<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/stable/linux.git/fs/btrfs/tree-checker.c, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=master</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=master'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-06-30T00:02:02+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: tree-checker: validate INODE_REF's namelen</title>
<updated>2026-06-30T00:02:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Weiming Shi</name>
<email>bestswngs@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-10T22:26:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3dc22abc21f5892406c09202fa2627196cc96967'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3dc22abc21f5892406c09202fa2627196cc96967</id>
<content type='text'>
[BUG]
A crafted btrfs image can trigger the following crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffd1dc42884000
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  CPU: 9 UID: 0 PID: 1034 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-custom+ #383 PREEMPT(full)  46af0a92938a63be7132e0dfd71e62327c51d5c2
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x10
  Call Trace:
   &lt;TASK&gt;
   read_extent_buffer+0xe4/0x100 [btrfs 3cf0785dd58fec8c5ff84633b772f17ce1f92a8f]
   btrfs_get_name+0x15e/0x1e0 [btrfs 3cf0785dd58fec8c5ff84633b772f17ce1f92a8f]
   reconnect_path+0x165/0x390
   exportfs_decode_fh_raw+0x337/0x400
   ? drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0xb0/0xb0
   &lt;/TASK&gt;
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  RIP: 0010:memcpy+0xc/0x10
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

[CAUSE]
TThe crafted image has the following corrupted INODE_REF item:

         item 9 key (258 INODE_REF 257) itemoff 11544 itemsize 4106
         	index 2 namelen 4096 name: d\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000\000

The itemsize matches the namelen, but the namelen is 4096, way larger
than normal name length limit (BTRFS_NAME_LEN, 255).

Meanwhile the memory of the @name is only 255 byte sized, this will cause
out-of-boundary access, and cause the above crash.

[FIX]
Add extra namelen verification for INODE_REF, just like what we have
done in ROOT_REF checks.

Now the crafted image can be rejected gracefully:

 BTRFS critical (device dm-2): corrupt leaf: root=5 block=30572544 slot=14 ino=259, invalid inode ref name length, has 4096 expect [1, 255]
 BTRFS error (device dm-2): read time tree block corruption detected on logical 30572544 mirror 2

Reported-by: Xiang Mei &lt;xmei5@asu.edu&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/aik0hEV6ehKx6Ldv@Air.local/
Acked-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi &lt;bestswngs@gmail.com&gt;
[ Rebase, add a Link: tag, add an simple cause analyze ]
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: validate data reloc tree file extent item members</title>
<updated>2026-06-09T16:22:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Teng Liu</name>
<email>27rabbitlt@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-13T11:35:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=a6908f88c9da9778957a07ac568aa643124278a8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a6908f88c9da9778957a07ac568aa643124278a8</id>
<content type='text'>
get_new_location() uses BUG_ON() to crash the kernel if the file extent
item it looks up has any of offset, compression, encryption, or
other_encoding set non-zero. The data reloc inode is only written by
relocation's own paths and the four fields are always 0 in what the
kernel writes:

  - insert_prealloc_file_extent() memsets the stack item to zero and
    only fills in type, disk_bytenr, disk_num_bytes and num_bytes, so
    offset/compression/encryption/other_encoding stay 0.
  - insert_ordered_extent_file_extent() copies oe-&gt;compress_type into
    the file extent's compression field, but the data reloc inode is
    created with BTRFS_INODE_NOCOMPRESS so compress_type is always 0;
    encryption and other_encoding are reserved-and-zero in btrfs.

A non-zero value here means the leaf decoded from disk does not match
what the kernel wrote, i.e. on-disk corruption. A malformed image
reaches this code via balance and panics the kernel.

A previous attempt to enforce all four constraints in tree-checker's
check_extent_data_item() was merged as commit 7d0ee95979e9 ("btrfs:
validate data reloc tree file extent item members in tree-checker")
and then reverted by commit 1c034697fcaa after btrfs/061 produced
false positives on arm64 with 64K pages. The reason: relocation
writeback legitimately produces REG file_extent_items with offset != 0
in the data reloc tree. When an ordered extent covers only the back
portion of an underlying PREALLOC (num_bytes &lt; ram_bytes on the input
file_extent), insert_ordered_extent_file_extent() inserts a REG with

  offset    = oe-&gt;offset
  num_bytes = oe-&gt;num_bytes
  ram_bytes preserved from the original PREALLOC,

and this item can reach disk if a transaction commit fires while it
is present in the leaf.

The four fields belong in different layers:

  - compression, encryption and other_encoding are universal
    invariants for every item in the data reloc tree, regardless of
    cluster geometry. Enforce them in tree-checker's
    check_extent_data_item() so a corrupt leaf is rejected at read
    time.

  - offset is only an invariant at the cluster-boundary keys that
    get_new_location() searches (the key is computed as
    src_disk_bytenr - reloc_block_group_start). Partial-PREALLOC
    writebacks legitimately place REG items at non-boundary keys with
    offset != 0; tree-checker cannot reject these. The cluster-
    boundary item is always written by either
    insert_prealloc_file_extent() (offset=0 by memset) or by the
    front portion of a partial writeback (offset=0 by construction),
    so a non-zero offset there is corruption.

Enforce the universal invariants in check_extent_data_item() with a
file_extent_err() rejection. Convert the BUG_ON() in
get_new_location() to a -EUCLEAN return paired with btrfs_print_leaf()
and btrfs_err() so the offending leaf is logged. The caller in
replace_file_extents() already handles non-zero returns from
get_new_location() by breaking out of the loop without aborting the
transaction.

Suggested-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Suggested-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+3e20d8f3d41bac5dc9a2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3e20d8f3d41bac5dc9a2
Signed-off-by: Teng Liu &lt;27rabbitlt@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: tree-checker: add more cross checks for free space tree</title>
<updated>2026-06-08T13:53:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-11T00:56:51+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=dfd70996e5894214ac49255131a2def1b8b9c19f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dfd70996e5894214ac49255131a2def1b8b9c19f</id>
<content type='text'>
This introduces extra checks using the previous key.

If there is a previous key, we can do extra validations:

- The previous key is FREE_SPACE_INFO
  This means the current extent/bitmap should be inside the
  free space info key range.

  And matches the type of the free space info.

- The previous key is FREE_SPACE_EXTENT or FREE_SPACE_BITMAP
  In that case both the current and previous key should belong to the same
  block group.

  Thus the key type must match, and no overlap between the two keys.

These extra checks are inspired by the recently added type checks during
free space tree loading.

The new tree-checker checks will allow earlier detection, but the
loading time checks are still needed, as the tree-checker checks are
still inside the same leaf, not matching per-bg level checks.

Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: tree-checker: ensure free space tree entries won't overflow</title>
<updated>2026-06-08T13:53:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-11T00:56:50+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=c37d09450c2e6d646d6dfc248e6c94f8669264d9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c37d09450c2e6d646d6dfc248e6c94f8669264d9</id>
<content type='text'>
Add an extra check to ensure the free space extent/bitmap and space info
keys won't overflow.

Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: tree-checker: extract the shared key check for free space entries</title>
<updated>2026-06-08T13:53:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Qu Wenruo</name>
<email>wqu@suse.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-11T00:56:49+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=6e4fe45f21ea741f90b5dfeea6b2e763d5642b18'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6e4fe45f21ea741f90b5dfeea6b2e763d5642b18</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently both check_free_space_extent() and check_free_space_bitmap()
share a very common validation on the keys.

Extract them into a helper, check_free_space_common_key(), and
change the output string ("extent" or "bitmap") depending on the key type.

Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: tree-checker: validate names in ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF</title>
<updated>2026-06-08T13:53:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhang Cen</name>
<email>rollkingzzc@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-11T07:01:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=0af37c217edf15fa21dac1c40822086df356c6bb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0af37c217edf15fa21dac1c40822086df356c6bb</id>
<content type='text'>
ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items contain a struct btrfs_root_ref followed
by the subvolume name. Several readers assume that this layout is already
valid and then use the on-disk name length directly. A corrupted item can
therefore make those readers address bytes outside the item, and
BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO can copy too many bytes into its fixed-size UAPI
name buffer.

Validate ROOT_REF and ROOT_BACKREF items in tree-checker before any reader
uses them. Reject records that do not contain a non-empty name, whose
name_len does not exactly describe the remaining item payload, or whose
name exceeds BTRFS_NAME_LEN.

For BTRFS_IOC_GET_SUBVOL_INFO, copy only the validated on-disk name_len
instead of deriving the copy length from the item size. The ioctl result is
zeroed when allocated. That leaves the existing trailing zero byte
untouched.

Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen &lt;rollkingzzc@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: free-space-tree: reject mismatched extent and bitmap items</title>
<updated>2026-06-08T13:53:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Zhang Cen</name>
<email>rollkingzzc@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-10T15:03:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=42b00a651aa18beb9697a66d932cb390d6d71b8f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:42b00a651aa18beb9697a66d932cb390d6d71b8f</id>
<content type='text'>
btrfs_load_free_space_tree() reads FREE_SPACE_INFO once and then chooses
the bitmap or extent loader for all following free-space records until the
next FREE_SPACE_INFO item. Those loaders currently enforce the selected
record type only with ASSERT().

On production builds without CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT, a malformed free-space
tree can therefore be decoded in the wrong mode. An EXTENT item can reach
btrfs_free_space_test_bit() as bitmap data, while a BITMAP item can be
added as a full free extent. The latter corrupts the in-memory free-space
cache and the former can read beyond the item payload.

Sanitizer validation reported:
general protection fault
Call trace:
  assert_eb_folio_uptodate() (fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4134)
  extent_buffer_test_bit() (?:?)
  btrfs_free_space_test_bit() (fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:518)
  srso_alias_return_thunk() (arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:375)
  __entry_text_end() (?:?)
  __asan_memcpy() (mm/kasan/shadow.c:103)
  read_extent_buffer() (?:?)
  load_free_space_bitmaps() (fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1548)
  btrfs_get_32() (fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:?)
  btrfs_set_16() (fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:?)
  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof() (?:?)
  btrfs_load_free_space_tree() (fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1685)
  load_free_space_tree_for_test() (?:?)
  rcu_disable_urgency_upon_qs() (kernel/rcu/tree.c:721)
  vprintk_emit() (?:?)
  __up_write() (kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1401)
  clone_commit_root_for_test() (?:?)
  test_extent_as_bitmap_mode_mismatch() (?:?)
  kmem_cache_free() (?:?)
  btrfs_free_path() (fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1449)
  __add_block_group_free_space() (fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:20)
  run_test() (?:?)
  do_raw_spin_unlock() (?:?)
  btrfs_test_free_space_tree() (fs/btrfs/tests/free-space-tree-tests.c:547)
  btrfs_test_qgroups() (fs/btrfs/tests/qgroup-tests.c:462)
  btrfs_run_sanity_tests() (fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:?)
  init_btrfs_fs() (fs/btrfs/super.c:2690)
  do_one_initcall() (init/main.c:1382)
  __kasan_kmalloc() (?:?)
  rcu_is_watching() (?:?)
  do_initcalls() (init/main.c:1457)
  kernel_init_freeable() (init/main.c:1674)
  kernel_init() (init/main.c:1584)
  ret_from_fork() (?:?)
  __switch_to() (?:?)
  ret_from_fork_asm() (?:?)

Validate every post-info key before decoding it. Reject keys whose type
does not match the mode selected by FREE_SPACE_INFO, and reject keys
whose range extends past the block group, returning -EUCLEAN instead of
feeding the wrong record type to the bitmap or extent decoder.

Also reject zero-length FREE_SPACE_EXTENT items in tree-checker, matching
the existing FREE_SPACE_BITMAP zero-length check. This keeps the loader
range check simple and prevents a zero-length extent item from being a
valid on-disk free-space record.

Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo &lt;wqu@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen &lt;rollkingzzc@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: tree-checker: add remap-tree checks to check_block_group_item()</title>
<updated>2026-04-07T16:56:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Harmstone</name>
<email>mark@harmstone.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-25T12:53:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b753612be0dc64744d6b027c93d32b1f895196e2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b753612be0dc64744d6b027c93d32b1f895196e2</id>
<content type='text'>
Add some write-time checks for block group items relating to the remap
tree.

Here we're checking:

* That the REMAPPED or METADATA_REMAP flags aren't set unless the
  REMAP_TREE incompat flag is also set
* That `remap_bytes` isn't more than the size of the block group
* That `identity_remap_count` isn't more than the number of sectors in
  the block group

Signed-off-by: Mark Harmstone &lt;mark@harmstone.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: tree-checker: check remap-tree flags in btrfs_check_chunk_valid()</title>
<updated>2026-04-07T16:56:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Harmstone</name>
<email>mark@harmstone.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-04T12:02:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=18addf9ec82f857bb36891bb5d93cc4a82281360'/>
<id>urn:sha1:18addf9ec82f857bb36891bb5d93cc4a82281360</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a check to btrfs_check_chunk_valid() that the METADATA_REMAP and
REMAPPED flags are only set if the REMAP_TREE incompat flag is also set.

Signed-off-by: Mark Harmstone &lt;mark@harmstone.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>btrfs: tree-checker: add checker for items in remap tree</title>
<updated>2026-04-07T16:56:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Harmstone</name>
<email>mark@harmstone.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-03T15:59:12+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=da08c02bc705694f51edb67b094f1e5db629c1e2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:da08c02bc705694f51edb67b094f1e5db629c1e2</id>
<content type='text'>
Add write-time checking of items in the remap tree, to catch errors
before they are written to disk.

We're checking:

* That remap items, remap backrefs, and identity remaps aren't written
  unless the REMAP_TREE incompat flag is set
* That identity remaps have a size of 0
* That remap items and remap backrefs have a size of sizeof(struct
  btrfs_remap_item)
* That the objectid for these items is aligned to the sector size
* That the offset for these items (i.e. the size of the remapping) isn't
  0 and is aligned to the sector size
* That objectid + offset doesn't overflow

Signed-off-by: Mark Harmstone &lt;mark@harmstone.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Sterba &lt;dsterba@suse.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
