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| author | Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com> | 2026-04-13 10:58:10 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-04-22 13:30:50 +0200 |
| commit | 77d0295725109d77f5854ef5b58c0d06c08168cc (patch) | |
| tree | dbf6ff30a6b02e3f2cd8ed823eced059da815a49 | |
| parent | 42da72a2e19e7b6c9850b4d1a383d310b496788b (diff) | |
| download | linux-77d0295725109d77f5854ef5b58c0d06c08168cc.tar.gz linux-77d0295725109d77f5854ef5b58c0d06c08168cc.zip | |
ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read
[ Upstream commit 1524af3685b35feac76662cc551cbc37bd14775f ]
When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs
various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If
the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual
inline data capacity (id_count).
This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data
buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from
freed memory.
In the syzbot report:
- i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB)
- Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes
- A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds
- This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()
Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure
inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the
corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from
operating on invalid data.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251212052132.16750-1-kartikey406@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+c897823f699449cc3eb4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c897823f699449cc3eb4
Tested-by: syzbot+c897823f699449cc3eb4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251211115231.3560028-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/T/ [v1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251212040400.6377-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/T/ [v2]
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: 7bc5da4842be ("ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c index b5fcc2725a29..7b7f1f3682da 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c @@ -1494,12 +1494,25 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb, goto bail; } - if ((le16_to_cpu(di->i_dyn_features) & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) && - le32_to_cpu(di->i_clusters)) { - rc = ocfs2_error(sb, "Invalid dinode %llu: %u clusters\n", - (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, - le32_to_cpu(di->i_clusters)); - goto bail; + if (le16_to_cpu(di->i_dyn_features) & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) { + struct ocfs2_inline_data *data = &di->id2.i_data; + + if (le32_to_cpu(di->i_clusters)) { + rc = ocfs2_error(sb, + "Invalid dinode %llu: %u clusters\n", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, + le32_to_cpu(di->i_clusters)); + goto bail; + } + + if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) { + rc = ocfs2_error(sb, + "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, + (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(di->i_size), + le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)); + goto bail; + } } if (le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_CHAIN_FL) { |