kernel/git/stable/linux.git/drivers/infiniband/sw, branch master

RDMA/siw: Bound fragmented header copies by the remaining length

2026-09-10T15:15:46+00:00

siw_get_hdr() can receive an extended DDP/RDMAP header across more than one TCP callback. The first callback may receive most of the header, while the next one still limits the copy to hdrlen - MIN_DDP_HDR instead of the number of missing bytes. This makes the destination move past the end of the header and overwrite the receive state, including fpdu_part_rcvd. A later callback can then use a negative fpdu_part_rcvd value as a copy offset, which creates an OOB write. Use the number of header bytes already received when calculating the next copy length. Fixes: 754209850df8 ("RDMA/siw: Always consume all skbuf data in sk_data_ready() upcall.") Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908085520.1746329-1-Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 Acked-by: Bernard Metzler Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky

RDMA/rxe: insert mcg into mcg_tree only after rxe_mcast_add() succeeds

2026-09-01T13:12:02+00:00

rxe_get_mcg() publishes a newly allocated multicast group in rxe->mcg_tree before programming the backing Ethernet multicast address with rxe_mcast_add(), which runs outside mcg_lock. A local userspace RDMA client reaches this path with ATTACH_MCAST on a UD QP; if rxe_mcast_add() then returns an error (for example -ENODEV when the backing netdev has been removed, or a propagated dev_mc_add() error), the unwind frees the published group without removing it from the tree. A later lookup of the same MGID dereferences the freed struct rxe_mcg from __rxe_lookup_mcg(). Fix this by keeping the new mcg private until rxe_mcast_add() succeeds. Split the tree publication into __rxe_publish_mcg(), call rxe_mcast_add() before taking the tree reference, and free the still-private mcg on failure. Because the group is never visible in mcg_tree until the multicast address is programmed, no concurrent caller can look it up or attach a QP to a group that is about to be torn down, so the error path needs no conditional unwind. If another caller publishes the same MGID while the address is being programmed, the post-add re-check under mcg_lock finds the winner; this caller then drops its private object and balances its own rxe_mcast_add() with rxe_mcast_del() before returning the winner. Reproduced by forcing the rxe_mcast_add() error return under KASAN: without the change the next attach to the same MGID reports a slab-use-after-free in __rxe_lookup_mcg(); with it the forced failure returns cleanly. A no-injection attach/detach regression, including a two-QP shared join/leave and re-attach, stays KASAN- and leak-clean. Fixes: a926a903b7dc ("RDMA/rxe: Do not call dev_mc_add/del() under a spinlock") Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617022728.2770116-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky

RDMA/rxe: Restore HMM_PFN_WRITE check in ODP write paths

2026-09-01T12:30:34+00:00

Commit 0b261d7c1cd3 ("RDMA/rxe: Break endless pagefault loop for RO pages") dropped the access permission test from rxe_check_pagefault() and left only HMM_PFN_VALID. A page faulted in read-only, for example a page-cache folio behind a PROT_READ file mapping, then satisfies the check and ODP write operations (RDMA WRITE, RDMA READ response, SEND payload, atomics) modify it through kmap without ever breaking CoW. An unprivileged user can register an ODP MR over such a mapping and have incoming RDMA traffic overwrite the page cache of a file it only holds O_RDONLY, including /etc/passwd or setuid binaries. This is the same primitive class as Dirty COW and CVE-2022-2590. mlx5 has the missing invariant: its ODP path sets the device write bit only for pfns that carry HMM_PFN_WRITE. Restore it in rxe by requiring HMM_PFN_WRITE in rxe_check_pagefault() for every operation except RXE_PAGEFAULT_RDONLY. A write to a non-writable VMA now fails the one fault attempt with -EPERM from hmm_vma_fault() instead of re-faulting forever. For a writable VMA the fault breaks CoW and the write lands in the private page. Keep pmem flushes on the read-only check. arch_wb_cache_pmem() never modifies memory, and the FLUSH access bits do not make the umem writable, so classifying flushes as writes would make every flush against a flush-only MR fail. Fixes: 0b261d7c1cd3 ("RDMA/rxe: Break endless pagefault loop for RO pages") Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260726111533.1037819-1-bestswngs@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun Tested-by: Hongqiang Luo Tested-by: Xinyu Ma Tested-by: Zhanbo Ye Reported-by: Weiming Shi Reported-by: Shaomin Chen Reported-by: Rui Ding Reported-by: Miao Zhao Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky

RDMA/rxe: Fix integer overflow in mr_check_range() leading to OOB access

2026-09-01T10:20:18+00:00

mr_check_range() validates that [iova, iova+length) falls within the registered MR range using wraparound-prone arithmetic: if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova || iova + length > mr->ibmr.iova + mr->ibmr.length) A remote peer can craft an RDMA-Write/Read RETH so that iova + length wraps to 0 (e.g. iova=0xfffffffffffffff8, length=8), bypassing the check. rxe_mr_iova_to_index() then computes a huge index (int idx, only guarded by WARN_ON) and rxe_mr_copy_xarray() dereferences mr->page_info[huge], causing an out-of-bounds read/write and a kernel oops that is triggerable by an unauthenticated remote peer. Rewrite the check in overflow-safe form; the first two clauses guarantee that the subsequent subtractions do not underflow: if (iova < mr->ibmr.iova || length > mr->ibmr.length || iova - mr->ibmr.iova > mr->ibmr.length - length) With the fix, mr_check_range() returns -EINVAL for the crafted iova and the responder reports REMOTE_ACCESS_ERROR instead of triggering the OOB. Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Signed-off-by: Gang Yan Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260814093740.292954-1-gang.yan@linux.dev Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun Reviewed-by: Shukai Ni Tested-by: Shukai Ni Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky

RDMA/rxe: validate access flags before swapping the MR's PD

2026-09-01T10:05:28+00:00

rxe_rereg_user_mr() reassigns mr->ibmr.pd first and only then validates the IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS argument: if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_PD) { rxe_put(old_pd); rxe_get(pd); mr->ibmr.pd = ibpd; } if (flags & IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS) { if (access & ~RXE_ACCESS_SUPPORTED_MR) return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); mr->access = access; } Both flags pass the entry check because RXE_MR_REREG_SUPPORTED is IB_MR_REREG_PD | IB_MR_REREG_ACCESS, so a caller can reach the access check with mr->ibmr.pd already reassigned. mr->ibmr.pd is owned by the core, which adjusts pd->usecnt only on the success path: ib_uverbs_rereg_mr() jumps to put_new_uobj on a driver error without undoing the reassignment, so mr->pd == new_pd while the usecnts still charge the MR to orig_pd. ib_dereg_mr_user() then decrements new_pd, whose count can reach zero while a memory window still references it; uverbs_free_pd() frees the PD on that count alone and rxe_mw_cleanup() writes to freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8881301dd690 by task rxe_poc/591 __rxe_put+0x31/0xa0 rxe_mw_cleanup+0x42/0x200 __rxe_cleanup+0x115/0x370 rxe_dealloc_mw+0x4c/0x80 Allocated by task 591: ib_uverbs_alloc_pd+0x258/0x540 Freed by task 591: ib_dealloc_pd_user+0x174/0x210 uverbs_free_pd+0x8d/0xc0 ib_uverbs_dealloc_pd+0x18e/0x1d0 Validate the access flags before mutating any state so the callback either applies every requested change or none. Fixes: 544c7f62cf32 ("RDMA/rxe: Implement rereg_user_mr") Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei Link: https://patch.msgid.link/46E1D5C0-24BE-4D01-BDB3-634FE09B22C5@doyensec.com Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky

RDMA/siw: Clear association under lock if siw_qp_modify fails in siw_accept

2026-09-01T07:33:04+00:00

We need to clear cep before release state_lock as siw_qp_llp_close and siw_qp_modify->siw_qp_llp_close did. Otherwise if siw_qp_modify() fails in siw_accept(), the QP's state_lock is released before the error path cleanup. A concurrent ibv_modify_qp() transitioning the QP to ERROR can race in this window: siw_accept() ibv_modify_qp(ERROR) ---------------------- ---------------------- siw_qp_modify() fails up_write(&qp->state_lock) down_write(&qp->state_lock) nextstate_from_idle(): if (qp->cep) siw_cep_put(qp->cep) <- frees cep qp->cep = NULL goto error cep->qp = NULL <- UAF Clear qp->cep and drop the association reference taken by siw_cep_get(), all under the write lock held from the initial down_write(&qp->state_lock). Thread B therefore sees qp->cep == NULL, skips its own put, and cannot free the cep before siw_accept() is done with it. Fixes: 6c52fdc244b5 ("rdma/siw: connection management") Reported-by: Shuangpeng Bai Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rdma/d6fbe475-a5c2-f975-99b0-a0bd6b6d10e8@linux.dev/T/#m5876c1ff2de8686a9a1173b8f1aa0ff5363a785c Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260827125553.12831-1-guoqing.jiang@linux.dev Acked-by: Bernard Metzler Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky

Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma

2026-08-21T18:48:54+00:00

Pull RDMA updates from Jason Gunthorpe: "About the normal size, still a lot of AI bug fixes and so on, but some interesting new functionality too: - Assorted locking, bounds-checking, cleanup, and error-path fixes across UCMA/CMA, bng_re, bnxt_re, cxgb4, EFA, ERDMA, HFI1, HNS, ionic, iRDMA, mlx4/mlx5, RXE, SIW, SRP/SRPT, and iSER target. - netlink report for max # of supported resources - get_zeroed_page()/etc removal - Robust udata for ionic - Allow unique RDMA device names per network namespace - Completion counters and v2 admit queue support for EFA - UC QP support for MANA - Completion timestamps for ionic - Harden uverbs data validation and resource lifetime handling, fixing several core use-after-free conditions. - bnxt_re toggle-page ownership and lifetime bug fixes - dmabuf SRQ support for mlx5" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma: (160 commits) RDMA/ucma: Allow path records to exactly fit the output buffer RDMA/uverbs: Guard legacy bundles without method_elm RDMA/efa: Add support for 128B admin v2 SQ entry RDMA/efa: Generalize the admin SQ RDMA/efa: Decouple admin command payload from admin header RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources() RDMA/cma: Fix WARNING in res_to_rt RDMA/cxgb4: Free debugfs on registration failure RDMA/cxgb4: Cancel reg_work before freeing device on remove RDMA/ucma: Lock the handler in ucma_set_ib_path() RDMA/ucma: Lock the handler in ucma_write_cm_event() RDMA/erdma: restrict the driver to little-endian systems RDMA/ionic: Embed counter driver data in rdma_counter allocation RDMA/ionic: Cap eq_count to the eth driver's interrupt vector budget RDMA/siw: Fix use-after-free in siw_accept() IB/isert: post the full-feature receive buffers after session registration IB/isert: delay the final Login Response until the session is registered RDMA/srp: fix heap information leak on a truncated SRP_CRED_REQ RDMA/erdma: Hold QP references for AE and CM processing RDMA/erdma: Hold CQ references when processing EQ events ...

Merge rdma branch 'for-rc' into 'for-next'

2026-08-18T14:05:13+00:00

These did not seem worth sending as a dedicated rc PR during the last week of the cycle. * ko-rdma/for-rc: RDMA/ipoib: Drain RCU callbacks during module teardown RDMA/mlx5: Drain RCU callbacks during module teardown RDMA/core: Wait for RCU callbacks before unloading ib_core RDMA/irdma: Prevent overflows in memory contiguity checks RDMA/siw: publish QP after initialization RDMA/hns: Fix potential integer overflow in mhop hem cleanup RDMA/core: Fix memory leak in __ib_create_cq() on invalid cqe RDMA/mana_ib: initialize err for empty send WR lists RDMA/erdma: initialize ret for empty receive WR lists RDMA/irdma: Prevent user-triggered null deref on QP create RDMA/irdma: Prevent rereg_mr for non-mem regions RDMA/cma: Fix hardware address comparison length in netevent callback RDMa/mlx5: Avoid frame overflow warning IB/mad: Drop unmatched RMPP responses before reassembly Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe

RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources()

2026-08-12T11:53:57+00:00

free_rd_atomic_resources() iterates using qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic. Updating max_dest_rd_atomic before freeing the old array can make the free path walk past the old allocation and trigger a slab out-of-bounds write catched by KASAN: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712 Write of size 4 at addr ffff88802b8dddb8 by task syz.3.451/11063 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 11063 Comm: syz.3.451 Not tainted 7.1.0 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xf7/0x600 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:595 free_rd_atomic_resource drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:180 [inline] free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:171 [inline] free_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:163 [inline] rxe_qp_from_attr+0x1e88/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:712 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fefc75a70cd Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fefc8495018 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fefc7835fa0 RCX: 00007fefc75a70cd RDX: 0000000000000078 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: 00007fefc764f10f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fefc7836038 R14: 00007fefc7835fa0 R15: 00007ffcf0586aa0 Allocated by task 11063: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:78 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5296 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x32a/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline] alloc_rd_atomic_resources drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:155 [inline] rxe_qp_from_attr+0x3f8/0x2150 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c:714 rxe_modify_qp+0x1e2/0x530 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:623 ib_security_modify_qp+0x223/0xfa0 drivers/infiniband/core/security.c:625 _ib_modify_qp+0x333/0xec0 drivers/infiniband/core/verbs.c:1915 modify_qp+0x13ca/0x1940 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1932 ib_uverbs_modify_qp+0xcb/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1958 ib_uverbs_write+0xb86/0x1030 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:680 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x250 fs/read_write.c:740 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802b8ddd80 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 56-byte region [ffff88802b8ddd80, ffff88802b8dddb8) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x2b8dd flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 00fff00000000000 ffff888015c418c0 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000800200020 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 4651, tgid 4651 ((udev-worker)), ts 123427165316, free_ts 123425874255 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0xfc/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:1853 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1861 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x75b/0x3220 mm/page_alloc.c:3941 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x27e/0x2b00 mm/page_alloc.c:5221 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3278 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:3467 [inline] new_slab+0xa6/0x670 mm/slub.c:3525 refill_objects+0x278/0x420 mm/slub.c:7272 refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2816 [inline] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2ed/0x640 mm/slub.c:4652 alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4750 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4884 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5295 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x68d/0x850 mm/slub.c:5308 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:954 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline] tomoyo_encode2+0x100/0x3e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45 tomoyo_encode+0x29/0x50 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80 tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x18c/0x690 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283 tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline] tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x2ab/0x3c0 security/tomoyo/file.c:776 tomoyo_file_open+0x6b/0x90 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c:334 security_file_open+0x7a/0x1b0 security/security.c:2739 do_dentry_open+0x57e/0x1690 fs/open.c:924 vfs_open+0x82/0x3f0 fs/open.c:1079 do_open fs/namei.c:4699 [inline] path_openat+0x218a/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4858 page last free pid 1 tgid 1 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline] __free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1397 [inline] __free_frozen_pages+0x763/0xfc0 mm/page_alloc.c:2938 selinux_genfs_get_sid security/selinux/hooks.c:1364 [inline] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x903/0x1320 security/selinux/hooks.c:1563 selinux_d_instantiate+0x26/0x30 security/selinux/hooks.c:6658 security_d_instantiate+0x123/0x190 security/security.c:3704 d_splice_alias_ops+0x92/0x850 fs/dcache.c:3141 kernfs_iop_lookup+0x23f/0x2d0 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1289 lookup_open.isra.0+0x659/0x1080 fs/namei.c:4484 open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4611 [inline] path_openat+0x17dd/0x3190 fs/namei.c:4855 do_file_open+0x20c/0x430 fs/namei.c:4887 do_sys_openat2+0x101/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1364 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1370 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1386 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1381 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200 fs/open.c:1381 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88802b8ddc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88802b8ddd00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88802b8ddd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88802b8dde00: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88802b8dde80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fix the OOB by moving the assignment after free_rd_atomic_resources() so the old array is freed using the old bound. This matches the original ordering in commit 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver"). Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/365C68B4923F8214+30195a67-0b90-4b92-ab96-2ce41517793c@smail.nju.edu.cn/ Fixes: b6bbee0d2438 ("IB/rxe: Properly honor max IRD value for rd/atomic.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peiyang He Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky

RDMA/siw: Fix use-after-free in siw_accept()

2026-08-06T10:49:53+00:00

siw_accept() looks up the QP supplied by userspace. If that QP is already in RTS, the function jumps to error cleanup before associating the incoming CEP with it. The cleanup tests whether qp->cep is non-NULL and assumes the current call installed the association. However, qp->cep can point to the CEP of an existing connection. The cleanup then drops a reference from the incoming cep, not qp->cep. Once the incoming endpoint loses its remaining references, this can free it before the subsequent cep->qp store, causing a use-after-free. It also clears the existing QP association. Only release the association reference when qp->cep is the incoming CEP. This preserves an existing association and avoids accessing the freed endpoint. Fixes: 6c52fdc244b5 ("rdma/siw: connection management") Signed-off-by: Shuangpeng Bai Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260801213632.1086548-1-shuangpeng.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky