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Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260702155112.110058792@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260703072816.644513463@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
Tested-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2f6701a5ce6257ae7a64ddc6d89d0a08d2a034f8 upstream.
The fix for tcp-fast-open ensures that the connect permission is being
mediated correctly but it didn't add an artifact to the feature set to
advertise the fix is available. Add an artifact so that the test suite
can identify if the fix has not been properly applied or a new
unexpected regression has occurred.
Fixes: 4d587cd8a7215 ("apparmor: mediate the implicit connect of TCP fast open sendmsg")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5ba9950bc9078e19b69cca1e56d1553b125c6857 upstream.
In tcp_ao_delete_key(), the del_async path skips the current_key
and rnext_key validity checks present in the synchronous path,
assuming these pointers are always NULL on LISTEN sockets. However,
if a key was added with set_current=1/set_rnext=1 while the socket
was in CLOSE state, current_key and rnext_key will be non-NULL
after listen() transitions the socket to LISTEN.
When such a key is deleted with del_async=1, hlist_del_rcu() and
call_rcu() free the key without clearing the dangling pointers.
After the RCU grace period, getsockopt(TCP_AO_INFO) dereferences
current_key->sndid and rnext_key->rcvid from freed slab memory.
Clear current_key and rnext_key in the del_async path when they
reference the key being deleted.
Fixes: d6732b95b6fb ("net/tcp: Allow asynchronous delete for TCP-AO keys (MKTs)")
Signed-off-by: HanQuan <eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260623015208.1191687-1-eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 10fc708b4de7f86002d2d735a2dbf3b5b7f65692 upstream.
dw8250_probe() registers the 8250 port via serial8250_register_8250_port()
and then, if the device has a clock, registers a clock notifier. If
clk_notifier_register() fails, probe returns the error but leaves the
8250 port registered. The matching serial8250_unregister_port() lives
in dw8250_remove(), which is not called when probe fails, so the port
slot stays occupied until the device is rebound or the system is
rebooted. The devm-allocated driver data is freed while the port still
references it (via the saved private_data and serial_in/serial_out
callbacks), so any access to that port slot before a rebind is a
use-after-free hazard.
Unregister the port on the clk_notifier_register() error path.
Fixes: cc816969d7b5 ("serial: 8250_dw: Fix common clocks usage race condition")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stepan Ionichev <sozdayvek@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260514143746.23671-2-sozdayvek@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1ef06004ed4bd6d3ed8c840d9d1a376b66d4935b upstream.
The permission-check ACE walk in smb_check_perm_dacl() validates the ACE
header size and caps sid.num_subauth at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES, but it
never checks that ace->size is actually large enough to contain
num_subauth sub-authorities before compare_sids() dereferences them.
CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE covers the SID header up to but excluding the
sub_auth[] array, and offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) is the ACE header,
so the existing guards only guarantee the 8-byte SID base, i.e. zero
sub-authorities. compare_sids() then reads ace->sid.sub_auth[i] for
i < min(local_sid->num_subauth, ace->sid.num_subauth). The local
comparison SIDs (sid_everyone, sid_unix_NFS_mode, and the id_to_sid()
result) always have at least one sub-authority, and an attacker controls
the ACE revision and authority bytes (which lie within the in-bounds SID
base), so they can match one of those SIDs and force the sub_auth read.
A crafted ACE with size == 16 and num_subauth >= 1 placed at the tail of
the security descriptor therefore causes a heap out-of-bounds read of up
to SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * sizeof(__le32) bytes past the pntsd
allocation. The security descriptor is loaded by ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr()
into a buffer sized exactly to the on-disk data (kzalloc(sd_size) in
ndr_decode_v4_ntacl()), so the read lands past the allocation. The
malformed descriptor can be stored verbatim via SMB2_SET_INFO (the DACL
is not normalised before being written to the security.NTACL xattr) and
the read fires on a subsequent SMB2_CREATE access check, making this
reachable by an authenticated client on a share that uses ACL xattrs.
Add the missing num_subauth-versus-ace_size check, mirroring the
identical guards already present in the sibling parsers parse_dacl() and
smb_inherit_dacl().
Fixes: d07b26f39246 ("ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hem Parekh <hemparekh1596@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d189f224308c8ac3feeea8e442c99922bd18f1b2 upstream.
It was overlooked to call ida_free() after a failed nfs_alloc_iostats() call.
Thus add the missed function call in an if branch.
Fixes: 1c7251187dc067a6d460cf33ca67da9c1dd87807 ("NFS: add superblock sysfs entries")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christophe Jaillet <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/1c8e10c9-def7-4f0d-8aa1-23c8035a38c8@wanadoo.fr/
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 238e9b51aa29f48b6243212a3b75c8e48d6b96fd upstream.
After a server returns NFS4ERR_DELAY for an NFSv4 CREATE issued by
mkdir(2), the client correctly waits and retries. When the retry
succeeds, however, mkdir(2) can still surface -EEXIST to userspace
even though the directory was just created on the server.
Reproducer (random 16-hex names so collisions are not the cause)
against an in-kernel Linux nfsd; reproduces under both NFSv4.0 and
NFSv4.2:
N=2000000; base=/var/gdc/export
for ((i=1; i<=N; i++)); do
d=$base/$(openssl rand -hex 8)
mkdir "$d" 2>/dev/null || echo "$(date +%T) failed loop=$i $d"
rmdir "$d" 2>/dev/null
done
Failures cluster at the cadence at which the server-side auth/export
cache refresh path causes nfsd to return NFS4ERR_DELAY for CREATE.
A wire trace of one failure (the three CREATE RPCs all come from a
single mkdir(2), generated by the do-while in nfs4_proc_mkdir()):
client -> server CREATE name=... -> NFS4ERR_DELAY
~100 ms later
client -> server CREATE name=... -> NFS4_OK (dir created)
~80 us later
client -> server CREATE name=... -> NFS4ERR_EXIST (correct)
Since commit dd862da61e91 ("nfs: fix incorrect handling of large-number
NFS errors in nfs4_do_mkdir()"), nfs4_handle_exception() is called only
when _nfs4_proc_mkdir() returned an error. That gate breaks retry-state
hygiene: nfs4_do_handle_exception() resets exception.{delay,recovering,
retry} to 0 on entry, so calling it on success is what previously
cleared the retry flag set by the preceding NFS4ERR_DELAY iteration.
With the gate in place, exception.retry stays at 1 after the successful
retry, the loop runs once more, and the resulting CREATE for an
already-created name yields NFS4ERR_EXIST -> -EEXIST to userspace.
Drop the conditional and call nfs4_handle_exception() unconditionally,
matching every other do-while in fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c (nfs4_proc_symlink(),
nfs4_proc_link(), etc.). The dentry/status separation introduced by
that commit is preserved.
Fixes: dd862da61e91 ("nfs: fix incorrect handling of large-number NFS errors in nfs4_do_mkdir()")
Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Čípa <jan.cipa@gooddata.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/CA+9S74hSp_tJu2Ffe2BPNC2T25gfkhgjjDkdgSsF5c2rnJq_wA@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Igor Raits <igor.raits@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 41fe0f7b84f0cb822ae10ab08592996a592b2a25 upstream.
nfs4_decode_mp_ds_addr() decodes the r_netid and r_addr opaques of a
netaddr4 from a GETDEVICEINFO multipath-DS body, then immediately
calls strrchr(buf, '.') to locate the port separator. Both decodes
use xdr_stream_decode_string_dup(), and the current code checks only
"nlen < 0" / "rlen < 0" before dereferencing the returned string.
When the on-wire opaque has length zero, xdr_stream_decode_opaque_inline()
returns 0 and xdr_stream_decode_string_dup() falls through to its
"*str = NULL; return ret" tail, leaving buf NULL with a return value
of 0. The "< 0" check does not catch this, and the next line is
strrchr(NULL, '.'), a kernel NULL pointer dereference reachable from
any pNFS-flexfile client mounted against a malicious or compromised
metadata server.
Reject the zero-length cases explicitly so the decoder fails with
-EBADMSG (treated as a malformed GETDEVICEINFO body) instead of
panicking the client.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6b7f3cf96364 ("nfs41: pull decode_ds_addr from file layout to generic pnfs")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2c6bb3c40bc24f6aa8dfbe6fe98c3ad6389203f2 upstream.
ff_layout_alloc_lseg() decodes the filehandle-version array count
from the flexfiles layout body. The value is used as the count for
kzalloc_objs(), and the current code only rejects NULL.
A zero count yields ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which can be stored in
dss_info->fh_versions even though later flexfiles paths assume that at
least one filehandle version exists.
Reject fh_count == 0 before the allocation, matching the existing zero
version_count validation in the flexfiles GETDEVICEINFO parser.
A QEMU/KASAN run with a malformed flexfiles layout hit:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
RIP: 0010:ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate.isra.0+0x15f/0x750
ff_layout_encode_layoutreturn+0x683/0x970
nfs4_xdr_enc_layoutreturn+0x278/0x3a0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
The patched kernel rejects the malformed layout without KASAN/oops/panic,
and a valid fh_count=1 regression still opens, reads, and unmounts cleanly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d67ae825a59d ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2090b05803faab8a9fa62fbff871007862cac1b7 upstream.
nfsd_vfs_write() and nfsd_commit() both call filemap_check_wb_err() to
detect deferred writeback errors, but neither rotates the server's write
verifier (nn->writeverf) when this check fails. Every other
durable-storage-failure path in these functions calls
commit_reset_write_verifier() before returning an error.
The missing rotation means clients holding UNSTABLE write data under the
current verifier will COMMIT, receive the unchanged verifier back, and
conclude their data is durable — silently dropping data that failed
writeback. This violates the UNSTABLE+COMMIT durability contract
(RFC 1813 §3.3.7, RFC 8881 §18.32).
Add commit_reset_write_verifier() calls at both filemap_check_wb_err()
error sites, matching the pattern used by adjacent error paths in the
same functions. The helper already filters -EAGAIN and -ESTALE
internally, so the calls are unconditionally safe.
Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Fixes: 555dbf1a9aac ("nfsd: Replace use of rwsem with errseq_t")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 57aee7a35bb12753057c5b65d72d1f46c0e95b07 upstream.
When find_or_alloc_open_stateowner() encounters an unconfirmed owner, it
calls release_openowner() and sets oo = NULL. Control then falls through
past the `if (oo)` guard -- which would have freed any pre-allocated
`new` -- and unconditionally executes `new = alloc_stateowner(...)`. If
`new` was already allocated on a prior iteration, the pointer is
silently overwritten and the previous allocation (slab object + owner
name buffer) is leaked.
This requires a race: two NFSv4.0 OPEN threads with the same owner
string, where a concurrent thread inserts a new unconfirmed owner into
the hash between retry iterations. The window is narrow but repeatable
under adversarial conditions.
Fix by adding `goto retry` after `oo = NULL` so the already-allocated
`new` is reused on the next iteration rather than overwritten.
Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Fixes: 23df17788c62 ("nfsd: perform all find_openstateowner_str calls in the one place.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e186fa1c057f5eccb22afb1e83e34c0627085868 upstream.
In __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(), the get_user() that reads
princhashlen from the userspace cld_msg_v2 buffer does not check its
return value. A failing copy leaves princhashlen with uninitialised
stack contents, which are then used to drive memdup_user() and stored
as princhash.len on the resulting reclaim record. The other get_user()
calls in this function all check the return; only this one is missed,
which is most likely a copy-paste oversight from when v2 upcalls were
introduced.
Mirror the existing pattern used a few lines above for namelen.
namecopy is declared with __free(kfree) so the early return cleans up
the already-allocated buffer automatically.
Fixes: 6ee95d1c8991 ("nfsd: add support for upcall version 2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dominik Woźniak <stalion@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0150459b05490b88b7e7378a31550a9e07b5517c upstream.
nfsd4_async_copy_reaper() is supposed to keep completed async copy
state around for NFSD_COPY_INITIAL_TTL (10) laundromat ticks so
that OFFLOAD_STATUS can report the result, then reap the state once
the countdown expires.
The TTL predicate is inverted: `if (--copy->cp_ttl)` is true while
ticks remain and false when the counter reaches zero. This causes
the copy to be reaped on the very first tick (cp_ttl goes from 10
to 9, which is non-zero) instead of after all 10 ticks elapse.
Once reaped, OFFLOAD_STATUS returns NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID because
the copy state has already been freed.
Fix by negating the test so that cleanup runs when the TTL expires.
Fixes: aa0ebd21df9c ("NFSD: Add nfsd4_copy time-to-live")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-6
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0853ac544c590880d797b04daa33fcb72b6be0e1 upstream.
nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each
call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for
NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly
allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If
the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns
false and argp->acl_access is left dangling.
ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and
ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle.
Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on
argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside
nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process()
skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is
unreachable on decode failure:
svc_process_common()
pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */
/* pc_func skipped */
pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */
The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server.
Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(),
which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition
to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL
procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after
decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are
removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one
place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by
the sibling GETACL procedures.
Fixes: a257cdd0e217 ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9e18e83b8846a5c3fe13fc8a464b4865d33996c6 upstream.
nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name() currently initializes sin_exp after
decoding sin_style. If the XDR stream is truncated, the decoder returns
nfserr_bad_xdr before sin_exp is initialized.
Since commit 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct
nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing"), the inline iops array is not
cleared between RPC calls. A failed SECINFO_NO_NAME decode can therefore
leave sin_exp holding stale union contents from a previous operation.
The error response path still invokes nfsd4_secinfo_no_name_release(),
which calls exp_put() on a non-NULL sin_exp.
Initialize sin_exp before the first failable decode step, matching
nfsd4_decode_secinfo().
Fixes: 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guannan Wang <wgnbuaa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ba14d7cf2fe7284610a29854bdff22b2537d3ce6 upstream.
Adapters can be looked up based on their id using i2c_get_adapter()
which takes a reference to the embedded struct device.
Make sure that the adapter (including its struct device) has been
initialised before adding it to the IDR to avoid accessing uninitialised
data which could, for example, lead to NULL-pointer dereferences or
use-after-free.
Note that the i2c-dev chardev, which is registered from a bus notifier,
currently uses i2c_get_adapter() so the adapter needs to be added to the
IDR before registration.
Fixes: 6e13e6418418 ("i2c: Add i2c_add_numbered_adapter()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.22
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d894c48a57d78206e4df9c90d4acfaf39394806a upstream.
The 1920x1080@60 modedb entry has one too many initializers before
its sync field: a stray "0" occupies the sync slot, which shifts the
remaining values by one field. The entry therefore decodes as
sync = 0, vmode = FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT (0x3,
i.e. FB_VMODE_INTERLACED | FB_VMODE_DOUBLE), and flag =
FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, instead of the intended sync = positive H/V,
vmode = non-interlaced.
fb_find_mode() then returns a 1920x1080 mode flagged as interlaced +
doublescan with active-low syncs. Drivers that honour var->vmode and
var->sync when programming display timing enable doublescan and the
wrong sync polarity, corrupting the output.
Drop the stray initializer so sync and vmode hold their intended
values (positive H/V sync, non-interlaced), matching the adjacent
1920x1200 entry.
Fixes: c8902258b2b8 ("fbdev: modedb: Add 1920x1080 at 60 Hz video mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steffen Persvold <spersvold@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 85b6256469cebdac395e7447147e06b2e151014f upstream.
If mode_option is NULL, it is assigned from mode_option_buf:
if (!mode_option) {
fb_get_options(NULL, &mode_option_buf);
mode_option = mode_option_buf;
}
Later, name is assigned from mode_option:
const char *name = mode_option;
However, mode_option_buf is freed before name is no longer used:
kfree(mode_option_buf);
while name is still accessed by:
if ((name_matches(db[i], name, namelen) ||
Since name aliases mode_option_buf, this may result in a
use-after-free.
Fix this by extending the lifetime of mode_option_buf until the end of the
function by using scope-based resource management for cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Tuo Li <islituo@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7f08fc10fa3d3366dc3af723970bd03d7d6d10e3 upstream.
info->var, a framebuffer's current mode, is expected to have a matching
entry in info->modelist. var_to_display() relies on this and treats a
failed fb_match_mode() as "This should not happen". fb_set_var() keeps it
true by adding the mode to the list on every change, and
do_register_framebuffer() does the same at registration.
store_modes() replaces the modelist from userspace. fb_new_modelist()
validates the new modes but does not check that info->var still has a
match. It relies on fbcon_new_modelist() to re-point consoles, but that
only handles consoles mapped to the framebuffer. With fbcon unbound there
are none, so info->var is left describing a mode that is no longer in the
list.
A later console takeover runs var_to_display(), where fb_match_mode()
returns NULL and leaves fb_display[i].mode NULL. fbcon_switch() passes it
to display_to_var(), and fb_videomode_to_var() dereferences the NULL mode.
Keep the current mode in the list in fb_new_modelist(), the same way
fb_set_var() does.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8d6c8c40e733b3fcaf92fed0a078bba2f6941a3b upstream.
In kfence_protect_page(), which kfence_unprotect() calls, we cannot send
IPIs to other CPUs to ask them to flush TLB. This may lead to those CPUs
spuriously faulting on a recently allocated kfence object despite it
being valid, leading to false positive use-after-free reports.
Fix this by calling mark_new_valid_map() so that the page fault handling
code path notices the spurious fault and flushes TLB then retries the
access.
Update the comment in handle_exception to indicate that
new_valid_map_cpus_check also handles kfence_unprotect() spurious
faults.
Note that kfence_protect() has the same stale TLB entries problem, but
that leads to false negatives, which is fine with kfence.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yanko Kaneti <yaneti@declera.com>
Fixes: b3431a8bb336 ("riscv: Fix IPIs usage in kfence_protect_page()")
Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang <wangruikang@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303-handle-kfence-protect-spurious-fault-v2-2-f80d8354d79d@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9ee25d0a70ff4494b4e1d266b962d0a574ef318a upstream.
In preparation of a future patch using the same mechanism for
non-vmalloc addresses, extract the mark_new_valid_map() helper from
flush_cache_vmap().
No functional change intended.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vivian Wang <wangruikang@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303-handle-kfence-protect-spurious-fault-v2-1-f80d8354d79d@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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linkstation_poweroff_init()
commit 8eec545cde69e46e9a1d2b7d915ce4f5df85b3bd upstream.
Move of_node_put(dn) after the of_match_node() call, which still needs
the node pointer. The node reference is correctly released after use.
Fixes: e2f471efe1d6 ("power: reset: linkstation-poweroff: prepare for new devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407073025.271865-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 78ee2d50185a037b3d2452a97f3dad69c3f7f389 upstream.
In sev_dbg_crypt(), the per-iteration transfer length is bounded by
the source page offset (PAGE_SIZE - s_off) but not by the destination
page offset (PAGE_SIZE - d_off). When d_off > s_off, the encrypt
path (__sev_dbg_encrypt_user) performs a read-modify-write using a
single-page intermediate buffer (dst_tpage):
1. __sev_dbg_decrypt() expands the size to round_up(len + (d_off & 15), 16)
before issuing the PSP command. If len + (d_off & 15) > PAGE_SIZE,
the PSP writes beyond the end of the 4096-byte dst_tpage allocation.
2. The subsequent memcpy()/copy_from_user() into
page_address(dst_tpage) + (d_off & 15) of 'len' bytes overflows
by up to 15 bytes under the same condition.
Trigger example: s_off = 0, d_off = 1, debug.len = PAGE_SIZE -
the PSP is instructed to write round_up(4097, 16) = 4112 bytes to
a 4096-byte buffer.
Fix by also bounding len by (PAGE_SIZE - d_off), the same check that
sev_send_update_data() already performs for its single-page guest
region.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
Write of size 4095 at addr ff110062293bb009 by task sev_dbg_test/228214
CPU: 96 UID: 0 PID: 228214 Comm: sev_dbg_test Tainted: G U W 7.0.0-smp--5ce9b0c48211-dbg #156 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20250817.1-0 08/25/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
print_report+0xbc/0x260
kasan_report+0xa2/0xd0
kasan_check_range+0x25f/0x2c0
__asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70
sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x33c/0x450 [kvm_amd]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x65d/0x6d0 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100
do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x870
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7fe72b6a0 pfn:0x62293bb
memcg:ff11000112827d82
flags: 0x1400000000000000(node=1|zone=1)
raw: 1400000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 00000007fe72b6a0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ff11000112827d82
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ff110062293bbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ff110062293bbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ff110062293bc000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ff110062293bc080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ff110062293bc100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Fixes: 24f41fb23a39 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command")
Fixes: 7d1594f5d94b ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993@gmail.com>
[sean: add sample KASAN splat, Fixes, and stable@]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501203537.2120074-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4721f8160f17554b003e8928bb61e6c9b2fe92a3 upstream.
When checking if a VP ID is included in a sparse bank set, explicitly check
that the ID can actually be contained in a sparse bank (the TLFS allows for
a maximum of 64 banks of 64 vCPUs each). When handling a paravirtual TLB
flush for L2, the VP ID is copied verbatim from the enlightened VMCS,
without any bounds check, i.e. isn't guaranteed to be under the limit of
4096.
Failure to check the bounds of the VP ID leads to an out-of-bounds read
when testing the sparse bank, and super strictly speaking could lead to KVM
performing an unnecessary TLB flush for an L2 vCPU.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811ba5f598 by task hyperv_evmcs/2802
CPU: 12 UID: 1000 PID: 2802 Comm: hyperv_evmcs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2 #7 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60
print_report+0xcb/0x5d0
kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0
kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0
hv_is_vp_in_sparse_set+0x85/0x100 [kvm]
kvm_hv_flush_tlb+0xe9e/0x16c0 [kvm]
kvm_hv_hypercall+0xe6b/0x1e60 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x485/0x1b60 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x22e3/0x5070 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x5d0/0x10c0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0
do_syscall_64+0xb9/0xcf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f0e62d1a9bf
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffffffffffffffff pfn:0x11ba5f
flags: 0x4000000000000000(zone=1)
raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
raw: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88811ba5f480: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88811ba5f500: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
>ffff88811ba5f580: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
^
ffff88811ba5f600: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
ffff88811ba5f680: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
==================================================================
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Opportunistically add a compile time assertion to ensure the maximum number
of sparse banks exactly matches the number of possible bits in the passed
in mask.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c58a318f6090 ("KVM: x86: hyper-v: L2 TLB flush")
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aiQyZIJtO-2Aj_xN@v4bel
[sean: add KASAN splat, drop comment, add assert, massage changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9f3f3bdc6d9dac1a5a8262ee7ad0f2ff1527a7e7 upstream.
smp_send_stop() parks all secondary CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). The function
marks the CPU offline for the scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but
never informs RCU, so RCU keeps expecting a quiescent state from CPUs
that are now spinning forever with interrupts disabled.
As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop()
this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. Since commit
91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT")
however, irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures without
an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() returns
false. That is the asm-generic default used by MIPS. Any irq_work_sync()
issued in the reboot/shutdown path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on
a grace period that can never complete, hanging the reboot:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on
...
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP.
This issue was noticed on several Realtek MIPS switch SoCs (MIPS
interAptiv) and came up during kernel bump downstream in OpenWrt from
6.18.33 to 6.18.34, after the backport of the patch to the 6.18 stable
branch. The patch also has been backported all the way back to 6.1.
Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring the
generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked CPUs
and grace periods can still complete. MIPS shuts down all CPUs here
without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is not
otherwise issued. Reporting a dying CPU to RCU outside the regular hotplug
offline path is not unprecedented: arm64 does the same in cpu_die_early().
There it is an exception for a CPU that was coming online and is aborting
bringup, rather than the default shutdown action as on MIPS.
Fixes: 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonas Jelonek <jelonek.jonas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1a3860d46e3eb47dbd60339783cdad7904486b9f upstream.
When p9_client_walk() is called with clone set to false, fid aliases
oldfid. If the walk subsequently fails after the request has been sent,
the error path jumps to clunk_fid, which currently calls p9_fid_put(fid)
unconditionally.
This drops a reference to oldfid even though ownership of oldfid remains
with the caller. If this is the last reference, oldfid can be clunked and
destroyed while the caller still expects it to be valid. A later use or
put of oldfid can then trigger a use-after-free or refcount underflow.
Fix this by only putting fid in the clunk_fid error path when it does not
alias oldfid, matching the existing guard in the error path below.
This can be triggered when a multi-component walk is split into multiple
p9_client_walk() calls and a later non-cloning walk fails. A reproducer
and refcount warning logs are available on request.
Fixes: b48dbb998d70 ("9p fid refcount: add p9_fid_get/put wrappers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuxiang Yang <yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ao Wang <wangao@seu.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Xuewei Feng <fengxw06@126.com>
Reported-by: Qi Li <qli01@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Ke Xu <xuke@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: GLM 5.1
Signed-off-by: Yizhou Zhao <zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Message-ID: <20260528053918.53550-1-zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9bd541e09dffff27e5bec0f9f45b0228173a5375 upstream.
ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent
allocator's chain geometry. A malicious descriptor can still claim a
bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in
the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run
past bg_bitmap.
Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent
allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that
capacity. Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk
bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor
is used.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
_find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375)
ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457)
ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86)
ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786)
ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886)
get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?)
do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?)
kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?)
__bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?)
get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?)
ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96)
sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?)
check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?)
__ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497)
check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?)
rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?)
check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?)
ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043)
ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?)
ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
__mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?)
inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?)
balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?)
generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?)
mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?)
file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?)
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?)
ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?)
read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?)
lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260524111248.1429884-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com
Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1ff3f528e67d20e2b1483dcaba899dc7832b2e6b upstream.
rpmsg_chrdev_probe() stores the newly allocated eptdev in the default
endpoint's priv pointer before calling rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add(). If
rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() then fails, its error path frees eptdev while
the default endpoint may still dispatch callbacks with the stale priv
pointer.
Avoid publishing eptdev through the default endpoint until
rpmsg_chrdev_eptdev_add() succeeds. Messages received before the priv
pointer is published should be ignored by rpmsg_ept_cb(). Flow-control
updates can hit rpmsg_ept_flow_cb() in the same window, so make both
callbacks return success when priv is NULL.
Fixes: bc69d1066569 ("rpmsg: char: Introduce the "rpmsg-raw" channel")
Signed-off-by: Yuho Choi <dbgh9129@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601183247.1962010-1-dbgh9129@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54f3c5643ec523a04b6ec0e7c19eb10f5ebebdd3 upstream.
Move of_node_put(child_region) after the error print to avoid accessing
freed memory when pr_err() references child_region.
Fixes: 0fa20cdfcc1f ("fpga: fpga-region: device tree control for FPGA")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
[ Yilun: Fix the Fixes tag ]
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408154534.404327-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 37738fdf2ab1e504d1c63ce5bc0aeb6452d8f057 upstream.
The driver allocates domain generic chips using
irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() during probe and sets up chained
handlers using irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(). However, on driver
removal, the generic chips are not freed and the chained handlers are
not removed.
The generic chips remain on the global gc_list and may later be accessed by
generic interrupt chip suspend, resume, or shutdown callbacks after the
driver has been removed, potentially resulting in a use-after-free and
kernel crash.
The chained handlers that were installed in probe for peripheral and
syswake interrupts are also left dangling, which can lead to spurious
interrupts accessing freed memory.
Fix these issues by:
- Setting IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC flag in domain->flags, so the
core code automatically removes generic chips when irq_domain_remove()
is called
- Clearing all chained handlers with NULL in pdc_intc_remove()
Fixes: b6ef9161e43a ("irq-imgpdc: add ImgTec PDC irqchip driver")
Signed-off-by: Qingshuang Fu <fuqingshuang@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618021352.661773-1-fffsqian@163.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 13e198a90ca4050f4bee8a3f23680389a6563ccc upstream.
When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(),
the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds,
pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(),
which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the
tracepoint accesses lo's fields.
Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo).
Fixes: 2c8d5fc37fe2 ("pNFS: Stricter ordering of layoutget and layoutreturn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f2539c56c74691e7a88af6372ba2b48c06ed2fe4 upstream.
This is a port of MIPS commit 9f3f3bdc6d9dac1 ("MIPS: smp: report dying
CPU to RCU in stop_this_cpu()"). smp_send_stop() parks all secondary
CPUs in stop_this_cpu(). And the function marks the CPU offline for the
scheduler via set_cpu_online(false) but never informs RCU, so RCU keeps
expecting a quiescent state from CPUs that are now spinning forever with
interrupts disabled.
As long as nothing waits for an RCU grace period after smp_send_stop()
this is harmless, which is why it went unnoticed. However, since commit
91840be8f710370 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on
PREEMPT_RT"), irq_work_sync() calls synchronize_rcu() on architectures
without an irq_work self-IPI, i.e. where arch_irq_work_has_interrupt()
returns false. Any irq_work_sync() issued in the reboot/shutdown/halt
path after smp_send_stop() then blocks on a grace period that can never
complete, hanging the reboot:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 15 at kernel/irq_work.c:144 irq_work_queue_on
...
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
rcu: Offline CPU 1 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 2 blocking current GP.
rcu: Offline CPU 3 blocking current GP.
This issue needs some hacks to reproduce, and it was not noticed on
LoongArch because arch_irq_work_has_interrupt() usually returns true.
Call rcutree_report_cpu_dead() once interrupts are disabled, mirroring
the generic CPU-hotplug offline path, so RCU stops waiting on the parked
CPUs and grace periods can still complete. LoongArch shuts down all CPUs
here without going through the CPU-hotplug mechanism, so this report is
not otherwise issued.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 91840be8f710 ("irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT")
Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit bda3348872a2ef0d19f2df6aa8cb5025adce2f20 upstream.
tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to
crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike
the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously
(e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the
meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the
per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and
aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences
aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory.
Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51
Workqueue: events_unbound
Call Trace:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Allocated by task 169:
__kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415)
tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502)
tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72)
ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137)
setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446)
copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579)
create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132)
__x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Freed by task 8:
kfree (mm/slub.c:6566)
tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119)
cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix
slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt
side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before
crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous
return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY
return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt
path was left without the equivalent guard.
Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference
before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching
bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the
-EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the
synchronous success/error return and at the end of
tipc_aead_decrypt_done().
Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is
flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the
cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn
down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive
tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts
synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The
unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the
unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks
maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free
on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617075818.37431-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 0ab5ee5a1badb58cbb2242617cb01a4972b1f2a2 upstream.
When multiple blkgs in the same blkcg are released concurrently,
a use-after-free can occur. The race happens when one blkg's
__blkcg_rstat_flush() removes another blkg's iostat entries via
llist_del_all(). The second blkg sees an empty list and proceeds
to free itself while the first is still iterating over its entries.
Move the flush from __blkg_release() (RCU callback) to blkg_release()
(before call_rcu). This ensures the RCU grace period waits for any
concurrent flush's rcu_read_lock() section to complete before freeing.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jay Shin <jaeshin@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Fixes: 20cb1c2fb756 ("blk-cgroup: Flush stats before releasing blkcg_gq")
Reported-by: coregee2000@gmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/CAHPqNmwT9oRpem3J3erS_W0uSQND47LGGSBsNxP8E6uSUish1w@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jose Fernandez (Anthropic) <jose.fernandez@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260205155425.342084-1-ming.lei@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit c78a4e41ab5ead6193ad8a2dd92e8906bae659fa upstream.
Each PPP control protocol (LCP/IPCP/IPV6CP) embedded in struct ppp
registers a timer via timer_setup(). That struct ppp is the
hdlc->state allocation, which detach_hdlc_protocol() frees with kfree()
in both teardown paths: unregister_hdlc_device() and the re-attach inside
attach_hdlc_protocol().
The ppp proto never registered a .detach callback, so
detach_hdlc_protocol() performs no timer synchronization before the
kfree(). The only cancel, timer_delete(&proto->timer) in ppp_cp_event(),
is partial (it does not wait for a running callback) and only runs on the
->CLOSED transition; ppp_stop()/ppp_close() do not sync either. A
ppp_timer callback already executing (blocked on ppp->lock) survives the
kfree and then dereferences proto->state / ppp->lock in freed memory,
leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by adding a .detach helper that calls timer_shutdown_sync() on
every per-proto timer. detach_hdlc_protocol() invokes proto->detach(dev)
before kfree(hdlc->state), so timer_shutdown_sync()
now runs on both free paths.
timer_shutdown_sync() is used instead of timer_delete_sync() because the
keepalive path re-arms the timer through add_timer()/mod_timer() and
shutdown blocks any re-activation during teardown.
Initialize the per-protocol timers in ppp_ioctl() when the protocol is
attached, and remove the now-redundant timer_setup() from ppp_start(), so
that the timers are initialized exactly once at attach time and
ppp_timer_release() never operates on uninitialized timer_list
structures. attach_hdlc_protocol() uses kmalloc() (not kzalloc), so
struct ppp's protos[i].timer is uninitialized garbage until the first
timer_setup(); without this init-at-attach, attaching the PPP protocol
without ever bringing the device up would leave timer_shutdown_sync()
operating on uninitialized memory in .detach. Moving the init out of
ppp_start() (which only runs on NETDEV_UP) into the attach path makes the
initialization unconditional and avoids initializing the same timer_list
twice.
This bug was found by static analysis.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <fanwu01@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617020518.116319-1-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 257595adf9dac15ae1edd9d07753fbc576a7583d upstream.
pwrseq_debugfs_seq_next() declares 'next' with __free(put_device),
which causes put_device() to be called on the returned pointer when
the variable goes out of scope. This results in a use-after-free
since the seq_file framework receives a pointer whose reference has
already been dropped.
Simply removing __free(put_device) would fix the UAF but would leak
the reference acquired by bus_find_next_device(), as stop() only
calls up_read(&pwrseq_sem) and never releases the device reference.
Fix this by making the reference counting consistent across all
seq_file callbacks, matching the standard pattern used by PCI and
SCSI:
- start(): use get_device() so it returns a referenced pointer.
- next(): explicitly put_device(curr) to release the previous
device's reference (no NULL check needed - the seq_file framework
only calls next() while the previous return was non-NULL).
- stop(): put_device(data) to release the last iterated device's
reference, with a NULL guard since stop() may be called with NULL
when start() returned NULL or next() reached end-of-sequence.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 249ebf3f65f8 ("power: sequencing: implement the pwrseq core")
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260616151049.1705503-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit f9c9ec2c319f843b70ecdf939d48b52d189bc081 upstream.
gfs2_qd_dealloc(), called as an RCU callback from gfs2_qd_dispose(),
accesses the superblock object sdp through qd->qd_sbd after freeing qd.
It does so to decrement sd_quota_count and wake up sd_kill_wait.
However, by the time the RCU callback runs, gfs2_put_super() may have
already freed sdp via free_sbd(). This can happen when
gfs2_quota_cleanup() is called during unmount: it disposes of quota
objects via call_rcu() and then waits on sd_kill_wait with a 60-second
timeout. If the timeout expires, or if gfs2_gl_hash_clear() triggers
additional qd_put() calls that schedule more RCU callbacks after the
wait completes, gfs2_put_super() will proceed to free the superblock
while RCU callbacks referencing it are still pending.
Add an rcu_barrier() before free_sbd() in gfs2_put_super() to ensure
all pending RCU callbacks (including gfs2_qd_dealloc) have completed
before the superblock is freed.
Fixes: a475c5dd16e5 ("gfs2: Free quota data objects synchronously")
Reported-by: syzbot+42a37bf8045847d8f9d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a37bf8045847d8f9d2
Tested-by: syzbot+42a37bf8045847d8f9d2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit 4e67f504ee9ded15e256b64f4fde150e917381d7 upstream.
nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit calls nx_crypto_ctx_exit with crypto_shash_ctx(...)
but crypto_shash_ctx gives a nx_crypto_ctx *, not a crypto_tfm *.
Fix the type in nx_crypto_ctx_exit and drop the bogus crypto_tfm_ctx
call.
This fixes the following oops:
BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xc0403effffffffc8
Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000396cb4
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#15]
Call Trace:
nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit+0x24/0x60
crypto_shash_exit_tfm+0x28/0x40
crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140
crypto_exit_ahash_using_shash+0x20/0x40
crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140
hash_release+0x1c/0x30
alg_sock_destruct+0x38/0x60
__sk_destruct+0x48/0x2b0
af_alg_release+0x58/0xb0
__sock_release+0x68/0x150
sock_close+0x20/0x40
__fput+0x110/0x3a0
sys_close+0x48/0xa0
system_call_exception+0x140/0x2d0
system_call_common+0xf4/0x258
.. which came from hardlink(1) opportunistically using AF_ALG.
The same problem exists with nx_crypto_ctx_skcipher_exit getting a context
it wasn't expecting, but apparently nobody hit that for years.
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bfd9efddf990 ("crypto: nx - convert AES-ECB to skcipher API")
Fixes: 9420e628e7d8 ("crypto: nx - Use API partial block handling")
Acked-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Calvin Buckley <calvin@cmpct.info>
Tested-by: Calvin Buckley <calvin@cmpct.info>
Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <brad.spengler@opensrcsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
get_unaligned()
commit f1edbed787ba67988ed34e0132ca128b052b6ce8 upstream.
Drop a BUG_ON() that has been reachable since it was first added, way back
in 2009, and instead use get_unaligned() to perform potentially-unaligned
accesses.
For a given store, KVM x86's emulator tracks the entire value in the
destination operand, x86_emulate_ctxt.dst. If the destination is memory,
and the target splits multiple pages and/or is emulated MMIO, then KVM
handles each fragment independently. E.g. on a page split starting at page
offset 0xffc, KVM writes 4 bytes to the first page, then the remaining
bytes to the second page, using ctxt->dst as the source for both (with
appropriate offsets).
If the destination splits a page *and* hits emulated MMIO on the second
page, then KVM will complete the write to the first page, then emulate the
MMIO access to the second page. If there is a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd
at offset 0 of the second page, then KVM will process the remainder of the
store as a potential ioeventfd signal.
Putting it all together, if the guest emits a store that splits a page
starting at page offset N, and the second page has a datamatch-enabled
ioeventfd at offset 0, then KVM will check for datamatch using
&dst.valptr[N] as the source. Due to dst (and thus dst.valptr) being
32-byte aligned, if N is not aligned to @len, the BUG_ON() fires.
E.g. with a 16-byte store at page offset 0xffc, to an ioeventfd of len 8,
all initial checks in ioeventfd_in_range() will succeed, and the BUG_ON()
fires due to @val being 4-byte aligned, but not 8-byte aligned.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:783!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 615 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2-ff238429d1ea #365 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ioeventfd_write+0x6c/0x70 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__kvm_io_bus_write+0x85/0xb0 [kvm]
kvm_io_bus_write+0x53/0x80 [kvm]
vcpu_mmio_write+0x66/0xf0 [kvm]
emulator_read_write_onepage+0x12a/0x540 [kvm]
emulator_read_write+0x109/0x2b0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_insn+0x4f8/0xfb0 [kvm]
x86_emulate_instruction+0x181/0x790 [kvm]
kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x313/0x630 [kvm]
vmx_handle_exit+0x18a/0x590 [kvm_intel]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc81/0x1c90 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x970 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x890
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f19c931a9bf
</TASK>
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
In a perfect world, the fix would be to simply delete the BUG_ON(), as KVM
x86 doesn't perform alignment checks on "normal" memory accesses at CPL0.
Sadly, C99 ruins all the fun; while the x86 architecture plays nice,
dereferencing an unaligned pointer directly is undefined behavior in C,
e.g. triggers splats when running with CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y.
Fixes: d34e6b175e61 ("KVM: add ioeventfd support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20260612225241.678509-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ef057cbf825e03b63f6edf5980f96abf3c53089d upstream.
When recovering hugepages in the shadow MMU, verify that the base gfn of
the shadow page is actually contained within the target memslot, *before*
querying the max mapping level given the shadow page's gfn. Failure to
pre-check the validity of the gfn can lead to an out-of-bounds access to
the slot's lpage_info (which typically manifests as a host #PF because the
lpage_info is vmalloc'd) if the guest creates a hugepage mapping (in its
PTEs) that extends "below" the bounds of a memslot.
When faulting in memory for a guest, and the size of the guest mapping is
greater than KVM's (current) max mapping, then KVM will create a "direct"
shadow page (direct in that there are no gPTEs to shadow, and so the target
gfn is a direct calculation given the base gfn of the shadow page). The
hugepage recovery flow looks for such direct shadow pages, as forcing 4KiB
mappings when dirty logging generates the guest > host mapping size case.
When the 4KiB restriction is lifted, then KVM can replace the shadow page
with a hugepage.
But if KVM originally used a smaller mapping than the guest because the
range of memory covered by the guest hugepage exceeds the bounds of a
memslot, then KVM will link a direct shadow page with a gfn that is outside
the bounds of the memslot being used to fault in memory. The rmap entry
added for the leaf mapping is correct and within bounds, but the gfn of the
leaf SPTE's parent shadow page will be out of bounds.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000806ffc
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1002a7067 PMD 10612f067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 13 UID: 1000 PID: 757 Comm: mmu_stress_test Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-48ce1e26eace-x86_pir_to_irr_comments-vm #341 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level+0x79/0x2b0 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages+0x21b/0x320 [kvm]
kvm_set_memslot+0x1ee/0x590 [kvm]
kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x3a1/0x4d0 [kvm]
kvm_vm_ioctl+0x9bf/0x15d0 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb7/0xbb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f21c0f1a9bf
</TASK>
Don't bother pre-checking the bounds of the potential hugepage, i.e. don't
check that e.g. sp->gfn + KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(sp->role.level + 1) is also
within the memslot, as the checks performed by kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level()
are a superset of the basic bounds checks. I.e. pre-checking the full
range would be a dubious micro-optimization.
Fixes: 9eba50f8d7fc ("KVM: x86/mmu: Consult max mapping level when zapping collapsible SPTEs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Cc: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Bulekov <bkov@amazon.com>
Cc: Fred Griffoul <fgriffo@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.de>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: Filippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de>
Cc: Ivan Orlov <iorlov@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 3f5f8ee9917cc2b9076ac533492d8a200edcabb8 upstream.
In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from
exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through
TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points
into bh->b_data):
brelse(bh);
if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
...
len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
...
}
After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the
underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent
exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in
commit fc961522ddbd ("exfat: Fix potential use after free in
exfat_load_upcase_table()").
Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on
each branch.
Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y
+ CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image
(long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path).
With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and
the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the
unpatched kernel faults:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0
With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes
cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a
crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the
instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the
patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim.
Fixes: ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 7fb13fd35110ebe95eb053faf79d018f51144d85 upstream.
In 64-bit configurations calling the initial console output handler from
a kernel thread other than the initial one will result in a situation
where the stack has been placed in the XKPHYS 64-bit memory segment and
consequently so has been the buffer allocated there that is used as the
argument corresponding to the `%s' output conversion specifier for the
firmware's printf() entry point.
This 64-bit address will then be truncated by 32-bit firmware, resulting
in an attempt to access the wrong memory location, which in turn will
cause all kinds of unpredictable behaviour, such as a kernel crash:
Console: colour dummy device 160x64
Calibrating delay loop... 49.36 BogoMIPS (lpj=192512)
pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301
CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000000203bd00, epc == ffffffffbfc08364, ra == ffffffffbfc08800
Oops[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-00254-gfb649bda6f56-dirty #121
$ 0 : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000023 ffffffff80684ba0
$ 4 : 000000000203bd00 ffffffffbfc0f3b4 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000073
$ 8 : 0a303d7469000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000073 ffffffffbfc0f473
$12 : 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffffffff80684c1c 0000000000000000
$16 : 0000000000000000 ffffffff80596dc9 0000000000000000 ffffffffbfc09240
$20 : ffffffff80684c40 ffffffffbfc0f400 000000000000002d 000000000000002b
$24 : ffffffffffffffbf 000000000203bd00
$28 : ffffffff805f0000 ffffffff80684b58 0000000000000030 ffffffffbfc08800
Hi : 0000000000000000
Lo : 0000000000000aa8
epc : ffffffffbfc08364 0xffffffffbfc08364
ra : ffffffffbfc08800 0xffffffffbfc08800
Status: 140120e2 KX SX UX KERNEL EXL
Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02)
BadVA : 000000000203bd00
PrId : 00000430 (R4000SC)
Modules linked in:
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____), tls=0000000000000000)
Stack : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000004d0000004d
80684cc0806a2a40 80596dc80000004d 8061000000000000 bfc0850c80684c38
0000000000000000 000000000203bd00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 00000000bfc0f3b4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000002500000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 802c1a7400000000
0203bd0080596dc8 0203bd4d69000000 6c61632000000018 5f746567646e6172
6c616320625f6d6f 5f736e5f6d6f7266 206361323778302b 303d74696e726320
806a0a38806b0000 806a0a38806b0000 00000000806b0000 80683c58806b0000
...
Call Trace:
Code: a082ffff 03e00008 00601021 <80820000> 00001821 10400005 24840001 80820000 24630001
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
KN04 V2.1k (PC: 0xa0026768, SP: 0x806848e8)
>>
In this case the pointer in $4 was truncated from 0x980000000203bd00 to
0x000000000203bd00.
This may happen when no final console driver has been enabled in the
configuration and consequently the initial console continues being used
late into bootstrap or with an upcoming change that will switch the zs
driver to use a platform device, which in turn will make the console
handover happen only after other kernel threads have already been
started.
Fix the issue by making the buffer static and initdata, and therefore
placed in the CKSEG0 32-bit compatibility segment, observing that the
console output handler is called with the console lock held, implying
no need for this code to be reentrant. Add an assertion to verify the
buffer actually has been placed in a compatibility segment.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.12+
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4c21b5927d4364bfe7365f2700da5fea0ed0d004 upstream.
proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with
kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since
kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing
that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory.
Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc
allocations.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1-rc5.
Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with
KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the
test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1
check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines
failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses
stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to
/proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under
that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30
? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870
? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480
? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
...
</TASK>
With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the
reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports.
Fixes: 4508943794ef ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-3-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f73aa66dffcb8e61e78f01b56163ec16a15d06d2 upstream.
The bdev pseudo-filesystem is an internal kernel filesystem with which
userspace should not interfere. Unregister it so that userspace cannot
even attempt to mount it.
This fixes a bug [1] that occurs when attempting to access files,
because the system call move_mount() uses pointers declared in the
inode_operations structure, which for the bdev pseudo-filesystem
are always equal to 0. `inode->i_op = &empty_iops;`
[1]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
#PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
PGD 23380067 P4D 23380067 PUD 23381067 PMD 0
Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 2 PID: 17125 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.155-syzkaller-00350-g84221fde2681 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:0x0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
lookup_open.isra.0+0x700/0x1180 fs/namei.c:3460
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3550 [inline]
path_openat+0x953/0x2700 fs/namei.c:3780
do_filp_open+0x1c5/0x410 fs/namei.c:3810
do_sys_openat2+0x171/0x4d0 fs/open.c:1318
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1334 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1350 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1345 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x13c/0x1f0 fs/open.c:1345
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20131010004732.GJ13318@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/T/#
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev@swemel.ru>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260521072857.5078-1-arefev@swemel.ru
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 6d874b65aadce56ac78f76129dbcfc2599b638f8 upstream.
A partial atomic write reserves a block in the COW inode before reading the
original data page for the untouched bytes in that page.
If that read fails, write_begin returns an error but leaves the COW inode
entry as NEW_ADDR. A retry of the same partial write then finds the COW
entry, treats it as existing COW data, and f2fs_write_begin() zeroes the
whole folio because blkaddr is NEW_ADDR.
If the retry is committed, the bytes outside the retried write range are
committed as zeroes instead of preserving the original file contents.
Only use the COW inode as the read source when it already has a real data
block. If the COW entry is still NEW_ADDR, treat it as a reservation to
reuse: keep reading the old data from the original inode and avoid
reserving or accounting the same atomic block again.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 3db1de0e582c ("f2fs: change the current atomic write way")
Signed-off-by: Wenjie Qi <qiwenjie@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 1f70ddb28a3c71df124da5fa4040c808116d6bb9 upstream.
When __destroy_extent_node() sets the inode flag FI_NO_EXTENT, it does
not reset the length of the largest extent to 0 and update the inode
folio. Since modifications to the extent tree are disallowed afterward,
the cached largest extent may become stale. This can trigger the
following error in xfstests generic/388:
F2FS-fs (dm-0): sanity_check_extent_cache: inode (ino=1761) extent info [220057, 57, 6] is incorrect, run fsck to fix
In the f2fs_drop_inode path, __destroy_extent_node() does not need to
guarantee that et->node_cnt is 0, because concurrency with writeback
is expected in this path, and writeback may update the extent cache.
This patch reverts commit ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between
extent node destroy and writeback"), and remove the unnecessary zero
check of et->node_cnt.
Fixes: ed78aeebef05 ("f2fs: fix node_cnt race between extent node destroy and writeback")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yongpeng Yang <yangyongpeng@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c4810ada31e80cbe4011467c4f3b1e93f94134f3 upstream.
f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A
malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only
contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk()
then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.
Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a
full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED from these new truncated-entry checks, while keeping the
pre-existing -EINVAL paths unchanged.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0
RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte
region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968)
Read of size 4
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
__f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
__f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
__get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?)
vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?)
do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?)
do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?)
do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?)
filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?)
do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?)
path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?)
cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?)
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?)
trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?)
_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4275b59673eb60b02eec3997816c83f1f4b909c4 upstream.
Currently, the length of fallocate for pin file is section-aligned to
keep allocated sections from being selected as victims of GC. However,
for the case that the start offset of fallocate is not aligned in
section, the allocated sections can't be fully utilized. It's because a
new section is allocated by f2fs_allocate_pinning_section() after using
blks_per_sec blocks regardless of the start offset. As a result, several
unexpected dirty segments may be created, including blocks assigned to
the pinned file.
To address this issue, let's round down the start offset of fallocate
to the length of section.
The reproducing scenario is as below
chunk=$(((2<<20)+4096)) # 2MB + 4KB
touch test
f2fs_io pinfile set test
f2fs_io fallocate 0 0 $chunk test
f2fs_io fallocate 0 $chunk $chunk test
f2fs_io fallocate 0 $((chunk*2)) $chunk test
f2fs_io fiemap 0 $((chunk*3)) test
Fiemap: offset = 0 len = 12288
logical addr. physical addr. length flags
0 0000000000000000 000000068c600000 0000000000400000 00001088
1 0000000000400000 000000003d400000 0000000000001000 00001088
2 0000000000401000 00000003eb200000 0000000000200000 00001088
3 0000000000601000 00000005e4200000 0000000000001000 00001088
4 0000000000602000 0000000605400000 0000000000200000 00001089
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f5a53edcf01e ("f2fs: support aligned pinned file")
Reviewed-by: Yunji Kang <yunji0.kang@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Yeongjin Gil <youngjin.gil@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Sunmin Jeong <s_min.jeong@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5073c66a96a9c23c0c2533ed4ed06e42f9021208 upstream.
F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() uses NM_I(sbi)->max_nid as the synthetic inode
number for the compressed page cache inode. That inode only exists when
the compress_cache mount option is enabled.
When compress_cache is disabled, max_nid is outside the valid inode
range. A corrupted directory entry that points to ino == max_nid should
therefore be rejected by f2fs_check_nid_range(). However, is_meta_ino()
currently treats F2FS_COMPRESS_INO() as a meta inode unconditionally,
so f2fs_iget() bypasses do_read_inode() and its nid range check, and
instantiates a fake internal inode instead.
Gate the compressed cache inode case on COMPRESS_CACHE, matching
f2fs_init_compress_inode(). With compress_cache disabled, ino ==
max_nid now follows the normal inode path and is rejected as an
out-of-range nid.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 6ce19aff0b8c ("f2fs: compress: add compress_inode to cache compressed blocks")
Signed-off-by: Wenjie Qi <qiwenjie@xiaomi.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
