kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/net/ceph, branch master

Merge tag 'ceph-for-7.3-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client

2026-08-28T18:51:05+00:00

Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov: "A wide variety of mostly CephFS fixes and cleanups, split between changes that address edge cases (Sam, Xiubo, Matthew), efficiency improvements (Max) and AI-assisted hardening (Michael, Jeremy). One thing that stands out is Alex's change to how CephFS behaves in NEARFULL scenarios: the long-standing "make all writes synchronous" behavior has become opt-in. It was always somewhat controversial and doesn't make much sense for modern deployments; the new default is to continue normal operation (i.e. buffer writes as MDS allows, etc). The behavior in case the cluster reaches any FULL state remains the same as before" * tag 'ceph-for-7.3-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client: (32 commits) ceph: force a cap message when a deferred revoke can't be acked immediately libceph: reject buckets with mismatched CRUSH ids ceph: reject export_targets ranks >= CEPH_MAX_MDS in mdsmap decode ceph: fix leaked inode reference on writeback abort at umount libceph: remove ceph_put_page_vector() libceph: validate banner payload length ceph: make nearfull sync writes opt-in ceph: do not repeat ceph_trim_dentries() if no progress possible ceph: drop mdsc->mutex before decoding the MDS reply ceph: fix UAF in check_new_map() on session freed during unlock ceph: fix UAF in __kick_flushing_caps() on cf entry freed during unlock ceph: pass inode pointer around instead of reloading it ceph: mark cap remove with RB_CLEAR_NODE() instead of setting ci=NULL ceph: add helper function ceph_cap_is_removed() ceph: make __ceph_remove_cap() static ceph: cap delegated inode count in ceph_parse_deleg_inos() ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3 ceph: bound MDSCapAuth path and fs_name decode in handle_session() ceph: bound xattr value length in __build_xattrs() ceph: bound copied dentry name length in NFS export get_name ...

libceph: reject buckets with mismatched CRUSH ids

2026-08-26T17:57:29+00:00

crush_decode() stores bucket data by array slot, and the mapper later derives the per-bucket workspace index from the decoded bucket id. A malformed map can therefore make one bucket reuse another bucket's workspace by encoding an id different from -1 - slot. For uniform buckets, the second replica selection expands the source bucket's permutation into that aliased workspace buffer. If the source bucket is larger than the aliased bucket, the write runs past the smaller permutation array and can escape the kvmalloc'd CRUSH workspace. KASAN reports a slab OOB write of 4 bytes in bucket_perm_choose(). Reject buckets whose encoded id does not match their array slot. Valid CRUSH maps already use the canonical negative id corresponding to the bucket slot, so this restores the invariant expected by work->work[-1 - in->id] without changing valid map behavior. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 66a0e2d579db ("crush: remove mutable part of CRUSH map") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5 Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: remove ceph_put_page_vector()

2026-08-26T17:57:28+00:00

ceph_put_page_vector() was paired with ceph_get_direct_page_vector(), which was removed in commit 97a385e55829 ("libceph: remove ceph_get_direct_page_vector()"). Its only remaining caller, finish_netfs_read(), uses it to put a page vector allocated with iov_iter_get_pages_alloc2(), which is confusing. Open-code the put_page() loop and kvfree() there instead. The caller passed dirty = false, so this also removes the dead dirty branch and with it a call to the deprecated set_page_dirty_lock(). Signed-off-by: Tal Zussman Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: validate banner payload length

2026-08-26T17:57:28+00:00

When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the `payload_len` field is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a `payload_len` of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in `populate_in_iter()`: ------------[ cut here ]------------ !iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter) WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070 WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x6634/0x6810 net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3159, CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070 ... Call Trace: ceph_con_workfn+0x1f5/0x14a0 net/ceph/messenger.c:1575 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405 worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 According to the msgr2 protocol specification, the banner payload is expected to contain at least two 64-bit integers (`server_feat` and `server_req_feat`). Therefore, `payload_len` must be at least 16 bytes. Fix this by adding a check in `process_banner_prefix()` to reject a `payload_len` smaller than 16 bytes. This prevents the 0-length read and correctly aborts the connection with a protocol error. Fixes: cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)") Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.5-flash Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview syzbot Reported-by: syzbot+87c7c2d63c44e41c77a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=87c7c2d63c44e41c77a3 Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=c8ca3d63-717a-4933-89ec-f3d761b8690d Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: validate OSD extent maps before cursor advance

2026-08-26T17:57:27+00:00

net/ceph/osd_client.c:osd_sparse_read() validates that the sparse-read data length matches the summed extent lengths, but it does not validate that each OSD-supplied extent is monotonic and lies inside the original request range. A malformed authenticated OSD reply can advertise a far-forward nonzero extent offset with a matching data length and make the client advance the message-data cursor beyond the request buffer. This reaches the BUG_ON(!*length) assertion in ceph_msg_data_next() from the client receive path. Impact: A malicious or compromised authenticated Ceph OSD peer can crash a kernel Ceph client via a malformed sparse-read reply. Reject sparse extent maps that overflow, move backwards, overlap, or extend outside the original sparse-read request before advancing the cursor. [ idryomov: perform sparse_extent_map_valid() check a bit earlier, in CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_LEN instead of CEPH_SPARSE_READ_DATA_PRE state ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: f628d7999727 ("libceph: add sparse read support to OSD client") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

Merge tag 'for-7.3/block-20260819' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux

2026-08-20T20:55:16+00:00

Pull block updates from Jens Axboe: - NVMe updates via Keith: - Enable Clang context analysis for the nvme host driver, adding context annotations across core, fabrics, rdma, tcp and pci - nvmet reservation state exposed through a new namespace-level debugfs directory, plus ABI documentation for the host sysfs and target configfs interfaces - nvme-tcp host memory disclosure fixes on the read path: reject a read that transferred too few bytes, don't accept C2HData based on blk_rq_payload_bytes() alone, and fix the R2T case for a read command - Parallelize nvme-rdma I/O queue allocation and startup (Surabhi) - Apple nvme fixes and quirks: page aligned admin queue buffers, destroy the admin queue on removal, and various DMA/NVMMU correctness fixes - A large pile of nvmet and host fixes for out-of-bounds reads, refcount/resource leaks, and NULL derefs across auth, zns, passthru, pci-epf, rdma and configfs - Various other fixes and cleanups - MD updates via Yu Kuai: - llbitmap reshape support, the large series wiring exact bitmap mapping and reshape lifecycle through raid5 and raid10, growing the page cache in place, and remapping checkpointed bits as reshape progresses - raid5 fixes for lockless max_nr_stripes and recovery_offset accesses, a reshape deadlock with more failed devices than max degraded, and bitmap batch counter consistency - Atomic write handling for raid1/raid10, and removal of the REQ_NOWAIT support from raid1/10/456 - raid5-ppl use-after-free fix in ppl_do_flush() - A batch of smaller fixes across md core and the bitmap code - s390/dasd ESE full-track write support and the surrounding infrastructure, plus enabling CONTEXT_ANALYSIS for s390/block - RWF_DONTCACHE support for block devices, built on new task-context bio completion infrastructure, and wiring it up for the iomap and buffer dropbehind writeback paths - Async io_uring zone reset all, plus zone management command cleanups allowing REQ_NOWAIT and tightening conventional zone rejection - Block integrity refactoring: lift BIP_CHECK_FLAGS to the shared header, handle nogenerate/noverify properly in fs-integrity, and drop the blk-integrity.h include from bdev.c - Split out a new blk_plug.h header - ublk improvements: add UBLK_F_IO_DESC_SIZE, split request validation from io_desc init, reject non-power-of-2 zone sizes in SET_PARAMS, and a series of hardening fixes around map/unmap and auto buf reg - null_blk cleanups and configfs serialization fixes - nbd queue freeze removal on the setup paths, and a new pre_defined_connections module parameter for pre-created devices - blk-cgroup fixes for the race between policy activation and blkg destruction, and accounting per-cpu stats over possible CPUs across blk-stat, iolatency, iocost and kyber - Various dio fixes: leak on metadata mapping error, validate user space vectors during extraction, and set dma_alignment from the backing file for loop and zloop direct I/O - bio cleanups - Various other fixes and cleanups all over * tag 'for-7.3/block-20260819' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux: (241 commits) nbd: add pre_defined_connections module parameter for pre-created devices nbd: remove queue freeze for newly created nbd from netlink path nbd: factor out a nbd_genl_foreach_sock nbd: skip queue freeze when setting size at device startup nbd: remove queue freeze in nbd_add_socket nbd: clear queue limits on disconnect nbd: disallow NBD_SET_SOCK on an active device nbd: simplify find_fallback() by removing redundant logic blk-mq: add missing call to srcu_barrier() in blk_mq_free_tag_set() block: mtip32xx: synchronize ioctls with device removal ublk: avoid teardown retry loop on xarray allocation failure null_blk: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds when zone_size is 0 or overflows block: don't include blk-integrity.h in bdev.c xfs: avoid double deferrals for RWF_DONTCACHE writes loop: Fix recently introduced lock inversion block: set QUEUE_FLAG_DYING unconditionally in blk_mark_disk_dead() swim3: Add missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION selftests: ublk: add SET_PARAMS validation test selftests: ublk: add helper for SET_PARAMS ublk: reject non-power-of-2 zone sizes in SET_PARAMS ...

libceph: Avoid using invalid osd indices from primary_temp

2026-08-12T19:21:41+00:00

A corrupted osdmap received from a Ceph monitor or OSD may contain osd indices in its pg_temp, primary_temp, pg_upmap, and pg_upmap_items parts that don't exist, i.e., that are greater than max_osd or smaller than CEPH_HOMELESS_OSD (-1). These indices are used to create the up and acting set in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds(), called from calc_target(). While most of these osd indices are checked, the one from primary_temp is not. Subsequently, this may lead to calc_target() returning this (potentially invalid) index as target osd for a (linger) request. Because the osd_state, osd_weight, and osd_addr arrays only contain max_osd entries (with indices 0 to max_osd -1), this leads to out-of-bounds accesses when trying to read values from these arrays. This patch fixes the issue by adding a check to get_temp_osds(), so that only valid osd indices from primary_temp are used, and it falls back to using the primary from pg_temp or the up set if it is invalid. [ idryomov: changelog ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5e8d4d36bf23 ("libceph: add support for primary_temp mappings") Signed-off-by: Raphael Zimmer Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check

2026-08-12T19:21:41+00:00

ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid: ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end, leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads. The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count. The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants (ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32) after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight. Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. [ idryomov: trim changelog ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a4ed38d7a180 ("libceph: support for CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS") Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()

2026-08-12T19:21:41+00:00

decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a bogus boundary. 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping the decode window entirely. Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_copy -> ceph_decode_copy_safe *p += sizeof(...) -> ceph_decode_skip_n ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe *p += len -> ceph_decode_skip_n A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition) without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. [ idryomov: use ceph_decode_skip_string() to skip description, trim changelog ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info") Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: tolerate addrvecs with multiple entries of the same type

2026-08-12T19:20:54+00:00

ceph_decode_entity_addrvec() rejects any addrvec containing more than one entry that matches the requested msgr type (LEGACY or MSGR2), logging "another match of type N in addrvec" and returning -EINVAL. Some admin tooling (e.g. pveceph mon create from Proxmox VE) generates addrvecs with multiple same-type entries when public_network lists more than one CIDR: it picks one local IP per subnet and emits both a v2 and a v1 entry for each IP. Monmaps shaped this way cause: libceph: mon0 (1)10.10.10.15:6789 session established libceph: another match of type 1 in addrvec libceph: problem decoding monmap, -22 No Ceph code uses the extra entries: since Nautilus, the userspace messenger (AsyncMessenger) unconditionally picks the first address of the requested type and ignores any subsequent matches. Match that behavior: use the first matching entry and silently skip any subsequent ones. This is a compatibility fix for existing deployments and does not enable dual-stack or multi-subnet address selection. [ idryomov: tweak ceph_decode_entity_addrvec() comment ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a5cbd5fc22d5 ("libceph, ceph: get and handle cluster maps with addrvecs") Link: https://bugzilla.proxmox.com/show_bug.cgi?id=7518 Signed-off-by: Kefu Chai Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov