<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/stable/linux.git/drivers/char/random.c, branch linux-5.19.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.19.y</id>
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<updated>2022-10-24T07:58:07+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>random: schedule jitter credit for next jiffy, not in two jiffies</title>
<updated>2022-10-24T07:58:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-30T22:31:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ccc9abee86c5cf7e0a1805ec3fbab6c4566a2413'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ccc9abee86c5cf7e0a1805ec3fbab6c4566a2413</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 122733471384be8c23f019fbbd46bdf7be561dcd ]

Counterintuitively, mod_timer(..., jiffies + 1) will cause the timer to
fire not in the next jiffy, but in two jiffies. The way to cause
the timer to fire in the next jiffy is with mod_timer(..., jiffies).
Doing so then lets us bump the upper bound back up again.

Fixes: 50ee7529ec45 ("random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively wait for it")
Fixes: 829d680e82a9 ("random: cap jitter samples per bit to factor of HZ")
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf &lt;sultan@kerneltoast.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: use expired timer rather than wq for mixing fast pool</title>
<updated>2022-10-15T06:01:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-22T16:46:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=848bb8517e41a7655e6a840f8adca7ec5e4b9959'/>
<id>urn:sha1:848bb8517e41a7655e6a840f8adca7ec5e4b9959</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 748bc4dd9e663f23448d8ad7e58c011a67ea1eca upstream.

Previously, the fast pool was dumped into the main pool periodically in
the fast pool's hard IRQ handler. This worked fine and there weren't
problems with it, until RT came around. Since RT converts spinlocks into
sleeping locks, problems cropped up. Rather than switching to raw
spinlocks, the RT developers preferred we make the transformation from
originally doing:

    do_some_stuff()
    spin_lock()
    do_some_other_stuff()
    spin_unlock()

to doing:

    do_some_stuff()
    queue_work_on(some_other_stuff_worker)

This is an ordinary pattern done all over the kernel. However, Sherry
noticed a 10% performance regression in qperf TCP over a 40gbps
InfiniBand card. Quoting her message:

&gt; MT27500 Family [ConnectX-3] cards:
&gt; Infiniband device 'mlx4_0' port 1 status:
&gt; default gid: fe80:0000:0000:0000:0010:e000:0178:9eb1
&gt; base lid: 0x6
&gt; sm lid: 0x1
&gt; state: 4: ACTIVE
&gt; phys state: 5: LinkUp
&gt; rate: 40 Gb/sec (4X QDR)
&gt; link_layer: InfiniBand
&gt;
&gt; Cards are configured with IP addresses on private subnet for IPoIB
&gt; performance testing.
&gt; Regression identified in this bug is in TCP latency in this stack as reported
&gt; by qperf tcp_lat metric:
&gt;
&gt; We have one system listen as a qperf server:
&gt; [root@yourQperfServer ~]# qperf
&gt;
&gt; Have the other system connect to qperf server as a client (in this
&gt; case, it’s X7 server with Mellanox card):
&gt; [root@yourQperfClient ~]# numactl -m0 -N0 qperf 20.20.20.101 -v -uu -ub --time 60 --wait_server 20 -oo msg_size:4K:1024K:*2 tcp_lat

Rather than incur the scheduling latency from queue_work_on, we can
instead switch to running on the next timer tick, on the same core. This
also batches things a bit more -- once per jiffy -- which is okay now
that mix_interrupt_randomness() can credit multiple bits at once.

Reported-by: Sherry Yang &lt;sherry.yang@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Paul Webb &lt;paul.x.webb@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Sherry Yang &lt;sherry.yang@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Phillip Goerl &lt;phillip.goerl@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Jack Vogel &lt;jack.vogel@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Nicky Veitch &lt;nicky.veitch@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Colm Harrington &lt;colm.harrington@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Ramanan Govindarajan &lt;ramanan.govindarajan@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Cc: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: Sultan Alsawaf &lt;sultan@kerneltoast.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 58340f8e952b ("random: defer fast pool mixing to worker")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: avoid reading two cache lines on irq randomness</title>
<updated>2022-10-15T06:01:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-22T16:46:04+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:111824744645736c4dd6b2100c530e6375a0f542</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9ee0507e896b45af6d65408c77815800bce30008 upstream.

In order to avoid reading and dirtying two cache lines on every IRQ,
move the work_struct to the bottom of the fast_pool struct. add_
interrupt_randomness() always touches .pool and .count, which are
currently split, because .mix pushes everything down. Instead, move .mix
to the bottom, so that .pool and .count are always in the first cache
line, since .mix is only accessed when the pool is full.

Fixes: 58340f8e952b ("random: defer fast pool mixing to worker")
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: clamp credited irq bits to maximum mixed</title>
<updated>2022-10-15T06:01:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-23T00:42:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b42a64428abe1e3e5fe323e941e5c60399a27e1e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b42a64428abe1e3e5fe323e941e5c60399a27e1e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e78a802a7b4febf53f2a92842f494b01062d85a8 upstream.

Since the most that's mixed into the pool is sizeof(long)*2, don't
credit more than that many bytes of entropy.

Fixes: e3e33fc2ea7f ("random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: restore O_NONBLOCK support</title>
<updated>2022-10-15T06:01:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-08T14:14:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=e1f8820bf83f2bd0ad490a5bf4a81297551d464f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e1f8820bf83f2bd0ad490a5bf4a81297551d464f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cd4f24ae9404fd31fc461066e57889be3b68641b upstream.

Prior to 5.6, when /dev/random was opened with O_NONBLOCK, it would
return -EAGAIN if there was no entropy. When the pools were unified in
5.6, this was lost. The post 5.6 behavior of blocking until the pool is
initialized, and ignoring O_NONBLOCK in the process, went unnoticed,
with no reports about the regression received for two and a half years.
However, eventually this indeed did break somebody's userspace.

So we restore the old behavior, by returning -EAGAIN if the pool is not
initialized. Unlike the old /dev/random, this can only occur during
early boot, after which it never blocks again.

In order to make this O_NONBLOCK behavior consistent with other
expectations, also respect users reading with preadv2(RWF_NOWAIT) and
similar.

Fixes: 30c08efec888 ("random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom")
Reported-by: Guozihua &lt;guozihua@huawei.com&gt;
Reported-by: Zhongguohua &lt;zhongguohua1@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Cc: Andrew Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: cap jitter samples per bit to factor of HZ</title>
<updated>2022-07-16T17:42:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-07-13T15:11:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=829d680e82a961c5370d9636130b43009ac36eb8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:829d680e82a961c5370d9636130b43009ac36eb8</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently the jitter mechanism will require two timer ticks per
iteration, and it requires N iterations per bit. This N is determined
with a small measurement, and if it's too big, it won't waste time with
jitter entropy because it'd take too long or not have sufficient entropy
anyway.

With the current max N of 32, there are large timeouts on systems with a
small CONFIG_HZ. Rather than set that maximum to 32, instead choose a
factor of CONFIG_HZ. In this case, 1/30 seems to yield sane values for
different configurations of CONFIG_HZ.

Reported-by: Vladimir Murzin &lt;vladimir.murzin@arm.com&gt;
Fixes: 78c768e619fb ("random: vary jitter iterations based on cycle counter speed")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
Tested-by: Vladimir Murzin &lt;vladimir.murzin@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: update comment from copy_to_user() -&gt; copy_to_iter()</title>
<updated>2022-06-20T09:06:17+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-20T09:03:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=63b8ea5e4f1a87dea4d3114293fc8e96a8f193d7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:63b8ea5e4f1a87dea4d3114293fc8e96a8f193d7</id>
<content type='text'>
This comment wasn't updated when we moved from read() to read_iter(), so
this patch makes the trivial fix.

Fixes: 1b388e7765f2 ("random: convert to using fops-&gt;read_iter()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: quiet urandom warning ratelimit suppression message</title>
<updated>2022-06-19T21:50:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-16T13:00:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=c01d4d0a82b71857be7449380338bc53dde2da92'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c01d4d0a82b71857be7449380338bc53dde2da92</id>
<content type='text'>
random.c ratelimits how much it warns about uninitialized urandom reads
using __ratelimit(). When the RNG is finally initialized, it prints the
number of missed messages due to ratelimiting.

It has been this way since that functionality was introduced back in
2018. Recently, cc1e127bfa95 ("random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel
unseeded randomness") put a bit more stress on the urandom ratelimiting,
which teased out a bug in the implementation.

Specifically, when under pressure, __ratelimit() will print its own
message and reset the count back to 0, making the final message at the
end less useful. Secondly, it does so as a pr_warn(), which apparently
is undesirable for people's CI.

Fortunately, __ratelimit() has the RATELIMIT_MSG_ON_RELEASE flag exactly
for this purpose, so we set the flag.

Fixes: 4e00b339e264 ("random: rate limit unseeded randomness warnings")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Jon Hunter &lt;jonathanh@nvidia.com&gt;
Reported-by: Ron Economos &lt;re@w6rz.net&gt;
Tested-by: Ron Economos &lt;re@w6rz.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: schedule mix_interrupt_randomness() less often</title>
<updated>2022-06-19T21:50:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-16T00:03:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=534d2eaf1970274150596fdd2bf552721e65d6b2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:534d2eaf1970274150596fdd2bf552721e65d6b2</id>
<content type='text'>
It used to be that mix_interrupt_randomness() would credit 1 bit each
time it ran, and so add_interrupt_randomness() would schedule mix() to
run every 64 interrupts, a fairly arbitrary number, but nonetheless
considered to be a decent enough conservative estimate.

Since e3e33fc2ea7f ("random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs"),
mix() is now able to credit multiple bits, depending on the number of
calls to add(). This was done for reasons separate from this commit, but
it has the nice side effect of enabling this patch to schedule mix()
less often.

Currently the rules are:
a) Credit 1 bit for every 64 calls to add().
b) Schedule mix() once a second that add() is called.
c) Schedule mix() once every 64 calls to add().

Rules (a) and (c) no longer need to be coupled. It's still important to
have _some_ value in (c), so that we don't "over-saturate" the fast
pool, but the once per second we get from rule (b) is a plenty enough
baseline. So, by increasing the 64 in rule (c) to something larger, we
avoid calling queue_work_on() as frequently during irq storms.

This commit changes that 64 in rule (c) to be 1024, which means we
schedule mix() 16 times less often. And it does *not* need to change the
64 in rule (a).

Fixes: 58340f8e952b ("random: defer fast pool mixing to worker")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Dominik Brodowski &lt;linux@dominikbrodowski.net&gt;
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior &lt;bigeasy@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>random: remove rng_has_arch_random()</title>
<updated>2022-06-10T09:29:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jason A. Donenfeld</name>
<email>Jason@zx2c4.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-06-08T08:31:25+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=e052a478a7daeca67664f7addd308ff51dd40654'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e052a478a7daeca67664f7addd308ff51dd40654</id>
<content type='text'>
With arch randomness being used by every distro and enabled in
defconfigs, the distinction between rng_has_arch_random() and
rng_is_initialized() is now rather small. In fact, the places where they
differ are now places where paranoid users and system builders really
don't want arch randomness to be used, in which case we should respect
that choice, or places where arch randomness is known to be broken, in
which case that choice is all the more important. So this commit just
removes the function and its one user.

Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek &lt;pmladek@suse.com&gt; # for vsprintf.c
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld &lt;Jason@zx2c4.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
