<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/fs/ocfs2/xattr.h, branch akpm-base</title>
<subtitle>The linux-next integration testing tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/atom?h=akpm-base</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/atom?h=akpm-base'/>
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<updated>2022-06-27T20:45:48+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: reflink deadlock when clone file to the same directory simultaneously</title>
<updated>2022-06-27T20:45:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Gang He</name>
<email>ghe@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-27T20:45:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=409745064d6fe5318d3aaad3261035c8070d70f3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:409745064d6fe5318d3aaad3261035c8070d70f3</id>
<content type='text'>
Running reflink from multiple nodes simultaneously to clone a file to the
same directory probably triggers a deadlock issue.  For example, there is
a three node ocfs2 cluster, each node mounts the ocfs2 file system to
/mnt/shared, and run the reflink command from each node repeatedly, like

  reflink "/mnt/shared/test" \
  "/mnt/shared/.snapshots/test.`date +%m%d%H%M%S`.`hostname`"
then, reflink command process will be hung on each node, and you
can't list this file system directory.
The problematic reflink command process is blocked at one node,
task:reflink         state:D stack:    0 pid: 1283 ppid:  4154
Call Trace:
  __schedule+0x2fd/0x750
  schedule+0x2f/0xa0
  schedule_timeout+0x1cc/0x310
  ? ocfs2_control_cfu+0x50/0x50 [ocfs2_stack_user]
  ? 0xffffffffc0e3e000
  wait_for_completion+0xba/0x140
  ? wake_up_q+0xa0/0xa0
  __ocfs2_cluster_lock.isra.41+0x3b5/0x820 [ocfs2]
  ? ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x1fc/0x960 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x1fc/0x960 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_init_security_and_acl+0xbe/0x1d0 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_reflink+0x436/0x4c0 [ocfs2]
  ? ocfs2_reflink_ioctl+0x2ca/0x360 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_reflink_ioctl+0x2ca/0x360 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_ioctl+0x25e/0x670 [ocfs2]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x680
  ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0
The other reflink command processes are blocked at other nodes,
task:reflink         state:D stack:    0 pid:29759 ppid:  4088
Call Trace:
  __schedule+0x2fd/0x750
  schedule+0x2f/0xa0
  schedule_timeout+0x1cc/0x310
  ? ocfs2_control_cfu+0x50/0x50 [ocfs2_stack_user]
  ? 0xffffffffc0b19000
  wait_for_completion+0xba/0x140
  ? wake_up_q+0xa0/0xa0
  __ocfs2_cluster_lock.isra.41+0x3b5/0x820 [ocfs2]
  ? ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x1fc/0x960 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x1fc/0x960 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_mv_orphaned_inode_to_new+0x87/0x7e0 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_reflink+0x335/0x4c0 [ocfs2]
  ? ocfs2_reflink_ioctl+0x2ca/0x360 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_reflink_ioctl+0x2ca/0x360 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_ioctl+0x25e/0x670 [ocfs2]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x680
  ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1e0
or
task:reflink         state:D stack:    0 pid:18465 ppid:  4156
Call Trace:
  __schedule+0x302/0x940
  ? usleep_range+0x80/0x80
  schedule+0x46/0xb0
  schedule_timeout+0xff/0x140
  ? ocfs2_control_cfu+0x50/0x50 [ocfs2_stack_user]
  ? 0xffffffffc0c3b000
  __wait_for_common+0xb9/0x170
  __ocfs2_cluster_lock.constprop.0+0x1d6/0x860 [ocfs2]
  ? ocfs2_wait_for_recovery+0x49/0xd0 [ocfs2]
  ? ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x30f/0xa50 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x30f/0xa50 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker+0xf2/0x2b0 [ocfs2]
  ? dput+0x32/0x2f0
  ocfs2_permission+0x45/0xe0 [ocfs2]
  inode_permission+0xcc/0x170
  link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x2a2/0x380
  ? path_init+0x2c1/0x3f0
  path_parentat+0x3c/0x90
  filename_parentat+0xc1/0x1d0
  ? filename_lookup+0x138/0x1c0
  filename_create+0x43/0x160
  ocfs2_reflink_ioctl+0xe6/0x380 [ocfs2]
  ocfs2_ioctl+0x1ea/0x2c0 [ocfs2]
  ? do_sys_openat2+0x81/0x150
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x82/0xb0
  do_syscall_64+0x61/0xb0

The deadlock is caused by multiple acquiring the destination directory
inode dlm lock in ocfs2_reflink function, we should acquire this directory
inode dlm lock at the beginning, and hold this dlm lock until end of the
function.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210729110230.18983-1-ghe@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Gang He &lt;ghe@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mark@fasheh.com&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;jiangqi903@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Changwei Ge &lt;gechangwei@live.cn&gt;
Cc: Gang He &lt;ghe@suse.com&gt;
Cc: Jun Piao &lt;piaojun@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: remove editor modelines and cruft</title>
<updated>2021-05-07T07:26:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>masahiroy@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-05-07T01:06:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=fa60ce2cb4506701c43bd4cf3ca23d970daf1b9c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fa60ce2cb4506701c43bd4cf3ca23d970daf1b9c</id>
<content type='text'>
The section "19) Editor modelines and other cruft" in
Documentation/process/coding-style.rst clearly says, "Do not include any
of these in source files."

I recently receive a patch to explicitly add a new one.

Let's do treewide cleanups, otherwise some people follow the existing code
and attempt to upstream their favoriate editor setups.

It is even nicer if scripts/checkpatch.pl can check it.

If we like to impose coding style in an editor-independent manner, I think
editorconfig (patch [1]) is a saner solution.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200703073143.423557-1-danny@kdrag0n.dev/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210324054457.1477489-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;masahiroy@kernel.org&gt;
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven &lt;geert@linux-m68k.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda &lt;ojeda@kernel.org&gt;	[auxdisplay]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 174</title>
<updated>2019-05-30T18:26:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Gleixner</name>
<email>tglx@linutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-27T06:55:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=1802d0beecafe581ad584634ba92f8a471d8a63a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1802d0beecafe581ad584634ba92f8a471d8a63a</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
  published by the free software foundation this program is
  distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
  warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
  fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
  for more details

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 655 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal &lt;allison@lohutok.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Richard Fontana &lt;rfontana@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070034.575739538@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: fix posix_acl_create deadlock</title>
<updated>2016-05-12T22:52:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Junxiao Bi</name>
<email>junxiao.bi@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-12T22:42:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=c25a1e0671fbca7b2c0d0757d533bd2650d6dc0c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c25a1e0671fbca7b2c0d0757d533bd2650d6dc0c</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 702e5bc68ad2 ("ocfs2: use generic posix ACL infrastructure")
refactored code to use posix_acl_create.  The problem with this function
is that it is not mindful of the cluster wide inode lock making it
unsuitable for use with ocfs2 inode creation with ACLs.  For example,
when used in ocfs2_mknod, this function can cause deadlock as follows.
The parent dir inode lock is taken when calling posix_acl_create -&gt;
get_acl -&gt; ocfs2_iop_get_acl which takes the inode lock again.  This can
cause deadlock if there is a blocked remote lock request waiting for the
lock to be downconverted.  And same deadlock happened in ocfs2_reflink.
This fix is to revert back using ocfs2_init_acl.

Fixes: 702e5bc68ad2 ("ocfs2: use generic posix ACL infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed &lt;tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi &lt;junxiao.bi@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Mark Fasheh &lt;mfasheh@suse.de&gt;
Cc: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt;
Cc: Joseph Qi &lt;joseph.qi@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: use generic posix ACL infrastructure</title>
<updated>2014-01-26T04:58:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2013-12-20T13:16:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=702e5bc68ad2c02f1b12b53ef7093074af9d2441'/>
<id>urn:sha1:702e5bc68ad2c02f1b12b53ef7093074af9d2441</id>
<content type='text'>
This contains some major refactoring for the create path so that
inodes are created with the right mode to start with instead of
fixing it up later.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xattr: Constify -&gt;name member of "struct xattr".</title>
<updated>2013-07-25T09:30:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2013-07-24T20:44:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=9548906b2bb7ff09e12c013a55d669bef2c8e121'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9548906b2bb7ff09e12c013a55d669bef2c8e121</id>
<content type='text'>
Since everybody sets kstrdup()ed constant string to "struct xattr"-&gt;name but
nobody modifies "struct xattr"-&gt;name , we can omit kstrdup() and its failure
checking by constifying -&gt;name member of "struct xattr".

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reviewed-by: Joel Becker &lt;jlbec@evilplan.org&gt; [ocfs2]
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com&gt;
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: propagate umode_t</title>
<updated>2012-01-04T03:55:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2011-07-26T06:55:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=67697cbdccb8b63eae892a9437bcc79d08b79578'/>
<id>urn:sha1:67697cbdccb8b63eae892a9437bcc79d08b79578</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creation</title>
<updated>2011-02-01T16:12:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-02-01T16:05:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=2a7dba391e5628ad665ce84ef9a6648da541ebab'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2a7dba391e5628ad665ce84ef9a6648da541ebab</id>
<content type='text'>
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes.  We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process.  This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label.  This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.

This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations.  We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly.  This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook.  If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs: constify xattr_handler</title>
<updated>2010-05-21T22:31:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Stephen Hemminger</name>
<email>shemminger@vyatta.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-05-14T00:53:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=537d81ca7c5338e4f13f3e7e7b50e87ba293ec68'/>
<id>urn:sha1:537d81ca7c5338e4f13f3e7e7b50e87ba293ec68</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger &lt;shemminger@vyatta.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ocfs2: Always include ACL support</title>
<updated>2009-10-29T06:05:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Kara</name>
<email>jack@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2009-10-15T12:54:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/commit/?id=e6aabe0cac14a495d42f629a803c5e221089bae8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e6aabe0cac14a495d42f629a803c5e221089bae8</id>
<content type='text'>
To become consistent with filesystems such as XFS or BTRFS, make posix
ACLs always available. This also reduces possibility of
misconfiguration on admin's side.

Signed-off-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Joel Becker &lt;joel.becker@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
