<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/drivers/nvme/target, branch linux-7.1.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/atom?h=linux-7.1.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/atom?h=linux-7.1.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/'/>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:55:39+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:55:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tianchu Chen</name>
<email>flynnnchen@tencent.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-29T14:18:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=caa71b3a43ea5c13fe7141cb019ebcb03b8ac857'/>
<id>urn:sha1:caa71b3a43ea5c13fe7141cb019ebcb03b8ac857</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9 upstream.

nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using
attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields
without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.

A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a
small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds
heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or
performs the host response memcmp.

With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to
sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching
up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.

Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen &lt;= tl before
any access to the variable-length fields.

Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.

Fixes: db1312dd9548 ("nvmet: implement basic In-Band Authentication")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen &lt;flynnnchen@tencent.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:55:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bryam Vargas</name>
<email>hexlabsecurity@proton.me</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-27T20:00:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a29b316b9bbfd269f323ab4ba9906a894025680f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 53cd102a7a56079b11b897835bd9b94c14e6322c upstream.

nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment
of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo).  The 64-bit offset is then
added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page
and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which
memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound
check:

    u64 offset      = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req-&gt;cmd);  /* 64-bit host */
    size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req-&gt;cmd);     /* 32-bit host */
    ...
    if (offset &amp; 0x3) { ... }                               /* only check */
    ...
    alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);
    buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
    ...
    status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);

The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed()
returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call
is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach
the nvmet target.  With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker
requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next
slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an
empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81
canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response).  Pointing the
offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and
crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead.

The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern
"nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique
to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every
other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and
silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local
destination offset with a fixed source pointer.

Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the
copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder
of the host transfer buffer.  The zero-fill matches the existing
short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns()
(admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the
host asks for more bytes than the log page contains.

Fixes: a07b4970f464 ("nvmet: add a generic NVMe target")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni &lt;kch@nvidia.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas &lt;hexlabsecurity@proton.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nvme: target: rdma: fix ndev refcount leak on queue connect</title>
<updated>2026-07-18T14:55:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wentao Liang</name>
<email>vulab@iscas.ac.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-27T08:45:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5828517d17eda27f21d29ea14800c9e0a57bad11'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5828517d17eda27f21d29ea14800c9e0a57bad11</id>
<content type='text'>
commit badc53620fe813b3a9f727ef9526f98567c2c898 upstream.

nvmet_rdma_queue_connect() calls nvmet_rdma_find_get_device() which
acquires a reference on the returned ndev via kref_get(). On the path
where the host queue backlog is exceeded and the function returns
NVME_SC_CONNECT_CTRL_BUSY, reference of ndev is not released, leaking
the kref.

Fix this by adding a goto to the existing put_device label before the
early return.

Fixes: 31deaeb11ba7 ("nvmet-rdma: avoid circular locking dependency on install_queue()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang &lt;vulab@iscas.ac.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nvmet-tcp: Fix potential UAF when ddgst mismatch</title>
<updated>2026-05-11T15:07:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sagi Grimberg</name>
<email>sagi@grimberg.me</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-10T20:30:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=dbbd07d0a7020b80f6a7028e561908f7b83b3d5a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dbbd07d0a7020b80f6a7028e561908f7b83b3d5a</id>
<content type='text'>
Shivam Kumar found via vulnerability testing:
When data digest is enabled on an NVMe/TCP connection and a digest
mismatch occurs on a non-final H2C_DATA PDU during an R2T-based
data transfer, the digest error handler in nvmet_tcp_try_recv_ddgst()
calls nvmet_req_uninit() — which performs percpu_ref_put() on the
submission queue — but does NOT mark the command as completed. It
does not set cqe-&gt;status, does not modify rbytes_done, and does not
clear any flag. When the subsequent fatal error triggers queue
teardown, nvmet_tcp_uninit_data_in_cmds() iterates all commands,
checks nvmet_tcp_need_data_in() for each one, and finds that the
already-uninited command still appears to need data (because
rbytes_done &lt; transfer_len and cqe-&gt;status == 0). It therefore calls
nvmet_req_uninit() a second time on the same command — a double
percpu_ref_put against a single percpu_ref_get.

Reported-by: Shivam Kumar &lt;kumar.shivam43666@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagi@grimberg.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nvmet-auth: Do not print DH-HMAC-CHAP secrets</title>
<updated>2026-05-11T15:07:39+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hannes Reinecke</name>
<email>hare@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-30T13:22:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=a891962ae5e48fb5476c23631df759482e62ab16'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a891962ae5e48fb5476c23631df759482e62ab16</id>
<content type='text'>
From a security standpoint we should not allow to print out the DH-HMAC-CHAP
secrets, but at the same time having them is useful for debugging
authentication failures.
So add a Kconfig option NVME_TARGET_AUTH_DEBUG to only enable debugging
if explictly requested at build time.

Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg &lt;sagi@grimberg.me&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'nvme-7.1-2026-04-24' of git://git.infradead.org/nvme into block-7.1</title>
<updated>2026-04-27T21:47:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jens Axboe</name>
<email>axboe@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-27T21:47:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=aa03cfe9dbf487f065d0b38b95edc25c386e3d40'/>
<id>urn:sha1:aa03cfe9dbf487f065d0b38b95edc25c386e3d40</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull NVMe fixes from Keith:

"- Target data transfer size confiruation (Aurelien)
 - Enable P2P for RDMA (Shivaji Kant)
 - TCP target updates (Maurizio, Alistair, Chaitanya, Shivam Kumar)
 - TCP host updates (Alistair, Chaitanya)
 - Authentication updates (Alistair, Daniel, Chris Leech)
 - Multipath fixes (John Garry)
 - New quirks (Alan Cui, Tao Jiang)
 - Apple driver fix (Fedor Pchelkin)
 - PCI admin doorbell update fix (Keith)"

* tag 'nvme-7.1-2026-04-24' of git://git.infradead.org/nvme: (22 commits)
  nvme-auth: Hash DH shared secret to create session key
  nvme-pci: fix missed admin queue sq doorbell write
  nvme-auth: Include SC_C in RVAL controller hash
  nvme-tcp: teardown circular locking fixes
  nvmet-tcp: Don't clear tls_key when freeing sq
  Revert "nvmet-tcp: Don't free SQ on authentication success"
  nvme: skip trace completion for host path errors
  nvme-pci: add quirk for Memblaze Pblaze5 (0x1c5f:0x0555)
  nvme-multipath: put module reference when delayed removal work is canceled
  nvme: expose TLS mode
  nvme-apple: drop invalid put of admin queue reference count
  nvme-core: fix parameter name in comment
  nvmet: avoid recursive nvmet-wq flush in nvmet_ctrl_free
  nvme-multipath: drop head pointer check in nvme_mpath_clear_current_path()
  nvme: add quirk NVME_QUIRK_IGNORE_DEV_SUBNQN for 144d:a808 (Samsung PM981/983/970 EVO Plus )
  nvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown
  nvmet-tcp: remove redundant calls to nvmet_tcp_fatal_error()
  nvmet-tcp: propagate nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() errors to its callers
  nvme: enable PCI P2PDMA support for RDMA transport
  nvmet: introduce new mdts configuration entry
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nvme-auth: Hash DH shared secret to create session key</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T20:02:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Chris Leech</name>
<email>cleech@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-22T19:06:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=bd7b7ce96db4487bb77692a85ee4489fd2c395df'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd7b7ce96db4487bb77692a85ee4489fd2c395df</id>
<content type='text'>
The NVMe Base Specification 8.3.5.5.9 states that the session key Ks
shall be computed from the ephemeral DH key by applying the hash
function selected by the HashID parameter.

The current implementation stores the raw DH shared secret as the
session key without hashing it. This causes redundant hash operations:

1. Augmented challenge computation (section 8.3.5.5.4) requires
   Ca = HMAC(H(g^xy mod p), C). The code compensates by hashing the
   unhashed session key in nvme_auth_augmented_challenge() to produce
   the correct result.

2. PSK generation (section 8.3.5.5.9) requires PSK = HMAC(Ks, C1 || C2)
   where Ks should already be H(g^xy mod p). As the DH shared secret
   is always larger than the HMAC block size, HMAC internally hashes
   it before use, accidentally producing the correct result.

When using secure channel concatenation with bidirectional
authentication, this results in hashing the DH value three times: twice
for augmented challenge calculations and once during PSK generation.

Fix this by:
- Modifying nvme_auth_gen_shared_secret() to hash the DH shared secret
  once after computation: Ks = H(g^xy mod p)
- Removing the hash operation from nvme_auth_augmented_challenge()
  as the session key is now already hashed
- Updating session key buffer size from DH key size to hash output size
- Adding specification references in comments

This avoid storing the raw DH shared secret and reduces the number of
hash operations from three to one when using secure channel
concatenation.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Chris Leech &lt;cleech@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nvme-auth: Include SC_C in RVAL controller hash</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T17:07:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alistair Francis</name>
<email>alistair.francis@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-17T00:50:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5d10069e1a1691a0d8642e1fa65f4c1869210299'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5d10069e1a1691a0d8642e1fa65f4c1869210299</id>
<content type='text'>
Section 8.3.4.5.5 of the NVMe Base Specification 2.1 describes what is
included in the Response Value (RVAL) hash and SC_C should be included.
Currently we are hardcoding 0 instead of using the correct SC_C value.

Update the host and target code to use the SC_C when calculating the
RVAL instead of using 0.

Fixes: e88a7595b57f2 ("nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation")
Reviewed-by: Chris Leech &lt;cleech@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis &lt;alistair.francis@wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>nvmet-tcp: Don't clear tls_key when freeing sq</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T17:07:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alistair Francis</name>
<email>alistair.francis@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-17T00:48:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5fc422951c962cc01e654950fc043ebd8fadd865'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5fc422951c962cc01e654950fc043ebd8fadd865</id>
<content type='text'>
Curently after the host sends a REPLACETLSPSK we free the TLS keys as
part of calling nvmet_auth_sq_free() on success. This means when the
host sends a follow up REPLACETLSPSK we return CONCAT_MISMATCH as the
check for !nvmet_queue_tls_keyid(req-&gt;sq) fails.

A previous attempt to fix this involed not calling nvmet_auth_sq_free()
on successful connections, but that results in memory leaks. Instead we
should not clear `tls_key` in nvmet_auth_sq_free(), as that was
incorrectly wiping the tls keys which are used for the session.

This patch ensures we correctly free the ephemeral session key on
connection, yet we don't free the TLS key unless closing the connection.

Reviewed-by: Chris Leech &lt;cleech@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis &lt;alistair.francis@wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "nvmet-tcp: Don't free SQ on authentication success"</title>
<updated>2026-04-22T17:07:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alistair Francis</name>
<email>alistair.francis@wdc.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-17T00:48:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f920ebd03cd13eb0976d18de77adf325b5461361'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f920ebd03cd13eb0976d18de77adf325b5461361</id>
<content type='text'>
In an attempt to fix REPLACETLSPSK we stopped freeing the secrets on
successful connections. This resulted in memory leaks in the kernel, so
let's revert the commit. A improved fix is being developed to just avoid
clearing the tls_key variable.

This reverts commit 2e6eb6b277f593b98f151ea8eff1beb558bbea3b.

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/CAHj4cs-u3MWQR4idywptMfjEYi4YwObWFx4KVib35dZ5HMBDdw@mail.gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Chris Leech &lt;cleech@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke &lt;hare@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis &lt;alistair.francis@wdc.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch &lt;kbusch@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
