<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/stable/linux.git/arch/powerpc/kvm, branch linux-3.16.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=linux-3.16.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=linux-3.16.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-05-22T20:19:33+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Free shared page if mmu initialization fails</title>
<updated>2020-05-22T20:19:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>sean.j.christopherson@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-18T21:54:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9c98c4926b6d5dbabfa3ee9df1083c88709aca8b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9c98c4926b6d5dbabfa3ee9df1083c88709aca8b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cb10bf9194f4d2c5d830eddca861f7ca0fecdbb4 upstream.

Explicitly free the shared page if kvmppc_mmu_init() fails during
kvmppc_core_vcpu_create(), as the page is freed only in
kvmppc_core_vcpu_free(), which is not reached via kvm_vcpu_uninit().

Fixes: 96bc451a15329 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce shared page")
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Uninit vCPU if vcore creation fails</title>
<updated>2020-05-22T20:19:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>sean.j.christopherson@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-18T21:54:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ad2b2732831389253b464b197f674b0cc6f3baa5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ad2b2732831389253b464b197f674b0cc6f3baa5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1a978d9d3e72ddfa40ac60d26301b154247ee0bc upstream.

Call kvm_vcpu_uninit() if vcore creation fails to avoid leaking any
resources allocated by kvm_vcpu_init(), i.e. the vcpu-&gt;run page.

Fixes: 371fefd6f2dc4 ("KVM: PPC: Allow book3s_hv guests to use SMT processor modes")
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz &lt;groug@kaod.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: Protect device ops-&gt;create and list_add with kvm-&gt;lock</title>
<updated>2019-03-25T17:32:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoffer Dall</name>
<email>christoffer.dall@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-09T17:13:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b68bf84b71970ef6eb32bd10d924d3edfa73d872'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b68bf84b71970ef6eb32bd10d924d3edfa73d872</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a28ebea2adc4a2bef5989a5a181ec238f59fbcad upstream.

KVM devices were manipulating list data structures without any form of
synchronization, and some implementations of the create operations also
suffered from a lack of synchronization.

Now when we've split the xics create operation into create and init, we
can hold the kvm-&gt;lock mutex while calling the create operation and when
manipulating the devices list.

The error path in the generic code gets slightly ugly because we have to
take the mutex again and delete the device from the list, but holding
the mutex during anon_inode_getfd or releasing/locking the mutex in the
common non-error path seemed wrong.

Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Drop change to a failure path that doesn't exist in kvm_vgic_create() 
 - Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Move xics_debugfs_init out of create</title>
<updated>2019-03-25T17:32:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Christoffer Dall</name>
<email>christoffer.dall@linaro.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-08-09T17:13:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=199883f7dc5f2a89f1e393debfabcdb536b2579d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:199883f7dc5f2a89f1e393debfabcdb536b2579d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 023e9fddc3616b005c3753fc1bb6526388cd7a30 upstream.

As we are about to hold the kvm-&gt;lock during the create operation on KVM
devices, we should move the call to xics_debugfs_init into its own
function, since holding a mutex over extended amounts of time might not
be a good idea.

Introduce an init operation on the kvm_device_ops struct which cannot
fail and call this, if configured, after the device has been created.

Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Don't truncate HPTE index in xlate function</title>
<updated>2018-12-16T22:08:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mackerras</name>
<email>paulus@ozlabs.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-08-20T06:05:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=bd52aa398818e7ed7c6538f61cf3fbd3613af2b0'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bd52aa398818e7ed7c6538f61cf3fbd3613af2b0</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 46dec40fb741f00f1864580130779aeeaf24fb3d upstream.

This fixes a bug which causes guest virtual addresses to get translated
to guest real addresses incorrectly when the guest is using the HPT MMU
and has more than 256GB of RAM, or more specifically has a HPT larger
than 2GB.  This has showed up in testing as a failure of the host to
emulate doorbell instructions correctly on POWER9 for HPT guests with
more than 256GB of RAM.

The bug is that the HPTE index in kvmppc_mmu_book3s_64_hv_xlate()
is stored as an int, and in forming the HPTE address, the index gets
shifted left 4 bits as an int before being signed-extended to 64 bits.
The simple fix is to make the variable a long int, matching the
return type of kvmppc_hv_find_lock_hpte(), which is what calculates
the index.

Fixes: 697d3899dcb4 ("KVM: PPC: Implement MMIO emulation support for Book3S HV guests")
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix svcpu copying with preemption enabled</title>
<updated>2018-06-16T21:22:04+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Alexander Graf</name>
<email>agraf@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-31T21:24:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=a6681bea45b2bc7f1004c5d6efe900457e17ace3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a6681bea45b2bc7f1004c5d6efe900457e17ace3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 07ae5389e98c53bb9e9f308fce9c903bc3ee7720 upstream.

When copying between the vcpu and svcpu, we may get scheduled away onto
a different host CPU which in turn means our svcpu pointer may change.

That means we need to atomically copy to and from the svcpu with preemption
disabled, so that all code around it always sees a coherent state.

Reported-by: Simon Guo &lt;wei.guo.simon@gmail.com&gt;
Fixes: 3d3319b45eea ("KVM: PPC: Book3S: PR: Enable interrupts earlier")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf &lt;agraf@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Enable TM before accessing TM registers</title>
<updated>2017-11-11T13:33:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mackerras</name>
<email>paulus@ozlabs.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-07-21T03:57:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=f673d5b06e8c9e4592b49a16d3eeefe01287b317'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f673d5b06e8c9e4592b49a16d3eeefe01287b317</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e47057151422a67ce08747176fa21cb3b526a2c9 upstream.

Commit 46a704f8409f ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Preserve userspace HTM state
properly", 2017-06-15) added code to read transactional memory (TM)
registers but forgot to enable TM before doing so.  The result is
that if userspace does have live values in the TM registers, a KVM_RUN
ioctl will cause a host kernel crash like this:

[  181.328511] Unrecoverable TM Unavailable Exception f60 at d00000001e7d9980
[  181.328605] Oops: Unrecoverable TM Unavailable Exception, sig: 6 [#1]
[  181.328613] SMP NR_CPUS=2048
[  181.328613] NUMA
[  181.328618] PowerNV
[  181.328646] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap nfs_layout_nfsv41_files rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs
+fscache xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat
+nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun ebtable_filter ebtables
+ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter bridge stp llc kvm_hv kvm nfsd ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas ghash_generic
+auth_rpcgss gf128mul xts sg ctr nfs_acl lockd vmx_crypto shpchp ipmi_powernv i2c_opal grace ipmi_devintf i2c_core
+powernv_rng sunrpc ipmi_msghandler ibmpowernv uio_pdrv_genirq uio leds_powernv powernv_op_panel ip_tables xfs sd_mod
+lpfc ipr bnx2x libata mdio ptp pps_core scsi_transport_fc libcrc32c dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[  181.329278] CPU: 40 PID: 9926 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 4.12.0+ #1
[  181.329337] task: c000003fc6980000 task.stack: c000003fe4d80000
[  181.329396] NIP: d00000001e7d9980 LR: d00000001e77381c CTR: d00000001e7d98f0
[  181.329465] REGS: c000003fe4d837e0 TRAP: 0f60   Not tainted  (4.12.0+)
[  181.329523] MSR: 9000000000009033 &lt;SF,HV,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE&gt;
[  181.329527]   CR: 24022448  XER: 00000000
[  181.329608] CFAR: d00000001e773818 SOFTE: 1
[  181.329608] GPR00: d00000001e77381c c000003fe4d83a60 d00000001e7ef410 c000003fdcfe0000
[  181.329608] GPR04: c000003fe4f00000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000003fd7954800
[  181.329608] GPR08: 0000000000000001 c000003fc6980000 0000000000000000 d00000001e7e2880
[  181.329608] GPR12: d00000001e7d98f0 c000000007b19000 00000001295220e0 00007fffc0ce2090
[  181.329608] GPR16: 0000010011886608 00007fff8c89f260 0000000000000001 00007fff8c080028
[  181.329608] GPR20: 0000000000000000 00000100118500a6 0000010011850000 0000010011850000
[  181.329608] GPR24: 00007fffc0ce1b48 0000010011850000 00000000d673b901 0000000000000000
[  181.329608] GPR28: 0000000000000000 c000003fdcfe0000 c000003fdcfe0000 c000003fe4f00000
[  181.330199] NIP [d00000001e7d9980] kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x90/0x6b0 [kvm_hv]
[  181.330264] LR [d00000001e77381c] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x2c/0x40 [kvm]
[  181.330322] Call Trace:
[  181.330351] [c000003fe4d83a60] [d00000001e773478] kvmppc_set_one_reg+0x48/0x340 [kvm] (unreliable)
[  181.330437] [c000003fe4d83b30] [d00000001e77381c] kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x2c/0x40 [kvm]
[  181.330513] [c000003fe4d83b50] [d00000001e7700b4] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x114/0x2a0 [kvm]
[  181.330586] [c000003fe4d83bd0] [d00000001e7642f8] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x598/0x7a0 [kvm]
[  181.330658] [c000003fe4d83d40] [c0000000003451b8] do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x8b0
[  181.330717] [c000003fe4d83de0] [c000000000345a64] SyS_ioctl+0xc4/0x120
[  181.330776] [c000003fe4d83e30] [c00000000000b004] system_call+0x58/0x6c
[  181.330833] Instruction dump:
[  181.330869] e92d0260 e9290b50 e9290108 792807e3 41820058 e92d0260 e9290b50 e9290108
[  181.330941] 792ae8a4 794a1f87 408204f4 e92d0260 &lt;7d4022a6&gt; f9490ff0 e92d0260 7d4122a6
[  181.331013] ---[ end trace 6f6ddeb4bfe92a92 ]---

The fix is just to turn on the TM bit in the MSR before accessing the
registers.

Fixes: 46a704f8409f ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Preserve userspace HTM state properly")
Reported-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jan Stancek &lt;jstancek@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Preserve userspace HTM state properly</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:11+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mackerras</name>
<email>paulus@ozlabs.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-15T06:10:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=1433c01991b9ea789ae9effc6d7b06ab9b1f6a6d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:1433c01991b9ea789ae9effc6d7b06ab9b1f6a6d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 46a704f8409f79fd66567ad3f8a7304830a84293 upstream.

If userspace attempts to call the KVM_RUN ioctl when it has hardware
transactional memory (HTM) enabled, the values that it has put in the
HTM-related SPRs TFHAR, TFIAR and TEXASR will get overwritten by
guest values.  To fix this, we detect this condition and save those
SPR values in the thread struct, and disable HTM for the task.  If
userspace goes to access those SPRs or the HTM facility in future,
a TM-unavailable interrupt will occur and the handler will reload
those SPRs and re-enable HTM.

If userspace has started a transaction and suspended it, we would
currently lose the transactional state in the guest entry path and
would almost certainly get a "TM Bad Thing" interrupt, which would
cause the host to crash.  To avoid this, we detect this case and
return from the KVM_RUN ioctl with an EINVAL error, with the KVM
exit reason set to KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY.

Fixes: b005255e12a3 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Context-switch new POWER8 SPRs", 2014-01-08)
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Context-switch EBB registers properly</title>
<updated>2017-09-15T17:30:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mackerras</name>
<email>paulus@ozlabs.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-06T06:47:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=9927e72a825d47cfb4ea02840272a3fc3a445242'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9927e72a825d47cfb4ea02840272a3fc3a445242</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ca8efa1df1d15a1795a2da57f9f6aada6ed6b946 upstream.

This adds code to save the values of three SPRs (special-purpose
registers) used by userspace to control event-based branches (EBBs),
which are essentially interrupts that get delivered directly to
userspace.  These registers are loaded up with guest values when
entering the guest, and their values are saved when exiting the
guest, but we were not saving the host values and restoring them
before going back to userspace.

On POWER8 this would only affect userspace programs which explicitly
request the use of EBBs and also use the KVM_RUN ioctl, since the
only source of EBBs on POWER8 is the PMU, and there is an explicit
enable bit in the PMU registers (and those PMU registers do get
properly context-switched between host and guest).  On POWER9 there
is provision for externally-generated EBBs, and these are not subject
to the control in the PMU registers.

Since these registers only affect userspace, we can save them when
we first come in from userspace and restore them before returning to
userspace, rather than saving/restoring the host values on every
guest entry/exit.  Similarly, we don't need to worry about their
values on offline secondary threads since they execute in the context
of the idle task, which never executes in userspace.

Fixes: b005255e12a3 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Context-switch new POWER8 SPRs", 2014-01-08)
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Save/restore XER in checkpointed register state</title>
<updated>2017-03-16T02:26:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mackerras</name>
<email>paulus@ozlabs.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-07T04:09:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=50bf72d08f1aeac1b398307003d5fe6608f3a499'/>
<id>urn:sha1:50bf72d08f1aeac1b398307003d5fe6608f3a499</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0d808df06a44200f52262b6eb72bcb6042f5a7c5 upstream.

When switching from/to a guest that has a transaction in progress,
we need to save/restore the checkpointed register state.  Although
XER is part of the CPU state that gets checkpointed, the code that
does this saving and restoring doesn't save/restore XER.

This fixes it by saving and restoring the XER.  To allow userspace
to read/write the checkpointed XER value, we also add a new ONE_REG
specifier.

The visible effect of this bug is that the guest may see its XER
value being corrupted when it uses transactions.

Fixes: e4e38121507a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add transactional memory support")
Fixes: 0a8eccefcb34 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add missing code for transaction reclaim on guest exit")
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth &lt;thuth@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras &lt;paulus@ozlabs.org&gt;
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context, spacing]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings &lt;ben@decadent.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
