kernel/git/stable/linux.git/net/tls, branch linux-6.15.y

tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP

2025-08-20T16:35:49+00:00

[ Upstream commit 6db015fc4b5d5f63a64a193f65d98da3a7fc811d ] TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket. This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry. We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock, so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read (not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len). If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record. Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash should take place. Reported-by: William Liu Reported-by: Savino Dicanosa Link: https://lore.kernel.org/tFjq_kf7sWIG3A7CrCg_egb8CVsT_gsmHAK0_wxDPJXfIzxFAMxqmLwp3MlU5EHiet0AwwJldaaFdgyHpeIUCS-3m3llsmRzp9xIOBR4lAI=@syst3mfailure.io Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250807232907.600366-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf, ktls: Fix data corruption when using bpf_msg_pop_data() in ktls

2025-08-15T10:16:24+00:00

[ Upstream commit 178f6a5c8cb3b6be1602de0964cd440243f493c9 ] When sending plaintext data, we initially calculated the corresponding ciphertext length. However, if we later reduced the plaintext data length via socket policy, we failed to recalculate the ciphertext length. This results in transmitting buffers containing uninitialized data during ciphertext transmission. This causes uninitialized bytes to be appended after a complete "Application Data" packet, leading to errors on the receiving end when parsing TLS record. Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") Reported-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Reviewed-by: John Fastabend Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250609020910.397930-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

tls: always refresh the queue when reading sock

2025-07-24T06:58:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit 4ab26bce3969f8fd925fe6f6f551e4d1a508c68b ] After recent changes in net-next TCP compacts skbs much more aggressively. This unearthed a bug in TLS where we may try to operate on an old skb when checking if all skbs in the queue have matching decrypt state and geometry. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tls_strp_check_rcv+0x898/0x9a0 [tls] (net/tls/tls_strp.c:436 net/tls/tls_strp.c:530 net/tls/tls_strp.c:544) Read of size 4 at addr ffff888013085750 by task tls/13529 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13529 Comm: tls Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-virtme Call Trace: kasan_report+0xca/0x100 tls_strp_check_rcv+0x898/0x9a0 [tls] tls_rx_rec_wait+0x2c9/0x8d0 [tls] tls_sw_recvmsg+0x40f/0x1aa0 [tls] inet_recvmsg+0x1c3/0x1f0 Always reload the queue, fast path is to have the record in the queue when we wake, anyway (IOW the path going down "if !strp->stm.full_len"). Fixes: 0d87bbd39d7f ("tls: strp: make sure the TCP skbs do not have overlapping data") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250716143850.1520292-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

ktls, sockmap: Fix missing uncharge operation

2025-06-19T13:39:52+00:00

[ Upstream commit 79f0c39ae7d3dc628c01b02f23ca5d01f9875040 ] When we specify apply_bytes, we divide the msg into multiple segments, each with a length of 'send', and every time we send this part of the data using tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(), we use sk_msg_return_zero() to uncharge the memory of the specified 'send' size. However, if the first segment of data fails to send, for example, the peer's buffer is full, we need to release all of the msg. When releasing the msg, we haven't uncharged the memory of the subsequent segments. This modification does not make significant logical changes, but only fills in the missing uncharge places. This issue has existed all along, until it was exposed after we added the apply test in test_sockmap: commit 3448ad23b34e ("selftests/bpf: Add apply_bytes test to test_txmsg_redir_wait_sndmem in test_sockmap") Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") Reported-by: Cong Wang Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/aAmIi0vlycHtbXeb@pop-os.localdomain/T/#t Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau Acked-by: John Fastabend Reviewed-by: Cong Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250425060015.6968-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

bpf: fix ktls panic with sockmap

2025-06-19T13:39:39+00:00

[ Upstream commit 54a3ecaeeeae8176da8badbd7d72af1017032c39 ] [ 2172.936997] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2172.936999] kernel BUG at lib/iov_iter.c:629! ...... [ 2172.944996] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2172.945155] Call Trace: [ 2172.945299] [ 2172.945428] ? die+0x36/0x90 [ 2172.945601] ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100 [ 2172.945795] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.946031] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.946267] ? do_error_trap+0x7d/0x110 [ 2172.946499] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.946736] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 [ 2172.946961] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.947197] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 2172.947446] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.947683] ? iov_iter_revert+0x5c/0x180 [ 2172.947913] tls_sw_sendmsg_locked.isra.0+0x794/0x840 [ 2172.948206] tls_sw_sendmsg+0x52/0x80 [ 2172.948420] ? inet_sendmsg+0x1f/0x70 [ 2172.948634] __sys_sendto+0x1cd/0x200 [ 2172.948848] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 2172.949072] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270 [ 2172.949330] ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x5e/0x170 [ 2172.949595] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 2172.949817] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270 [ 2172.950211] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190 [ 2172.950632] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xc2/0xd0 [ 2172.951036] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 [ 2172.951382] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x170 ...... After calling bpf_exec_tx_verdict(), the size of msg_pl->sg may increase, e.g., when the BPF program executes bpf_msg_push_data(). If the BPF program sets cork_bytes and sg.size is smaller than cork_bytes, it will return -ENOSPC and attempt to roll back to the non-zero copy logic. However, during rollback, msg->msg_iter is reset, but since msg_pl->sg.size has been increased, subsequent executions will exceed the actual size of msg_iter. ''' iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size); ''' The changes in this commit are based on the following considerations: 1. When cork_bytes is set, rolling back to non-zero copy logic is pointless and can directly go to zero-copy logic. 2. We can not calculate the correct number of bytes to revert msg_iter. Assume the original data is "abcdefgh" (8 bytes), and after 3 pushes by the BPF program, it becomes 11-byte data: "abc?de?fgh?". Then, we set cork_bytes to 6, which means the first 6 bytes have been processed, and the remaining 5 bytes "?fgh?" will be cached until the length meets the cork_bytes requirement. However, some data in "?fgh?" is not within 'sg->msg_iter' (but in msg_pl instead), especially the data "?" we pushed. So it doesn't seem as simple as just reverting through an offset of msg_iter. 3. For non-TLS sockets in tcp_bpf_sendmsg, when a "cork" situation occurs, the user-space send() doesn't return an error, and the returned length is the same as the input length parameter, even if some data is cached. Additionally, I saw that the current non-zero-copy logic for handling corking is written as: ''' line 1177 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) { if (ret == -ENOSPC) ret = 0; goto send_end; ''' So it's ok to just return 'copied' without error when a "cork" situation occurs. Fixes: fcb14cb1bdac ("new iov_iter flavour - ITER_UBUF") Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen Acked-by: John Fastabend Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250219052015.274405-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

net/tls: fix kernel panic when alloc_page failed

2025-05-15T14:40:51+00:00

We cannot set frag_list to NULL pointer when alloc_page failed. It will be used in tls_strp_check_queue_ok when the next time tls_strp_read_sock is called. This is because we don't reset full_len in tls_strp_flush_anchor_copy() so the recv path will try to continue handling the partial record on the next call but we dettached the rcvq from the frag list. Alternative fix would be to reset full_len. Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000028 Call trace: tls_strp_check_rcv+0x128/0x27c tls_strp_data_ready+0x34/0x44 tls_data_ready+0x3c/0x1f0 tcp_data_ready+0x9c/0xe4 tcp_data_queue+0xf6c/0x12d0 tcp_rcv_established+0x52c/0x798 Fixes: 84c61fe1a75b ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser") Signed-off-by: Pengtao He Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250514132013.17274-1-hept.hept.hept@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

net: tls: explicitly disallow disconnect

2025-04-08T09:38:49+00:00

syzbot discovered that it can disconnect a TLS socket and then run into all sort of unexpected corner cases. I have a vague recollection of Eric pointing this out to us a long time ago. Supporting disconnect is really hard, for one thing if offload is enabled we'd need to wait for all packets to be _acked_. Disconnect is not commonly used, disallow it. The immediate problem syzbot run into is the warning in the strp, but that's just the easiest bug to trigger: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5834 at net/tls/tls_strp.c:486 tls_strp_msg_load+0x72e/0xa80 net/tls/tls_strp.c:486 RIP: 0010:tls_strp_msg_load+0x72e/0xa80 net/tls/tls_strp.c:486 Call Trace: tls_rx_rec_wait+0x280/0xa60 net/tls/tls_sw.c:1363 tls_sw_recvmsg+0x85c/0x1c30 net/tls/tls_sw.c:2043 inet6_recvmsg+0x2c9/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:678 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1023 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1045 __sys_recvfrom+0x202/0x380 net/socket.c:2237 Fixes: 3c4d7559159b ("tls: kernel TLS support") Reported-by: syzbot+b4cd76826045a1eb93c1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404180334.3224206-1-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni

Merge tag 'v6.15-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6

2025-03-29T17:01:55+00:00

Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - Remove legacy compression interface - Improve scatterwalk API - Add request chaining to ahash and acomp - Add virtual address support to ahash and acomp - Add folio support to acomp - Remove NULL dst support from acomp Algorithms: - Library options are fuly hidden (selected by kernel users only) - Add Kerberos5 algorithms - Add VAES-based ctr(aes) on x86 - Ensure LZO respects output buffer length on compression - Remove obsolete SIMD fallback code path from arm/ghash-ce Drivers: - Add support for PCI device 0x1134 in ccp - Add support for rk3588's standalone TRNG in rockchip - Add Inside Secure SafeXcel EIP-93 crypto engine support in eip93 - Fix bugs in tegra uncovered by multi-threaded self-test - Fix corner cases in hisilicon/sec2 Others: - Add SG_MITER_LOCAL to sg miter - Convert ubifs, hibernate and xfrm_ipcomp from legacy API to acomp" * tag 'v6.15-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (187 commits) crypto: testmgr - Add multibuffer acomp testing crypto: acomp - Fix synchronous acomp chaining fallback crypto: testmgr - Add multibuffer hash testing crypto: hash - Fix synchronous ahash chaining fallback crypto: arm/ghash-ce - Remove SIMD fallback code path crypto: essiv - Replace memcpy() + NUL-termination with strscpy() crypto: api - Call crypto_alg_put in crypto_unregister_alg crypto: scompress - Fix incorrect stream freeing crypto: lib/chacha - remove unused arch-specific init support crypto: remove obsolete 'comp' compression API crypto: compress_null - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: cavium/zip - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: zstd - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: lzo - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: lzo-rle - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: lz4hc - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: lz4 - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: deflate - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: 842 - drop obsolete 'comp' implementation crypto: nx - Migrate to scomp API ...

tcp: move icsk_clean_acked to a better location

2025-03-24T16:55:18+00:00

As a followup of my presentation in Zagreb for netdev 0x19: icsk_clean_acked is only used by TCP when/if CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE is enabled from tcp_ack(). Rename it to tcp_clean_acked, move it to tcp_sock structure in the tcp_sock_read_rx for better cache locality in TCP fast path. Define this field only when CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE is enabled saving 8 bytes on configs not using it. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Neal Cardwell Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250317085313.2023214-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski

tcp: ulp: diag: more info without CAP_NET_ADMIN

2025-03-08T03:39:53+00:00

When introduced in commit 61723b393292 ("tcp: ulp: add functions to dump ulp-specific information"), the whole ULP diag info has been exported only if the requester had CAP_NET_ADMIN. It looks like not everything is sensitive, and some info can be exported to all users in order to ease the debugging from the userspace side without requiring additional capabilities. Each layer should then decide what can be exposed to everybody. The 'net_admin' boolean is then passed to the different layers. On kTLS side, it looks like there is nothing sensitive there: version, cipher type, tx/rx user config type, plus some flags. So, only some metadata about the configuration, no cryptographic info like keys, etc. Then, everything can be exported to all users. On MPTCP side, that's different. The MPTCP-related sequence numbers per subflow should certainly not be exposed to everybody. For example, the DSS mapping and ssn_offset would give all users on the system access to narrow ranges of values for the subflow TCP sequence numbers and MPTCP-level DSNs, and then ease packet injection. The TCP diag interface doesn't expose the TCP sequence numbers for TCP sockets, so best to do the same here. The rest -- token, IDs, flags -- can be exported to everybody. Acked-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250306-net-next-tcp-ulp-diag-net-admin-v1-2-06afdd860fc9@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski