kernel/git/stable/linux.git/net/irda, branch linux-2.6.32.y

net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument

2016-01-29T21:12:42+00:00

commit 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 upstream. éæ°¸å reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by using a simple program: int socket_fd; struct sockaddr_in addr; addr.sin_port = 0; addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; addr.sin_family = 10; socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000); connect(socket_fd , &addr,16); AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly, thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and store a zero in the protocol fields. This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which is NULL for raw sockets. kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70 kernel: [] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80 kernel: [] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110 kernel: [] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80 kernel: [] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200 kernel: [] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10 kernel: [] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89 I found no particular commit which introduced this problem. CVE: CVE-2015-8543 Cc: Cong Wang Reported-by: éæ°¸å Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa Signed-off-by: David S. Miller [bwh: Backported to 2.6.32: open-code U8_MAX; adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau

net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic

2014-05-19T05:54:00+00:00

CVE-2013-7266 BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1267081 This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage) to return msg_name to the user. This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak uninitialized memory. Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets msg_name to NULL. Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David Miller. Changes since RFC: Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of verify_iovec. With this change in place I could remove " if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0) msg->msg_name = NULL ". This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL. Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change comments to netdev style. Cc: David Miller Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa Signed-off-by: David S. Miller (back ported from commit f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c) Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques Acked-by: Andy Whitcroft Acked-by: Stefan Bader Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau

irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()

2013-06-10T09:43:46+00:00

commit 5ae94c0d2f0bed41d6718be743985d61b7f5c47d upstream. The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set. It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was set. Cc: Samuel Ortiz Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause Signed-off-by: David S. Miller [dannf: adjusted to apply to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau

irda: prevent integer underflow in IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES

2011-04-14T23:53:54+00:00

commit fdac1e0697356ac212259f2147aa60c72e334861 upstream. If the user-provided len is less than the expected offset, the IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES getsockopt will do a copy_to_user() with a very large size value. While this isn't be a security issue on x86 because it will get caught by the access_ok() check, it may leak large amounts of kernel heap on other architectures. In any event, this patch fixes it. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

irda: prevent heap corruption on invalid nickname

2011-04-14T23:53:25+00:00

commit d50e7e3604778bfc2dc40f440e0742dbae399d54 upstream. Invalid nicknames containing only spaces will result in an underflow in a memcpy size calculation, subsequently destroying the heap and panicking. v2 also catches the case where the provided nickname is longer than the buffer size, which can result in controllable heap corruption. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths

2011-04-14T23:53:25+00:00

commit d370af0ef7951188daeb15bae75db7ba57c67846 upstream. Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack buffer overflows. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

irda: Fix heap memory corruption in iriap.c

2010-12-09T21:26:32+00:00

commit 37f9fc452d138dfc4da2ee1ce5ae85094efc3606 upstream. While parsing the GetValuebyClass command frame, we could potentially write passed the skb->data pointer. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

irda: Fix parameter extraction stack overflow

2010-12-09T21:26:32+00:00

commit efc463eb508798da4243625b08c7396462cabf9f upstream. Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

irda: Correctly clean up self->ias_obj on irda_bind() failure.

2010-09-27T00:21:16+00:00

[ Upstream commit 628e300cccaa628d8fb92aa28cb7530a3d5f2257 ] If irda_open_tsap() fails, the irda_bind() code tries to destroy the ->ias_obj object by hand, but does so wrongly. In particular, it fails to a) release the hashbin attached to the object and b) reset the self->ias_obj pointer to NULL. Fix both problems by using irias_delete_object() and explicitly setting self->ias_obj to NULL, just as irda_release() does. Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

irda: off by one

2010-09-20T20:17:52+00:00

commit cf9b94f88bdbe8a02015fc30d7c232b2d262d4ad upstream. This is an off by one. We would go past the end when we NUL terminate the "value" string at end of the function. The "value" buffer is allocated in irlan_client_parse_response() or irlan_provider_parse_command(). CC: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: David S. Miller