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When the last request in a compound request becomes async, ksmbd sends a
STATUS_PENDING response for it. But the responses for previous requests in
the same compound request are still kept in the same response buffer.
Send these previous responses first. Clear NextCommand for the last
response in this part, sign it again if needed, and reset the iov state.
After that, the async request sends STATUS_PENDING first, and sends the
real response later. Both are separate responses.
Example:
smbtorture //${server_ip}/export -U${username}%${password} smb2.compound_async.write_write
Client request:
Write Request Len:64 Off:0, File: compound_async_write_write; Write Request Len:64 Off:64
Before this patch, STATUS_PENDING Write Response is the first of
several responses:
Write Response, Error: STATUS_PENDING
Write Response, File: compound_async_write_write; Write Response
But STATUS_PENDING Write Response should be in the middle of several
responses, after this patch:
Write Response, File: compound_async_write_write
Write Response
SMB2, STATUS_PENDING, Write Response, MessageId 7
SMB2, Write Response, MessageId 7
Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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Unknown RPC pipe names and malformed CREATE parameters both use
-EINVAL. Mapping that errno to STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND therefore
also hides invalid request parameters as a missing pipe.
Return -ENOENT when RPC method lookup cannot find a supported pipe and
map only that error to STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND. Preserve
STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER for -EINVAL returned by request validation.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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smb2_update_xattrs() copies the DOS SPARSE attribute bit verbatim from
the stored xattr into the in-memory file attributes, without checking
whether the share is currently advertising FILE_SUPPORTS_SPARSE_FILES.
A file whose xattr has a stale SPARSE bit (set by a previous client,
or from before the share was reconfigured) would keep reporting as
sparse even after sparse-file support is turned off for the share.
This matters for Time Machine: sparsebundle band files rely on
accurate sparse-file status being reported, since macOS decides
whether to issue FSCTL_SET_SPARSE based on it. Mask the bit out when
the share doesn't currently advertise sparse-file support.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5
Signed-off-by: Gael Blivet <gael.blivet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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macOS routinely probes the mdssvc RPC pipe to check for Spotlight
search support. __rpc_method() already falls through to returning 0
(unsupported) for it via the default case, but that path also logs
"Unsupported RPC: mdssvc" via pr_err on every single probe -- which
happens often enough during normal macOS browsing/backup activity to
spam the kernel log. Add an explicit case that returns the same value
without the log line; behavior is unchanged, this only removes noise
for an expected, routine client behavior.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5
Signed-off-by: Gael Blivet <gael.blivet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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create_smb2_pipe() maps ksmbd_session_rpc_open() failing with -EINVAL
(pipe name not recognized/supported) to STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER.
macOS Time Machine's backupd treats STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER on a
pipe open as a fatal error and aborts the backup immediately, whereas
STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND is handled gracefully -- the client just
treats that particular pipe as unavailable and continues.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5
Signed-off-by: Gael Blivet <gael.blivet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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fp->stream.size holds the byte length of the mangled xattr *name*
string (it's used as the attr_name_len argument when looking up the
xattr), not the size of the stream's actual data. CREATE and every
QUERY_INFO handler that reports EndOfFile/AllocationSize for a stream
handle used fp->stream.size directly, so clients received a bogus
size derived from the internal xattr key name length instead of the
stream's real content length.
Add ksmbd_stream_eof() to query the xattr's actual value length via
ksmbd_vfs_casexattr_len(), and use it at every site that reports a
stream handle's size: the CREATE response, get_file_standard_info(),
get_file_all_info(), get_file_network_open_info(), and
find_file_posix_info().
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5
Signed-off-by: Gael Blivet <gael.blivet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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set_file_disposition_info() calls ksmbd_set_inode_pending_delete() /
ksmbd_clear_inode_pending_delete() unconditionally, which always sets
S_DEL_PENDING on the whole inode (ci->m_flags), regardless of whether
the handle being closed is a regular file or an alternate data stream.
Requesting delete-pending on a single stream handle (e.g. deleting
just an alternate data stream some clients keep alongside a file)
would therefore incorrectly schedule deletion of the entire file's
data, not just the stream.
Add ksmbd_fd_set_delete_pending()/ksmbd_fd_clear_delete_pending(),
following the same stream-vs-whole-file routing pattern already used
by ksmbd_fd_set_delete_on_close() for the CREATE-time DeleteOnClose
option, and switch set_file_disposition_info() to use them.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5
Signed-off-by: Gael Blivet <gael.blivet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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The FSCTL_COPYCHUNK/FSCTL_COPYCHUNK_WRITE input length check uses
in_buf_len <= sizeof(struct copychunk_ioctl_req), which rejects a
buffer that is exactly sizeof(struct copychunk_ioctl_req) bytes -- the
minimal, valid request containing only the fixed header with
ChunkCount=0 and no chunk entries, used by clients to query the
server's copy limits before issuing a real copychunk.
Since copychunk_ioctl_req ends in a flexible array member, the correct
minimum is that the buffer covers the fixed header, so use
offsetof(..., Chunks) with '<' instead of '<=' against sizeof(): same
value, but the boundary case is now correctly accepted.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-sonnet-5
Signed-off-by: Gael Blivet <gael.blivet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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macOS can reuse the main file's chunk list when issuing a copychunk
request for alternate data streams. The requested source range can
therefore exceed the length of the xattr-backed stream and currently
fails with STATUS_INVALID_VIEW_SIZE.
For AAPL connections copying between two streams, limit the actual copy
to the available source data while reporting the requested chunk length
as written. Keep the source range validation unchanged for non-AAPL
connections and requests involving a regular file.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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Copychunk rejects requests when either handle refers to an alternate
data stream. These streams are stored in extended attributes and cannot
be passed directly to vfs_copy_file_range().
Use the bounded buffered copy path when a source or destination is a
stream. Obtain the source length from the stream extended attribute and
perform I/O through the existing stream-aware read and write helpers.
Keep vfs_copy_file_range() and its fallback for regular files only.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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The copychunk error mapping handles -EACCES in an independent if
statement. The following error chain therefore reaches its final else
clause and overwrites STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED with
STATUS_UNEXPECTED_IO_ERROR.
Join the -EACCES check to the remaining error chain so an access failure
is returned as STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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Copying an overlapping range within the same file through
do_splice_direct() can overwrite source data that has not yet been
read. This corrupts the destination when the target range starts
inside and after the source range.
Handle overlapping ranges with a bounded temporary buffer. Copy from
the end when the destination follows the source and from the beginning
otherwise, providing memmove semantics without allocating the entire
copy length.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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The FSCTL_SRV_REQUEST_RESUME_KEY response contains a mandatory
four-byte context field after ContextLength.
Defining the context as a flexible array excludes it from
sizeof(struct resume_key_ioctl_rsp), so ksmbd sends only 28 bytes
instead of the required 32 bytes. The truncated response cannot be
decoded and results in an NDR buffer size error.
Define the reserved context as a fixed four-byte field. This makes the
response size match the wire format and ensures the field is zeroed and
included in OutputCount.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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FSCTL_SRV_ENUM_SNAPS is currently unimplemented, causing clients to
treat shadow-copy enumeration as unsupported even when the share simply
has no snapshots.
Handle the count-only SRV_SNAPSHOT_ARRAY request and return a valid
empty snapshot list after validating the file handle and minimum output
buffer size. Report a two-byte empty UTF-16 MULTI_SZ array and zero
snapshot counts.
This allows smb2.ioctl.shadow_copy to run without a snapshot backend.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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SMB2 QUERY_INFO security requests currently return owner, group, and DACL
information without checking the access granted to the opened handle. A
handle opened with only SYNCHRONIZE or READ_ATTRIBUTES can consequently
read the security descriptor.
Require READ_CONTROL when OWNER_SECINFO, GROUP_SECINFO, or DACL_SECINFO
is requested and return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED otherwise.
This fixes smb2.getinfo.getinfo_access.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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FILE_NORMALIZED_NAME_INFORMATION is not handled and is returned as
STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS. SMB 3.1.1 clients use this information class
to obtain the share-relative path with the on-disk name casing.
Build the normalized path from the opened dentry, remove the leading
share-relative separator, and recover the canonical named-stream casing
from its backing xattr. Return an empty name for the share root and
STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED for dialects older than SMB 3.1.1.
Also distinguish a named $DATA stream on a directory from the unnamed
data stream so that directory:stream:$DATA can be opened normally.
This fixes smb2.getinfo.normalized.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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SMB2 QUERY_INFO security requests with an output buffer too small for
the self-relative security descriptor header can fall through descriptor
construction and be reported as STATUS_INVALID_INFO_CLASS.
After validating the file handle, reject buffers shorter than struct
smb_ntsd with STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL before building the descriptor.
This fixes smb2.getinfo.qsec_buffercheck.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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Variable-length file information handlers use the client output length
while constructing the response. FILE_ALL_INFORMATION can consequently
return -EINVAL before the common buffer check, while stream information
can stop building the complete result too early.
Build the complete response within the available server response buffer
and apply the client output length only when selecting the final status
and transmitted length. Use the protocol-defined fixed sizes for all,
alternate-name, and stream information to distinguish
STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH from STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW.
This fixes smb2.getinfo.qfile_buffercheck.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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check_lock_range() uses inclusive ranges. Its callers pass the end
offset as start + length - 1, so start == end represents a valid
single-byte range rather than an empty range.
The start == end shortcut therefore skips mandatory byte-range lock
checks for one-byte reads, writes, copychunk operations and one-byte
truncate ranges. A conflicting lock covering that byte is not checked
and the operation is allowed to proceed.
Remove the shortcut. The truncate size == inode->i_size case is already
handled by only calling check_lock_range() when the new size differs
from the current file size.
Fixes: 5d510ac31626 ("ksmbd: skip lock-range check on equal size to avoid size==0 underflow")
Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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The query-info buffer check returns STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH for
every output buffer smaller than the complete response. Variable-length
filesystem information instead requires STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW when the
fixed portion fits but the complete data does not.
Pass the fixed size for each filesystem information class to the buffer
checker. Keep INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH for buffers below that size, and
return BUFFER_OVERFLOW with a response truncated to the requested length
for larger partial buffers.
This fixes smb2.getinfo.qfs_buffercheck.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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Named streams are stored as extended attributes on the base inode. The
VFS read and write helpers reject directory inodes before or together
with checking whether the handle represents a stream.
Permit read and write operations when a directory-backed handle is a
named stream. Continue rejecting direct I/O on ordinary directory
handles.
This fixes creation of the directory stream in smb2.getinfo.complex.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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SMB clients can currently create an EA named NTACL because SMB EAs are
mapped into the user namespace while the ksmbd security descriptor is
stored as security.NTACL. Allowing the reserved logical name makes the
server-private ACL metadata appear writable through the SMB EA API.
Reject NTACL, DOSATTRIB, and DosStream-prefixed EA names without regard
to case. Filter the same private names from EA query results so stale or
externally-created user namespace attributes cannot be exposed.
This fixes smb2.ea.acl_xattr when acl_xattr_name is configured as
NTACL.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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DELETE_ON_CLOSE is currently accepted for files carrying the read-only
DOS attribute. The server consequently creates or opens the file and
marks it for deletion instead of returning STATUS_CANNOT_DELETE.
Reject creation of a new read-only file with DELETE_ON_CLOSE. For an
existing file, load the stored DOS attributes before accepting the
create option. Also reject FileDispositionInformation when the opened
file has the read-only attribute.
Preserve the explicit STATUS_CANNOT_DELETE value while unwinding the
CREATE request.
This fixes smb2.delete-on-close-perms.READONLY.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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The SMB2 create maximal-access context is currently calculated from
POSIX mode bits when the client does not request MAXIMUM_ALLOWED. This
overwrites the access granted by a stored Windows DACL.
Calculate the create-context result with the DACL permission checker.
Recognize the S-1-3-4 Owner Rights SID as applying to the object owner
and process its allow and deny ACEs in ACL order.
When an Owner Rights ACE is present, do not add the owner implicit
READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC rights. The Owner Rights ACE replaces those
implicit grants as required by Windows access-check semantics.
Without an Owner Rights ACE, preserve the existing implicit owner grants,
including FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES and DELETE.
This fixes smb2.acls.OWNER-RIGHTS and its deny variants without regressing
smb2.acls.GENERIC.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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SMB shares can advertise access-based directory enumeration. ksmbd does
not currently provide a share option or filter inaccessible directory
entries.
Add a hide-unreadable share flag and advertise
SMB2_SHAREFLAG_ACCESS_BASED_DIRECTORY_ENUM when it is enabled. During
QUERY_DIRECTORY, omit entries unless the connected user has
FILE_READ_DATA, FILE_READ_EA, and FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES access according
to the Windows ACL.
Keep the existing implicit access allowances for normal CREATE
permission checks while using strict access-mask matching for directory
enumeration.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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The DACL permission check looks for an ACE matching the current user and
falls back to the Everyone ACE. It does not consider an Authenticated
Users ACE, even though an authenticated session is a member of that
well-known group.
As a result, opening a file whose access is granted through S-1-5-11 can
incorrectly fail with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. Treat an Authenticated Users
ACE as a fallback entry alongside Everyone.
The maximal access calculation also combines access masks from every ACE,
regardless of whether its SID applies to the current user. This can grant
rights belonging to an unrelated principal. Process only ACEs applying to
the user, Everyone, or Authenticated Users, and accumulate allowed and
denied masks in ACL order. Preserve explicitly requested access bits so
they are validated against the resulting maximal mask.
When ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY is denied, report STATUS_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD
instead of the generic STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. Access to the system ACL
requires a security privilege that ksmbd does not grant.
For regular files, include FILE_EXECUTE in maximal access when the client
requested GENERIC_EXECUTE and the DACL grants the complete file-read set.
Keep a direct FILE_EXECUTE request subject to the explicit DACL bit. This
matches the POSIX file ACL mapping without broadening specific execute
requests.
Do not replace rights from an applicable NT ACE with a POSIX ACL entry.
The POSIX ACL is only a fallback when no user, Everyone, or Authenticated
Users ACE applies; otherwise it can incorrectly broaden the stored DACL.
This fixes smb2.maximum_allowed.maximum_allowed.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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An SMB2 WRITE request with a negative offset returns -EINVAL directly
from smb2_write(). This bypasses the common error response path, leaving
the client waiting until the request times out.
ksmbd also allows nonempty writes at or beyond MAXFILESIZE as defined by
[MS-FSA]. Writes beyond the limit must fail with
STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER. Writes ending at the limit fail with
STATUS_DISK_FULL, while a zero-length write remains valid.
Route negative offsets through the common error path and validate the end
offset of nonempty writes against MAXFILESIZE.
This fixes smb2.rw.invalid.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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SMB3.1.1 multichannel connections belonging to the same session must use
the same negotiated encryption cipher.
ksmbd validates the dialect and client GUID during session binding, but
does not compare the cipher negotiated by the new connection with the
cipher used by the existing session channels. This allows a channel
negotiated with AES-128-CCM to bind to a session using AES-128-GCM.
Compare the new connection's cipher with an existing session channel and
return STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER when they differ.
This fixes smb2.session.bind_negative_smb3encGtoCs.
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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XFS already defers some writes to a workqueue when transactions are
needed to process the I/O completion. Disable the block layer bio task
completion in this case to avoid a major performance drop.
Fixes: efbde6f9f449 ("iomap: use BIO_COMPLETE_IN_TASK for dropbehind writeback")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/8124341f-3af2-4a16-897d-38db5ab5a9d4@columbia.edu/
Signed-off-by: Tal Zussman <tz2294@columbia.edu>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810-xfs-dontcache-double-defer-v1-1-aea7484b3e49@columbia.edu
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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futex_exit_release() and futex_exec_release() are identical now. That means
also exit_mm_release() and exec_mm_release() are identical.
Consolidate the whole lot and remove the redundant copies.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
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The check for private futexes whether the waiter's mm, which is stored in
the futex_key and copied into the pi_state, is the same as the owner's mm
is not sufficient for exec(). exec() has a gap where the mm check fails to
give the correct answer:
exec()
...
exec_release_mm()
futex_exec_release()
tsk::futex::exit_state = EXITING;
cleanup_robust_list();
1) tsk::futex::exit_state = OK;
...
old_mm = tsk::mm;
2) tsk::mm = ->mm;
Between #1 and #2 the check for the mm is wrong as that mm is about to be
swapped out and eventually freed.
Plug this gap by:
1) Setting tsk::futex::exit_state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD in
futex_exec_release()
2) Setting tsk::futex::exit_state to FUTEX_STATE_OK after
the mm has been switched.
From a futex point of view the task is dead after it finished the robust
list cleanup up to the point where it sets the state to OK again.
Fixes: 80367ad01d93 ("futex: Add basic infrastructure for local task local hash")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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kernfs_iop_listxattr() only needs to report existing xattrs, but it uses
kernfs_iattrs(), which allocates kernfs_iattrs when the node does not
have one yet.
This makes a query operation create persistent per-node metadata even
when the xattr list is empty.
Use kernfs_iattrs_noalloc() instead and return an empty list when no
iattrs exist.
Signed-off-by: Yichong Chen <chenyichong@uniontech.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260731120554.630147-1-chenyichong@uniontech.com
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
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Pull ceph fixes from Ilya Dryomov:
"A handful of tiny fixes, with the main ones being a follow-up for
CEPH_IOC_SET_LAYOUT{,_POLICY} ioctl permissions check that went into
rc5 and a userspace compatibility fixup. The rest mostly harden
against malformed network input. All marked for stable"
* tag 'ceph-for-7.2-rc8' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
ceph: use the mount idmap for the owner checks in the SET_LAYOUT ioctls
ceph: fix MDS random selection readiness predicate
libceph: Avoid using invalid osd indices from primary_temp
libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check
libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
libceph: tolerate addrvecs with multiple entries of the same type
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Christian Brauner:
- Don't warn when a mount is completed from another user namespace.
fsopen() records the caller's user namespace in fc->user_ns and
hands back an ordinary file descriptor. The task that calls
fsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) doesn't have to be the one that
created the context, and mount_capable() lets it through as long
as the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN over fc->user_ns, which anyone in
an ancestor namespace does. So fc->user_ns != current_user_ns()
is something an unprivileged user can arrange.
Both overlayfs and binfmt_misc WARN_ON() that. Overlayfs already
has the same check as a plain error return in ovl_parse_param().
Drop the WARN_ON() and just refuse. Add selftests for both cases.
- Reject pid allocations through dead ancestor pid namespaces.
Require PIDNS_ADDING in every namespace that will receive the pid
before publishing any of them. That preserves the invariant that
free_pid() never decrements pid_allocated in a namespace whose
child_reaper is no longer live. The existing ENOMEM behavior is
unchanged.
* tag 'vfs-7.2-rc8.fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
pid: reject allocations through dead ancestor pid namespaces
selftests/filesystems: test completing a context from another user namespace
binfmt_misc: don't warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace
ovl: don't warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace
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CONFIG_NR_CPUS doesn't define on some UP platforms (e.g. arm), so this
can cause make oldconfig to loop indefinitely when CONFIG_SMP=n:
$ make ARCH=arm allmodconfig
$ sed -i "/CONFIG_SMP=y/d" .config
$ sed -i "/CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS.*/d" .config
EROFS LZMA default maximum decompression streams (EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS) [0] (NEW)
EROFS LZMA default maximum decompression streams (EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS) [0] (NEW)
...
Let's guard NR_CPUS with SMP instead of using a hardcoded arbitrary CPU
uplimit here, similar to commit a3344078101c ("mm: make SPLIT_PTE_PTLOCKS
depend on SMP").
The initial report from SJ Park was for m68k [1] (m68k is the only arch
without NR_CPUS in Kconfig), and that got fixed in commit 1fd495ef09ee
("m68k: Define NR_CPUS to 1")
Reported-by: SJ Park <sj@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/anuyFHLUGDjZWY4K@XiangdeMacBook-Pro.local/T/#u [1]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260728065447.91511-1-sj@kernel.org
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck7@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87853c96-cc8f-49e6-81b1-02bfe409e372@roeck-us.net
Fixes: c9b47e6b2311 ("erofs: cap LZMA stream pool size")
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org>
Tested-by: SJ Park <sj@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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exfat_find_free_bitmap() searches the entire allocation bitmap and may
wrap around to its beginning. exfat_trim_fs() does not verify that the
returned cluster is still within the requested FITRIM range.
As a result, a partial FITRIM operation may discard free clusters outside
the user-specified range and report a trimmed length larger than the
requested length.
Validate each returned cluster against the requested range and stop the
search when it wraps around or passes the range end.
Signed-off-by: Yang Wen <anmuxixixi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
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Sashiko has complained about out of bounds issues if ctx->pos isn't what
is expected in __eventfs_iterate()[1]. This would be an issue if the logic
that calls __eventfs_iterate() didn't already prevent the code from going
out of bounds.
The issue Sashiko brings up is if a user uses lseek64() to put in a
position like 0x100000000 which will overflow the integer used to iterate
the files. This should never be an issue because both tracefs and eventfs
uses the default "maxbytes" for its superblock "s_maxbytes" field which is
defined as:
fs/super.c: s->s_maxbytes = MAX_NON_LFS;
include/linux/fs.h:#define MAX_NON_LFS ((1UL<<31) - 1)
Where MAX_NON_LFS turns into 0x7fffffff.
Testing this with code to try to pass 0x100000000 to lseek64() to a
eventfs directory returns -EINVAL.
But relying on logic for the integrity of a function is not very robust.
Add a WARN_ON_ONCE() in case the ctx->pos is out of the expected range.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260810160708.3460a2fd%40gandalf.local.home
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810175928.5f4d9d5c@gandalf.local.home
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
|
|
In mi_enum_attr(), the start/end VCN validation for non-resident
attributes is:
if (svcn > evcn + 1) goto out;
When evcn is U64_MAX the "evcn + 1" expression wraps to 0 and any svcn
passes the check. For evcn values close to U64_MAX (but not equal to it)
the right-hand side is still a meaningless near-wrap upper bound, so a
malformed on-disk attribute with svcn == 0 and evcn near U64_MAX can pass
mi_enum_attr() unrejected.
VCN (virtual cluster number) is a cluster index, so any valid evcn is
bounded by the volume's total cluster count, which ntfs3 holds in
sbi->used.bitmap.nbits (set up in ntfs_init_from_boot() before any caller
of mi_enum_attr() runs). Reject evcn values that fall outside this range.
However, an empty non-resident attribute (no allocated clusters) is
legitimately encoded with svcn == 0 and evcn == -1 (U64_MAX), e.g. via
attr->nres.evcn = cpu_to_le64((u64)vcn - 1) with vcn == 0. That sentinel
must keep passing, so exclude evcn == U64_MAX from the range check. The
existing "svcn > evcn + 1" test still tolerates the sentinel ("0 > 0" is
false) and continues to require svcn == 0 for it, while the range check
rejects every other out-of-range evcn and thereby also defuses the
"evcn + 1" wraparound.
svcn does not need its own bound: once evcn < nbits, "svcn > evcn + 1"
implies svcn <= nbits.
Fixes: 013ff63b6494 ("fs/ntfs3: Add more attributes checks in mi_enum_attr()")
Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: fixed evcn check]
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
|
|
In ntfs_init_from_boot(), the boot sector's MFT cluster numbers are
validated against the volume size with:
if (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors ||
mlcn2 * sct_per_clst >= sectors)
goto out;
mlcn and mlcn2 are u64 fields read directly from the boot sector.
sct_per_clst is bounded above by 4096 (true_sectors_per_clst() plus
the is_power_of_2() check below it), but the multiplication is done
in u64 and wraps when mlcn (or mlcn2) is large enough -- e.g. mlcn
near 2^62 with sct_per_clst == 4 wraps to 0, which compares below
any non-zero 'sectors', so the check is bypassed and the malformed
record is accepted.
The accepted mlcn is then used unchanged in
sbi->mft.lbo = mlcn << cluster_bits;
In practice the resulting reads fail at the block layer (sb_bread()
returns NULL via grow_buffers()'s check_mul_overflow() guard), so
today this manifests as mount failing in odd places rather than as
something more dangerous, but the validation step is still wrong
and there is no reason for callers to rely on the block layer to
catch a value that should never have been accepted in the first
place.
Use check_mul_overflow() to compute the two sector positions and
fail the mount if either multiplication wraps; this preserves the
existing semantics (mlcn * sct_per_clst >= sectors) instead of
switching to division (mlcn >= sectors / sct_per_clst), which
would tighten the check at edge cases where 'sectors' is not a
multiple of sct_per_clst. The check_*_overflow() style is the
one ntfs3 already uses for similar on-disk arithmetic in
fs/ntfs3/run.c.
Fixes: 82cae269cfa9 ("fs/ntfs3: Add initialization of super block")
Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
|
|
If a negative offset is read off disk (for example the offset into the
decompressed fragment block), this will cause squashfs_copy_data() to
perform an out of bounds access.
Fix by checking if offset is negative, and returning 0. This matches
existing behaviour where an offset beyond the block returns 0 bytes
copied.
To trigger this out of bounds access requires a crafted Squashfs
filesystem and CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount it. Unprivileged users will not be
able to mount such a filesystem, but once mounted, an unprivileged user
can trigger the out of bounds access by reading the crafted file with the
negative offset.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260807162951.672510-1-phillip@squashfs.org.uk
Fixes: f400e12656ab ("Squashfs: cache operations")
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Reported-by: Yuejie Shi <syjcnss@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260803032735.81785-1-syjcnss@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the directory cookie position is
rebuilt with
ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;
`ctx->pos` is loff_t (signed 64-bit), while `sb->s_blocksize` is
unsigned long. On 32-bit kernels unsigned long is 32-bit, so the mask
~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)
is computed as a 32-bit unsigned value (e.g. 0xfffff000 for a 4 KiB
block size). In the AND expression with the 64-bit `ctx->pos`, that
unsigned operand is zero-extended to 64 bits per the usual arithmetic
conversions, yielding 0x00000000fffff000. The high 32 bits of
`ctx->pos` are silently cleared, even though directory size is
allowed to exceed 4 GiB.
When readdir() crosses the 4 GiB boundary on a 32-bit kernel the
position is reset back into the first 4 GiB block, making the
re-validation path re-enumerate already-returned dirents indefinitely.
This is ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the extent-list readdir path taken
for all non-inline directories, so a directory large enough to cross
4 GiB reaches it.
This is the same class of bug that commit 3dce5bb82c97 ("exfat: Fix
bitwise operation having different size") fixed in exfat, and the
fix mirrors the equivalent ext4 fix in this series. Cast the operand
to loff_t so the mask is 64-bit before the AND:
ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~((loff_t)sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;
64-bit kernels are unaffected.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260806022044.167962-3-zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com
Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: "zhangyi (F)" <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
When reclaiming a suballocator block group, first reduce the on-disk
cluster count by cl_cpg. The current code then subtracts that new count
(fe->i_clusters) from the old cached count
(OCFS2_I(alloc_inode)->ip_clusters).
For an allocator with N block groups, that leaves the cache at
N * cl_cpg - (N * cl_cpg - cl_cpg) = cl_cpg
i.e. ip_clusters -= (fe->i_clusters - cl_cpg) leaves ip_clusters equal to
cl_cpg regardless of N. This happens to be correct when reclaiming from
two block groups, but undercounts the clusters from three block groups
onwards. The incorrect cache value is also used immediately to update
i_blocks.
Assign the updated on-disk count to the cache, matching the allocation and
inode refresh paths.
In a QEMU test using a clean 256 MiB OCFS2 image and a 10,000-file
create/delete workload, the first buggy reclaim left the on-disk
(fe->i_clusters) and cached (ip_clusters) counts at 2048 and 512 clusters
respectively; later reclaims underflowed the cache. With this change, the
cache matched the on-disk count across all four reclaims: 2048, 1536,
1024, and 512 clusters.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260805113920.385959-1-matthias.goergens@gmail.com
Fixes: 4a54331616b3 ("ocfs2: give ocfs2 the ability to reclaim suballocator free bg")
Signed-off-by: Matthias Goergens <matthias.goergens@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
A lockdep warning indicates a circular locking dependency between
`&oi->ip_xattr_sem` and `&journal->j_trans_barrier`:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
is trying to acquire lock:
(&oi->ip_xattr_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_init_acl+0x2fd/0x7e0
fs/ocfs2/acl.c:367
but task is already holding lock:
(&journal->j_trans_barrier){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_start_trans+0x3ab/0x700
fs/ocfs2/journal.c:369
The deadlock involves two code paths: Path 1 (setxattr) where
`ocfs2_xattr_set()` acquires `ip_xattr_sem` (write) and then starts a
transaction, which acquires `j_trans_barrier` (read); and Path 2
(mkdir/mknod) where `ocfs2_mknod()` starts a transaction (`j_trans_barrier`
read) and then calls `ocfs2_init_acl()`, which attempts to acquire
`ip_xattr_sem` (read) on the parent directory to retrieve the default ACL.
Because rw_semaphores are subject to writer priority, a pending writer on
`j_trans_barrier` (e.g., the journal commit thread) can cause Path 1 to
block, while Path 2 is blocked waiting for Path 1 to release
`ip_xattr_sem`.
The patch fixes the lock ordering by precomputing the ACL state before
starting the OCFS2 transaction, while preserving POSIX ACL storage
semantics and the existing inode/security initialization order. By reading
the parent directory's default ACL and preparing the new inode's ACLs
outside the transaction, `ip_xattr_sem` is always acquired before
`j_trans_barrier`.
`struct ocfs2_acl_state` encapsulates the prepared ACL state, while
`ocfs2_acl_init_prepare()` and `ocfs2_acl_init_release()` avoid code
duplication between `ocfs2_mknod()` and `ocfs2_init_security_and_acl()`.
`ocfs2_calc_xattr_init()` and `ocfs2_init_acl()` use this precomputed
state, removing internal `ip_xattr_sem` acquisition and redundant disk
reads.
Additionally, remove the `ip_xattr_sem` acquisition from
`ocfs2_xattr_set_handle()`. This function is only used while initializing a
new inode that has not yet been inserted into the inode hash or attached to
a dentry, meaning there is no risk of concurrent access and the lock is
unnecessary.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/4094de06-9b69-4174-b2ee-08126dffc693@mail.kernel.org
Fixes: 16c8d569f570 ("ocfs2/acl: use 'ip_xattr_sem' to protect getting extended attribute")
Signed-off-by: Krystian Kaniewski <krystianmkaniewski@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.5-flash Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview syzbot
Reported-by: syzbot+4007ab5229e732466d9f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4007ab5229e732466d9f
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=cc75363d-c672-499e-8fc5-44bcdc1cee39
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
[BUG]
A corrupted append-DIO dinode (high byte at offset 0xa1
corrupted from 0 to 1) can carry an i_dio_orphaned_slot
outside the mounted filesystem slot range and trigger a
use-after-free error:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan() uses i_dio_orphaned_slot to index the
slot-local system inode cache. The dinode validator does not check
this active slot, so an out-of-range value produces an invalid cache
entry pointer that is dereferenced as an inode pointer.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_dio_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before DIO orphan recovery can consume it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803030007.3993199-3-gality369@gmail.com
Fixes: 06ee5c75b575 ("ocfs2: add functions to add and remove inode in orphan dir")
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read".
OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes.
A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local
system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is
reported.
Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing.
Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and
orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode
validation boundary.
This patch (of 2):
[BUG]
A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an
i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range.
ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking
up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves
the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers
assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803030007.3993199-1-gality369@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803030007.3993199-2-gality369@gmail.com
Fixes: b4df6ed8db0c ("[PATCH] ocfs2: fix orphan recovery deadlock")
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Clear the local crypto-related structures via __cleanup() functions
when we're done with them to avoid that sensitive data could leak on
the stack.
Note: cmac_ctx in ksmbd_sign_smb3_pdu() gets cleared in aes_cmac_final()
already, so this does not need a __cleanup() marker.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807125845.1477067-3-thuth@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
|
|
- Call f2fs_add_ino_entry() and f2fs_remove_ino_entry() for ORPHAN_INO
- introduce __f2fs_add_ino_entry() to wrap __add_ino_entry(), so that
both f2fs_add_ino_entry() and f2fs_set_dirty_device() will call
__f2fs_add_ino_entry().
So, after this change:
add delete lookup
ORPHAN_INO f2fs_add_ino_entry f2fs_remove_ino_entry N/A
FLUSH_INO f2fs_set_dirty_device f2fs_remove_ino_entry f2fs_is_dirty_device
APPEND_INO f2fs_add_ino_entry f2fs_remove_ino_entry f2fs_exist_written_data
UPDATA_INO f2fs_add_ino_entry f2fs_remove_ino_entry f2fs_exist_written_data
TRANS_DIR_INO f2fs_add_ino_entry N/A f2fs_exist_written_data
XATTR_DIR_INO f2fs_add_ino_entry N/A f2fs_exist_written_data
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
|
generic/794 4s ... - output mismatch (see /share/git/fstests/results//generic/794.out.bad)
--- tests/generic/794.out 2026-06-12 08:46:32.766426241 +0800
+++ /share/git/fstests/results//generic/794.out.bad 2026-07-05 18:32:55.000000000 +0800
@@ -1,4 +1,16 @@
QA output created by 794
append_write
+FAIL: non-zero data in gap [4080,4096) after shutdown+remount
+000000 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a >ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ<
+*
+001000
truncate_up
...
(Run 'diff -u /share/git/fstests/tests/generic/794.out /share/git/fstests/results//generic/794.out.bad' to see the entire diff)
Ran: generic/794
Failures: generic/794
Failed 1 of 1 tests
Steps of generic/794:
1. write 4096 bytes to file w/ 0x5a
2. use fiemap to get PBA of first block in file
3. truncate file to 4080
4. umount; write 4096 bytes to file w/ 0x5a directly via PBA; mount
5. extend filesize via
a) append 4096 from offset 4096, or
b) truncate 8192, or
c) fallocate 4096 from offset 4096
6. verify the gap is zeroed in memory [4080,4096)
7. sync range 4096 from offset 4096; shutdown -f (flush meta before shutdown)
8. umount; mount; verify [4080,4096) is zeroed or not.
When extending file size (e.g. via truncate, fallocate, or write) across an
unaligned EOF boundary, we need to ensure that post-EOF data in the partial
page is zeroed out in pagecache and marked dirty, then writeback the cache to
persist zeroed data before committing inode w/ updated i_size.
This help to prevent stale disk data beyond the previous EOF from being exposed
after remounting or crash recovery.
Since f2fs is a LFS filesystem, we only support direct write via PBA in pinfile,
and pinfile has section-aligned filesize, so in Android, there should no problem,
but for other usage in different environment, let's fix this w/ fsync_mode=strict
mount option.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
|
Otherwise, it will drop one more page after new_size which is not
necessary.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: ba8dac350faf ("f2fs: fix to zero post-eof page")
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
|
|
ceph_ioctl_set_layout() and ceph_ioctl_set_layout_policy() call
inode_owner_or_capable() with &nop_mnt_idmap instead of the idmap of the
mount the ioctl was issued on.
CephFS supports idmapped mounts (FS_ALLOW_IDMAP), so on such a mount this
compares the caller's fsuid against the unmapped on-disk owner rather than
the mapped owner: the actual owner can be wrongly denied with -EACCES and
an unrelated caller wrongly allowed. Both functions already have the
struct file, so use file_mnt_idmap(file) instead.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: cee38bbf5556 ("ceph: add owner/capability checks for CEPH_IOC_SET_LAYOUT*")
Signed-off-by: Zhan Xusheng <zhanxusheng@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li@clyso.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
|
