kernel/git/stable/linux.git/security, branch master

Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2026-08-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

2026-08-26T18:04:24+00:00

Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen: "The biggest functional change is Jann Horn's fix for how aparmor is doing stale cred updates after a policy replacement. apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section() It moves the update to be done during task_work at the end of the syscall. One major feature is allowing policy to be compressed in userspace instead of after the fact (in kernel) if we need to hold onto it for CRIU/introspection. The other major change is to do with network mediation. It is a lot of code churn but does not do any functional changes to mediation. It moves the code around, and refactors it to use newer patterns for consistency, and in preparation for some improvements in mediation in a future patchset. Features: - support loading compressed policies - add audit mode to provide a mechanism to silence complain messages - refactor network mediation to use new patterns, and prepare to for extended inet mediation (no functional change) Cleanups: - switch website link to https - make include headers self-contained, and fix circular include - constify aa_label, aa_dfa, aa_profile, and aa_perms paraneters - mark static tables and structs as read only - drop use of _confined variant for iteration - refactory mount to use check_perms - refactor network mediation code to be together - refactor xattr attachment, to take the file path - optimize current_label_crit_section() - leverage audit_log_n_untrustedstring() when possible Bug Fixes: - initialized policy lists heads before fail path - fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat - auditing of mount binary data - fix error debug output in fn_label_build - fix race condition in label replacement - fix unconfined user namespace restriction forced stack - fix error handling for copy_from_user in policy_update - fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec - fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check - fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section() - use SEND_SIG_NOINFO instead of NULL in aa_audit()" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2026-08-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (40 commits) apparmor: policy_int make sure list heads are initialized before fail path apparmor: fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat apparmor: constify aa_label parameters on read-only query helpers apparmor: constify aa_dfa parameters on read-only compute paths apparmor: constify aa_profile parameters on read-only compute paths apparmor: constify aa_perms parameters that are read-only apparmor: drop use of _confined variant for iteration apparmor: refactory mount to use check_perms apparmor: fix auditing of mount binary data apparmor: add audit mode to provide a mechanism to silence complain messages apparmor: mark static tables and structs as read only apparmor: fix error debug output in fn_label_build apparmor: make table entry count last enum for static tables apparmor: fix race condition in label replacement apparmor: refactor xattr attachment, to take the file path apparmor: fix unconfined user namespace restriction forced stack apparmor: reserve mediation class for packet mediation apparmor: move sock_rcv_skb() next to inet_conn_request apparmor: move netfilter functions next to the LSM network operations apparmor: refactor network socket mediation to support compatibility ...

apparmor: policy_int make sure list heads are initialized before fail path

2026-08-26T07:03:13+00:00

If profile create fails before policy_init is complete the list heads are not properly initialized causing profile_free() sanity checks to trigger the following splat. AppArmor WARN aa_policy_destroy: (((!list_empty(&policy->profiles) && (&policy->profiles)->prev != ((void *) 0x122 + (0xdead000000000000UL))))): WARNING: security/apparmor/lib.c:509 at aa_policy_destroy+0x164/0x1b0 security/apparmor/lib.c:509, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5541 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5541 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:aa_policy_destroy+0x16b/0x1b0 security/apparmor/lib.c:509 Code: 85 ed 7e 4d e8 96 bc 37 fd 5b 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 19 27 4e 07 cc e8 83 bc 37 fd 48 8d 3d 0c f0 d3 0b 48 c7 c6 a4 eb 38 8e <67> 48 0f b9 3a e9 04 ff ff ff e8 66 bc 37 fd 48 8d 3d ff ef d3 0b RSP: 0018:ffffc9000345eaa0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff848f530d RBX: ffff88803f734800 RCX: ffff88801af2a580 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8e38eba4 RDI: ffffffff90634320 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000cc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d95913 R12: dead000000000122 R13: ffff88803f734800 R14: ffff88803f734828 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f5f6a1836c0(0000) GS:ffff88808c519000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055d02407b048 CR3: 0000000012aa9000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: aa_free_profile+0x9d/0x9f0 security/apparmor/policy.c:334 aa_alloc_profile+0x1e4/0x3e0 security/apparmor/policy.c:416 unpack_profile security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1153 [inline] aa_unpack+0x17db/0x7430 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1748 aa_replace_profiles+0x226/0x2a20 security/apparmor/policy.c:1183 policy_update+0x234/0x4a0 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:505 profile_load+0x1cb/0x320 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:522 vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685 ksys_write+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:739 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f5f6939e0d9 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f5f6a183028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5f69625fa0 RCX: 00007f5f6939e0d9 RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000200000000400 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f5f6a183090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007f5f69626038 R14: 00007f5f69625fa0 R15: 00007ffe23725c18 Reported-by: syzbot+faed97c4ed43bfe7fee5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=faed97c4ed43bfe7fee5 Fixes: fe6bb31f590c9 ("apparmor: split out shared policy_XXX fns to lib") Signed-off-by: John Johansen

Merge tag 'for-next-keys-v7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

2026-08-23T15:29:33+00:00

Pull TPM update from Jarkko Sakkinen: "Just a single bug fix" * tag 'for-next-keys-v7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering

Merge tag 'landlock-7.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux

2026-08-21T19:28:35+00:00

Pull Landlock update from Mickaël Salaün: "This improves observability with Landlock tracepoints support, which required some refactoring for dedicated domain types and common helpers shared with audit code. A LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS flag is also added to improve process-wide domain enforcement consistency. Whiteout files are now correctly handled and tested, and a few other fixes" * tag 'landlock-7.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: (34 commits) landlock: Document tracepoints selftests/landlock: Add landlock_enforce_domain trace tests selftests/landlock: Add scope and ptrace tracepoint tests selftests/landlock: Add network tracepoint tests selftests/landlock: Add filesystem tracepoint tests selftests/landlock: Add trace event test infrastructure and tests landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials landlock: Add landlock_deny_access_fs and landlock_deny_access_net landlock: Add tracepoints for rule checking landlock: Add landlock_enforce_domain tracepoint landlock: Add create_domain and free_domain tracepoints landlock: Add landlock_add_rule_fs and landlock_add_rule_net tracepoints landlock: Add create_ruleset and free_ruleset tracepoints landlock: Consolidate access-right and scope names in a shared header landlock: Decouple the per-denial logging decision from CONFIG_AUDIT landlock: Split denial logging from audit into common framework landlock: Split struct landlock_domain from struct landlock_ruleset landlock: Move domain query functions to domain.c landlock: Prepare ruleset and domain type split samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS to sampler ...

KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering

2026-08-21T01:33:21+00:00

trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup() holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the synchronization point that must precede backend teardown. The current order permits this interleaving: CPU 0 CPU 1 trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted") put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal() kfree(digests) pcrlock() unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests) CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can also be released before callbacks stop using it. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89 Call Trace: tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200 pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted] trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted] trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted] __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0 __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50 __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310 Allocated by task 88: __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490 do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390 do_init_module+0x2df/0x840 Freed by task 90: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted] __do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510 Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the backend state is destroyed. Fixes: 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260731140925.2973492-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen

Merge tag 'integrity-v7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

2026-08-20T00:17:17+00:00

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar: - TPM initialization is sometimes delayed until deferred_probe_initcall Since ordering is not guaranteed within the same initcall level, IMA may initialize before the TPM and fall back to TPM-bypass mode. A new config option, CONFIG_IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC, allows those building the kernel to defer IMA initialization to late_initcall_sync, accepting the integrity risk of missing early measurements in exchange for avoiding TPM-bypass mode. - The raw policy rules are now measured, as well as the complete policy, closing a gap in integrity measurement coverage * tag 'integrity-v7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: measure userspace policy writes before parsing ima: add critical data measurement for loaded policy security: ima: rename boot_aggregate when ima is initialised at late_sync security: ima: introduce IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC option security: lsm: allow LSMs to register for late_initcall_sync init

Merge tag 'Smack-for-7.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next

2026-08-19T23:51:39+00:00

Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: - Spelling fix - Code optimization in smackfs - Fix credential mis-uses - Place limits on two of the smackfs interfaces * tag 'Smack-for-7.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smack: fix cred UAF in smack_file_send_sigiotask() smack: restrict smackfs/{direct,mapped} values to 0-255 smack: deduplicate smackfs/{direct,mapped} file_operations smack: show msgrcv() subject task in audit smack: fix incorrect task context in smack_msg_queue_msgrcv security: smack: fix spelling mistake smack: simplify write handlers of sysfs entries Smack: Fix error in capability bypass

Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20260814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

2026-08-19T23:28:23+00:00

Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore: - Remove task_euid() The task_euid(), and Rust counterpart, was never widely used, for good reason, and now that the only user is gone we're removing it to rid ourselves of both dead and funky code. - Documentation improvements Correct some of the kdoc comments for security_task_prctl() and clarify the rust comments on task UID accessors. - Fix a memory leak in the LSM syscall selftests * tag 'lsm-pr-20260814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: selftests/lsm: Fix memory leak in attr_lsm_count cred: delete task_euid() rust: task: clarify comments on task UID accessors lsm: clarify security_task_prctl() hook documentation

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20260814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

2026-08-19T23:24:46+00:00

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Convert a __get_free_page() call into a kmalloc() call We had some very old code that called out to __get_free_page() for allocating a pathname. There is no reason this couldn't be done with a call to kmalloc() so we've done the conversion and now there is one less __get_free_page() caller in the kernel. - Limit the number of retired/unknown DCCP netlink messages While DCCP is gone from the kernel, there are still userspace tools which try to talk to the kernel about DCCP sockets which were generating SELinux related log noise (unrecognized netlink message). This pull request both limits the log messages to just the first instance and also explains to the user that DCCP support has been removed. - Convert the SELinux strlcat() calls to seq_buf_XXX() calls As part of the effort to drop the strlcat() API from the kernel, the SELinux/IMA code was converted over to using seq_buf_XXX() calls. - Only calculate the SELinux IMA configuration string length once Previously each call to generate a SELinux configuration string for IMA would have to calculate the length of the string. While the contents of the string will likely change over the lifetime of the system, the length of the string will not. Calculate the string length once at boot and reuse the length value throughout the lifetime of the system. - Further validation of the SELinux policy at policy load time Perform additional sanity checks on the policy constraints and types. - Proper cleanup and error handling for selinuxfs init failures We were not properly cleaning up some state in the case where selinuxfs fails to initialize properly. It's somewhat of an academic exercise as a failure to initialize selinuxfs will cause the system to fail on boot, but it's arguably better to make sure we do things the proper way. - Various code cleanups Convert integer flags to boolean types and drop an uncessary goto from the SELinux code. * tag 'selinux-pr-20260814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: validate constraint expression attr and op at load time selinux: compute the IMA configuration settings string length once at boot selinux: replace strlcat() with seq_buf in selinux_ima_collect_state() selinux: suppress warning flood for retired DCCP netlink messages selinux: tighten type validation during policy load selinux: drop unnecessary goto and label from avc_alloc_node() selinux: convert int flags to bool flags in ss/services.c selinux: clean up selinuxfs resources on init failure selinux: hooks: use kmalloc() to allocate path buffer

landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials

2026-08-17T08:17:16+00:00

Scope and ptrace denials follow a different code path (a domain hierarchy check) than access-right denials, so they need dedicated tracepoints with type-specific TP_PROTO arguments. Complete the denial coverage with: - landlock_deny_ptrace: ptrace access denied by a domain hierarchy mismatch. - landlock_deny_scope_signal: signal delivery denied by LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL. - landlock_deny_scope_abstract_unix_socket: abstract unix socket access denied by LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET. TP_PROTO passes the raw kernel object (struct task_struct or struct sock) for eBPF BTF access; the comm and sun_path string fields use __print_untrusted_str() because they hold untrusted input. Unlike the deny_access events, these omit the blockers field: each maps to exactly one denial type named by the event, so the bitmask would always be zero. Like the deny_access events they carry same_exec and logged. Audit logs the task-targeted denials with generic field names (opid, ocomm), but a strongly typed trace event can use role-prefixed names (tracee_pid/tracee_comm, target_pid/target_comm) that match the mainline task-name convention (sched_process_fork's parent_comm/child_comm) and say whose name each field holds; a bare comm= would collide across events. The abstract-unix-socket event reports peer_pid instead, a tracepoint-only field with no audit counterpart. A scope or ptrace verdict compares the subject domain against the other party's domain, so each event also reports that other party's Landlock domain (tracee_domain=, target_domain=, or peer_domain=); the subject domain= alone does not let a consumer redo domain_is_scoped() or domain_ptrace(). It is reported as a scalar ID rather than a domain pointer: a domain object is immutable, but the other task can replace its credential and free the domain that credential referenced, so a stored foreign pointer could dangle before the event is consumed. The scalar ID also honors the tracepoint no-nullable-pointer rule, since the other party is frequently unsandboxed. Passing the foreign domain hierarchy object so an eBPF consumer could walk the other party's ancestry live would lengthen the RCU section on the shared denial path and needs a deferred refcount put, so it is left as a future enhancement. The relational domain-ID field (tracee_domain, target_domain, or peer_domain) is trace-only and is not added to audit records, so audit's denial format is unchanged by this series. Cc: Günther Noack Cc: Justin Suess Cc: Masami Hiramatsu Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Steven Rostedt Cc: Tingmao Wang Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811094338.288094-14-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün