kernel/git/stable/linux.git/fs/afs/security.c, branch linux-4.13.y

afs: Ignore AFS_ACE_READ and AFS_ACE_WRITE for directories

2017-07-09T21:40:12+00:00

The AFS_ACE_READ and AFS_ACE_WRITE permission bits should not be used to make access decisions for the directory itself. They are meant to control access for the objects contained in that directory. Reading a directory is allowed if the AFS_ACE_LOOKUP bit is set. This would cause an incorrect access denied error for a directory with AFS_ACE_LOOKUP but not AFS_ACE_READ. The AFS_ACE_WRITE bit does not allow operations that modify the directory. For a directory with AFS_ACE_WRITE but neither AFS_ACE_INSERT nor AFS_ACE_DELETE, this would result in trying operations that would ultimately be denied by the server. Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

afs: security: Replace rcu_assign_pointer() with RCU_INIT_POINTER()

2017-03-16T16:27:45+00:00

The use of "rcu_assign_pointer()" is NULLing out the pointer. According to RCU_INIT_POINTER()'s block comment: "1. This use of RCU_INIT_POINTER() is NULLing out the pointer" it is better to use it instead of rcu_assign_pointer() because it has a smaller overhead. The following Coccinelle semantic patch was used: @@ @@ - rcu_assign_pointer + RCU_INIT_POINTER (..., NULL) Signed-off-by: Andreea-Cristina Bernat Signed-off-by: David Howells

afs: Adjust mode bits processing

2017-03-16T16:27:44+00:00

Mode bits for an afs file should not be enforced in the usual way. For files, the absence of user bits can restrict file access with respect to what is granted by the server. These bits apply regardless of the owner or the current uid; the rest of the mode bits (group, other) are ignored. Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David Howells

->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to ->permission()

2011-07-20T05:43:24+00:00

not used by the instances anymore. Signed-off-by: Al Viro

->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to generic_permission()

2011-07-20T05:43:22+00:00

redundant; all callers get it duplicated in mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK and none of them removes that bit. Signed-off-by: Al Viro

kill check_acl callback of generic_permission()

2011-07-20T05:43:16+00:00

its value depends only on inode and does not change; we might as well store it in ->i_op->check_acl and be done with that. Signed-off-by: Al Viro

fs: provide rcu-walk aware permission i_ops

2011-01-07T06:50:29+00:00

Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin

AFS: Potential null dereference

2010-03-22T16:57:19+00:00

It seems clear from the surrounding code that xpermits is allowed to be NULL here. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

[PATCH] sanitize ->permission() prototype

2008-07-27T00:53:14+00:00

* kill nameidata * argument; map the 3 bits in ->flags anybody cares about to new MAY_... ones and pass with the mask. * kill redundant gfs2_iop_permission() * sanitize ecryptfs_permission() * fix remaining places where ->permission() instances might barf on new MAY_... found in mask. The obvious next target in that direction is permission(9) folded fix for nfs_permission() breakage from Miklos Szeredi Signed-off-by: Al Viro

fs/afs/security.c: fix uninitialized var warning

2008-02-08T17:22:36+00:00

fs/afs/security.c: In function 'afs_permission': fs/afs/security.c:290: warning: 'access' may be used uninitialized in this function Cc: David Howells Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds