kernel/git/stable/linux.git/security/selinux/include, branch linux-3.5.y

Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2012-07-18T20:42:44+00:00

Pull SELinux regression fixes from James Morris. Andrew Morton has a box that hit that open perms problem. I also renamed the "epollwakeup" selinux name for the new capability to be "block_suspend", to match the rename done by commit d9914cf66181 ("PM: Rename CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP to CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND"). * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: SELinux: do not check open perms if they are not known to policy SELinux: include definition of new capabilities

SELinux: include definition of new capabilities

2012-07-16T01:40:31+00:00

The kernel has added CAP_WAKE_ALARM and CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP. We need to define these in SELinux so they can be mediated by policy. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: James Morris

SELinux: avc: remove the useless fields in avc_add_callback

2012-04-09T16:23:44+00:00

avc_add_callback now just used for registering reset functions in initcalls, and the callback functions just did reset operations. So, reducing the arguments to only one event is enough now. Signed-off-by: Wanlong Gao Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

SELinux: unify the selinux_audit_data and selinux_late_audit_data

2012-04-09T16:23:06+00:00

We no longer need the distinction. We only need data after we decide to do an audit. So turn the "late" audit data into just "data" and remove what we currently have as "data". Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

SELinux: remove auditdeny from selinux_audit_data

2012-04-09T16:23:05+00:00

It's just takin' up space. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

SELinux: delay initialization of audit data in selinux_inode_permission

2012-04-09T16:22:59+00:00

We pay a rather large overhead initializing the common_audit_data. Since we only need this information if we actually emit an audit message there is little need to set it up in the hot path. This patch splits the functionality of avc_has_perm() into avc_has_perm_noaudit(), avc_audit_required() and slow_avc_audit(). But we take care of setting up to audit between required() and the actual audit call. Thus saving measurable time in a hot path. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

SELinux: add default_type statements

2012-04-09T16:22:48+00:00

Because Fedora shipped userspace based on my development tree we now have policy version 27 in the wild defining only default user, role, and range. Thus to add default_type we need a policy.28. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

SELinux: allow default source/target selectors for user/role/range

2012-04-09T16:22:47+00:00

When new objects are created we have great and flexible rules to determine the type of the new object. We aren't quite as flexible or mature when it comes to determining the user, role, and range. This patch adds a new ability to specify the place a new objects user, role, and range should come from. For users and roles it can come from either the source or the target of the operation. aka for files the user can either come from the source (the running process and todays default) or it can come from the target (aka the parent directory of the new file) examples always are done with directory context: system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 process context: unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [no rule] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_none [default user source] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_source [default user target] system_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_user_target [default role source] unconfined_u:unconfined_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_source [default role target] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_role_target [default range source low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_source_low [default range source high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_high [default range source low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 test_range_source_low-high [default range target low] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0 test_range_target_low [default range target high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_high [default range target low-high] unconfined_u:object_r:mnt_t:s0-s0:c0.c512 test_range_target_low-high Signed-off-by: Eric Paris

SELinux: do not allocate stack space for AVC data unless needed

2012-04-03T16:49:41+00:00

Instead of declaring the entire selinux_audit_data on the stack when we start an operation on declare it on the stack if we are going to use it. We know it's usefulness at the end of the security decision and can declare it there. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

SELinux: remove avd from selinux_audit_data

2012-04-03T16:49:10+00:00

We do not use it. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds