply fails we then attempt to delete the xattr to avoid an inconsistency. However we don't verify if the deletion succeed, so if it fails we leave an inconsistency between the state in the btree and the in-memory inode. Address this by validating first if we can apply the property, then set the xattr, then apply the property, and this last step should not fail since the validation succeeded before - assert that it does not fail but leave code to attempt to delete the xattr if it happens, and then abort the transaction only if the xattr delete failed. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba