<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/security/tomoyo, branch linux-2.6.39.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/atom?h=linux-2.6.39.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/atom?h=linux-2.6.39.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/'/>
<updated>2011-06-23T22:05:40+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: Fix oops in tomoyo_mount_acl().</title>
<updated>2011-06-23T22:05:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2011-06-13T04:49:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=93b18ca021e7b38d26eb55bcb0d1ca4c9105f643'/>
<id>urn:sha1:93b18ca021e7b38d26eb55bcb0d1ca4c9105f643</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4e78c724d47e2342aa8fde61f6b8536f662f795f upstream.

In tomoyo_mount_acl() since 2.6.36, kern_path() was called without checking
dev_name != NULL. As a result, an unprivileged user can trigger oops by issuing
mount(NULL, "/", "ext3", 0, NULL) request.
Fix this by checking dev_name != NULL before calling kern_path(dev_name).

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@suse.de&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix common misspellings</title>
<updated>2011-03-31T14:26:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lucas De Marchi</name>
<email>lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-31T01:57:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=25985edcedea6396277003854657b5f3cb31a628'/>
<id>urn:sha1:25985edcedea6396277003854657b5f3cb31a628</id>
<content type='text'>
Fixes generated by 'codespell' and manually reviewed.

Signed-off-by: Lucas De Marchi &lt;lucas.demarchi@profusion.mobi&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open.</title>
<updated>2011-03-02T23:13:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-02T07:54:24+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=eae61f3c829439f8f9121b5cd48a14be04df451f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:eae61f3c829439f8f9121b5cd48a14be04df451f</id>
<content type='text'>
In tomoyo_check_open_permission() since 2.6.36, TOMOYO was by error
recalculating already calculated pathname when checking allow_rewrite
permission. As a result, memory will leak whenever a file is opened for writing
without O_APPEND flag. Also, performance will degrade because TOMOYO is
calculating pathname regardless of profile configuration.
This patch fixes the leak and performance degrade.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: dcache scale d_unhashed</title>
<updated>2011-01-07T06:50:21+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nick Piggin</name>
<email>npiggin@kernel.dk</email>
</author>
<published>2011-01-07T06:49:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=da5029563a0a026c64821b09e8e7b4fd81d3fe1b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:da5029563a0a026c64821b09e8e7b4fd81d3fe1b</id>
<content type='text'>
Protect d_unhashed(dentry) condition with d_lock. This means keeping
DCACHE_UNHASHED bit in synch with hash manipulations.

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin &lt;npiggin@kernel.dk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fs: take dcache_lock inside __d_path</title>
<updated>2010-10-26T01:26:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoph Hellwig</name>
<email>hch@infradead.org</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-10T09:36:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=be148247cfbe2422f5709e77d9c3e10b8a6394da'/>
<id>urn:sha1:be148247cfbe2422f5709e77d9c3e10b8a6394da</id>
<content type='text'>
All callers take dcache_lock just around the call to __d_path, so
take the lock into it in preparation of getting rid of dcache_lock.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: Print URL information before panic().</title>
<updated>2010-10-20T23:12:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2010-10-08T05:43:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=9f1c1d426b0402b25cd0d7ca719ffc8e20e46d5f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9f1c1d426b0402b25cd0d7ca719ffc8e20e46d5f</id>
<content type='text'>
Configuration files for TOMOYO 2.3 are not compatible with TOMOYO 2.2.
But current panic() message is too unfriendly and is confusing users.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro &lt;kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tomoyo: cleanup. don't store bogus pointer</title>
<updated>2010-10-20T23:12:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dan Carpenter</name>
<email>error27@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-08-07T22:17:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=68eda8f59081c74a51d037cc29893bd7c9b3c2d8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:68eda8f59081c74a51d037cc29893bd7c9b3c2d8</id>
<content type='text'>
If domain is NULL then &amp;domain-&gt;list is a bogus address.  Let's leave
head-&gt;r.domain NULL instead of saving an unusable pointer.

This is just a cleanup.  The current code always checks head-&gt;r.eof
before dereferencing head-&gt;r.domain.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter &lt;error27@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: Don't abuse sys_getpid(), sys_getppid()</title>
<updated>2010-09-27T00:53:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ben Hutchings</name>
<email>ben@decadent.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2010-09-26T04:55:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=c8da96e87d349e9035345293093ecc74792fb96a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c8da96e87d349e9035345293093ecc74792fb96a</id>
<content type='text'>
System call entry functions sys_*() are never to be called from
general kernel code.  The fact that they aren't declared in header
files should have been a clue.  These functions also don't exist on
Alpha since it has sys_getxpid() instead.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: Use pathname specified by policy rather than execve()</title>
<updated>2010-08-02T05:38:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2010-07-29T05:29:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=484ca79c653121d3c79fffb86e1deea724f2e20b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:484ca79c653121d3c79fffb86e1deea724f2e20b</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit c9e69318 "TOMOYO: Allow wildcard for execute permission." changed execute
permission and domainname to accept wildcards. But tomoyo_find_next_domain()
was using pathname passed to execve() rather than pathname specified by the
execute permission. As a result, processes were not able to transit to domains
which contain wildcards in their domainnames.

This patch passes pathname specified by the execute permission back to
tomoyo_find_next_domain() so that processes can transit to domains which
contain wildcards in their domainnames.

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>TOMOYO: Update version to 2.3.0</title>
<updated>2010-08-02T05:35:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2010-07-27T08:17:06+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable.git/commit/?id=e6f6a4cc955d626ed26562d98de5766bf1f73526'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e6f6a4cc955d626ed26562d98de5766bf1f73526</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
