kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/security/selinux, branch linux-3.16.y

selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()

2020-06-11T18:05:39+00:00

commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream. Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected the first message in the sk_buff. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()

2020-06-11T18:05:39+00:00

commit 76319946f321e30872dd72af7de867cb26e7a373 upstream. Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types. Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam. The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so print the triggering command name and pid. Reported-by: Florian Weimer Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov [PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs

2020-06-11T18:05:39+00:00

commit cded3fffbeab777e6ad2ec05d4a3b62c5caca0f3 upstream. This prints the 'sclass' field as string instead of index in unrecognized netlink message. The textual representation makes it easier to distinguish the right class. Signed-off-by: Marek Milkovic Acked-by: Stephen Smalley [PM: 80-char width fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

selinux: convert WARN_ONCE() to printk() in selinux_nlmsg_perm()

2020-06-11T18:05:38+00:00

commit d950f84c1c6658faec2ecbf5b09f7e7191953394 upstream. Convert WARN_ONCE() to printk() in selinux_nlmsg_perm(). After conversion from audit_log() in commit e173fb26, WARN_ONCE() was deemed too alarmist, so switch it to printk(). Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs [PM: Changed to printk(WARNING) so we catch all of the different invalid netlink messages. In Richard's defense, he brought this point up earlier, but I didn't understand his point at the time.] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm()

2020-06-11T18:05:38+00:00

commit e173fb2646a832b424c80904c306b816760ce477 upstream. Convert audit_log() call to WARN_ONCE(). Rename "type=" to nlmsg_type=" to avoid confusion with the audit record type. Added "protocol=" to help track down which protocol (NETLINK_AUDIT?) was used within the netlink protocol family. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs [Rewrote the patch subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()

2019-11-22T15:57:09+00:00

commit 45385237f65aeee73641f1ef737d7273905a233f upstream. Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in the error path. Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk

2019-07-09T21:03:45+00:00

commit 3a28cff3bd4bf43f02be0c4e7933aebf3dc8197e upstream. commit 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe") results in no audit messages at all if in permissive mode because the cache is updated during the rcu walk and thus no denial occurs on the subsequent ref walk. Fix this by not updating the cache when performing a non-blocking permission check. This only affects search and symlink read checks during rcu walk. Fixes: 0dc1ba24f7fff6 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe") Reported-by: BMK Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Add flags parameter to avc_update_node(), done upstream in commit fa1aa143ac4a "selinux: extended permissions for ioctls" - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

security/selinux: pass 'flags' arg to avc_audit() and avc_has_perm_flags()

2019-07-09T21:03:45+00:00

commit 7b20ea2579238f5e0da4bc93276c1b63c960c9ef upstream. This allows MAY_NOT_BLOCK to be passed, in RCU-walk mode, through the new avc_has_perm_flags() to avc_audit() and thence the slow_avc_audit. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Signed-off-by: Al Viro [bwh: Backported to 3.16 as dependency of commit 3a28cff3bd4b "selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk"] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity

2018-10-21T07:46:21+00:00

commit efe3de79e0b52ca281ef6691480c8c68c82a4657 upstream. Call trace: [] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428 [] show_stack+0x28/0x38 [] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124 [] print_address_description+0x68/0x258 [] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0 [] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70 [] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0 [] memcpy+0x34/0x68 [] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160 [] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120 [] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8 [] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0 [] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr() on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string, it would result in a panic. To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context instead of the length passed by the userspace process. Signed-off-by: Sachin Grover Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings

selinux: fix double free in selinux_parse_opts_str()

2017-09-15T17:30:10+00:00

commit 023f108dcc187e34ef864bf10ed966cf25e14e2a upstream. This patch is based on a discussion generated by an earlier patch from Tetsuo Handa: * https://marc.info/?t=149035659300001&r=1&w=2 The double free problem involves the mnt_opts field of the security_mnt_opts struct, selinux_parse_opts_str() frees the memory on error, but doesn't set the field to NULL so if the caller later attempts to call security_free_mnt_opts() we trigger the problem. In order to play it safe we change selinux_parse_opts_str() to call security_free_mnt_opts() on error instead of free'ing the memory directly. This should ensure that everything is handled correctly, regardless of what the caller may do. Fixes: e0007529893c1c06 ("LSM/SELinux: Interfaces to allow FS to control mount options") Cc: Tetsuo Handa Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: James Morris [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings