kernel/git/next/linux-next.git/security, branch master

Merge branch 'headers' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache.git

2026-08-28T13:15:25+00:00

# Conflicts: # net/ceph/osd_client.c

Merge branch 'for-next-tpm' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git

2026-08-28T13:12:09+00:00

Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2026-08-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

2026-08-26T18:04:24+00:00

Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen: "The biggest functional change is Jann Horn's fix for how aparmor is doing stale cred updates after a policy replacement. apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section() It moves the update to be done during task_work at the end of the syscall. One major feature is allowing policy to be compressed in userspace instead of after the fact (in kernel) if we need to hold onto it for CRIU/introspection. The other major change is to do with network mediation. It is a lot of code churn but does not do any functional changes to mediation. It moves the code around, and refactors it to use newer patterns for consistency, and in preparation for some improvements in mediation in a future patchset. Features: - support loading compressed policies - add audit mode to provide a mechanism to silence complain messages - refactor network mediation to use new patterns, and prepare to for extended inet mediation (no functional change) Cleanups: - switch website link to https - make include headers self-contained, and fix circular include - constify aa_label, aa_dfa, aa_profile, and aa_perms paraneters - mark static tables and structs as read only - drop use of _confined variant for iteration - refactory mount to use check_perms - refactor network mediation code to be together - refactor xattr attachment, to take the file path - optimize current_label_crit_section() - leverage audit_log_n_untrustedstring() when possible Bug Fixes: - initialized policy lists heads before fail path - fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat - auditing of mount binary data - fix error debug output in fn_label_build - fix race condition in label replacement - fix unconfined user namespace restriction forced stack - fix error handling for copy_from_user in policy_update - fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec - fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check - fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section() - use SEND_SIG_NOINFO instead of NULL in aa_audit()" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2026-08-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (40 commits) apparmor: policy_int make sure list heads are initialized before fail path apparmor: fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat apparmor: constify aa_label parameters on read-only query helpers apparmor: constify aa_dfa parameters on read-only compute paths apparmor: constify aa_profile parameters on read-only compute paths apparmor: constify aa_perms parameters that are read-only apparmor: drop use of _confined variant for iteration apparmor: refactory mount to use check_perms apparmor: fix auditing of mount binary data apparmor: add audit mode to provide a mechanism to silence complain messages apparmor: mark static tables and structs as read only apparmor: fix error debug output in fn_label_build apparmor: make table entry count last enum for static tables apparmor: fix race condition in label replacement apparmor: refactor xattr attachment, to take the file path apparmor: fix unconfined user namespace restriction forced stack apparmor: reserve mediation class for packet mediation apparmor: move sock_rcv_skb() next to inet_conn_request apparmor: move netfilter functions next to the LSM network operations apparmor: refactor network socket mediation to support compatibility ...

apparmor: policy_int make sure list heads are initialized before fail path

2026-08-26T07:03:13+00:00

If profile create fails before policy_init is complete the list heads are not properly initialized causing profile_free() sanity checks to trigger the following splat. AppArmor WARN aa_policy_destroy: (((!list_empty(&policy->profiles) && (&policy->profiles)->prev != ((void *) 0x122 + (0xdead000000000000UL))))): WARNING: security/apparmor/lib.c:509 at aa_policy_destroy+0x164/0x1b0 security/apparmor/lib.c:509, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5541 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5541 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:aa_policy_destroy+0x16b/0x1b0 security/apparmor/lib.c:509 Code: 85 ed 7e 4d e8 96 bc 37 fd 5b 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 19 27 4e 07 cc e8 83 bc 37 fd 48 8d 3d 0c f0 d3 0b 48 c7 c6 a4 eb 38 8e <67> 48 0f b9 3a e9 04 ff ff ff e8 66 bc 37 fd 48 8d 3d ff ef d3 0b RSP: 0018:ffffc9000345eaa0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff848f530d RBX: ffff88803f734800 RCX: ffff88801af2a580 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8e38eba4 RDI: ffffffff90634320 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000cc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d95913 R12: dead000000000122 R13: ffff88803f734800 R14: ffff88803f734828 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f5f6a1836c0(0000) GS:ffff88808c519000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055d02407b048 CR3: 0000000012aa9000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: aa_free_profile+0x9d/0x9f0 security/apparmor/policy.c:334 aa_alloc_profile+0x1e4/0x3e0 security/apparmor/policy.c:416 unpack_profile security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1153 [inline] aa_unpack+0x17db/0x7430 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1748 aa_replace_profiles+0x226/0x2a20 security/apparmor/policy.c:1183 policy_update+0x234/0x4a0 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:505 profile_load+0x1cb/0x320 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:522 vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685 ksys_write+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:739 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f5f6939e0d9 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f5f6a183028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5f69625fa0 RCX: 00007f5f6939e0d9 RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000200000000400 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f5f6a183090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007f5f69626038 R14: 00007f5f69625fa0 R15: 00007ffe23725c18 Reported-by: syzbot+faed97c4ed43bfe7fee5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=faed97c4ed43bfe7fee5 Fixes: fe6bb31f590c9 ("apparmor: split out shared policy_XXX fns to lib") Signed-off-by: John Johansen

security: Remove pagemap.h includes

2026-08-25T19:12:26+00:00

The security subsystem does not use the page cache. Removing just the pagemap.h includes isn't quite enough to insulate it from changes to pagemap as it's also pulled in by swap.h and hugetlb.h. Fortunately, security doesn't need either of those so we can lose all three. Now touching pagemap.h causes no rebuilds in the security subsystem. Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)

tpm-buf: Memory-safe allocations

2026-08-25T15:13:36+00:00

Decouple kzalloc from buffer creation, so that a managed allocation can be used: struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) buf = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE); Alternatively, other allocations are also possible (static data, stack, etc) for example: u8 buf_data[512]; struct tpm_buf *buf = (struct tpm_buf *)buf_data; tpm_buf_init(buf, sizeof(buf_data)); This is achieved by embedding buffer's header inside the allocated blob, instead of having an outer wrapper. Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Srish Srinivasan Message-ID: <20260522013555.1063716-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson

tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW

2026-08-25T15:13:36+00:00

Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW flags into the TPM_BUF_INVALID flag, as their behavior is identical (the only difference being the associated log messages). Message-ID: <20260125192526.782202-11-jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson

tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers

2026-08-25T15:13:35+00:00

Consolidate TPM1 constants in tpm_command.h and remove duplicate constants from tpm1-cmd.c. Co-developed-by: Daniel P. Smith Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith Co-developed-by: Alec Brown Signed-off-by: Alec Brown Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

Merge tag 'for-next-keys-v7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

2026-08-23T15:29:33+00:00

Pull TPM update from Jarkko Sakkinen: "Just a single bug fix" * tag 'for-next-keys-v7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering

Merge tag 'landlock-7.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux

2026-08-21T19:28:35+00:00

Pull Landlock update from Mickaël Salaün: "This improves observability with Landlock tracepoints support, which required some refactoring for dedicated domain types and common helpers shared with audit code. A LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS flag is also added to improve process-wide domain enforcement consistency. Whiteout files are now correctly handled and tested, and a few other fixes" * tag 'landlock-7.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: (34 commits) landlock: Document tracepoints selftests/landlock: Add landlock_enforce_domain trace tests selftests/landlock: Add scope and ptrace tracepoint tests selftests/landlock: Add network tracepoint tests selftests/landlock: Add filesystem tracepoint tests selftests/landlock: Add trace event test infrastructure and tests landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials landlock: Add landlock_deny_access_fs and landlock_deny_access_net landlock: Add tracepoints for rule checking landlock: Add landlock_enforce_domain tracepoint landlock: Add create_domain and free_domain tracepoints landlock: Add landlock_add_rule_fs and landlock_add_rule_net tracepoints landlock: Add create_ruleset and free_ruleset tracepoints landlock: Consolidate access-right and scope names in a shared header landlock: Decouple the per-denial logging decision from CONFIG_AUDIT landlock: Split denial logging from audit into common framework landlock: Split struct landlock_domain from struct landlock_ruleset landlock: Move domain query functions to domain.c landlock: Prepare ruleset and domain type split samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS to sampler ...