<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/stable/linux.git/net/tls, branch linux-4.17.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.17.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=linux-4.17.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:06:58+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>tls: fix skb_to_sgvec returning unhandled error.</title>
<updated>2018-08-24T11:06:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Doron Roberts-Kedes</name>
<email>doronrk@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-02T17:25:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3634c1433bbcc929dc054a86798296f0e937fe53'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3634c1433bbcc929dc054a86798296f0e937fe53</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 52ee6ef36ee10dd493cf2067311e56ca8015eb8d ]

The current code does not inspect the return value of skb_to_sgvec. This
can cause a nullptr kernel panic when the malformed sgvec is passed into
the crypto request.

Checking the return value of skb_to_sgvec and skipping decryption if it
is negative fixes this problem.

Fixes: c46234ebb4d1 ("tls: RX path for ktls")
Acked-by: Dave Watson &lt;davejwatson@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doron Roberts-Kedes &lt;doronrk@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tls: check RCV_SHUTDOWN in tls_wait_data</title>
<updated>2018-07-28T05:57:14+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Doron Roberts-Kedes</name>
<email>doronrk@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-18T23:22:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=c049fc66cca2c1e2a207730c9aa35e731fd6c9e5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c049fc66cca2c1e2a207730c9aa35e731fd6c9e5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fcf4793e278edede8fcd748198d12128037e526c ]

The current code does not check sk-&gt;sk_shutdown &amp; RCV_SHUTDOWN.
tls_sw_recvmsg may return a positive value in the case where bytes have
already been copied when the socket is shutdown. sk-&gt;sk_err has been
cleared, causing the tls_wait_data to hang forever on a subsequent
invocation. Checking sk-&gt;sk_shutdown &amp; RCV_SHUTDOWN, as in tcp_recvmsg,
fixes this problem.

Fixes: c46234ebb4d1 ("tls: RX path for ktls")
Acked-by: Dave Watson &lt;davejwatson@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Doron Roberts-Kedes &lt;doronrk@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tls: Stricter error checking in zerocopy sendmsg path</title>
<updated>2018-07-22T13:16:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Watson</name>
<email>davejwatson@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-12T15:03:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=cf3fd8f306f08401ae40eb7de13ef2e94011e706'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cf3fd8f306f08401ae40eb7de13ef2e94011e706</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 32da12216e467dea70a09cd7094c30779ce0f9db upstream.

In the zerocopy sendmsg() path, there are error checks to revert
the zerocopy if we get any error code.  syzkaller has discovered
that tls_push_record can return -ECONNRESET, which is fatal, and
happens after the point at which it is safe to revert the iter,
as we've already passed the memory to do_tcp_sendpages.

Previously this code could return -ENOMEM and we would want to
revert the iter, but AFAIK this no longer returns ENOMEM after
a447da7d004 ("tls: fix waitall behavior in tls_sw_recvmsg"),
so we fail for all error codes.

Reported-by: syzbot+c226690f7b3126c5ee04@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+709f2810a6a05f11d4d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Dave Watson &lt;davejwatson@fb.com&gt;
Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ("tls: kernel TLS support")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tls: fix waitall behavior in tls_sw_recvmsg</title>
<updated>2018-06-25T23:51:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-15T01:07:46+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=6196f30e84ca9f8ad53cd15aaef163b453ed7d20'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6196f30e84ca9f8ad53cd15aaef163b453ed7d20</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 06030dbaf3b6c5801dcdb7fe4fbab3b91c8da84a ]

Current behavior in tls_sw_recvmsg() is to wait for incoming tls
messages and copy up to exactly len bytes of data that the user
provided. This is problematic in the sense that i) if no packet
is currently queued in strparser we keep waiting until one has been
processed and pushed into tls receive layer for tls_wait_data() to
wake up and push the decrypted bits to user space. Given after
tls decryption, we're back at streaming data, use sock_rcvlowat()
hint from tcp socket instead. Retain current behavior with MSG_WAITALL
flag and otherwise use the hint target for breaking the loop and
returning to application. This is done if currently no ctx-&gt;recv_pkt
is ready, otherwise continue to process it from our strparser
backlog.

Fixes: c46234ebb4d1 ("tls: RX path for ktls")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Watson &lt;davejwatson@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tls: fix use-after-free in tls_push_record</title>
<updated>2018-06-25T23:51:18+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Borkmann</name>
<email>daniel@iogearbox.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-15T01:07:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=7fd98de479ea75144d71862d67eb597c868bf453'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7fd98de479ea75144d71862d67eb597c868bf453</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a447da7d00410278c90d3576782a43f8b675d7be ]

syzkaller managed to trigger a use-after-free in tls like the
following:

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tls_push_record.constprop.15+0x6a2/0x810 [tls]
  Write of size 1 at addr ffff88037aa08000 by task a.out/2317

  CPU: 3 PID: 2317 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.17.0+ #144
  Hardware name: LENOVO 20FBCTO1WW/20FBCTO1WW, BIOS N1FET47W (1.21 ) 11/28/2016
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x71/0xab
   print_address_description+0x6a/0x280
   kasan_report+0x258/0x380
   ? tls_push_record.constprop.15+0x6a2/0x810 [tls]
   tls_push_record.constprop.15+0x6a2/0x810 [tls]
   tls_sw_push_pending_record+0x2e/0x40 [tls]
   tls_sk_proto_close+0x3fe/0x710 [tls]
   ? tcp_check_oom+0x4c0/0x4c0
   ? tls_write_space+0x260/0x260 [tls]
   ? kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0
   inet_release+0xd6/0x1b0
   __sock_release+0xc0/0x240
   sock_close+0x11/0x20
   __fput+0x22d/0x660
   task_work_run+0x114/0x1a0
   do_exit+0x71a/0x2780
   ? mm_update_next_owner+0x650/0x650
   ? handle_mm_fault+0x2f5/0x5f0
   ? __do_page_fault+0x44f/0xa50
   ? mm_fault_error+0x2d0/0x2d0
   do_group_exit+0xde/0x300
   __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
   do_syscall_64+0x9a/0x300
   ? page_fault+0x8/0x30
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

This happened through fault injection where aead_req allocation in
tls_do_encryption() eventually failed and we returned -ENOMEM from
the function. Turns out that the use-after-free is triggered from
tls_sw_sendmsg() in the second tls_push_record(). The error then
triggers a jump to waiting for memory in sk_stream_wait_memory()
resp. returning immediately in case of MSG_DONTWAIT. What follows is
the trim_both_sgl(sk, orig_size), which drops elements from the sg
list added via tls_sw_sendmsg(). Now the use-after-free gets triggered
when the socket is being closed, where tls_sk_proto_close() callback
is invoked. The tls_complete_pending_work() will figure that there's
a pending closed tls record to be flushed and thus calls into the
tls_push_pending_closed_record() from there. ctx-&gt;push_pending_record()
is called from the latter, which is the tls_sw_push_pending_record()
from sw path. This again calls into tls_push_record(). And here the
tls_fill_prepend() will panic since the buffer address has been freed
earlier via trim_both_sgl(). One way to fix it is to move the aead
request allocation out of tls_do_encryption() early into tls_push_record().
This means we don't prep the tls header and advance state to the
TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD before allocation which could potentially
fail happened. That fixes the issue on my side.

Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ("tls: kernel TLS support")
Reported-by: syzbot+5c74af81c547738e1684@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+709f2810a6a05f11d4d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann &lt;daniel@iogearbox.net&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Watson &lt;davejwatson@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tls: don't use stack memory in a scatterlist</title>
<updated>2018-05-17T18:49:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Matt Mullins</name>
<email>mmullins@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-16T17:48:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=8ab6ffba14a466c7298cb3fd5066d774d2977ad1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8ab6ffba14a466c7298cb3fd5066d774d2977ad1</id>
<content type='text'>
scatterlist code expects virt_to_page() to work, which fails with
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y.

Fixes: c46234ebb4d1e ("tls: RX path for ktls")
Signed-off-by: Matt Mullins &lt;mmullins@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tls: Fix connection stall on partial tls record</title>
<updated>2018-05-08T03:47:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andre Tomt</name>
<email>andre@tomt.net</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-07T02:24:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=080324c36ade319f57e505633ab54f6f53289b45'/>
<id>urn:sha1:080324c36ade319f57e505633ab54f6f53289b45</id>
<content type='text'>
In the case of writing a partial tls record we forgot to clear the
ctx-&gt;in_tcp_sendpages flag, causing some connections to stall.

Fixes: c212d2c7fc47 ("net/tls: Don't recursively call push_record during tls_write_space callbacks")
Signed-off-by: Andre Tomt &lt;andre@tomt.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tls: fix use after free in tls_sk_proto_close</title>
<updated>2018-05-08T03:40:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-05T15:35:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=98f0a39529e553bb45c0a7d775d2cc2afe9ed91d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:98f0a39529e553bb45c0a7d775d2cc2afe9ed91d</id>
<content type='text'>
syzbot reported a use-after-free in tls_sk_proto_close

Add a boolean value to cleanup a bit this function.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tls_sk_proto_close+0x8ab/0x9c0 net/tls/tls_main.c:297
Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801ae40a858 by task syz-executor363/4503

CPU: 0 PID: 4503 Comm: syz-executor363 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #34
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
 tls_sk_proto_close+0x8ab/0x9c0 net/tls/tls_main.c:297
 inet_release+0x104/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427
 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:460
 sock_release+0x96/0x1b0 net/socket.c:594
 sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1149
 __fput+0x34d/0x890 fs/file_table.c:209
 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243
 task_work_run+0x1e4/0x290 kernel/task_work.c:113
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
 do_exit+0x1aee/0x2730 kernel/exit.c:865
 do_group_exit+0x16f/0x430 kernel/exit.c:968
 get_signal+0x886/0x1960 kernel/signal.c:2469
 do_signal+0x98/0x2040 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:810
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x28a/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
 syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x6ac/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4457b9
RSP: 002b:00007fdf4d766da8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00000000006dac3c RCX: 00000000004457b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000006dac3c
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dac38
R13: 3692738801137283 R14: 6bf92c39443c4c1d R15: 0000000000000006

Allocated by task 4498:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
 kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x152/0x780 mm/slab.c:3620
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:512 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:701 [inline]
 create_ctx net/tls/tls_main.c:521 [inline]
 tls_init+0x1f9/0xb00 net/tls/tls_main.c:633
 tcp_set_ulp+0x1bc/0x520 net/ipv4/tcp_ulp.c:153
 do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.39+0x44a/0x2600 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2588
 tcp_setsockopt+0xc1/0xe0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2893
 sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3039
 __sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 4503:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
 kfree+0xd9/0x260 mm/slab.c:3813
 tls_sw_free_resources+0x2a3/0x360 net/tls/tls_sw.c:1037
 tls_sk_proto_close+0x67c/0x9c0 net/tls/tls_main.c:288
 inet_release+0x104/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427
 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:460
 sock_release+0x96/0x1b0 net/socket.c:594
 sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1149
 __fput+0x34d/0x890 fs/file_table.c:209
 ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243
 task_work_run+0x1e4/0x290 kernel/task_work.c:113
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
 do_exit+0x1aee/0x2730 kernel/exit.c:865
 do_group_exit+0x16f/0x430 kernel/exit.c:968
 get_signal+0x886/0x1960 kernel/signal.c:2469
 do_signal+0x98/0x2040 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:810
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x28a/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
 syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x6ac/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801ae40a800
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
 256-byte region [ffff8801ae40a800, ffff8801ae40a900)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0006b90280 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801ae40a080 index:0x0
flags: 0x2fffc0000000100(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000100 ffff8801ae40a080 0000000000000000 000000010000000c
raw: ffffea0006bea9e0 ffffea0006bc94a0 ffff8801da8007c0 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Fixes: dd0bed1665d6 ("tls: support for Inline tls record")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Cc: Atul Gupta &lt;atul.gupta@chelsio.com&gt;
Cc: Steve Wise &lt;swise@opengridcomputing.com&gt;
Cc: Ilya Lesokhin &lt;ilyal@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Aviad Yehezkel &lt;aviadye@mellanox.com&gt;
Cc: Dave Watson &lt;davejwatson@fb.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tls: Don't recursively call push_record during tls_write_space callbacks</title>
<updated>2018-05-01T22:57:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Watson</name>
<email>davejwatson@fb.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-05-01T20:05:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=c212d2c7fc4736d49be102fb7a1a545cdc2f1fea'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c212d2c7fc4736d49be102fb7a1a545cdc2f1fea</id>
<content type='text'>
It is reported that in some cases, write_space may be called in
do_tcp_sendpages, such that we recursively invoke do_tcp_sendpages again:

[  660.468802]  ? do_tcp_sendpages+0x8d/0x580
[  660.468826]  ? tls_push_sg+0x74/0x130 [tls]
[  660.468852]  ? tls_push_record+0x24a/0x390 [tls]
[  660.468880]  ? tls_write_space+0x6a/0x80 [tls]
...

tls_push_sg already does a loop over all sending sg's, so ignore
any tls_write_space notifications until we are done sending.
We then have to call the previous write_space to wake up
poll() waiters after we are done with the send loop.

Reported-by: Andre Tomt &lt;andre@tomt.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Watson &lt;davejwatson@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tls: Remove VLA usage</title>
<updated>2018-04-13T01:46:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-11T00:52:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.rulkc.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b16520f7493d06d8ef6d4255bdfcf7a803d7874a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b16520f7493d06d8ef6d4255bdfcf7a803d7874a</id>
<content type='text'>
In the quest to remove VLAs from the kernel[1], this replaces the VLA
size with the only possible size used in the code, and adds a mechanism
to double-check future IV sizes.

[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Dave Watson &lt;davejwatson@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
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