<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/fs/namei.c, branch linux-5.0.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/atom?h=linux-5.0.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/atom?h=linux-5.0.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/'/>
<updated>2018-12-22T22:18:34+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Revert "vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems."</title>
<updated>2018-12-22T22:18:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christian Brauner</name>
<email>christian@brauner.io</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-05T15:51:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=94f82008ce30e2624537d240d64ce718255e0b80'/>
<id>urn:sha1:94f82008ce30e2624537d240d64ce718255e0b80</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 55956b59df336f6738da916dbb520b6e37df9fbd.

commit 55956b59df33 ("vfs: Allow userns root to call mknod on owned filesystems.")
enabled mknod() in user namespaces for userns root if CAP_MKNOD is
available. However, these device nodes are useless since any filesystem
mounted from a non-initial user namespace will set the SB_I_NODEV flag on
the filesystem. Now, when a device node s created in a non-initial user
namespace a call to open() on said device node will fail due to:

bool may_open_dev(const struct path *path)
{
        return !(path-&gt;mnt-&gt;mnt_flags &amp; MNT_NODEV) &amp;&amp;
                !(path-&gt;mnt-&gt;mnt_sb-&gt;s_iflags &amp; SB_I_NODEV);
}

The problem with this is that as of the aforementioned commit mknod()
creates partially functional device nodes in non-initial user namespaces.
In particular, it has the consequence that as of the aforementioned commit
open() will be more privileged with respect to device nodes than mknod().
Before it was the other way around. Specifically, if mknod() succeeded
then it was transparent for any userspace application that a fatal error
must have occured when open() failed.

All of this breaks multiple userspace workloads and a widespread assumption
about how to handle mknod(). Basically, all container runtimes and systemd
live by the slogan "ask for forgiveness not permission" when running user
namespace workloads. For mknod() the assumption is that if the syscall
succeeds the device nodes are useable irrespective of whether it succeeds
in a non-initial user namespace or not. This logic was chosen explicitly
to allow for the glorious day when mknod() will actually be able to create
fully functional device nodes in user namespaces.
A specific problem people are already running into when running 4.18 rc
kernels are failing systemd services. For any distro that is run in a
container systemd services started with the PrivateDevices= property set
will fail to start since the device nodes in question cannot be
opened (cf. the arguments in [1]).

Full disclosure, Seth made the very sound argument that it is already
possible to end up with partially functional device nodes. Any filesystem
mounted with MS_NODEV set will allow mknod() to succeed but will not allow
open() to succeed. The difference to the case here is that the MS_NODEV
case is transparent to userspace since it is an explicitly set mount option
while the SB_I_NODEV case is an implicit property enforced by the kernel
and hence opaque to userspace.

[1]: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/9483

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian@brauner.io&gt;
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Cc: Seth Forshee &lt;seth.forshee@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T01:48:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Salvatore Mesoraca</name>
<email>s.mesoraca16@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-24T00:00:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5</id>
<content type='text'>
Disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
writable sticky directories, unless the owner is the same as that of the
directory or the file is opened without the O_CREAT flag.  The purpose
is to make data spoofing attacks harder.  This protection can be turned
on and off separately for FIFOs and regular files via sysctl, just like
the symlinks/hardlinks protection.  This patch is based on Openwall's
"HARDEN_FIFO" feature by Solar Designer.

This is a brief list of old vulnerabilities that could have been prevented
by this feature, some of them even allow for privilege escalation:

CVE-2000-1134
CVE-2007-3852
CVE-2008-0525
CVE-2009-0416
CVE-2011-4834
CVE-2015-1838
CVE-2015-7442
CVE-2016-7489

This list is not meant to be complete.  It's difficult to track down all
vulnerabilities of this kind because they were often reported without any
mention of this particular attack vector.  In fact, before
hardlinks/symlinks restrictions, fifos/regular files weren't the favorite
vehicle to exploit them.

[s.mesoraca16@gmail.com: fix bug reported by Dan Carpenter]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426081456.GA7060@mwanda
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524829819-11275-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com
[keescook@chromium.org: drop pr_warn_ratelimited() in favor of audit changes in the future]
[keescook@chromium.org: adjust commit subjet]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180416175918.GA13494@beast
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca &lt;s.mesoraca16@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Solar Designer &lt;solar@openwall.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Dan Carpenter &lt;dan.carpenter@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'ovl-update-4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs</title>
<updated>2018-08-22T01:19:09+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-22T01:19:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=d9a185f8b49678775ef56ecbdbc7b76970302897'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d9a185f8b49678775ef56ecbdbc7b76970302897</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
 "This contains two new features:

   - Stack file operations: this allows removal of several hacks from
     the VFS, proper interaction of read-only open files with copy-up,
     possibility to implement fs modifying ioctls properly, and others.

   - Metadata only copy-up: when file is on lower layer and only
     metadata is modified (except size) then only copy up the metadata
     and continue to use the data from the lower file"

* tag 'ovl-update-4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs: (66 commits)
  ovl: Enable metadata only feature
  ovl: Do not do metacopy only for ioctl modifying file attr
  ovl: Do not do metadata only copy-up for truncate operation
  ovl: add helper to force data copy-up
  ovl: Check redirect on index as well
  ovl: Set redirect on upper inode when it is linked
  ovl: Set redirect on metacopy files upon rename
  ovl: Do not set dentry type ORIGIN for broken hardlinks
  ovl: Add an inode flag OVL_CONST_INO
  ovl: Treat metacopy dentries as type OVL_PATH_MERGE
  ovl: Check redirects for metacopy files
  ovl: Move some dir related ovl_lookup_single() code in else block
  ovl: Do not expose metacopy only dentry from d_real()
  ovl: Open file with data except for the case of fsync
  ovl: Add helper ovl_inode_realdata()
  ovl: Store lower data inode in ovl_inode
  ovl: Fix ovl_getattr() to get number of blocks from lower
  ovl: Add helper ovl_dentry_lowerdata() to get lower data dentry
  ovl: Copy up meta inode data from lowest data inode
  ovl: Modify ovl_lookup() and friends to lookup metacopy dentry
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branches 'work.misc' and 'work.dcache' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2018-08-14T04:28:25+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-14T04:28:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=4591343e3560d51fa37a24cd262192a7b889a6a3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4591343e3560d51fa37a24cd262192a7b889a6a3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Misc cleanups from various folks all over the place

  I expected more fs/dcache.c cleanups this cycle, so that went into a
  separate branch. Said cleanups have missed the window, so in the
  hindsight it could've gone into work.misc instead. Decided not to
  cherry-pick, thus the 'work.dcache' branch"

* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  fs: dcache: Use true and false for boolean values
  fold generic_readlink() into its only caller
  fs: shave 8 bytes off of struct inode
  fs: Add more kernel-doc to the produced documentation
  fs: Fix attr.c kernel-doc
  removed extra extern file_fdatawait_range

* 'work.dcache' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  kill dentry_update_name_case()
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fold generic_readlink() into its only caller</title>
<updated>2018-07-19T21:35:51+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-19T21:35:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=f2df5da66262f429cbb0d5da0e72ada6a6345f28'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f2df5da66262f429cbb0d5da0e72ada6a6345f28</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "vfs: update ovl inode before relatime check"</title>
<updated>2018-07-18T13:44:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-18T13:44:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c6718543463dbb78486ad259f884cb800df802b5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c6718543463dbb78486ad259f884cb800df802b5</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit 598e3c8f72f5b77c84d2cb26cfd936ffb3cfdbaa.

Overlayfs no longer relies on the vfs correct atime handling.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>few more cleanups of link_path_walk() callers</title>
<updated>2018-07-12T14:04:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-09T20:38:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=5f336e722cc961be94d264d96b90c92888fffae1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5f336e722cc961be94d264d96b90c92888fffae1</id>
<content type='text'>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>allow link_path_walk() to take ERR_PTR()</title>
<updated>2018-07-12T14:04:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-09T20:33:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9b5858e99ae1cfb60dc00461cfc7bd4dd077d7d7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9b5858e99ae1cfb60dc00461cfc7bd4dd077d7d7</id>
<content type='text'>
There is a check for IS_ERR(name) immediately upstream of each call
of link_path_walk(name, nd), with positives treated as if link_path_walk()
failed with PTR_ERR(name).  Taking that check into link_path_walk() itself
simplifies things nicely.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>make path_init() unconditionally paired with terminate_walk()</title>
<updated>2018-07-12T14:04:30+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-09T20:27:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=edc2b1da779887c74ade799574efc5819906598f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:edc2b1da779887c74ade799574efc5819906598f</id>
<content type='text'>
including the failure exits

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>switch atomic_open() and lookup_open() to returning 0 in all success cases</title>
<updated>2018-07-12T14:04:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-09T23:30:20+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=00a07c1591a3fb3d71f7083361eab4a2444938a3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:00a07c1591a3fb3d71f7083361eab4a2444938a3</id>
<content type='text'>
caller can tell "opened" from "open it yourself" by looking at -&gt;f_mode.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
