kernel/git/stable/linux.git/drivers/firmware, branch linux-5.13.y

firmware: raspberrypi: Fix a leak in 'rpi_firmware_get()'

2021-09-15T08:00:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit 09cbd1df7d2615c19e40facbe31fdcb5f1ebfa96 ] The reference taken by 'of_find_device_by_node()' must be released when not needed anymore. Add the corresponding 'put_device()' in the normal and error handling paths. Fixes: 4e3d60656a72 ("ARM: bcm2835: Add the Raspberry Pi firmware driver") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5e17e5409b934cd08bf6f9279c73be5c1cb11cce.1628232242.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

firmware: dmi: Move product_sku info to the end of the modalias

2021-09-12T06:59:58+00:00

commit f97a2103f1a75ca70f23deadb4d96a16c4d85e7d upstream. Commit e26f023e01ef ("firmware/dmi: Include product_sku info to modalias") added a new field to the modalias in the middle of the modalias, breaking some existing udev/hwdb matches on the whole modalias without a wildcard ('*') in between the pvr and rvn fields. All modalias matches in e.g. : https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/main/hwdb.d/60-sensor.hwdb deliberately end in ':*' so that new fields can be added at *the end* of the modalias, but adding a new field in the middle like this breaks things. Move the new sku field to the end of the modalias to fix some hwdb entries no longer matching. The new sku field has already been put to use in 2 new hwdb entries: sensor:modalias:platform:HID-SENSOR-200073:dmi:*svnDell*:sku0A3E:* ACCEL_LOCATION=base sensor:modalias:platform:HID-SENSOR-200073:dmi:*svnDell*:sku0B0B:* ACCEL_LOCATION=base The wildcard use before and after the sku in these matches means that they should keep working with the sku moved to the end. Note that there is a second instance of in essence the same problem, commit f5152f4ded3c ("firmware/dmi: Report DMI Bios & EC firmware release") Added 2 new br and efr fields in the middle of the modalias. This too breaks some hwdb modalias matches, but this has gone unnoticed for over a year. So some newer hwdb modalias matches actually depend on these fields being in the middle of the string. Moving these to the end now would break 3 hwdb entries, while fixing 8 entries. Since there is no good answer for the new br and efr fields I have chosen to leave these as is. Instead I'll submit a hwdb update to put a wildcard at the place where these fields may or may not be present depending on the kernel version. BugLink: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/20550 Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/20562 Fixes: e26f023e01ef ("firmware/dmi: Include product_sku info to modalias") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kai-Chuan Hsieh Cc: Erwan Velu Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Jean Delvare Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

efi/libstub: arm64: Double check image alignment at entry

2021-08-18T07:07:07+00:00

commit c32ac11da3f83bb42b986702a9b92f0a14ed4182 upstream. On arm64, the stub only moves the kernel image around in memory if needed, which is typically only for KASLR, given that relocatable kernels (which is the default) can run from any 64k aligned address, which is also the minimum alignment communicated to EFI via the PE/COFF header. Unfortunately, some loaders appear to ignore this header, and load the kernel at some arbitrary offset in memory. We can deal with this, but let's check for this condition anyway, so non-compliant code can be spotted and fixed. Cc: # v5.10+ Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Tested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

efi/libstub: arm64: Relax 2M alignment again for relocatable kernels

2021-08-18T07:07:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit 3a262423755b83a5f85009ace415d6e7f572dfe8 ] Commit 82046702e288 ("efi/libstub/arm64: Replace 'preferred' offset with alignment check") simplified the way the stub moves the kernel image around in memory before booting it, given that a relocatable image does not need to be copied to a 2M aligned offset if it was loaded on a 64k boundary by EFI. Commit d32de9130f6c ("efi/arm64: libstub: Deal gracefully with EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL failure") inadvertently defeated this logic by overriding the value of efi_nokaslr if EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL is not available, which was mistaken by the loader logic as an explicit request on the part of the user to disable KASLR and any associated relocation of an Image not loaded on a 2M boundary. So let's reinstate this functionality, by capturing the value of efi_nokaslr at function entry to choose the minimum alignment. Fixes: d32de9130f6c ("efi/arm64: libstub: Deal gracefully with EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL failure") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Tested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

efi/libstub: arm64: Force Image reallocation if BSS was not reserved

2021-08-18T07:07:03+00:00

[ Upstream commit 5b94046efb4706b3429c9c8e7377bd8d1621d588 ] Distro versions of GRUB replace the usual LoadImage/StartImage calls used to load the kernel image with some local code that fails to honor the allocation requirements described in the PE/COFF header, as it does not account for the image's BSS section at all: it fails to allocate space for it, and fails to zero initialize it. Since the EFI stub itself is allocated in the .init segment, which is in the middle of the image, its BSS section is not impacted by this, and the main consequence of this omission is that the BSS section may overlap with memory regions that are already used by the firmware. So let's warn about this condition, and force image reallocation to occur in this case, which works around the problem. Fixes: 82046702e288 ("efi/libstub/arm64: Replace 'preferred' offset with alignment check") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Tested-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

arm64: efi: kaslr: Fix occasional random alloc (and boot) failure

2021-08-18T07:07:02+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4152433c397697acc4b02c4a10d17d5859c2730d ] The EFI stub random allocator used for kaslr on arm64 has a subtle bug. In function get_entry_num_slots() which counts the number of possible allocation "slots" for the image in a given chunk of free EFI memory, "last_slot" can become negative if the chunk is smaller than the requested allocation size. The test "if (first_slot > last_slot)" doesn't catch it because both first_slot and last_slot are unsigned. I chose not to make them signed to avoid problems if this is ever used on architectures where there are meaningful addresses with the top bit set. Instead, fix it with an additional test against the allocation size. This can cause a boot failure in addition to a loss of randomisation due to another bug in the arm64 stub fixed separately. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Fixes: 2ddbfc81eac8 ("efi: stub: add implementation of efi_random_alloc()") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

firmware: tee_bnxt: Release TEE shm, session, and context during kexec

2021-08-15T12:01:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit 914ab19e471d8fb535ed50dff108b0a615f3c2d8 ] Implement a .shutdown hook that will be called during a kexec operation so that the TEE shared memory, session, and context that were set up during .probe can be properly freed/closed. Additionally, don't use dma-buf backed shared memory for the fw_shm_pool. dma-buf backed shared memory cannot be reliably freed and unregistered during a kexec operation even when tee_shm_free() is called on the shm from a .shutdown hook. The problem occurs because dma_buf_put() calls fput() which then uses task_work_add(), with the TWA_RESUME parameter, to queue tee_shm_release() to be called before the current task returns to user mode. However, the current task never returns to user mode before the kexec completes so the memory is never freed nor unregistered. Use tee_shm_alloc_kernel_buf() to avoid dma-buf backed shared memory allocation so that tee_shm_free() can directly call tee_shm_release(). This will ensure that the shm can be freed and unregistered during a kexec operation. Fixes: 246880958ac9 ("firmware: broadcom: add OP-TEE based BNXT f/w manager") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Allen Pais Co-developed-by: Tyler Hicks Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg Acked-by: Florian Fainelli Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

efi/mokvar: Reserve the table only if it is in boot services data

2021-08-08T07:06:56+00:00

[ Upstream commit 47e1e233e9d822dfda068383fb9a616451bda703 ] One of the SUSE QA tests triggered: localhost kernel: efi: Failed to lookup EFI memory descriptor for 0x000000003dcf8000 which comes from x86's version of efi_arch_mem_reserve() trying to reserve a memory region. Usually, that function expects EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA memory descriptors but the above case is for the MOKvar table which is allocated in the EFI shim as runtime services. That lead to a fix changing the allocation of that table to boot services. However, that fix broke booting SEV guests with that shim leading to this kernel fix 8d651ee9c71b ("x86/ioremap: Map EFI-reserved memory as encrypted for SEV") which extended the ioremap hint to map reserved EFI boot services as decrypted too. However, all that wasn't needed, IMO, because that error message in efi_arch_mem_reserve() was innocuous in this case - if the MOKvar table is not in boot services, then it doesn't need to be reserved in the first place because it is, well, in runtime services which *should* be reserved anyway. So do that reservation for the MOKvar table only if it is allocated in boot services data. I couldn't find any requirement about where that table should be allocated in, unlike the ESRT which allocation is mandated to be done in boot services data by the UEFI spec. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

firmware: arm_scmi: Fix range check for the maximum number of pending messages

2021-07-31T06:13:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit bdb8742dc6f7c599c3d61959234fe4c23638727b ] SCMI message headers carry a sequence number and such field is sized to allow for MSG_TOKEN_MAX distinct numbers; moreover zero is not really an acceptable maximum number of pending in-flight messages. Fix accordingly the checks performed on the value exported by transports in scmi_desc.max_msg Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712141833.6628-3-cristian.marussi@arm.com Reported-by: Vincent Guittot Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi [sudeep.holla: updated the patch title and error message] Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

firmware: arm_scmi: Fix possible scmi_linux_errmap buffer overflow

2021-07-31T06:13:47+00:00

[ Upstream commit 7a691f16ccad05d770f813d9c4b4337a30c6d63f ] The scmi_linux_errmap buffer access index is supposed to depend on the array size to prevent element out of bounds access. It uses SCMI_ERR_MAX to check bounds but that can mismatch with the array size. It also changes the success into -EIO though scmi_linux_errmap is never used in case of success, it is expected to work for success case too. It is slightly confusing code as the negative of the error code is used as index to the buffer. Fix it by negating it at the start and make it more readable. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210707135028.1869642-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com Reported-by: kernel test robot Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Reviewed-by: Cristian Marussi Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin