kernel/git/stable/linux.git/net/ceph, branch linux-4.10.y

libceph: force GFP_NOIO for socket allocations

2017-04-08T07:35:03+00:00

commit 633ee407b9d15a75ac9740ba9d3338815e1fcb95 upstream. sock_alloc_inode() allocates socket+inode and socket_wq with GFP_KERNEL, which is not allowed on the writeback path: Workqueue: ceph-msgr con_work [libceph] ffff8810871cb018 0000000000000046 0000000000000000 ffff881085d40000 0000000000012b00 ffff881025cad428 ffff8810871cbfd8 0000000000012b00 ffff880102fc1000 ffff881085d40000 ffff8810871cb038 ffff8810871cb148 Call Trace: [] schedule+0x29/0x70 [] schedule_timeout+0x1bd/0x200 [] ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x2c/0x120 [] ? ttwu_do_activate.constprop.135+0x66/0x70 [] wait_for_completion+0xbf/0x180 [] ? try_to_wake_up+0x390/0x390 [] flush_work+0x165/0x250 [] ? worker_detach_from_pool+0xd0/0xd0 [] xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x81/0x200 [xfs] [] ? __slab_free+0xee/0x234 [] _xfs_log_force_lsn+0x4d/0x2c0 [xfs] [] ? lookup_page_cgroup_used+0xe/0x30 [] ? xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs] [] xfs_log_force_lsn+0x3f/0xf0 [xfs] [] ? xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs] [] xfs_iunpin_wait+0xc6/0x1a0 [xfs] [] ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x40/0x40 [] xfs_reclaim_inode+0xa3/0x330 [xfs] [] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x257/0x3d0 [xfs] [] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x33/0x40 [xfs] [] xfs_fs_free_cached_objects+0x15/0x20 [xfs] [] super_cache_scan+0x178/0x180 [] shrink_slab_node+0x14e/0x340 [] ? mem_cgroup_iter+0x16b/0x450 [] shrink_slab+0x100/0x140 [] do_try_to_free_pages+0x335/0x490 [] try_to_free_pages+0xb9/0x1f0 [] ? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0x69/0x1be [] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x69a/0xb40 [] alloc_pages_current+0x9e/0x110 [] new_slab+0x2c5/0x390 [] __slab_alloc+0x33b/0x459 [] ? sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0 [] ? inet_sendmsg+0x71/0xc0 [] ? sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0 [] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1a2/0x1b0 [] sock_alloc_inode+0x2d/0xd0 [] alloc_inode+0x26/0xa0 [] new_inode_pseudo+0x1a/0x70 [] sock_alloc+0x1e/0x80 [] __sock_create+0x95/0x220 [] sock_create_kern+0x24/0x30 [] con_work+0xef9/0x2050 [libceph] [] ? rbd_img_request_submit+0x4c/0x60 [rbd] [] process_one_work+0x159/0x4f0 [] worker_thread+0x11b/0x530 [] ? create_worker+0x1d0/0x1d0 [] kthread+0xc9/0xe0 [] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x90/0x90 [] ret_from_fork+0x58/0x90 [] ? flush_kthread_worker+0x90/0x90 Use memalloc_noio_{save,restore}() to temporarily force GFP_NOIO here. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19309 Reported-by: Sergey Jerusalimov Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: don't set weight to IN when OSD is destroyed

2017-03-30T07:44:09+00:00

commit b581a5854eee4b7851dedb0f8c2ceb54fb902c06 upstream. Since ceph.git commit 4e28f9e63644 ("osd/OSDMap: clear osd_info, osd_xinfo on osd deletion"), weight is set to IN when OSD is deleted. This changes the result of applying an incremental for clients, not just OSDs. Because CRUSH computations are obviously affected, pre-4e28f9e63644 servers disagree with post-4e28f9e63644 clients on object placement, resulting in misdirected requests. Mirrors ceph.git commit a6009d1039a55e2c77f431662b3d6cc5a8e8e63f. Fixes: 930c53286977 ("libceph: apply new_state before new_up_client on incrementals") Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/19122 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ceph: update readpages osd request according to size of pages

2017-03-12T05:44:21+00:00

commit d641df819db8b80198fd85d9de91137e8a823b07 upstream. add_to_page_cache_lru() can fails, so the actual pages to read can be smaller than the initial size of osd request. We need to update osd request size in that case. Signed-off-by: Yan, Zheng Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

libceph: make sure ceph_aes_crypt() IV is aligned

2017-01-18T16:58:45+00:00

... otherwise the crypto stack will align it for us with a GFP_ATOMIC allocation and a memcpy() -- see skcipher_walk_first(). Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: remove now unused finish_request() wrapper

2016-12-14T21:39:08+00:00

Kill the wrapper and rename __finish_request() to finish_request(). Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: always signal completion when done

2016-12-14T21:39:08+00:00

r_safe_completion is currently, and has always been, signaled only if on-disk ack was requested. It's there for fsync and syncfs, which wait for in-flight writes to flush - all data write requests set ONDISK. However, the pool perm check code introduced in 4.2 sends a write request with only ACK set. An unfortunately timed syncfs can then hang forever: r_safe_completion won't be signaled because only an unsafe reply was requested. We could patch ceph_osdc_sync() to skip !ONDISK write requests, but that is somewhat incomplete and yet another special case. Instead, rename this completion to r_done_completion and always signal it when the OSD client is done with the request, whether unsafe, safe, or error. This is a bit cleaner and helps with the cancellation code. Reported-by: Yan, Zheng Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

crush: include mapper.h in mapper.c

2016-12-12T22:54:26+00:00

Include linux/crush/mapper.h in crush/mapper.c to get the prototypes of crush_find_rule and crush_do_rule which are defined there. This fixes the following GCC warnings when building with 'W=1': net/ceph/crush/mapper.c:40:5: warning: no previous prototype for ‘crush_find_rule’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] net/ceph/crush/mapper.c:793:5: warning: no previous prototype for ‘crush_do_rule’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser [idryomov@gmail.com: corresponding !__KERNEL__ include] Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov

libceph: no need to drop con->mutex for ->get_authorizer()

2016-12-12T22:09:21+00:00

->get_authorizer(), ->verify_authorizer_reply(), ->sign_message() and ->check_message_signature() shouldn't be doing anything with or on the connection (like closing it or sending messages). Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil

libceph: drop len argument of *verify_authorizer_reply()

2016-12-12T22:09:21+00:00

The length of the reply is protocol-dependent - for cephx it's ceph_x_authorize_reply. Nothing sensible can be passed from the messenger layer anyway. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil

libceph: verify authorize reply on connect

2016-12-12T22:09:21+00:00

After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b), the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks. The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(), ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never invoked by the the messenger. AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph: negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol"). The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill it in the next commit. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Sage Weil