From 35e0f9a9af4869a4b1a3943da08d3a29ac6c4a42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xu Wang Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2021 09:32:17 +0000 Subject: sunrpc: Remove unneeded null check In g_verify_token_header, the null check of 'ret' is unneeded to be done twice. Signed-off-by: Xu Wang Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c index fe97f3106536..4a4082bb22ad 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_generic_token.c @@ -222,10 +222,8 @@ g_verify_token_header(struct xdr_netobj *mech, int *body_size, if (ret) return ret; - if (!ret) { - *buf_in = buf; - *body_size = toksize; - } + *buf_in = buf; + *body_size = toksize; return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From c4f0396688b5916b3a95bcb004d158634f2234ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiapeng Chong Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 17:37:41 +0800 Subject: SUNRPC: clean up some inconsistent indenting Eliminate the follow smatch warning: net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c:1912 xs_local_connect() warn: inconsistent indenting. Reported-by: Abaci Robot Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c index d8ee06a9650a..69b6ee5a5fd1 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c @@ -1910,7 +1910,7 @@ static void xs_local_connect(struct rpc_xprt *xprt, struct rpc_task *task) struct sock_xprt *transport = container_of(xprt, struct sock_xprt, xprt); int ret; - if (RPC_IS_ASYNC(task)) { + if (RPC_IS_ASYNC(task)) { /* * We want the AF_LOCAL connect to be resolved in the * filesystem namespace of the process making the rpc -- cgit v1.2.3 From 86439fa2678d1ae752ac9c787aac1c145b87b4c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2021 15:48:23 +0100 Subject: SUNRPC: use default_groups in kobj_type There are currently 2 ways to create a set of sysfs files for a kobj_type, through the default_attrs field, and the default_groups field. Move the sunrpc sysfs code to use default_groups field which has been the preferred way since aa30f47cf666 ("kobject: Add support for default attribute groups to kobj_type") so that we can soon get rid of the obsolete default_attrs field. Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" Cc: Chuck Lever Cc: Trond Myklebust Cc: Anna Schumaker Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/sysfs.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c b/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c index 2766dd21935b..b1aea3419218 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c @@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ static struct attribute *rpc_sysfs_xprt_attrs[] = { &rpc_sysfs_xprt_change_state.attr, NULL, }; +ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(rpc_sysfs_xprt); static struct kobj_attribute rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_info = __ATTR(xprt_switch_info, 0444, rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_info_show, NULL); @@ -430,6 +431,7 @@ static struct attribute *rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_attrs[] = { &rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_info.attr, NULL, }; +ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch); static struct kobj_type rpc_sysfs_client_type = { .release = rpc_sysfs_client_release, @@ -439,14 +441,14 @@ static struct kobj_type rpc_sysfs_client_type = { static struct kobj_type rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_type = { .release = rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_release, - .default_attrs = rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_attrs, + .default_groups = rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_groups, .sysfs_ops = &kobj_sysfs_ops, .namespace = rpc_sysfs_xprt_switch_namespace, }; static struct kobj_type rpc_sysfs_xprt_type = { .release = rpc_sysfs_xprt_release, - .default_attrs = rpc_sysfs_xprt_attrs, + .default_groups = rpc_sysfs_xprt_groups, .sysfs_ops = &kobj_sysfs_ops, .namespace = rpc_sysfs_xprt_namespace, }; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0e906607b9c5ee22312c9af4d8adb45c617ea38a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2022 15:51:38 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack_netbios_ns: fix helper module alias The helper gets registered as 'netbios-ns', not netbios_ns. Intentionally not adding a fixes-tag because i don't want this to go to stable. This wasn't noticed for a very long time so no so no need to risk regressions. Reported-by: Yi Chen Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netbios_ns.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netbios_ns.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netbios_ns.c index 7f19ee259609..55415f011943 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netbios_ns.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netbios_ns.c @@ -20,13 +20,14 @@ #include #include +#define HELPER_NAME "netbios-ns" #define NMBD_PORT 137 MODULE_AUTHOR("Patrick McHardy "); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NetBIOS name service broadcast connection tracking helper"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_ALIAS("ip_conntrack_netbios_ns"); -MODULE_ALIAS_NFCT_HELPER("netbios_ns"); +MODULE_ALIAS_NFCT_HELPER(HELPER_NAME); static unsigned int timeout __read_mostly = 3; module_param(timeout, uint, 0400); @@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ static int netbios_ns_help(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff, } static struct nf_conntrack_helper helper __read_mostly = { - .name = "netbios-ns", + .name = HELPER_NAME, .tuple.src.l3num = NFPROTO_IPV4, .tuple.src.u.udp.port = cpu_to_be16(NMBD_PORT), .tuple.dst.protonum = IPPROTO_UDP, -- cgit v1.2.3 From cf46eacbc156a82d6643eb10afe8969abad5a35f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 10:40:30 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: remove unused variable > Remove unused variable and fix missing initialization. > > >> net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8266:6: warning: variable 'i' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] > int i; > ^ Fixes: 2c865a8a28a1 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add rule blob layout") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 77938b1042f3..1cde8cd0d1a7 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -8264,14 +8264,12 @@ static int nf_tables_commit_chain_prepare(struct net *net, struct nft_chain *cha void *data, *data_boundary; struct nft_rule_dp *prule; struct nft_rule *rule; - int i; /* already handled or inactive chain? */ if (chain->blob_next || !nft_is_active_next(net, chain)) return 0; rule = list_entry(&chain->rules, struct nft_rule, list); - i = 0; data_size = 0; list_for_each_entry_continue(rule, &chain->rules, list) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From fe75e84a8fe17449ea16b73cfcfc9e7d06a49130 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Wed, 12 Jan 2022 12:29:05 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: set last expression in register tracking area nft_rule_for_each_expr() sets on last to nft_rule_last(), however, this is coming after track.last field is set on. Use nft_expr_last() to set track.last accordingly. Fixes: 12e4ecfa244b ("netfilter: nf_tables: add register tracking infrastructure") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 1cde8cd0d1a7..cf454f8ca2b0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -8299,7 +8299,7 @@ static int nf_tables_commit_chain_prepare(struct net *net, struct nft_chain *cha return -ENOMEM; size = 0; - track.last = last; + track.last = nft_expr_last(rule); nft_rule_for_each_expr(expr, last, rule) { track.cur = expr; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7d70984a1ad4c445dff08edb9aacce8906b6a222 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 12:22:38 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nft_connlimit: memleak if nf_ct_netns_get() fails Check if nf_ct_netns_get() fails then release the limit object previously allocated via kmalloc(). Fixes: 37f319f37d90 ("netfilter: nft_connlimit: move stateful fields out of expression data") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_connlimit.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_connlimit.c b/net/netfilter/nft_connlimit.c index 7d00a1452b1d..3362417ebfdb 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_connlimit.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_connlimit.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static int nft_connlimit_do_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, { bool invert = false; u32 flags, limit; + int err; if (!tb[NFTA_CONNLIMIT_COUNT]) return -EINVAL; @@ -84,7 +85,15 @@ static int nft_connlimit_do_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, priv->limit = limit; priv->invert = invert; - return nf_ct_netns_get(ctx->net, ctx->family); + err = nf_ct_netns_get(ctx->net, ctx->family); + if (err < 0) + goto err_netns; + + return 0; +err_netns: + kfree(priv->list); + + return err; } static void nft_connlimit_do_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, -- cgit v1.2.3 From b8a09619a56334414cbd7f935a0796240d0cc07e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Olga Kornievskaia Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 14:53:34 -0500 Subject: SUNRPC allow for unspecified transport time in rpc_clnt_add_xprt If the supplied argument doesn't specify the transport type, use the type of the existing rpc clnt and its existing transport. Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c index a312ea2bc440..c83fe618767c 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/clnt.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/clnt.c @@ -2900,7 +2900,7 @@ int rpc_clnt_add_xprt(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, unsigned long connect_timeout; unsigned long reconnect_timeout; unsigned char resvport, reuseport; - int ret = 0; + int ret = 0, ident; rcu_read_lock(); xps = xprt_switch_get(rcu_dereference(clnt->cl_xpi.xpi_xpswitch)); @@ -2914,8 +2914,11 @@ int rpc_clnt_add_xprt(struct rpc_clnt *clnt, reuseport = xprt->reuseport; connect_timeout = xprt->connect_timeout; reconnect_timeout = xprt->max_reconnect_timeout; + ident = xprt->xprt_class->ident; rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!xprtargs->ident) + xprtargs->ident = ident; xprt = xprt_create_transport(xprtargs); if (IS_ERR(xprt)) { ret = PTR_ERR(xprt); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 776d794f28c95051bc70405a7b1fa40115658a18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xiyu Yang Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2021 12:32:38 +0800 Subject: net/sunrpc: fix reference count leaks in rpc_sysfs_xprt_state_change The refcount leak issues take place in an error handling path. When the 3rd argument buf doesn't match with "offline", "online" or "remove", the function simply returns -EINVAL and forgets to decrease the reference count of a rpc_xprt object and a rpc_xprt_switch object increased by rpc_sysfs_xprt_kobj_get_xprt() and rpc_sysfs_xprt_kobj_get_xprt_switch(), causing reference count leaks of both unused objects. Fix this issue by jumping to the error handling path labelled with out_put when buf matches none of "offline", "online" or "remove". Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong Signed-off-by: Xin Tan Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/sysfs.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c b/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c index b1aea3419218..49fd0339dc59 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c @@ -295,8 +295,10 @@ static ssize_t rpc_sysfs_xprt_state_change(struct kobject *kobj, online = 1; else if (!strncmp(buf, "remove", 6)) remove = 1; - else - return -EINVAL; + else { + count = -EINVAL; + goto out_put; + } if (wait_on_bit_lock(&xprt->state, XPRT_LOCKED, TASK_KILLABLE)) { count = -EINTR; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1a48db3fef499f615b56093947ec4b0d3d8e3021 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anna Schumaker Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2021 11:54:25 -0500 Subject: sunrpc: Fix potential race conditions in rpc_sysfs_xprt_state_change() We need to use test_and_set_bit() when changing xprt state flags to avoid potentially getting xps->xps_nactive out of sync. Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/sysfs.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c b/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c index 49fd0339dc59..b64a0286b182 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c @@ -309,25 +309,28 @@ static ssize_t rpc_sysfs_xprt_state_change(struct kobject *kobj, goto release_tasks; } if (offline) { - set_bit(XPRT_OFFLINE, &xprt->state); - spin_lock(&xps->xps_lock); - xps->xps_nactive--; - spin_unlock(&xps->xps_lock); + if (!test_and_set_bit(XPRT_OFFLINE, &xprt->state)) { + spin_lock(&xps->xps_lock); + xps->xps_nactive--; + spin_unlock(&xps->xps_lock); + } } else if (online) { - clear_bit(XPRT_OFFLINE, &xprt->state); - spin_lock(&xps->xps_lock); - xps->xps_nactive++; - spin_unlock(&xps->xps_lock); + if (test_and_clear_bit(XPRT_OFFLINE, &xprt->state)) { + spin_lock(&xps->xps_lock); + xps->xps_nactive++; + spin_unlock(&xps->xps_lock); + } } else if (remove) { if (test_bit(XPRT_OFFLINE, &xprt->state)) { - set_bit(XPRT_REMOVE, &xprt->state); - xprt_force_disconnect(xprt); - if (test_bit(XPRT_CONNECTED, &xprt->state)) { - if (!xprt->sending.qlen && - !xprt->pending.qlen && - !xprt->backlog.qlen && - !atomic_long_read(&xprt->queuelen)) - rpc_xprt_switch_remove_xprt(xps, xprt); + if (!test_and_set_bit(XPRT_REMOVE, &xprt->state)) { + xprt_force_disconnect(xprt); + if (test_bit(XPRT_CONNECTED, &xprt->state)) { + if (!xprt->sending.qlen && + !xprt->pending.qlen && + !xprt->backlog.qlen && + !atomic_long_read(&xprt->queuelen)) + rpc_xprt_switch_remove_xprt(xps, xprt); + } } } else { count = -EINVAL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c03061e7a210b4fe37440a1940fc198744a55ca4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 12:20:23 -0500 Subject: xprtrdma: Remove final dprintk call sites from xprtrdma Deprecated. This information is available via tracepoints. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c | 12 ------------ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c index 3d3673ba9e1e..1d6e85fe3133 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c @@ -274,8 +274,6 @@ rpcrdma_cm_event_handler(struct rdma_cm_id *id, struct rdma_cm_event *event) ep->re_connect_status = -ENETUNREACH; goto wake_connect_worker; case RDMA_CM_EVENT_REJECTED: - dprintk("rpcrdma: connection to %pISpc rejected: %s\n", - sap, rdma_reject_msg(id, event->status)); ep->re_connect_status = -ECONNREFUSED; if (event->status == IB_CM_REJ_STALE_CONN) ep->re_connect_status = -ENOTCONN; @@ -291,8 +289,6 @@ disconnected: break; } - dprintk("RPC: %s: %pISpc on %s/frwr: %s\n", __func__, sap, - ep->re_id->device->name, rdma_event_msg(event->event)); return 0; } @@ -419,14 +415,6 @@ static int rpcrdma_ep_create(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt) ep->re_attr.qp_type = IB_QPT_RC; ep->re_attr.port_num = ~0; - dprintk("RPC: %s: requested max: dtos: send %d recv %d; " - "iovs: send %d recv %d\n", - __func__, - ep->re_attr.cap.max_send_wr, - ep->re_attr.cap.max_recv_wr, - ep->re_attr.cap.max_send_sge, - ep->re_attr.cap.max_recv_sge); - ep->re_send_batch = ep->re_max_requests >> 3; ep->re_send_count = ep->re_send_batch; init_waitqueue_head(&ep->re_connect_wait); -- cgit v1.2.3 From c0f26167ddcf94fb94e80fcb20aaac7f7db13c1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chuck Lever Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 12:20:30 -0500 Subject: xprtrdma: Remove definitions of RPCDBG_FACILITY Deprecated. dprintk is no longer used in xprtrdma. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/backchannel.c | 4 ---- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/frwr_ops.c | 4 ---- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c | 4 ---- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c | 4 ---- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c | 11 ----------- 5 files changed, 27 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/backchannel.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/backchannel.c index 17f174d6ea3b..faba7136dd9a 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/backchannel.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/backchannel.c @@ -13,10 +13,6 @@ #include "xprt_rdma.h" #include -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) -# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_TRANS -#endif - #undef RPCRDMA_BACKCHANNEL_DEBUG /** diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/frwr_ops.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/frwr_ops.c index ff699307e820..515dd7a66a04 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/frwr_ops.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/frwr_ops.c @@ -45,10 +45,6 @@ #include "xprt_rdma.h" #include -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) -# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_TRANS -#endif - static void frwr_cid_init(struct rpcrdma_ep *ep, struct rpcrdma_mr *mr) { diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c index 8035a983c8ce..281ddb87ac8d 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c @@ -54,10 +54,6 @@ #include "xprt_rdma.h" #include -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) -# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_TRANS -#endif - /* Returns size of largest RPC-over-RDMA header in a Call message * * The largest Call header contains a full-size Read list and a diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c index 16e5696314a4..42e375dbdadb 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/transport.c @@ -60,10 +60,6 @@ #include "xprt_rdma.h" #include -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) -# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_TRANS -#endif - /* * tunables */ diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c index 1d6e85fe3133..f172d1298013 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c @@ -63,17 +63,6 @@ #include "xprt_rdma.h" #include -/* - * Globals/Macros - */ - -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) -# define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_TRANS -#endif - -/* - * internal functions - */ static int rpcrdma_sendctxs_create(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt); static void rpcrdma_sendctxs_destroy(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt); static void rpcrdma_sendctx_put_locked(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 830af2eba40327abec64325a5b08b1e85c37a2e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 21:37:58 +0100 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: don't increment invalid counter on NF_REPEAT The packet isn't invalid, REPEAT means we're trying again after cleaning out a stale connection, e.g. via tcp tracker. This caused increases of invalid stat counter in a test case involving frequent connection reuse, even though no packet is actually invalid. Fixes: 56a62e2218f5 ("netfilter: conntrack: fix NF_REPEAT handling") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 894a325d39f2..d6aa5b47031e 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -1924,15 +1924,17 @@ repeat: pr_debug("nf_conntrack_in: Can't track with proto module\n"); nf_ct_put(ct); skb->_nfct = 0; - NF_CT_STAT_INC_ATOMIC(state->net, invalid); - if (ret == -NF_DROP) - NF_CT_STAT_INC_ATOMIC(state->net, drop); /* Special case: TCP tracker reports an attempt to reopen a * closed/aborted connection. We have to go back and create a * fresh conntrack. */ if (ret == -NF_REPEAT) goto repeat; + + NF_CT_STAT_INC_ATOMIC(state->net, invalid); + if (ret == -NF_DROP) + NF_CT_STAT_INC_ATOMIC(state->net, drop); + ret = -ret; goto out; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 47934e06b65637c88a762d9c98329ae6e3238888 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Congyu Liu Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 14:20:13 -0500 Subject: net: fix information leakage in /proc/net/ptype In one net namespace, after creating a packet socket without binding it to a device, users in other net namespaces can observe the new `packet_type` added by this packet socket by reading `/proc/net/ptype` file. This is minor information leakage as packet socket is namespace aware. Add a net pointer in `packet_type` to keep the net namespace of of corresponding packet socket. In `ptype_seq_show`, this net pointer must be checked when it is not NULL. Fixes: 2feb27dbe00c ("[NETNS]: Minor information leak via /proc/net/ptype file.") Signed-off-by: Congyu Liu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/netdevice.h | 1 + net/core/net-procfs.c | 3 ++- net/packet/af_packet.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h index 3213c7227b59..e490b84732d1 100644 --- a/include/linux/netdevice.h +++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h @@ -2548,6 +2548,7 @@ struct packet_type { struct net_device *); bool (*id_match)(struct packet_type *ptype, struct sock *sk); + struct net *af_packet_net; void *af_packet_priv; struct list_head list; }; diff --git a/net/core/net-procfs.c b/net/core/net-procfs.c index d8b9dbabd4a4..5b8016335aca 100644 --- a/net/core/net-procfs.c +++ b/net/core/net-procfs.c @@ -260,7 +260,8 @@ static int ptype_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) seq_puts(seq, "Type Device Function\n"); - else if (pt->dev == NULL || dev_net(pt->dev) == seq_file_net(seq)) { + else if ((!pt->af_packet_net || net_eq(pt->af_packet_net, seq_file_net(seq))) && + (!pt->dev || net_eq(dev_net(pt->dev), seq_file_net(seq)))) { if (pt->type == htons(ETH_P_ALL)) seq_puts(seq, "ALL "); else diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 5bd409ab4cc2..85ea7ddb48db 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -1774,6 +1774,7 @@ static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, struct fanout_args *args) match->prot_hook.dev = po->prot_hook.dev; match->prot_hook.func = packet_rcv_fanout; match->prot_hook.af_packet_priv = match; + match->prot_hook.af_packet_net = read_pnet(&match->net); match->prot_hook.id_match = match_fanout_group; match->max_num_members = args->max_num_members; list_add(&match->list, &fanout_list); @@ -3353,6 +3354,7 @@ static int packet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, po->prot_hook.func = packet_rcv_spkt; po->prot_hook.af_packet_priv = sk; + po->prot_hook.af_packet_net = sock_net(sk); if (proto) { po->prot_hook.type = proto; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 973bf8fdd12f0e70ea351c018e68edd377a836d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Victor Nogueira Date: Tue, 18 Jan 2022 14:19:09 -0300 Subject: net: sched: Clarify error message when qdisc kind is unknown When adding a tc rule with a qdisc kind that is not supported or not compiled into the kernel, the kernel emits the following error: "Error: Specified qdisc not found.". Found via tdc testing when ETS qdisc was not compiled in and it was not obvious right away what the message meant without looking at the kernel code. Change the error message to be more explicit and say the qdisc kind is unknown. Signed-off-by: Victor Nogueira Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c index 2cb496c84878..179825a3b2fd 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c @@ -1204,7 +1204,7 @@ static struct Qdisc *qdisc_create(struct net_device *dev, err = -ENOENT; if (!ops) { - NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Specified qdisc not found"); + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Specified qdisc kind is unknown"); goto err_out; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 6cee105e7f2ced596373951d9ea08dacc3883c68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ido Schimmel Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 10:05:46 +0200 Subject: ipv6_tunnel: Rate limit warning messages The warning messages can be invoked from the data path for every packet transmitted through an ip6gre netdev, leading to high CPU utilization. Fix that by rate limiting the messages. Fixes: 09c6bbf090ec ("[IPV6]: Do mandatory IPv6 tunnel endpoint checks in realtime") Reported-by: Maksym Yaremchuk Tested-by: Maksym Yaremchuk Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel Reviewed-by: Amit Cohen Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c index fe786df4f849..97ade833f58c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c @@ -1036,14 +1036,14 @@ int ip6_tnl_xmit_ctl(struct ip6_tnl *t, if (unlikely(!ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags(net, laddr, ldev, false, 0, IFA_F_TENTATIVE))) - pr_warn("%s xmit: Local address not yet configured!\n", - p->name); + pr_warn_ratelimited("%s xmit: Local address not yet configured!\n", + p->name); else if (!(p->flags & IP6_TNL_F_ALLOW_LOCAL_REMOTE) && !ipv6_addr_is_multicast(raddr) && unlikely(ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags(net, raddr, ldev, true, 0, IFA_F_TENTATIVE))) - pr_warn("%s xmit: Routing loop! Remote address found on this node!\n", - p->name); + pr_warn_ratelimited("%s xmit: Routing loop! Remote address found on this node!\n", + p->name); else ret = 1; rcu_read_unlock(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From ebdc1a0309629e71e5910b353e6b005f022ce171 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 04:45:30 -0800 Subject: tcp: add a missing sk_defer_free_flush() in tcp_splice_read() Without it, splice users can hit the warning added in commit 79074a72d335 ("net: Flush deferred skb free on socket destroy") Fixes: f35f821935d8 ("tcp: defer skb freeing after socket lock is released") Fixes: 79074a72d335 ("net: Flush deferred skb free on socket destroy") Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Gal Pressman Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220120124530.925607-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 3b75836db19b..78e81465f5f3 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -842,6 +842,7 @@ ssize_t tcp_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos, } release_sock(sk); + sk_defer_free_flush(sk); if (spliced) return spliced; -- cgit v1.2.3 From aafc2e3285c2d7a79b7ee15221c19fbeca7b1509 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 09:41:12 -0800 Subject: ipv6: annotate accesses to fn->fn_sernum struct fib6_node's fn_sernum field can be read while other threads change it. Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations. Do not change existing smp barriers in fib6_get_cookie_safe() and __fib6_update_sernum_upto_root() syzbot reported: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in fib6_clean_node / inet6_csk_route_socket write to 0xffff88813df62e2c of 4 bytes by task 1920 on cpu 1: fib6_clean_node+0xc2/0x260 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2178 fib6_walk_continue+0x38e/0x430 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2112 fib6_walk net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2160 [inline] fib6_clean_tree net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2240 [inline] __fib6_clean_all+0x1a9/0x2e0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2256 fib6_flush_trees+0x6c/0x80 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2281 rt_genid_bump_ipv6 include/net/net_namespace.h:488 [inline] addrconf_dad_completed+0x57f/0x870 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4230 addrconf_dad_work+0x908/0x1170 process_one_work+0x3f6/0x960 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x616/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x1bf/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:359 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 read to 0xffff88813df62e2c of 4 bytes by task 15701 on cpu 0: fib6_get_cookie_safe include/net/ip6_fib.h:285 [inline] rt6_get_cookie include/net/ip6_fib.h:306 [inline] ip6_dst_store include/net/ip6_route.h:234 [inline] inet6_csk_route_socket+0x352/0x3c0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:109 inet6_csk_xmit+0x91/0x1e0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:121 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1323/0x1840 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1402 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1420 [inline] tcp_write_xmit+0x1450/0x4460 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2680 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x68/0x1c0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2864 tcp_push+0x2d9/0x2f0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:725 mptcp_push_release net/mptcp/protocol.c:1491 [inline] __mptcp_push_pending+0x46c/0x490 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1578 mptcp_sendmsg+0x9ec/0xa50 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1764 inet6_sendmsg+0x5f/0x80 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:643 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline] kernel_sendmsg+0x97/0xd0 net/socket.c:745 sock_no_sendpage+0x84/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:3086 inet_sendpage+0x9d/0xc0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:834 kernel_sendpage+0x187/0x200 net/socket.c:3492 sock_sendpage+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1007 pipe_to_sendpage+0x128/0x160 fs/splice.c:364 splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:418 [inline] __splice_from_pipe+0x207/0x500 fs/splice.c:562 splice_from_pipe fs/splice.c:597 [inline] generic_splice_sendpage+0x94/0xd0 fs/splice.c:746 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:767 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x80/0xa0 fs/splice.c:936 splice_direct_to_actor+0x345/0x650 fs/splice.c:891 do_splice_direct+0x106/0x190 fs/splice.c:979 do_sendfile+0x675/0xc40 fs/read_write.c:1245 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1310 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1296 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x102/0x140 fs/read_write.c:1296 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x0000026f -> 0x00000271 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 15701 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 The Fixes tag I chose is probably arbitrary, I do not think we need to backport this patch to older kernels. Fixes: c5cff8561d2d ("ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220120174112.1126644-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/net/ip6_fib.h | 2 +- net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- net/ipv6/route.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/ip6_fib.h b/include/net/ip6_fib.h index a9a4ccc0cdb5..40ae8f1b18e5 100644 --- a/include/net/ip6_fib.h +++ b/include/net/ip6_fib.h @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static inline bool fib6_get_cookie_safe(const struct fib6_info *f6i, fn = rcu_dereference(f6i->fib6_node); if (fn) { - *cookie = fn->fn_sernum; + *cookie = READ_ONCE(fn->fn_sernum); /* pairs with smp_wmb() in __fib6_update_sernum_upto_root() */ smp_rmb(); status = true; diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c index 463c37dea449..413f66781e50 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ void fib6_update_sernum(struct net *net, struct fib6_info *f6i) fn = rcu_dereference_protected(f6i->fib6_node, lockdep_is_held(&f6i->fib6_table->tb6_lock)); if (fn) - fn->fn_sernum = fib6_new_sernum(net); + WRITE_ONCE(fn->fn_sernum, fib6_new_sernum(net)); } /* @@ -590,12 +590,13 @@ static int fib6_dump_table(struct fib6_table *table, struct sk_buff *skb, spin_unlock_bh(&table->tb6_lock); if (res > 0) { cb->args[4] = 1; - cb->args[5] = w->root->fn_sernum; + cb->args[5] = READ_ONCE(w->root->fn_sernum); } } else { - if (cb->args[5] != w->root->fn_sernum) { + int sernum = READ_ONCE(w->root->fn_sernum); + if (cb->args[5] != sernum) { /* Begin at the root if the tree changed */ - cb->args[5] = w->root->fn_sernum; + cb->args[5] = sernum; w->state = FWS_INIT; w->node = w->root; w->skip = w->count; @@ -1345,7 +1346,7 @@ static void __fib6_update_sernum_upto_root(struct fib6_info *rt, /* paired with smp_rmb() in fib6_get_cookie_safe() */ smp_wmb(); while (fn) { - fn->fn_sernum = sernum; + WRITE_ONCE(fn->fn_sernum, sernum); fn = rcu_dereference_protected(fn->parent, lockdep_is_held(&rt->fib6_table->tb6_lock)); } @@ -2174,8 +2175,8 @@ static int fib6_clean_node(struct fib6_walker *w) }; if (c->sernum != FIB6_NO_SERNUM_CHANGE && - w->node->fn_sernum != c->sernum) - w->node->fn_sernum = c->sernum; + READ_ONCE(w->node->fn_sernum) != c->sernum) + WRITE_ONCE(w->node->fn_sernum, c->sernum); if (!c->func) { WARN_ON_ONCE(c->sernum == FIB6_NO_SERNUM_CHANGE); @@ -2543,7 +2544,7 @@ static void ipv6_route_seq_setup_walk(struct ipv6_route_iter *iter, iter->w.state = FWS_INIT; iter->w.node = iter->w.root; iter->w.args = iter; - iter->sernum = iter->w.root->fn_sernum; + iter->sernum = READ_ONCE(iter->w.root->fn_sernum); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&iter->w.lh); fib6_walker_link(net, &iter->w); } @@ -2571,8 +2572,10 @@ static struct fib6_table *ipv6_route_seq_next_table(struct fib6_table *tbl, static void ipv6_route_check_sernum(struct ipv6_route_iter *iter) { - if (iter->sernum != iter->w.root->fn_sernum) { - iter->sernum = iter->w.root->fn_sernum; + int sernum = READ_ONCE(iter->w.root->fn_sernum); + + if (iter->sernum != sernum) { + iter->sernum = sernum; iter->w.state = FWS_INIT; iter->w.node = iter->w.root; WARN_ON(iter->w.skip); diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index e6de94203c13..f4884cda13b9 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -2802,7 +2802,7 @@ static void ip6_link_failure(struct sk_buff *skb) if (from) { fn = rcu_dereference(from->fib6_node); if (fn && (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_DEFAULT)) - fn->fn_sernum = -1; + WRITE_ONCE(fn->fn_sernum, -1); } } rcu_read_unlock(); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8e9eacad7ec7a9cbf262649ebf1fa6e6f6cc7d82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 16:35:27 -0800 Subject: mptcp: fix msk traversal in mptcp_nl_cmd_set_flags() The MPTCP endpoint list is under RCU protection, guarded by the pernet spinlock. mptcp_nl_cmd_set_flags() traverses the list without acquiring the spin-lock nor under the RCU critical section. This change addresses the issue performing the lookup and the endpoint update under the pernet spinlock. Fixes: 0f9f696a502e ("mptcp: add set_flags command in PM netlink") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c index 75af1f701e1d..f17a09f7fbf9 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +++ b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c @@ -478,6 +478,20 @@ __lookup_addr_by_id(struct pm_nl_pernet *pernet, unsigned int id) return NULL; } +static struct mptcp_pm_addr_entry * +__lookup_addr(struct pm_nl_pernet *pernet, const struct mptcp_addr_info *info, + bool lookup_by_id) +{ + struct mptcp_pm_addr_entry *entry; + + list_for_each_entry(entry, &pernet->local_addr_list, list) { + if ((!lookup_by_id && addresses_equal(&entry->addr, info, true)) || + (lookup_by_id && entry->addr.id == info->id)) + return entry; + } + return NULL; +} + static int lookup_id_by_addr(struct pm_nl_pernet *pernet, const struct mptcp_addr_info *addr) { @@ -1763,18 +1777,21 @@ static int mptcp_nl_cmd_set_flags(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } - list_for_each_entry(entry, &pernet->local_addr_list, list) { - if ((!lookup_by_id && addresses_equal(&entry->addr, &addr.addr, true)) || - (lookup_by_id && entry->addr.id == addr.addr.id)) { - mptcp_nl_addr_backup(net, &entry->addr, bkup); - - if (bkup) - entry->flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_BACKUP; - else - entry->flags &= ~MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_BACKUP; - } + spin_lock_bh(&pernet->lock); + entry = __lookup_addr(pernet, &addr.addr, lookup_by_id); + if (!entry) { + spin_unlock_bh(&pernet->lock); + return -EINVAL; } + if (bkup) + entry->flags |= MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_BACKUP; + else + entry->flags &= ~MPTCP_PM_ADDR_FLAG_BACKUP; + addr = *entry; + spin_unlock_bh(&pernet->lock); + + mptcp_nl_addr_backup(net, &addr.addr, bkup); return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From a4c0214fbee97c46e3f41fee37931d66c0fc3cb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geliang Tang Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 16:35:28 -0800 Subject: mptcp: fix removing ids bitmap setting In mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow(), the bit of rm_list->ids[i] in the id_avail_bitmap should be set, not rm_list->ids[1]. This patch fixed it. Fixes: 86e39e04482b ("mptcp: keep track of local endpoint still available for each msk") Acked-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c index f17a09f7fbf9..782b1d452269 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +++ b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c @@ -791,7 +791,7 @@ static void mptcp_pm_nl_rm_addr_or_subflow(struct mptcp_sock *msk, removed = true; __MPTCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), rm_type); } - __set_bit(rm_list->ids[1], msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap); + __set_bit(rm_list->ids[i], msk->pm.id_avail_bitmap); if (!removed) continue; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2c13c05c5ff4b9fc907b07f7311821910ebaaf8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 23:12:58 +0000 Subject: rxrpc: Adjust retransmission backoff Improve retransmission backoff by only backing off when we retransmit data packets rather than when we set the lost ack timer. To this end: (1) In rxrpc_resend(), use rxrpc_get_rto_backoff() when setting the retransmission timer and only tell it that we are retransmitting if we actually have things to retransmit. Note that it's possible for the retransmission algorithm to race with the processing of a received ACK, so we may see no packets needing retransmission. (2) In rxrpc_send_data_packet(), don't bump the backoff when setting the ack_lost_at timer, as it may then get bumped twice. With this, when looking at one particular packet, the retransmission intervals were seen to be 1.5ms, 2ms, 3ms, 5ms, 9ms, 17ms, 33ms, 71ms, 136ms, 264ms, 544ms, 1.088s, 2.1s, 4.2s and 8.3s. Fixes: c410bf01933e ("rxrpc: Fix the excessive initial retransmission timeout") Suggested-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David Howells Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne Tested-by: Marc Dionne cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164138117069.2023386.17446904856843997127.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/rxrpc/call_event.c | 8 +++----- net/rxrpc/output.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c index 6be2672a65ea..df864e692267 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_event.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_event.c @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void rxrpc_congestion_timeout(struct rxrpc_call *call) static void rxrpc_resend(struct rxrpc_call *call, unsigned long now_j) { struct sk_buff *skb; - unsigned long resend_at, rto_j; + unsigned long resend_at; rxrpc_seq_t cursor, seq, top; ktime_t now, max_age, oldest, ack_ts; int ix; @@ -165,10 +165,8 @@ static void rxrpc_resend(struct rxrpc_call *call, unsigned long now_j) _enter("{%d,%d}", call->tx_hard_ack, call->tx_top); - rto_j = call->peer->rto_j; - now = ktime_get_real(); - max_age = ktime_sub(now, jiffies_to_usecs(rto_j)); + max_age = ktime_sub(now, jiffies_to_usecs(call->peer->rto_j)); spin_lock_bh(&call->lock); @@ -213,7 +211,7 @@ static void rxrpc_resend(struct rxrpc_call *call, unsigned long now_j) } resend_at = nsecs_to_jiffies(ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(now, oldest))); - resend_at += jiffies + rto_j; + resend_at += jiffies + rxrpc_get_rto_backoff(call->peer, retrans); WRITE_ONCE(call->resend_at, resend_at); if (unacked) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/output.c b/net/rxrpc/output.c index 10f2bf2e9068..a45c83f22236 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/output.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/output.c @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ done: if (call->peer->rtt_count > 1) { unsigned long nowj = jiffies, ack_lost_at; - ack_lost_at = rxrpc_get_rto_backoff(call->peer, retrans); + ack_lost_at = rxrpc_get_rto_backoff(call->peer, false); ack_lost_at += nowj; WRITE_ONCE(call->ack_lost_at, ack_lost_at); rxrpc_reduce_call_timer(call, ack_lost_at, nowj, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 63ec72bd58487935a2e40d2cdffe5c9498f1275e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 23:39:35 -0800 Subject: mptcp: Use struct_group() to avoid cross-field memset() In preparation for FORTIFY_SOURCE performing compile-time and run-time field bounds checking for memcpy(), memmove(), and memset(), avoid intentionally writing across neighboring fields. Use struct_group() to capture the fields to be reset, so that memset() can be appropriately bounds-checked by the compiler. Cc: Matthieu Baerts Cc: mptcp@lists.linux.dev Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220121073935.1154263-1-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/mptcp/protocol.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/protocol.h b/net/mptcp/protocol.h index 0e6b42c76ea0..85317ce38e3f 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/protocol.h +++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.h @@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct mptcp_delegated_action, mptcp_delegated_actions); struct mptcp_subflow_context { struct list_head node;/* conn_list of subflows */ - char reset_start[0]; + struct_group(reset, unsigned long avg_pacing_rate; /* protected by msk socket lock */ u64 local_key; @@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ struct mptcp_subflow_context { long delegated_status; - char reset_end[0]; + ); struct list_head delegated_node; /* link into delegated_action, protected by local BH */ @@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ mptcp_subflow_tcp_sock(const struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow) static inline void mptcp_subflow_ctx_reset(struct mptcp_subflow_context *subflow) { - memset(subflow->reset_start, 0, subflow->reset_end - subflow->reset_start); + memset(&subflow->reset, 0, sizeof(subflow->reset)); subflow->request_mptcp = 1; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1d10f8a1f40b965d449e8f2d5ed7b96a7c138b77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jianguo Wu Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 17:15:31 +0800 Subject: net-procfs: show net devices bound packet types After commit:7866a621043f ("dev: add per net_device packet type chains"), we can not get packet types that are bound to a specified net device by /proc/net/ptype, this patch fix the regression. Run "tcpdump -i ens192 udp -nns0" Before and after apply this patch: Before: [root@localhost ~]# cat /proc/net/ptype Type Device Function 0800 ip_rcv 0806 arp_rcv 86dd ipv6_rcv After: [root@localhost ~]# cat /proc/net/ptype Type Device Function ALL ens192 tpacket_rcv 0800 ip_rcv 0806 arp_rcv 86dd ipv6_rcv v1 -> v2: - fix the regression rather than adding new /proc API as suggested by Stephen Hemminger. Fixes: 7866a621043f ("dev: add per net_device packet type chains") Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/net-procfs.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/net-procfs.c b/net/core/net-procfs.c index 5b8016335aca..88cc0ad7d386 100644 --- a/net/core/net-procfs.c +++ b/net/core/net-procfs.c @@ -190,12 +190,23 @@ static const struct seq_operations softnet_seq_ops = { .show = softnet_seq_show, }; -static void *ptype_get_idx(loff_t pos) +static void *ptype_get_idx(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t pos) { + struct list_head *ptype_list = NULL; struct packet_type *pt = NULL; + struct net_device *dev; loff_t i = 0; int t; + for_each_netdev_rcu(seq_file_net(seq), dev) { + ptype_list = &dev->ptype_all; + list_for_each_entry_rcu(pt, ptype_list, list) { + if (i == pos) + return pt; + ++i; + } + } + list_for_each_entry_rcu(pt, &ptype_all, list) { if (i == pos) return pt; @@ -216,22 +227,40 @@ static void *ptype_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) __acquires(RCU) { rcu_read_lock(); - return *pos ? ptype_get_idx(*pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN; + return *pos ? ptype_get_idx(seq, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN; } static void *ptype_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) { + struct net_device *dev; struct packet_type *pt; struct list_head *nxt; int hash; ++*pos; if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) - return ptype_get_idx(0); + return ptype_get_idx(seq, 0); pt = v; nxt = pt->list.next; + if (pt->dev) { + if (nxt != &pt->dev->ptype_all) + goto found; + + dev = pt->dev; + for_each_netdev_continue_rcu(seq_file_net(seq), dev) { + if (!list_empty(&dev->ptype_all)) { + nxt = dev->ptype_all.next; + goto found; + } + } + + nxt = ptype_all.next; + goto ptype_all; + } + if (pt->type == htons(ETH_P_ALL)) { +ptype_all: if (nxt != &ptype_all) goto found; hash = 0; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 27a8caa59babb96c5890569e131bc0eb6d45daee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Kicinski Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 16:57:31 -0800 Subject: ipv4: fix ip option filtering for locally generated fragments During IP fragmentation we sanitize IP options. This means overwriting options which should not be copied with NOPs. Only the first fragment has the original, full options. ip_fraglist_prepare() copies the IP header and options from previous fragment to the next one. Commit 19c3401a917b ("net: ipv4: place control buffer handling away from fragmentation iterators") moved sanitizing options before ip_fraglist_prepare() which means options are sanitized and then overwritten again with the old values. Fixing this is not enough, however, nor did the sanitization work prior to aforementioned commit. ip_options_fragment() (which does the sanitization) uses ipcb->opt.optlen for the length of the options. ipcb->opt of fragments is not populated (it's 0), only the head skb has the state properly built. So even when called at the right time ip_options_fragment() does nothing. This seems to date back all the way to v2.5.44 when the fast path for pre-fragmented skbs had been introduced. Prior to that ip_options_build() would have been called for every fragment (in fact ever since v2.5.44 the fragmentation handing in ip_options_build() has been dead code, I'll clean it up in -next). In the original patch (see Link) caixf mentions fixing the handling for fragments other than the second one, but I'm not sure how _any_ fragment could have had their options sanitized with the code as it stood. Tested with python (MTU on lo lowered to 1000 to force fragmentation): import socket s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM) s.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_IP, socket.IP_OPTIONS, bytearray([7,4,5,192, 20|0x80,4,1,0])) s.sendto(b'1'*2000, ('127.0.0.1', 1234)) Before: IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 1053, offset 0, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost.36500 > localhost.search-agent: UDP, length 2000 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 1053, offset 968, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp IP (tos 0x0, ttl 64, id 1053, offset 1936, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 100, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp After: IP (tos 0x0, ttl 96, id 42549, offset 0, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (RR [bad length 4] [bad ptr 5] 192.148.4.1,,RA value 256)) localhost.51607 > localhost.search-agent: UDP, bad length 2000 > 960 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 96, id 42549, offset 968, flags [+], proto UDP (17), length 996, options (NOP,NOP,NOP,NOP,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp IP (tos 0x0, ttl 96, id 42549, offset 1936, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 100, options (NOP,NOP,NOP,NOP,RA value 256)) localhost > localhost: udp RA (20 | 0x80) is now copied as expected, RR (7) is "NOPed out". Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20220107080559.122713-1-ooppublic@163.com/ Fixes: 19c3401a917b ("net: ipv4: place control buffer handling away from fragmentation iterators") Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: caixf Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c index 57c1d8431386..e331c8d4e6cf 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c @@ -825,15 +825,24 @@ int ip_do_fragment(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, /* Everything is OK. Generate! */ ip_fraglist_init(skb, iph, hlen, &iter); - if (iter.frag) - ip_options_fragment(iter.frag); - for (;;) { /* Prepare header of the next frame, * before previous one went down. */ if (iter.frag) { + bool first_frag = (iter.offset == 0); + IPCB(iter.frag)->flags = IPCB(skb)->flags; ip_fraglist_prepare(skb, &iter); + if (first_frag && IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen) { + /* ipcb->opt is not populated for frags + * coming from __ip_make_skb(), + * ip_options_fragment() needs optlen + */ + IPCB(iter.frag)->opt.optlen = + IPCB(skb)->opt.optlen; + ip_options_fragment(iter.frag); + ip_send_check(iter.iph); + } } skb->tstamp = tstamp; -- cgit v1.2.3 From c0bf3d8a943b6f2e912b7c1de03e2ef28e76f760 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gu Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2022 17:43:09 +0800 Subject: net/smc: Transitional solution for clcsock race issue We encountered a crash in smc_setsockopt() and it is caused by accessing smc->clcsock after clcsock was released. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 50309 Comm: nginx Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0-rc4+ #53 RIP: 0010:smc_setsockopt+0x59/0x280 [smc] Call Trace: __sys_setsockopt+0xfc/0x190 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f16ba83918e This patch tries to fix it by holding clcsock_release_lock and checking whether clcsock has already been released before access. In case that a crash of the same reason happens in smc_getsockopt() or smc_switch_to_fallback(), this patch also checkes smc->clcsock in them too. And the caller of smc_switch_to_fallback() will identify whether fallback succeeds according to the return value. Fixes: fd57770dd198 ("net/smc: wait for pending work before clcsock release_sock") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5dd7ffd1-28e2-24cc-9442-1defec27375e@linux.ibm.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Wen Gu Acked-by: Karsten Graul Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/af_smc.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/af_smc.c b/net/smc/af_smc.c index 961854e56736..d5ea62b82bb8 100644 --- a/net/smc/af_smc.c +++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c @@ -566,12 +566,17 @@ static void smc_stat_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc) mutex_unlock(&net->smc.mutex_fback_rsn); } -static void smc_switch_to_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc, int reason_code) +static int smc_switch_to_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc, int reason_code) { wait_queue_head_t *smc_wait = sk_sleep(&smc->sk); - wait_queue_head_t *clc_wait = sk_sleep(smc->clcsock->sk); + wait_queue_head_t *clc_wait; unsigned long flags; + mutex_lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); + if (!smc->clcsock) { + mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); + return -EBADF; + } smc->use_fallback = true; smc->fallback_rsn = reason_code; smc_stat_fallback(smc); @@ -586,18 +591,30 @@ static void smc_switch_to_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc, int reason_code) * smc socket->wq, which should be removed * to clcsocket->wq during the fallback. */ + clc_wait = sk_sleep(smc->clcsock->sk); spin_lock_irqsave(&smc_wait->lock, flags); spin_lock_nested(&clc_wait->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); list_splice_init(&smc_wait->head, &clc_wait->head); spin_unlock(&clc_wait->lock); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&smc_wait->lock, flags); } + mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); + return 0; } /* fall back during connect */ static int smc_connect_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc, int reason_code) { - smc_switch_to_fallback(smc, reason_code); + struct net *net = sock_net(&smc->sk); + int rc = 0; + + rc = smc_switch_to_fallback(smc, reason_code); + if (rc) { /* fallback fails */ + this_cpu_inc(net->smc.smc_stats->clnt_hshake_err_cnt); + if (smc->sk.sk_state == SMC_INIT) + sock_put(&smc->sk); /* passive closing */ + return rc; + } smc_copy_sock_settings_to_clc(smc); smc->connect_nonblock = 0; if (smc->sk.sk_state == SMC_INIT) @@ -1518,11 +1535,12 @@ static void smc_listen_decline(struct smc_sock *new_smc, int reason_code, { /* RDMA setup failed, switch back to TCP */ smc_conn_abort(new_smc, local_first); - if (reason_code < 0) { /* error, no fallback possible */ + if (reason_code < 0 || + smc_switch_to_fallback(new_smc, reason_code)) { + /* error, no fallback possible */ smc_listen_out_err(new_smc); return; } - smc_switch_to_fallback(new_smc, reason_code); if (reason_code && reason_code != SMC_CLC_DECL_PEERDECL) { if (smc_clc_send_decline(new_smc, reason_code, version) < 0) { smc_listen_out_err(new_smc); @@ -1964,8 +1982,11 @@ static void smc_listen_work(struct work_struct *work) /* check if peer is smc capable */ if (!tcp_sk(newclcsock->sk)->syn_smc) { - smc_switch_to_fallback(new_smc, SMC_CLC_DECL_PEERNOSMC); - smc_listen_out_connected(new_smc); + rc = smc_switch_to_fallback(new_smc, SMC_CLC_DECL_PEERNOSMC); + if (rc) + smc_listen_out_err(new_smc); + else + smc_listen_out_connected(new_smc); return; } @@ -2254,7 +2275,9 @@ static int smc_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) { if (sk->sk_state == SMC_INIT && !smc->connect_nonblock) { - smc_switch_to_fallback(smc, SMC_CLC_DECL_OPTUNSUPP); + rc = smc_switch_to_fallback(smc, SMC_CLC_DECL_OPTUNSUPP); + if (rc) + goto out; } else { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; @@ -2447,6 +2470,11 @@ static int smc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, /* generic setsockopts reaching us here always apply to the * CLC socket */ + mutex_lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); + if (!smc->clcsock) { + mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); + return -EBADF; + } if (unlikely(!smc->clcsock->ops->setsockopt)) rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; else @@ -2456,6 +2484,7 @@ static int smc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, sk->sk_err = smc->clcsock->sk->sk_err; sk_error_report(sk); } + mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); if (optlen < sizeof(int)) return -EINVAL; @@ -2472,7 +2501,7 @@ static int smc_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, case TCP_FASTOPEN_NO_COOKIE: /* option not supported by SMC */ if (sk->sk_state == SMC_INIT && !smc->connect_nonblock) { - smc_switch_to_fallback(smc, SMC_CLC_DECL_OPTUNSUPP); + rc = smc_switch_to_fallback(smc, SMC_CLC_DECL_OPTUNSUPP); } else { rc = -EINVAL; } @@ -2515,13 +2544,23 @@ static int smc_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen) { struct smc_sock *smc; + int rc; smc = smc_sk(sock->sk); + mutex_lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); + if (!smc->clcsock) { + mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); + return -EBADF; + } /* socket options apply to the CLC socket */ - if (unlikely(!smc->clcsock->ops->getsockopt)) + if (unlikely(!smc->clcsock->ops->getsockopt)) { + mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return smc->clcsock->ops->getsockopt(smc->clcsock, level, optname, - optval, optlen); + } + rc = smc->clcsock->ops->getsockopt(smc->clcsock, level, optname, + optval, optlen); + mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); + return rc; } static int smc_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2afc3b5a31f9edf3ef0f374f5d70610c79c93a42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2022 06:40:56 -0500 Subject: ping: fix the sk_bound_dev_if match in ping_lookup When 'ping' changes to use PING socket instead of RAW socket by: # sysctl -w net.ipv4.ping_group_range="0 100" the selftests 'router_broadcast.sh' will fail, as such command # ip vrf exec vrf-h1 ping -I veth0 198.51.100.255 -b can't receive the response skb by the PING socket. It's caused by mismatch of sk_bound_dev_if and dif in ping_rcv() when looking up the PING socket, as dif is vrf-h1 if dif's master was set to vrf-h1. This patch is to fix this regression by also checking the sk_bound_dev_if against sdif so that the packets can stil be received even if the socket is not bound to the vrf device but to the real iif. Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Reported-by: Hangbin Liu Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ping.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c index 0e56df3a45e2..bcf7bc71cb56 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ping.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c @@ -220,7 +220,8 @@ static struct sock *ping_lookup(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 ident) continue; } - if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != dif) + if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != dif && + sk->sk_bound_dev_if != inet_sdif(skb)) continue; sock_hold(sk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 29044dae2e746949ad4b9cbdbfb248994d1dcdb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Amir Goldstein Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 23:53:05 +0200 Subject: fsnotify: fix fsnotify hooks in pseudo filesystems Commit 49246466a989 ("fsnotify: move fsnotify_nameremove() hook out of d_delete()") moved the fsnotify delete hook before d_delete() so fsnotify will have access to a positive dentry. This allowed a race where opening the deleted file via cached dentry is now possible after receiving the IN_DELETE event. To fix the regression in pseudo filesystems, convert d_delete() calls to d_drop() (see commit 46c46f8df9aa ("devpts_pty_kill(): don't bother with d_delete()") and move the fsnotify hook after d_drop(). Add a missing fsnotify_unlink() hook in nfsdfs that was found during the audit of fsnotify hooks in pseudo filesystems. Note that the fsnotify hooks in simple_recursive_removal() follow d_invalidate(), so they require no change. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220120215305.282577-2-amir73il@gmail.com Reported-by: Ivan Delalande Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/YeNyzoDM5hP5LtGW@visor/ Fixes: 49246466a989 ("fsnotify: move fsnotify_nameremove() hook out of d_delete()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+ Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein Signed-off-by: Jan Kara --- fs/configfs/dir.c | 6 +++--- fs/devpts/inode.c | 2 +- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 5 +++-- net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/fs/configfs/dir.c b/fs/configfs/dir.c index 1466b5d01cbb..d3cd2a94d1e8 100644 --- a/fs/configfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/configfs/dir.c @@ -1780,8 +1780,8 @@ void configfs_unregister_group(struct config_group *group) configfs_detach_group(&group->cg_item); d_inode(dentry)->i_flags |= S_DEAD; dont_mount(dentry); + d_drop(dentry); fsnotify_rmdir(d_inode(parent), dentry); - d_delete(dentry); inode_unlock(d_inode(parent)); dput(dentry); @@ -1922,10 +1922,10 @@ void configfs_unregister_subsystem(struct configfs_subsystem *subsys) configfs_detach_group(&group->cg_item); d_inode(dentry)->i_flags |= S_DEAD; dont_mount(dentry); - fsnotify_rmdir(d_inode(root), dentry); inode_unlock(d_inode(dentry)); - d_delete(dentry); + d_drop(dentry); + fsnotify_rmdir(d_inode(root), dentry); inode_unlock(d_inode(root)); diff --git a/fs/devpts/inode.c b/fs/devpts/inode.c index 42e5a766d33c..4f25015aa534 100644 --- a/fs/devpts/inode.c +++ b/fs/devpts/inode.c @@ -621,8 +621,8 @@ void devpts_pty_kill(struct dentry *dentry) dentry->d_fsdata = NULL; drop_nlink(dentry->d_inode); - fsnotify_unlink(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), dentry); d_drop(dentry); + fsnotify_unlink(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), dentry); dput(dentry); /* d_alloc_name() in devpts_pty_new() */ } diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c index b9f27fbcd768..68b020f2002b 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c @@ -1247,7 +1247,8 @@ static void nfsdfs_remove_file(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) clear_ncl(d_inode(dentry)); dget(dentry); ret = simple_unlink(dir, dentry); - d_delete(dentry); + d_drop(dentry); + fsnotify_unlink(dir, dentry); dput(dentry); WARN_ON_ONCE(ret); } @@ -1338,8 +1339,8 @@ void nfsd_client_rmdir(struct dentry *dentry) dget(dentry); ret = simple_rmdir(dir, dentry); WARN_ON_ONCE(ret); + d_drop(dentry); fsnotify_rmdir(dir, dentry); - d_delete(dentry); dput(dentry); inode_unlock(dir); } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c b/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c index ee5336d73fdd..35588f0afa86 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/rpc_pipe.c @@ -600,9 +600,9 @@ static int __rpc_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) dget(dentry); ret = simple_rmdir(dir, dentry); + d_drop(dentry); if (!ret) fsnotify_rmdir(dir, dentry); - d_delete(dentry); dput(dentry); return ret; } @@ -613,9 +613,9 @@ static int __rpc_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) dget(dentry); ret = simple_unlink(dir, dentry); + d_drop(dentry); if (!ret) fsnotify_unlink(dir, dentry); - d_delete(dentry); dput(dentry); return ret; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 429c3be8a5e2695b5b92a6a12361eb89eb185495 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maxim Mikityanskiy Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 12:06:54 +0200 Subject: sch_htb: Fail on unsupported parameters when offload is requested The current implementation of HTB offload doesn't support some parameters. Instead of ignoring them, actively return the EINVAL error when they are set to non-defaults. As this patch goes to stable, the driver API is not changed here. If future drivers support more offload parameters, the checks can be moved to the driver side. Note that the buffer and cbuffer parameters are also not supported, but the tc userspace tool assigns some default values derived from rate and ceil, and identifying these defaults in sch_htb would be unreliable, so they are still ignored. Fixes: d03b195b5aa0 ("sch_htb: Hierarchical QoS hardware offload") Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220125100654.424570-1-maximmi@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sched/sch_htb.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/sch_htb.c b/net/sched/sch_htb.c index 9267922ea9c3..23a9d6242429 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_htb.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_htb.c @@ -1810,6 +1810,26 @@ static int htb_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid, if (!hopt->rate.rate || !hopt->ceil.rate) goto failure; + if (q->offload) { + /* Options not supported by the offload. */ + if (hopt->rate.overhead || hopt->ceil.overhead) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "HTB offload doesn't support the overhead parameter"); + goto failure; + } + if (hopt->rate.mpu || hopt->ceil.mpu) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "HTB offload doesn't support the mpu parameter"); + goto failure; + } + if (hopt->quantum) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "HTB offload doesn't support the quantum parameter"); + goto failure; + } + if (hopt->prio) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "HTB offload doesn't support the prio parameter"); + goto failure; + } + } + /* Keeping backward compatible with rate_table based iproute2 tc */ if (hopt->rate.linklayer == TC_LINKLAYER_UNAWARE) qdisc_put_rtab(qdisc_get_rtab(&hopt->rate, tb[TCA_HTB_RTAB], -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7355bfe0e0cc27597d530f78e259a985cb85af40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Geert Uytterhoeven Date: Sun, 23 Jan 2022 13:57:17 +0100 Subject: netfilter: Remove flowtable relics NF_FLOW_TABLE_IPV4 and NF_FLOW_TABLE_IPV6 are invisble, selected by nothing (so they can no longer be enabled), and their last real users have been removed (nf_flow_table_ipv6.c is empty). Clean up the leftovers. Fixes: c42ba4290b2147aa ("netfilter: flowtable: remove ipv4/ipv6 modules") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig | 4 ---- net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig | 4 ---- net/ipv6/netfilter/Makefile | 3 --- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ipv6.c | 0 4 files changed, 11 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ipv6.c (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig index 67087f95579f..aab384126f61 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/Kconfig @@ -58,10 +58,6 @@ config NF_TABLES_ARP endif # NF_TABLES -config NF_FLOW_TABLE_IPV4 - tristate - select NF_FLOW_TABLE_INET - config NF_DUP_IPV4 tristate "Netfilter IPv4 packet duplication to alternate destination" depends on !NF_CONNTRACK || NF_CONNTRACK diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig b/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig index 97d3d1b36dbc..0ba62f4868f9 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/Kconfig @@ -47,10 +47,6 @@ config NFT_FIB_IPV6 endif # NF_TABLES_IPV6 endif # NF_TABLES -config NF_FLOW_TABLE_IPV6 - tristate - select NF_FLOW_TABLE_INET - config NF_DUP_IPV6 tristate "Netfilter IPv6 packet duplication to alternate destination" depends on !NF_CONNTRACK || NF_CONNTRACK diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/Makefile b/net/ipv6/netfilter/Makefile index b85383606df7..b8d6dc9aeeb6 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/Makefile +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/Makefile @@ -28,9 +28,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NFT_REJECT_IPV6) += nft_reject_ipv6.o obj-$(CONFIG_NFT_DUP_IPV6) += nft_dup_ipv6.o obj-$(CONFIG_NFT_FIB_IPV6) += nft_fib_ipv6.o -# flow table support -obj-$(CONFIG_NF_FLOW_TABLE_IPV6) += nf_flow_table_ipv6.o - # matches obj-$(CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_AH) += ip6t_ah.o obj-$(CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_EUI64) += ip6t_eui64.o diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ipv6.c deleted file mode 100644 index e69de29bb2d1..000000000000 -- cgit v1.2.3 From 34243b9ec856309339172b1507379074156947e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sun, 23 Jan 2022 15:24:00 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nft_ct: fix use after free when attaching zone template The conversion erroneously removed the refcount increment. In case we can use the percpu template, we need to increment the refcount, else it will be released when the skb gets freed. In case the slowpath is taken, the new template already has a refcount of 1. Fixes: 719774377622 ("netfilter: conntrack: convert to refcount_t api") Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c index 518d96c8c247..5adf8bb628a8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c @@ -260,9 +260,12 @@ static void nft_ct_set_zone_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, ct = this_cpu_read(nft_ct_pcpu_template); if (likely(refcount_read(&ct->ct_general.use) == 1)) { + refcount_inc(&ct->ct_general.use); nf_ct_zone_add(ct, &zone); } else { - /* previous skb got queued to userspace */ + /* previous skb got queued to userspace, allocate temporary + * one until percpu template can be reused. + */ ct = nf_ct_tmpl_alloc(nft_net(pkt), &zone, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!ct) { regs->verdict.code = NF_DROP; -- cgit v1.2.3 From aeac4554eb549037ff2f719200c0a9c1c25e7eaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phil Sutter Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 20:06:03 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nft_reject_bridge: Fix for missing reply from prerouting Prior to commit fa538f7cf05aa ("netfilter: nf_reject: add reject skbuff creation helpers"), nft_reject_bridge did not assign to nskb->dev before passing nskb on to br_forward(). The shared skbuff creation helpers introduced in above commit do which seems to confuse br_forward() as reject statements in prerouting hook won't emit a packet anymore. Fix this by simply passing NULL instead of 'dev' to the helpers - they use the pointer for just that assignment, nothing else. Fixes: fa538f7cf05aa ("netfilter: nf_reject: add reject skbuff creation helpers") Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c index eba0efe64d05..fbf858ddec35 100644 --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static void nft_reject_br_send_v4_tcp_reset(struct net *net, { struct sk_buff *nskb; - nskb = nf_reject_skb_v4_tcp_reset(net, oldskb, dev, hook); + nskb = nf_reject_skb_v4_tcp_reset(net, oldskb, NULL, hook); if (!nskb) return; @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void nft_reject_br_send_v4_unreach(struct net *net, { struct sk_buff *nskb; - nskb = nf_reject_skb_v4_unreach(net, oldskb, dev, hook, code); + nskb = nf_reject_skb_v4_unreach(net, oldskb, NULL, hook, code); if (!nskb) return; @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static void nft_reject_br_send_v6_tcp_reset(struct net *net, { struct sk_buff *nskb; - nskb = nf_reject_skb_v6_tcp_reset(net, oldskb, dev, hook); + nskb = nf_reject_skb_v6_tcp_reset(net, oldskb, NULL, hook); if (!nskb) return; @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static void nft_reject_br_send_v6_unreach(struct net *net, { struct sk_buff *nskb; - nskb = nf_reject_skb_v6_unreach(net, oldskb, dev, hook, code); + nskb = nf_reject_skb_v6_unreach(net, oldskb, NULL, hook, code); if (!nskb) return; -- cgit v1.2.3 From f459bfd4b9793f25e0fcf19878edd87d8dc569d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 01:46:58 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nft_byteorder: track register operations Cancel tracking for byteorder operation, otherwise selector + byteorder operation is incorrectly reduced if source and destination registers are the same. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c b/net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c index 9d5947ab8d4e..e646e9ee4a98 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_byteorder.c @@ -167,12 +167,24 @@ nla_put_failure: return -1; } +static bool nft_byteorder_reduce(struct nft_regs_track *track, + const struct nft_expr *expr) +{ + struct nft_byteorder *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr); + + track->regs[priv->dreg].selector = NULL; + track->regs[priv->dreg].bitwise = NULL; + + return false; +} + static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_byteorder_ops = { .type = &nft_byteorder_type, .size = NFT_EXPR_SIZE(sizeof(struct nft_byteorder)), .eval = nft_byteorder_eval, .init = nft_byteorder_init, .dump = nft_byteorder_dump, + .reduce = nft_byteorder_reduce, }; struct nft_expr_type nft_byteorder_type __read_mostly = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 79c37ca73a6e9a33f7b2b7783ba6af07a448c8a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miquel Raynal Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 13:14:25 +0100 Subject: net: ieee802154: Return meaningful error codes from the netlink helpers Returning -1 does not indicate anything useful. Use a standard and meaningful error code instead. Fixes: a26c5fd7622d ("nl802154: add support for security layer") Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal Acked-by: Alexander Aring Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220125121426.848337-6-miquel.raynal@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt --- net/ieee802154/nl802154.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ieee802154/nl802154.c b/net/ieee802154/nl802154.c index 277124f206e0..e0b072aecf0f 100644 --- a/net/ieee802154/nl802154.c +++ b/net/ieee802154/nl802154.c @@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@ static int nl802154_send_key(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 cmd, u32 portid, hdr = nl802154hdr_put(msg, portid, seq, flags, cmd); if (!hdr) - return -1; + return -ENOBUFS; if (nla_put_u32(msg, NL802154_ATTR_IFINDEX, dev->ifindex)) goto nla_put_failure; @@ -1634,7 +1634,7 @@ static int nl802154_send_device(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 cmd, u32 portid, hdr = nl802154hdr_put(msg, portid, seq, flags, cmd); if (!hdr) - return -1; + return -ENOBUFS; if (nla_put_u32(msg, NL802154_ATTR_IFINDEX, dev->ifindex)) goto nla_put_failure; @@ -1812,7 +1812,7 @@ static int nl802154_send_devkey(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 cmd, u32 portid, hdr = nl802154hdr_put(msg, portid, seq, flags, cmd); if (!hdr) - return -1; + return -ENOBUFS; if (nla_put_u32(msg, NL802154_ATTR_IFINDEX, dev->ifindex)) goto nla_put_failure; @@ -1988,7 +1988,7 @@ static int nl802154_send_seclevel(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 cmd, u32 portid, hdr = nl802154hdr_put(msg, portid, seq, flags, cmd); if (!hdr) - return -1; + return -ENOBUFS; if (nla_put_u32(msg, NL802154_ATTR_IFINDEX, dev->ifindex)) goto nla_put_failure; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 36268983e90316b37000a005642af42234dabb36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Guillaume Nault Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 16:38:52 +0100 Subject: Revert "ipv6: Honor all IPv6 PIO Valid Lifetime values" This reverts commit b75326c201242de9495ff98e5d5cff41d7fc0d9d. This commit breaks Linux compatibility with USGv6 tests. The RFC this commit was based on is actually an expired draft: no published RFC currently allows the new behaviour it introduced. Without full IETF endorsement, the flash renumbering scenario this patch was supposed to enable is never going to work, as other IPv6 equipements on the same LAN will keep the 2 hours limit. Fixes: b75326c20124 ("ipv6: Honor all IPv6 PIO Valid Lifetime values") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/addrconf.h | 2 ++ net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/addrconf.h b/include/net/addrconf.h index 78ea3e332688..e7ce719838b5 100644 --- a/include/net/addrconf.h +++ b/include/net/addrconf.h @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ #define RTR_SOLICITATION_INTERVAL (4*HZ) #define RTR_SOLICITATION_MAX_INTERVAL (3600*HZ) /* 1 hour */ +#define MIN_VALID_LIFETIME (2*3600) /* 2 hours */ + #define TEMP_VALID_LIFETIME (7*86400) #define TEMP_PREFERRED_LIFETIME (86400) #define REGEN_MAX_RETRY (3) diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index 3eee17790a82..f927c199a93c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -2589,7 +2589,7 @@ int addrconf_prefix_rcv_add_addr(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev, __u32 valid_lft, u32 prefered_lft) { struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp = ipv6_get_ifaddr(net, addr, dev, 1); - int create = 0; + int create = 0, update_lft = 0; if (!ifp && valid_lft) { int max_addresses = in6_dev->cnf.max_addresses; @@ -2633,19 +2633,32 @@ int addrconf_prefix_rcv_add_addr(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev, unsigned long now; u32 stored_lft; - /* Update lifetime (RFC4862 5.5.3 e) - * We deviate from RFC4862 by honoring all Valid Lifetimes to - * improve the reaction of SLAAC to renumbering events - * (draft-gont-6man-slaac-renum-06, Section 4.2) - */ + /* update lifetime (RFC2462 5.5.3 e) */ spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock); now = jiffies; if (ifp->valid_lft > (now - ifp->tstamp) / HZ) stored_lft = ifp->valid_lft - (now - ifp->tstamp) / HZ; else stored_lft = 0; - if (!create && stored_lft) { + const u32 minimum_lft = min_t(u32, + stored_lft, MIN_VALID_LIFETIME); + valid_lft = max(valid_lft, minimum_lft); + + /* RFC4862 Section 5.5.3e: + * "Note that the preferred lifetime of the + * corresponding address is always reset to + * the Preferred Lifetime in the received + * Prefix Information option, regardless of + * whether the valid lifetime is also reset or + * ignored." + * + * So we should always update prefered_lft here. + */ + update_lft = 1; + } + + if (update_lft) { ifp->valid_lft = valid_lft; ifp->prefered_lft = prefered_lft; ifp->tstamp = now; -- cgit v1.2.3 From dcb2c5c6ca9b9177f04abaf76e5a983d177c9414 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikolay Aleksandrov Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 15:10:25 +0200 Subject: net: bridge: vlan: fix single net device option dumping When dumping vlan options for a single net device we send the same entries infinitely because user-space expects a 0 return at the end but we keep returning skb->len and restarting the dump on retry. Fix it by returning the value from br_vlan_dump_dev() if it completed or there was an error. The only case that must return skb->len is when the dump was incomplete and needs to continue (-EMSGSIZE). Reported-by: Benjamin Poirier Fixes: 8dcea187088b ("net: bridge: vlan: add rtm definitions and dump support") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/bridge/br_vlan.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_vlan.c b/net/bridge/br_vlan.c index 84ba456a78cc..43201260e37b 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_vlan.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_vlan.c @@ -2020,7 +2020,8 @@ static int br_vlan_rtm_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) goto out_err; } err = br_vlan_dump_dev(dev, skb, cb, dump_flags); - if (err && err != -EMSGSIZE) + /* if the dump completed without an error we return 0 here */ + if (err != -EMSGSIZE) goto out_err; } else { for_each_netdev_rcu(net, dev) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 153a0d187e767c68733b8e9f46218eb1f41ab902 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 16:51:16 -0800 Subject: ipv4: raw: lock the socket in raw_bind() For some reason, raw_bind() forgot to lock the socket. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __ip4_datagram_connect / raw_bind write to 0xffff8881170d4308 of 4 bytes by task 5466 on cpu 0: raw_bind+0x1b0/0x250 net/ipv4/raw.c:739 inet_bind+0x56/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:443 __sys_bind+0x14b/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1697 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1708 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1706 [inline] __x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1706 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881170d4308 of 4 bytes by task 5468 on cpu 1: __ip4_datagram_connect+0xb7/0x7b0 net/ipv4/datagram.c:39 ip4_datagram_connect+0x2a/0x40 net/ipv4/datagram.c:89 inet_dgram_connect+0x107/0x190 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:576 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1900 [inline] __sys_connect+0x197/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1917 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1927 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1924 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1924 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x0003007f Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 5468 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/raw.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c index a53f256bf9d3..0505935b6b8c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/raw.c +++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c @@ -722,6 +722,7 @@ static int raw_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) int ret = -EINVAL; int chk_addr_ret; + lock_sock(sk); if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) goto out; @@ -741,7 +742,9 @@ static int raw_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) inet->inet_saddr = 0; /* Use device */ sk_dst_reset(sk); ret = 0; -out: return ret; +out: + release_sock(sk); + return ret; } /* -- cgit v1.2.3 From 970a5a3ea86da637471d3cd04d513a0755aba4bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 17:10:21 -0800 Subject: ipv4: tcp: send zero IPID in SYNACK messages In commit 431280eebed9 ("ipv4: tcp: send zero IPID for RST and ACK sent in SYN-RECV and TIME-WAIT state") we took care of some ctl packets sent by TCP. It turns out we need to use a similar strategy for SYNACK packets. By default, they carry IP_DF and IPID==0, but there are ways to ask them to use the hashed IP ident generator and thus be used to build off-path attacks. (Ref: Off-Path TCP Exploits of the Mixed IPID Assignment) One of this way is to force (before listener is started) echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_no_pmtu_disc Another way is using forged ICMP ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED with a very small MTU (like 68) to force a false return from ip_dont_fragment() In this patch, ip_build_and_send_pkt() uses the following heuristics. 1) Most SYNACK packets are smaller than IPV4_MIN_MTU and therefore can use IP_DF regardless of the listener or route pmtu setting. 2) In case the SYNACK packet is bigger than IPV4_MIN_MTU, we use prandom_u32() generator instead of the IPv4 hashed ident one. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: Ray Che Reviewed-by: David Ahern Cc: Geoff Alexander Cc: Willy Tarreau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c index e331c8d4e6cf..139cec29ed06 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c @@ -162,12 +162,19 @@ int ip_build_and_send_pkt(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sock *sk, iph->daddr = (opt && opt->opt.srr ? opt->opt.faddr : daddr); iph->saddr = saddr; iph->protocol = sk->sk_protocol; - if (ip_dont_fragment(sk, &rt->dst)) { + /* Do not bother generating IPID for small packets (eg SYNACK) */ + if (skb->len <= IPV4_MIN_MTU || ip_dont_fragment(sk, &rt->dst)) { iph->frag_off = htons(IP_DF); iph->id = 0; } else { iph->frag_off = 0; - __ip_select_ident(net, iph, 1); + /* TCP packets here are SYNACK with fat IPv4/TCP options. + * Avoid using the hashed IP ident generator. + */ + if (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_TCP) + iph->id = (__force __be16)prandom_u32(); + else + __ip_select_ident(net, iph, 1); } if (opt && opt->opt.optlen) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 364df53c081d93fcfd6b91085ff2650c7f17b3c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Menglong Dong Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 17:13:01 +0800 Subject: net: socket: rename SKB_DROP_REASON_SOCKET_FILTER Rename SKB_DROP_REASON_SOCKET_FILTER, which is used as the reason of skb drop out of socket filter before it's part of a released kernel. It will be used for more protocols than just TCP in future series. Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong Reviewed-by: David Ahern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220127091308.91401-2-imagedong@tencent.com/ Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/linux/skbuff.h | 2 +- include/trace/events/skb.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h index bf11e1fbd69b..8a636e678902 100644 --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ enum skb_drop_reason { SKB_DROP_REASON_NO_SOCKET, SKB_DROP_REASON_PKT_TOO_SMALL, SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_CSUM, - SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_FILTER, + SKB_DROP_REASON_SOCKET_FILTER, SKB_DROP_REASON_UDP_CSUM, SKB_DROP_REASON_MAX, }; diff --git a/include/trace/events/skb.h b/include/trace/events/skb.h index 3e042ca2cedb..a8a64b97504d 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/skb.h +++ b/include/trace/events/skb.h @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ EM(SKB_DROP_REASON_NO_SOCKET, NO_SOCKET) \ EM(SKB_DROP_REASON_PKT_TOO_SMALL, PKT_TOO_SMALL) \ EM(SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_CSUM, TCP_CSUM) \ - EM(SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_FILTER, TCP_FILTER) \ + EM(SKB_DROP_REASON_SOCKET_FILTER, SOCKET_FILTER) \ EM(SKB_DROP_REASON_UDP_CSUM, UDP_CSUM) \ EMe(SKB_DROP_REASON_MAX, MAX) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c index b3f34e366b27..938b59636578 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c @@ -2095,7 +2095,7 @@ process: nf_reset_ct(skb); if (tcp_filter(sk, skb)) { - drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_FILTER; + drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_SOCKET_FILTER; goto discard_and_relse; } th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data; -- cgit v1.2.3 From b07f413732549e5a96e891411fbb5980f2d8e5a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 13:40:38 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_tables: remove assignment with no effect in chain blob builder cppcheck possible warnings: >> net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2014:2: warning: Assignment of function parameter has no effect outside the function. Did you forget dereferencing it? [uselessAssignmentPtrArg] ptr += offsetof(struct nft_rule_dp, data); ^ Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index cf454f8ca2b0..5fa16990da95 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -2011,7 +2011,6 @@ static void nft_last_rule(struct nft_rule_blob *blob, const void *ptr) prule = (struct nft_rule_dp *)ptr; prule->is_last = 1; - ptr += offsetof(struct nft_rule_dp, data); /* blob size does not include the trailer rule */ } -- cgit v1.2.3 From fd20d9738395cf8e27d0a17eba34169699fccdff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Yi Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2022 15:49:53 +0800 Subject: net: bridge: vlan: fix memory leak in __allowed_ingress When using per-vlan state, if vlan snooping and stats are disabled, untagged or priority-tagged ingress frame will go to check pvid state. If the port state is forwarding and the pvid state is not learning/forwarding, untagged or priority-tagged frame will be dropped but skb memory is not freed. Should free skb when __allowed_ingress returns false. Fixes: a580c76d534c ("net: bridge: vlan: add per-vlan state") Signed-off-by: Tim Yi Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220127074953.12632-1-tim.yi@pica8.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/bridge/br_vlan.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_vlan.c b/net/bridge/br_vlan.c index 43201260e37b..1402d5ca242d 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_vlan.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_vlan.c @@ -560,10 +560,10 @@ static bool __allowed_ingress(const struct net_bridge *br, !br_opt_get(br, BROPT_VLAN_STATS_ENABLED)) { if (*state == BR_STATE_FORWARDING) { *state = br_vlan_get_pvid_state(vg); - return br_vlan_state_allowed(*state, true); - } else { - return true; + if (!br_vlan_state_allowed(*state, true)) + goto drop; } + return true; } } v = br_vlan_find(vg, *vid); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4e0f718daf97d47cf7dec122da1be970f145c809 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 12:47:15 +0800 Subject: ax25: improve the incomplete fix to avoid UAF and NPD bugs The previous commit 1ade48d0c27d ("ax25: NPD bug when detaching AX25 device") introduce lock_sock() into ax25_kill_by_device to prevent NPD bug. But the concurrency NPD or UAF bug will occur, when lock_sock() or release_sock() dereferences the ax25_cb->sock. The NULL pointer dereference bug can be shown as below: ax25_kill_by_device() | ax25_release() | ax25_destroy_socket() | ax25_cb_del() ... | ... | ax25->sk=NULL; lock_sock(s->sk); //(1) | s->ax25_dev = NULL; | ... release_sock(s->sk); //(2) | ... | The root cause is that the sock is set to null before dereference site (1) or (2). Therefore, this patch extracts the ax25_cb->sock in advance, and uses ax25_list_lock to protect it, which can synchronize with ax25_cb_del() and ensure the value of sock is not null before dereference sites. The concurrency UAF bug can be shown as below: ax25_kill_by_device() | ax25_release() | ax25_destroy_socket() ... | ... | sock_put(sk); //FREE lock_sock(s->sk); //(1) | s->ax25_dev = NULL; | ... release_sock(s->sk); //(2) | ... | The root cause is that the sock is released before dereference site (1) or (2). Therefore, this patch uses sock_hold() to increase the refcount of sock and uses ax25_list_lock to protect it, which can synchronize with ax25_cb_del() in ax25_destroy_socket() and ensure the sock wil not be released before dereference sites. Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c index 02f43f3e2c56..44a8730c26ac 100644 --- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c +++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ static void ax25_kill_by_device(struct net_device *dev) { ax25_dev *ax25_dev; ax25_cb *s; + struct sock *sk; if ((ax25_dev = ax25_dev_ax25dev(dev)) == NULL) return; @@ -85,13 +86,15 @@ static void ax25_kill_by_device(struct net_device *dev) again: ax25_for_each(s, &ax25_list) { if (s->ax25_dev == ax25_dev) { + sk = s->sk; + sock_hold(sk); spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_list_lock); - lock_sock(s->sk); + lock_sock(sk); s->ax25_dev = NULL; - release_sock(s->sk); + release_sock(sk); ax25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH); spin_lock_bh(&ax25_list_lock); - + sock_put(sk); /* The entry could have been deleted from the * list meanwhile and thus the next pointer is * no longer valid. Play it safe and restart -- cgit v1.2.3 From d01ffb9eee4af165d83b08dd73ebdf9fe94a519b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 12:47:16 +0800 Subject: ax25: add refcount in ax25_dev to avoid UAF bugs If we dereference ax25_dev after we call kfree(ax25_dev) in ax25_dev_device_down(), it will lead to concurrency UAF bugs. There are eight syscall functions suffer from UAF bugs, include ax25_bind(), ax25_release(), ax25_connect(), ax25_ioctl(), ax25_getname(), ax25_sendmsg(), ax25_getsockopt() and ax25_info_show(). One of the concurrency UAF can be shown as below: (USE) | (FREE) | ax25_device_event | ax25_dev_device_down ax25_bind | ... ... | kfree(ax25_dev) ax25_fillin_cb() | ... ax25_fillin_cb_from_dev() | ... | The root cause of UAF bugs is that kfree(ax25_dev) in ax25_dev_device_down() is not protected by any locks. When ax25_dev, which there are still pointers point to, is released, the concurrency UAF bug will happen. This patch introduces refcount into ax25_dev in order to guarantee that there are no pointers point to it when ax25_dev is released. Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/ax25.h | 10 ++++++++++ net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 2 ++ net/ax25/ax25_dev.c | 12 ++++++++++-- net/ax25/ax25_route.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/ax25.h b/include/net/ax25.h index 526e49589197..50b417df6221 100644 --- a/include/net/ax25.h +++ b/include/net/ax25.h @@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ typedef struct ax25_dev { #if defined(CONFIG_AX25_DAMA_SLAVE) || defined(CONFIG_AX25_DAMA_MASTER) ax25_dama_info dama; #endif + refcount_t refcount; } ax25_dev; typedef struct ax25_cb { @@ -293,6 +294,15 @@ static __inline__ void ax25_cb_put(ax25_cb *ax25) } } +#define ax25_dev_hold(__ax25_dev) \ + refcount_inc(&((__ax25_dev)->refcount)) + +static __inline__ void ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev *ax25_dev) +{ + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ax25_dev->refcount)) { + kfree(ax25_dev); + } +} static inline __be16 ax25_type_trans(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) { skb->dev = dev; diff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c index 44a8730c26ac..32f61978ff29 100644 --- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c +++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ again: spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_list_lock); lock_sock(sk); s->ax25_dev = NULL; + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); release_sock(sk); ax25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH); spin_lock_bh(&ax25_list_lock); @@ -439,6 +440,7 @@ static int ax25_ctl_ioctl(const unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg) } out_put: + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); ax25_cb_put(ax25); return ret; diff --git a/net/ax25/ax25_dev.c b/net/ax25/ax25_dev.c index 256fadb94df3..770b787fb7bb 100644 --- a/net/ax25/ax25_dev.c +++ b/net/ax25/ax25_dev.c @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ ax25_dev *ax25_addr_ax25dev(ax25_address *addr) for (ax25_dev = ax25_dev_list; ax25_dev != NULL; ax25_dev = ax25_dev->next) if (ax25cmp(addr, (const ax25_address *)ax25_dev->dev->dev_addr) == 0) { res = ax25_dev; + ax25_dev_hold(ax25_dev); } spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); @@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ void ax25_dev_device_up(struct net_device *dev) return; } + refcount_set(&ax25_dev->refcount, 1); dev->ax25_ptr = ax25_dev; ax25_dev->dev = dev; dev_hold_track(dev, &ax25_dev->dev_tracker, GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -83,6 +85,7 @@ void ax25_dev_device_up(struct net_device *dev) spin_lock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); ax25_dev->next = ax25_dev_list; ax25_dev_list = ax25_dev; + ax25_dev_hold(ax25_dev); spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); ax25_register_dev_sysctl(ax25_dev); @@ -112,20 +115,22 @@ void ax25_dev_device_down(struct net_device *dev) if ((s = ax25_dev_list) == ax25_dev) { ax25_dev_list = s->next; + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); dev->ax25_ptr = NULL; dev_put_track(dev, &ax25_dev->dev_tracker); - kfree(ax25_dev); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return; } while (s != NULL && s->next != NULL) { if (s->next == ax25_dev) { s->next = ax25_dev->next; + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); dev->ax25_ptr = NULL; dev_put_track(dev, &ax25_dev->dev_tracker); - kfree(ax25_dev); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return; } @@ -133,6 +138,7 @@ void ax25_dev_device_down(struct net_device *dev) } spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); dev->ax25_ptr = NULL; + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); } int ax25_fwd_ioctl(unsigned int cmd, struct ax25_fwd_struct *fwd) @@ -149,6 +155,7 @@ int ax25_fwd_ioctl(unsigned int cmd, struct ax25_fwd_struct *fwd) if (ax25_dev->forward != NULL) return -EINVAL; ax25_dev->forward = fwd_dev->dev; + ax25_dev_put(fwd_dev); break; case SIOCAX25DELFWD: @@ -161,6 +168,7 @@ int ax25_fwd_ioctl(unsigned int cmd, struct ax25_fwd_struct *fwd) return -EINVAL; } + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return 0; } diff --git a/net/ax25/ax25_route.c b/net/ax25/ax25_route.c index d0b2e094bd55..1e32693833e5 100644 --- a/net/ax25/ax25_route.c +++ b/net/ax25/ax25_route.c @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static int __must_check ax25_rt_add(struct ax25_routes_struct *route) ax25_rt->dev = ax25_dev->dev; ax25_rt->digipeat = NULL; ax25_rt->ip_mode = ' '; + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); if (route->digi_count != 0) { if ((ax25_rt->digipeat = kmalloc(sizeof(ax25_digi), GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) { write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); @@ -172,6 +173,7 @@ static int ax25_rt_del(struct ax25_routes_struct *route) } } } + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); return 0; @@ -214,6 +216,7 @@ static int ax25_rt_opt(struct ax25_route_opt_struct *rt_option) } out: + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 341adeec9adad0874f29a0a1af35638207352a39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gu Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 23:33:04 +0800 Subject: net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket->wq, such as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications. After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket->wq will be woken up. Applications can't be notified by the entries which were inserted in smc socket->wq before fallback. So we need a mechanism to wake up smc socket->wq at the same time if some entries remaining in it. The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107 RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170 Call Trace: __wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0 sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70 tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40 tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660 ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260 tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60 ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60 ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230 ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320 napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300 __do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2 irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0 common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0 The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq. The owners of these entries, such as epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock (smc socket->wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive, but it doesn't work. The operations to the entries, such as removing from the waitqueue (now is clcsock->wq after fallback), may cause a crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment. This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock's callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will forward the wakeup to smc socket->wq if clcsock->wq is actually woken up and smc socket->wq has remaining entries. Fixes: 2153bd1e3d3d ("net/smc: Transfer remaining wait queue entries during fallback") Suggested-by: Karsten Graul Signed-off-by: Wen Gu Acked-by: Karsten Graul Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/af_smc.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- net/smc/smc.h | 20 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/af_smc.c b/net/smc/af_smc.c index d5ea62b82bb8..8c89d0b0ca18 100644 --- a/net/smc/af_smc.c +++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c @@ -566,17 +566,115 @@ static void smc_stat_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc) mutex_unlock(&net->smc.mutex_fback_rsn); } +/* must be called under rcu read lock */ +static void smc_fback_wakeup_waitqueue(struct smc_sock *smc, void *key) +{ + struct socket_wq *wq; + __poll_t flags; + + wq = rcu_dereference(smc->sk.sk_wq); + if (!skwq_has_sleeper(wq)) + return; + + /* wake up smc sk->sk_wq */ + if (!key) { + /* sk_state_change */ + wake_up_interruptible_all(&wq->wait); + } else { + flags = key_to_poll(key); + if (flags & (EPOLLIN | EPOLLOUT)) + /* sk_data_ready or sk_write_space */ + wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&wq->wait, flags); + else if (flags & EPOLLERR) + /* sk_error_report */ + wake_up_interruptible_poll(&wq->wait, flags); + } +} + +static int smc_fback_mark_woken(wait_queue_entry_t *wait, + unsigned int mode, int sync, void *key) +{ + struct smc_mark_woken *mark = + container_of(wait, struct smc_mark_woken, wait_entry); + + mark->woken = true; + mark->key = key; + return 0; +} + +static void smc_fback_forward_wakeup(struct smc_sock *smc, struct sock *clcsk, + void (*clcsock_callback)(struct sock *sk)) +{ + struct smc_mark_woken mark = { .woken = false }; + struct socket_wq *wq; + + init_waitqueue_func_entry(&mark.wait_entry, + smc_fback_mark_woken); + rcu_read_lock(); + wq = rcu_dereference(clcsk->sk_wq); + if (!wq) + goto out; + add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(clcsk), &mark.wait_entry); + clcsock_callback(clcsk); + remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(clcsk), &mark.wait_entry); + + if (mark.woken) + smc_fback_wakeup_waitqueue(smc, mark.key); +out: + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +static void smc_fback_state_change(struct sock *clcsk) +{ + struct smc_sock *smc = + smc_clcsock_user_data(clcsk); + + if (!smc) + return; + smc_fback_forward_wakeup(smc, clcsk, smc->clcsk_state_change); +} + +static void smc_fback_data_ready(struct sock *clcsk) +{ + struct smc_sock *smc = + smc_clcsock_user_data(clcsk); + + if (!smc) + return; + smc_fback_forward_wakeup(smc, clcsk, smc->clcsk_data_ready); +} + +static void smc_fback_write_space(struct sock *clcsk) +{ + struct smc_sock *smc = + smc_clcsock_user_data(clcsk); + + if (!smc) + return; + smc_fback_forward_wakeup(smc, clcsk, smc->clcsk_write_space); +} + +static void smc_fback_error_report(struct sock *clcsk) +{ + struct smc_sock *smc = + smc_clcsock_user_data(clcsk); + + if (!smc) + return; + smc_fback_forward_wakeup(smc, clcsk, smc->clcsk_error_report); +} + static int smc_switch_to_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc, int reason_code) { - wait_queue_head_t *smc_wait = sk_sleep(&smc->sk); - wait_queue_head_t *clc_wait; - unsigned long flags; + struct sock *clcsk; mutex_lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); if (!smc->clcsock) { mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); return -EBADF; } + clcsk = smc->clcsock->sk; + smc->use_fallback = true; smc->fallback_rsn = reason_code; smc_stat_fallback(smc); @@ -587,16 +685,22 @@ static int smc_switch_to_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc, int reason_code) smc->clcsock->wq.fasync_list = smc->sk.sk_socket->wq.fasync_list; - /* There may be some entries remaining in - * smc socket->wq, which should be removed - * to clcsocket->wq during the fallback. + /* There might be some wait entries remaining + * in smc sk->sk_wq and they should be woken up + * as clcsock's wait queue is woken up. */ - clc_wait = sk_sleep(smc->clcsock->sk); - spin_lock_irqsave(&smc_wait->lock, flags); - spin_lock_nested(&clc_wait->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); - list_splice_init(&smc_wait->head, &clc_wait->head); - spin_unlock(&clc_wait->lock); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&smc_wait->lock, flags); + smc->clcsk_state_change = clcsk->sk_state_change; + smc->clcsk_data_ready = clcsk->sk_data_ready; + smc->clcsk_write_space = clcsk->sk_write_space; + smc->clcsk_error_report = clcsk->sk_error_report; + + clcsk->sk_state_change = smc_fback_state_change; + clcsk->sk_data_ready = smc_fback_data_ready; + clcsk->sk_write_space = smc_fback_write_space; + clcsk->sk_error_report = smc_fback_error_report; + + smc->clcsock->sk->sk_user_data = + (void *)((uintptr_t)smc | SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY); } mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); return 0; @@ -2115,10 +2219,9 @@ out: static void smc_clcsock_data_ready(struct sock *listen_clcsock) { - struct smc_sock *lsmc; + struct smc_sock *lsmc = + smc_clcsock_user_data(listen_clcsock); - lsmc = (struct smc_sock *) - ((uintptr_t)listen_clcsock->sk_user_data & ~SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY); if (!lsmc) return; lsmc->clcsk_data_ready(listen_clcsock); diff --git a/net/smc/smc.h b/net/smc/smc.h index 3d0b8e300deb..37b2001a0255 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc.h +++ b/net/smc/smc.h @@ -139,6 +139,12 @@ enum smc_urg_state { SMC_URG_READ = 3, /* data was already read */ }; +struct smc_mark_woken { + bool woken; + void *key; + wait_queue_entry_t wait_entry; +}; + struct smc_connection { struct rb_node alert_node; struct smc_link_group *lgr; /* link group of connection */ @@ -228,8 +234,14 @@ struct smc_connection { struct smc_sock { /* smc sock container */ struct sock sk; struct socket *clcsock; /* internal tcp socket */ + void (*clcsk_state_change)(struct sock *sk); + /* original stat_change fct. */ void (*clcsk_data_ready)(struct sock *sk); - /* original data_ready fct. **/ + /* original data_ready fct. */ + void (*clcsk_write_space)(struct sock *sk); + /* original write_space fct. */ + void (*clcsk_error_report)(struct sock *sk); + /* original error_report fct. */ struct smc_connection conn; /* smc connection */ struct smc_sock *listen_smc; /* listen parent */ struct work_struct connect_work; /* handle non-blocking connect*/ @@ -264,6 +276,12 @@ static inline struct smc_sock *smc_sk(const struct sock *sk) return (struct smc_sock *)sk; } +static inline struct smc_sock *smc_clcsock_user_data(struct sock *clcsk) +{ + return (struct smc_sock *) + ((uintptr_t)clcsk->sk_user_data & ~SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY); +} + extern struct workqueue_struct *smc_hs_wq; /* wq for handshake work */ extern struct workqueue_struct *smc_close_wq; /* wq for close work */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From a72c01a94f1d285a274219d36e2a17b4846c0615 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Wed, 5 Jan 2022 16:15:59 +0800 Subject: mac80211: mlme: check for null after calling kmemdup As the possible failure of the alloc, the ifmgd->assoc_req_ies might be NULL pointer returned from kmemdup(). Therefore it might be better to free the skb and return error in order to fail the association, like ieee80211_assoc_success(). Also, the caller, ieee80211_do_assoc(), needs to deal with the return value from ieee80211_send_assoc(). Fixes: 4d9ec73d2b78 ("cfg80211: Report Association Request frame IEs in association events") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220105081559.2387083-1-jiasheng@iscas.ac.cn [fix some paths to be errors, not success] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/mac80211/mlme.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mac80211/mlme.c b/net/mac80211/mlme.c index 1eeabdf10052..e5ccf17618ab 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/mlme.c +++ b/net/mac80211/mlme.c @@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ static void ieee80211_add_he_ie(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, ieee80211_ie_build_he_6ghz_cap(sdata, skb); } -static void ieee80211_send_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) +static int ieee80211_send_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) { struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; struct ieee80211_if_managed *ifmgd = &sdata->u.mgd; @@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ static void ieee80211_send_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) enum nl80211_iftype iftype = ieee80211_vif_type_p2p(&sdata->vif); const struct ieee80211_sband_iftype_data *iftd; struct ieee80211_prep_tx_info info = {}; + int ret; /* we know it's writable, cast away the const */ if (assoc_data->ie_len) @@ -699,7 +700,7 @@ static void ieee80211_send_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) chanctx_conf = rcu_dereference(sdata->vif.chanctx_conf); if (WARN_ON(!chanctx_conf)) { rcu_read_unlock(); - return; + return -EINVAL; } chan = chanctx_conf->def.chan; rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -750,7 +751,7 @@ static void ieee80211_send_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) (iftd ? iftd->vendor_elems.len : 0), GFP_KERNEL); if (!skb) - return; + return -ENOMEM; skb_reserve(skb, local->hw.extra_tx_headroom); @@ -1031,15 +1032,22 @@ skip_rates: skb_put_data(skb, assoc_data->ie + offset, noffset - offset); } - if (assoc_data->fils_kek_len && - fils_encrypt_assoc_req(skb, assoc_data) < 0) { - dev_kfree_skb(skb); - return; + if (assoc_data->fils_kek_len) { + ret = fils_encrypt_assoc_req(skb, assoc_data); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_kfree_skb(skb); + return ret; + } } pos = skb_tail_pointer(skb); kfree(ifmgd->assoc_req_ies); ifmgd->assoc_req_ies = kmemdup(ie_start, pos - ie_start, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!ifmgd->assoc_req_ies) { + dev_kfree_skb(skb); + return -ENOMEM; + } + ifmgd->assoc_req_ies_len = pos - ie_start; drv_mgd_prepare_tx(local, sdata, &info); @@ -1049,6 +1057,8 @@ skip_rates: IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb)->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTL_REQ_TX_STATUS | IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_MLME_CONN_TX; ieee80211_tx_skb(sdata, skb); + + return 0; } void ieee80211_send_pspoll(struct ieee80211_local *local, @@ -4497,6 +4507,7 @@ static int ieee80211_do_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) { struct ieee80211_mgd_assoc_data *assoc_data = sdata->u.mgd.assoc_data; struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; + int ret; sdata_assert_lock(sdata); @@ -4517,7 +4528,9 @@ static int ieee80211_do_assoc(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) sdata_info(sdata, "associate with %pM (try %d/%d)\n", assoc_data->bss->bssid, assoc_data->tries, IEEE80211_ASSOC_MAX_TRIES); - ieee80211_send_assoc(sdata); + ret = ieee80211_send_assoc(sdata); + if (ret) + return ret; if (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, REPORTS_TX_ACK_STATUS)) { assoc_data->timeout = jiffies + IEEE80211_ASSOC_TIMEOUT; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 04c2a47ffb13c29778e2a14e414ad4cb5a5db4b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 09:20:18 -0800 Subject: net: sched: fix use-after-free in tc_new_tfilter() Whenever tc_new_tfilter() jumps back to replay: label, we need to make sure @q and @chain local variables are cleared again, or risk use-after-free as in [1] For consistency, apply the same fix in tc_ctl_chain() BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581 Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880985c4b08 by task syz-executor.4/1945 CPU: 0 PID: 1945 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00495-gff58831fa02d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581 tcf_chain_head_change_item net/sched/cls_api.c:372 [inline] tcf_chain0_head_change.isra.0+0xb9/0x120 net/sched/cls_api.c:386 tcf_chain_tp_insert net/sched/cls_api.c:1657 [inline] tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique net/sched/cls_api.c:1707 [inline] tc_new_tfilter+0x1e67/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2086 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725 ____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467 __sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f2647172059 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f2645aa5168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f2647285100 RCX: 00007f2647172059 RDX: 040000000000009f RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007f26471cc08d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 9e00000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fffb3f7f02f R14: 00007f2645aa5300 R15: 0000000000022000 Allocated by task 1944: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:436 [inline] ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:515 [inline] ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:474 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:524 kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline] kzalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:726 [inline] qdisc_alloc+0xac/0xa10 net/sched/sch_generic.c:941 qdisc_create.constprop.0+0xce/0x10f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1211 tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c5/0x1980 net/sched/sch_api.c:1660 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5592 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725 ____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467 __sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Freed by task 3609: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:370 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x160 mm/kasan/common.c:328 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:236 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1728 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x8b/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:1754 slab_free mm/slub.c:3509 [inline] kfree+0xcb/0x280 mm/slub.c:4562 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2527 [inline] rcu_core+0x7b8/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2778 __do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:348 __call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3026 [inline] call_rcu+0xb1/0x740 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3106 qdisc_put_unlocked+0x6f/0x90 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1109 tcf_block_release+0x86/0x90 net/sched/cls_api.c:1238 tc_new_tfilter+0xc0d/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2148 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725 ____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467 __sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880985c4800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 776 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff8880985c4800, ffff8880985c4c00) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0002617000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x985c0 head:ffffea0002617000 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888010c41dc0 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 1941, ts 1038999441284, free_ts 1033444432829 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165 __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389 alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x310 mm/mempolicy.c:2271 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1799 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1944 [inline] new_slab+0x28a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2004 ___slab_alloc+0x87c/0xe90 mm/slub.c:3018 __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3105 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3196 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline] __kmalloc+0x2fb/0x340 mm/slub.c:4420 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:586 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:715 [inline] __register_sysctl_table+0x112/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1335 neigh_sysctl_register+0x2c8/0x5e0 net/core/neighbour.c:3787 devinet_sysctl_register+0xb1/0x230 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2618 inetdev_init+0x286/0x580 net/ipv4/devinet.c:278 inetdev_event+0xa8a/0x15d0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1532 notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:84 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1919 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1931 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1945 [inline] register_netdevice+0x1073/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:9698 veth_newlink+0x59c/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1722 page last free stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline] free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404 free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline] free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404 release_pages+0x748/0x1220 mm/swap.c:956 tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:50 [inline] tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:243 [inline] tlb_flush_mmu+0xe9/0x6b0 mm/mmu_gather.c:250 zap_pte_range mm/memory.c:1441 [inline] zap_pmd_range mm/memory.c:1490 [inline] zap_pud_range mm/memory.c:1519 [inline] zap_p4d_range mm/memory.c:1540 [inline] unmap_page_range+0x1d1d/0x2a30 mm/memory.c:1561 unmap_single_vma+0x198/0x310 mm/memory.c:1606 unmap_vmas+0x16b/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:1638 exit_mmap+0x201/0x670 mm/mmap.c:3178 __mmput+0x122/0x4b0 kernel/fork.c:1114 mmput+0x56/0x60 kernel/fork.c:1135 exit_mm kernel/exit.c:507 [inline] do_exit+0xa3c/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:793 do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:946 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:944 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:944 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880985c4a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880985c4a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8880985c4b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880985c4b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880985c4c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 470502de5bdb ("net: sched: unlock rules update API") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Vlad Buslov Cc: Jiri Pirko Cc: Cong Wang Reported-by: syzbot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131172018.3704490-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sched/cls_api.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/cls_api.c b/net/sched/cls_api.c index d4e27c679123..5f0f346b576f 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_api.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c @@ -1945,9 +1945,9 @@ static int tc_new_tfilter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n, bool prio_allocate; u32 parent; u32 chain_index; - struct Qdisc *q = NULL; + struct Qdisc *q; struct tcf_chain_info chain_info; - struct tcf_chain *chain = NULL; + struct tcf_chain *chain; struct tcf_block *block; struct tcf_proto *tp; unsigned long cl; @@ -1976,6 +1976,8 @@ replay: tp = NULL; cl = 0; block = NULL; + q = NULL; + chain = NULL; flags = 0; if (prio == 0) { @@ -2798,8 +2800,8 @@ static int tc_ctl_chain(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n, struct tcmsg *t; u32 parent; u32 chain_index; - struct Qdisc *q = NULL; - struct tcf_chain *chain = NULL; + struct Qdisc *q; + struct tcf_chain *chain; struct tcf_block *block; unsigned long cl; int err; @@ -2809,6 +2811,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_chain(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n, return -EPERM; replay: + q = NULL; err = nlmsg_parse_deprecated(n, sizeof(*t), tca, TCA_MAX, rtm_tca_policy, extack); if (err < 0) -- cgit v1.2.3 From c6f6f2444bdbe0079e41914a35081530d0409963 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 17:21:06 -0800 Subject: rtnetlink: make sure to refresh master_dev/m_ops in __rtnl_newlink() While looking at one unrelated syzbot bug, I found the replay logic in __rtnl_newlink() to potentially trigger use-after-free. It is better to clear master_dev and m_ops inside the loop, in case we have to replay it. Fixes: ba7d49b1f0f8 ("rtnetlink: provide api for getting and setting slave info") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Jiri Pirko Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201012106.216495-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/core/rtnetlink.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c index e476403231f0..710da8a36729 100644 --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -3275,8 +3275,8 @@ static int __rtnl_newlink(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, struct nlattr *slave_attr[RTNL_SLAVE_MAX_TYPE + 1]; unsigned char name_assign_type = NET_NAME_USER; struct nlattr *linkinfo[IFLA_INFO_MAX + 1]; - const struct rtnl_link_ops *m_ops = NULL; - struct net_device *master_dev = NULL; + const struct rtnl_link_ops *m_ops; + struct net_device *master_dev; struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); const struct rtnl_link_ops *ops; struct nlattr *tb[IFLA_MAX + 1]; @@ -3314,6 +3314,8 @@ replay: else dev = NULL; + master_dev = NULL; + m_ops = NULL; if (dev) { master_dev = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev); if (master_dev) -- cgit v1.2.3 From e42e70ad6ae2ae511a6143d2e8da929366e58bd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 18:23:58 -0800 Subject: af_packet: fix data-race in packet_setsockopt / packet_setsockopt When packet_setsockopt( PACKET_FANOUT_DATA ) reads po->fanout, no lock is held, meaning that another thread can change po->fanout. Given that po->fanout can only be set once during the socket lifetime (it is only cleared from fanout_release()), we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to document the race. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_setsockopt / packet_setsockopt write to 0xffff88813ae8e300 of 8 bytes by task 14653 on cpu 0: fanout_add net/packet/af_packet.c:1791 [inline] packet_setsockopt+0x22fe/0x24a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3931 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff88813ae8e300 of 8 bytes by task 14654 on cpu 1: packet_setsockopt+0x691/0x24a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3935 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x0000000000000000 -> 0xffff888106f8c000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 14654 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Fixes: 47dceb8ecdc1 ("packet: add classic BPF fanout mode") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Willem de Bruijn Reported-by: syzbot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201022358.330621-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/packet/af_packet.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index 85ea7ddb48db..ab87f22cc7ec 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -1789,7 +1789,10 @@ static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, struct fanout_args *args) err = -ENOSPC; if (refcount_read(&match->sk_ref) < match->max_num_members) { __dev_remove_pack(&po->prot_hook); - po->fanout = match; + + /* Paired with packet_setsockopt(PACKET_FANOUT_DATA) */ + WRITE_ONCE(po->fanout, match); + po->rollover = rollover; rollover = NULL; refcount_set(&match->sk_ref, refcount_read(&match->sk_ref) + 1); @@ -3934,7 +3937,8 @@ packet_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, sockptr_t optval, } case PACKET_FANOUT_DATA: { - if (!po->fanout) + /* Paired with the WRITE_ONCE() in fanout_add() */ + if (!READ_ONCE(po->fanout)) return -EINVAL; return fanout_set_data(po, optval, optlen); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 479f5547239d970d3833f15f54a6481fffdb91ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2022 22:52:54 -0800 Subject: tcp: fix mem under-charging with zerocopy sendmsg() We got reports of following warning in inet_sock_destruct() WARN_ON(sk_forward_alloc_get(sk)); Whenever we add a non zero-copy fragment to a pure zerocopy skb, we have to anticipate that whole skb->truesize will be uncharged when skb is finally freed. skb->data_len is the payload length. But the memory truesize estimated by __zerocopy_sg_from_iter() is page aligned. Fixes: 9b65b17db723 ("net: avoid double accounting for pure zerocopy skbs") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Talal Ahmad Cc: Arjun Roy Cc: Willem de Bruijn Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201065254.680532-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 78e81465f5f3..bdf108f544a4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -1322,10 +1322,13 @@ new_segment: /* skb changing from pure zc to mixed, must charge zc */ if (unlikely(skb_zcopy_pure(skb))) { - if (!sk_wmem_schedule(sk, skb->data_len)) + u32 extra = skb->truesize - + SKB_TRUESIZE(skb_end_offset(skb)); + + if (!sk_wmem_schedule(sk, extra)) goto wait_for_space; - sk_mem_charge(sk, skb->data_len); + sk_mem_charge(sk, extra); skb_shinfo(skb)->flags &= ~SKBFL_PURE_ZEROCOPY; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From c86d86131ab75696fc52d98571148842e067d620 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Dmitry V. Levin" Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 06:09:04 +0300 Subject: Partially revert "net/smc: Add netlink net namespace support" The change of sizeof(struct smc_diag_linkinfo) by commit 79d39fc503b4 ("net/smc: Add netlink net namespace support") introduced an ABI regression: since struct smc_diag_lgrinfo contains an object of type "struct smc_diag_linkinfo", offset of all subsequent members of struct smc_diag_lgrinfo was changed by that change. As result, applications compiled with the old version of struct smc_diag_linkinfo will receive garbage in struct smc_diag_lgrinfo.role if the kernel implements this new version of struct smc_diag_linkinfo. Fix this regression by reverting the part of commit 79d39fc503b4 that changes struct smc_diag_linkinfo. After all, there is SMC_GEN_NETLINK interface which is good enough, so there is probably no need to touch the smc_diag ABI in the first place. Fixes: 79d39fc503b4 ("net/smc: Add netlink net namespace support") Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin Reviewed-by: Karsten Graul Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220202030904.GA9742@altlinux.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/uapi/linux/smc_diag.h | 11 +++++------ net/smc/smc_diag.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/smc_diag.h b/include/uapi/linux/smc_diag.h index c7008d87f1a4..8cb3a6fef553 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/smc_diag.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/smc_diag.h @@ -84,12 +84,11 @@ struct smc_diag_conninfo { /* SMC_DIAG_LINKINFO */ struct smc_diag_linkinfo { - __u8 link_id; /* link identifier */ - __u8 ibname[IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX]; /* name of the RDMA device */ - __u8 ibport; /* RDMA device port number */ - __u8 gid[40]; /* local GID */ - __u8 peer_gid[40]; /* peer GID */ - __aligned_u64 net_cookie; /* RDMA device net namespace */ + __u8 link_id; /* link identifier */ + __u8 ibname[IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX]; /* name of the RDMA device */ + __u8 ibport; /* RDMA device port number */ + __u8 gid[40]; /* local GID */ + __u8 peer_gid[40]; /* peer GID */ }; struct smc_diag_lgrinfo { diff --git a/net/smc/smc_diag.c b/net/smc/smc_diag.c index b8898c787d23..1fca2f90a9c7 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_diag.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_diag.c @@ -146,13 +146,11 @@ static int __smc_diag_dump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, (req->diag_ext & (1 << (SMC_DIAG_LGRINFO - 1))) && !list_empty(&smc->conn.lgr->list)) { struct smc_link *link = smc->conn.lnk; - struct net *net = read_pnet(&link->smcibdev->ibdev->coredev.rdma_net); struct smc_diag_lgrinfo linfo = { .role = smc->conn.lgr->role, .lnk[0].ibport = link->ibport, .lnk[0].link_id = link->link_id, - .lnk[0].net_cookie = net->net_cookie, }; memcpy(linfo.lnk[0].ibname, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2ea88716369ac9a7486a8cb309d6bf1239ea156c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilya Dryomov Date: Sun, 23 Jan 2022 17:27:47 +0100 Subject: libceph: make recv path in secure mode work the same as send path The recv path of secure mode is intertwined with that of crc mode. While it's slightly more efficient that way (the ciphertext is read into the destination buffer and decrypted in place, thus avoiding two potentially heavy memory allocations for the bounce buffer and the corresponding sg array), it isn't really amenable to changes. Sacrifice that edge and align with the send path which always uses a full-sized bounce buffer (currently there is no other way -- if the kernel crypto API ever grows support for streaming (piecewise) en/decryption for GCM [1], we would be able to easily take advantage of that on both sides). [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20141225202830.GA18794@gondor.apana.org.au/ Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton --- include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 4 + net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h index ff99ce094cfa..6c6b6ea52bb8 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h @@ -383,6 +383,10 @@ struct ceph_connection_v2_info { struct ceph_gcm_nonce in_gcm_nonce; struct ceph_gcm_nonce out_gcm_nonce; + struct page **in_enc_pages; + int in_enc_page_cnt; + int in_enc_resid; + int in_enc_i; struct page **out_enc_pages; int out_enc_page_cnt; int out_enc_resid; diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c index c4099b641b38..2ea00489e691 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c @@ -57,8 +57,9 @@ #define IN_S_HANDLE_CONTROL_REMAINDER 3 #define IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA 4 #define IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA_CONT 5 -#define IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE 6 -#define IN_S_FINISH_SKIP 7 +#define IN_S_PREPARE_READ_ENC_PAGE 6 +#define IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE 7 +#define IN_S_FINISH_SKIP 8 #define OUT_S_QUEUE_DATA 1 #define OUT_S_QUEUE_DATA_CONT 2 @@ -1032,22 +1033,41 @@ static int decrypt_control_remainder(struct ceph_connection *con) padded_len(rem_len) + CEPH_GCM_TAG_LEN); } -static int decrypt_message(struct ceph_connection *con) +static int decrypt_tail(struct ceph_connection *con) { + struct sg_table enc_sgt = {}; struct sg_table sgt = {}; + int tail_len; int ret; + tail_len = tail_onwire_len(con->in_msg, true); + ret = sg_alloc_table_from_pages(&enc_sgt, con->v2.in_enc_pages, + con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt, 0, tail_len, + GFP_NOIO); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = setup_message_sgs(&sgt, con->in_msg, FRONT_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), MIDDLE_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), DATA_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), con->v2.in_buf, true); if (ret) goto out; - ret = gcm_crypt(con, false, sgt.sgl, sgt.sgl, - tail_onwire_len(con->in_msg, true)); + dout("%s con %p msg %p enc_page_cnt %d sg_cnt %d\n", __func__, con, + con->in_msg, con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt, sgt.orig_nents); + ret = gcm_crypt(con, false, enc_sgt.sgl, sgt.sgl, tail_len); + if (ret) + goto out; + + WARN_ON(!con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt); + ceph_release_page_vector(con->v2.in_enc_pages, + con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt); + con->v2.in_enc_pages = NULL; + con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt = 0; out: sg_free_table(&sgt); + sg_free_table(&enc_sgt); return ret; } @@ -1737,8 +1757,7 @@ static void prepare_read_data(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct bio_vec bv; - if (!con_secure(con)) - con->in_data_crc = -1; + con->in_data_crc = -1; ceph_msg_data_cursor_init(&con->v2.in_cursor, con->in_msg, data_len(con->in_msg)); @@ -1751,11 +1770,10 @@ static void prepare_read_data_cont(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct bio_vec bv; - if (!con_secure(con)) - con->in_data_crc = ceph_crc32c_page(con->in_data_crc, - con->v2.in_bvec.bv_page, - con->v2.in_bvec.bv_offset, - con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + con->in_data_crc = ceph_crc32c_page(con->in_data_crc, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_page, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_offset, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); ceph_msg_data_advance(&con->v2.in_cursor, con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); if (con->v2.in_cursor.total_resid) { @@ -1766,21 +1784,94 @@ static void prepare_read_data_cont(struct ceph_connection *con) } /* - * We've read all data. Prepare to read data padding (if any) - * and epilogue. + * We've read all data. Prepare to read epilogue. */ reset_in_kvecs(con); - if (con_secure(con)) { - if (need_padding(data_len(con->in_msg))) - add_in_kvec(con, DATA_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), - padding_len(data_len(con->in_msg))); - add_in_kvec(con, con->v2.in_buf, CEPH_EPILOGUE_SECURE_LEN); + add_in_kvec(con, con->v2.in_buf, CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN); + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE; +} + +static void prepare_read_tail_plain(struct ceph_connection *con) +{ + struct ceph_msg *msg = con->in_msg; + + if (!front_len(msg) && !middle_len(msg)) { + WARN_ON(!data_len(msg)); + prepare_read_data(con); + return; + } + + reset_in_kvecs(con); + if (front_len(msg)) { + add_in_kvec(con, msg->front.iov_base, front_len(msg)); + WARN_ON(msg->front.iov_len != front_len(msg)); + } + if (middle_len(msg)) { + add_in_kvec(con, msg->middle->vec.iov_base, middle_len(msg)); + WARN_ON(msg->middle->vec.iov_len != middle_len(msg)); + } + + if (data_len(msg)) { + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA; } else { add_in_kvec(con, con->v2.in_buf, CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN); + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE; + } +} + +static void prepare_read_enc_page(struct ceph_connection *con) +{ + struct bio_vec bv; + + dout("%s con %p i %d resid %d\n", __func__, con, con->v2.in_enc_i, + con->v2.in_enc_resid); + WARN_ON(!con->v2.in_enc_resid); + + bv.bv_page = con->v2.in_enc_pages[con->v2.in_enc_i]; + bv.bv_offset = 0; + bv.bv_len = min(con->v2.in_enc_resid, (int)PAGE_SIZE); + + set_in_bvec(con, &bv); + con->v2.in_enc_i++; + con->v2.in_enc_resid -= bv.bv_len; + + if (con->v2.in_enc_resid) { + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_READ_ENC_PAGE; + return; } + + /* + * We are set to read the last piece of ciphertext (ending + * with epilogue) + auth tag. + */ + WARN_ON(con->v2.in_enc_i != con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt); con->v2.in_state = IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE; } +static int prepare_read_tail_secure(struct ceph_connection *con) +{ + struct page **enc_pages; + int enc_page_cnt; + int tail_len; + + tail_len = tail_onwire_len(con->in_msg, true); + WARN_ON(!tail_len); + + enc_page_cnt = calc_pages_for(0, tail_len); + enc_pages = ceph_alloc_page_vector(enc_page_cnt, GFP_NOIO); + if (IS_ERR(enc_pages)) + return PTR_ERR(enc_pages); + + WARN_ON(con->v2.in_enc_pages || con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt); + con->v2.in_enc_pages = enc_pages; + con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt = enc_page_cnt; + con->v2.in_enc_resid = tail_len; + con->v2.in_enc_i = 0; + + prepare_read_enc_page(con); + return 0; +} + static void __finish_skip(struct ceph_connection *con) { con->in_seq++; @@ -2589,46 +2680,26 @@ static int __handle_control(struct ceph_connection *con, void *p) } msg = con->in_msg; /* set in process_message_header() */ - if (!front_len(msg) && !middle_len(msg)) { - if (!data_len(msg)) - return process_message(con); - - prepare_read_data(con); - return 0; - } - - reset_in_kvecs(con); if (front_len(msg)) { WARN_ON(front_len(msg) > msg->front_alloc_len); - add_in_kvec(con, msg->front.iov_base, front_len(msg)); msg->front.iov_len = front_len(msg); - - if (con_secure(con) && need_padding(front_len(msg))) - add_in_kvec(con, FRONT_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), - padding_len(front_len(msg))); } else { msg->front.iov_len = 0; } if (middle_len(msg)) { WARN_ON(middle_len(msg) > msg->middle->alloc_len); - add_in_kvec(con, msg->middle->vec.iov_base, middle_len(msg)); msg->middle->vec.iov_len = middle_len(msg); - - if (con_secure(con) && need_padding(middle_len(msg))) - add_in_kvec(con, MIDDLE_PAD(con->v2.in_buf), - padding_len(middle_len(msg))); } else if (msg->middle) { msg->middle->vec.iov_len = 0; } - if (data_len(msg)) { - con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA; - } else { - add_in_kvec(con, con->v2.in_buf, - con_secure(con) ? CEPH_EPILOGUE_SECURE_LEN : - CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN); - con->v2.in_state = IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE; - } + if (!front_len(msg) && !middle_len(msg) && !data_len(msg)) + return process_message(con); + + if (con_secure(con)) + return prepare_read_tail_secure(con); + + prepare_read_tail_plain(con); return 0; } @@ -2717,7 +2788,7 @@ static int handle_epilogue(struct ceph_connection *con) int ret; if (con_secure(con)) { - ret = decrypt_message(con); + ret = decrypt_tail(con); if (ret) { if (ret == -EBADMSG) con->error_msg = "integrity error, bad epilogue auth tag"; @@ -2792,6 +2863,10 @@ static int populate_in_iter(struct ceph_connection *con) prepare_read_data_cont(con); ret = 0; break; + case IN_S_PREPARE_READ_ENC_PAGE: + prepare_read_enc_page(con); + ret = 0; + break; case IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE: ret = handle_epilogue(con); break; @@ -3326,20 +3401,16 @@ void ceph_con_v2_revoke(struct ceph_connection *con) static void revoke_at_prepare_read_data(struct ceph_connection *con) { - int remaining; /* data + [data padding] + epilogue */ + int remaining; int resid; + WARN_ON(con_secure(con)); WARN_ON(!data_len(con->in_msg)); WARN_ON(!iov_iter_is_kvec(&con->v2.in_iter)); resid = iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter); WARN_ON(!resid); - if (con_secure(con)) - remaining = padded_len(data_len(con->in_msg)) + - CEPH_EPILOGUE_SECURE_LEN; - else - remaining = data_len(con->in_msg) + CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN; - + remaining = data_len(con->in_msg) + CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN; dout("%s con %p resid %d remaining %d\n", __func__, con, resid, remaining); con->v2.in_iter.count -= resid; @@ -3350,8 +3421,9 @@ static void revoke_at_prepare_read_data(struct ceph_connection *con) static void revoke_at_prepare_read_data_cont(struct ceph_connection *con) { int recved, resid; /* current piece of data */ - int remaining; /* [data padding] + epilogue */ + int remaining; + WARN_ON(con_secure(con)); WARN_ON(!data_len(con->in_msg)); WARN_ON(!iov_iter_is_bvec(&con->v2.in_iter)); resid = iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter); @@ -3363,12 +3435,7 @@ static void revoke_at_prepare_read_data_cont(struct ceph_connection *con) ceph_msg_data_advance(&con->v2.in_cursor, recved); WARN_ON(resid > con->v2.in_cursor.total_resid); - if (con_secure(con)) - remaining = padding_len(data_len(con->in_msg)) + - CEPH_EPILOGUE_SECURE_LEN; - else - remaining = CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN; - + remaining = CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN; dout("%s con %p total_resid %zu remaining %d\n", __func__, con, con->v2.in_cursor.total_resid, remaining); con->v2.in_iter.count -= resid; @@ -3376,11 +3443,26 @@ static void revoke_at_prepare_read_data_cont(struct ceph_connection *con) con->v2.in_state = IN_S_FINISH_SKIP; } +static void revoke_at_prepare_read_enc_page(struct ceph_connection *con) +{ + int resid; /* current enc page (not necessarily data) */ + + WARN_ON(!con_secure(con)); + WARN_ON(!iov_iter_is_bvec(&con->v2.in_iter)); + resid = iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter); + WARN_ON(!resid || resid > con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + + dout("%s con %p resid %d enc_resid %d\n", __func__, con, resid, + con->v2.in_enc_resid); + con->v2.in_iter.count -= resid; + set_in_skip(con, resid + con->v2.in_enc_resid); + con->v2.in_state = IN_S_FINISH_SKIP; +} + static void revoke_at_handle_epilogue(struct ceph_connection *con) { int resid; - WARN_ON(!iov_iter_is_kvec(&con->v2.in_iter)); resid = iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter); WARN_ON(!resid); @@ -3399,6 +3481,9 @@ void ceph_con_v2_revoke_incoming(struct ceph_connection *con) case IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA_CONT: revoke_at_prepare_read_data_cont(con); break; + case IN_S_PREPARE_READ_ENC_PAGE: + revoke_at_prepare_read_enc_page(con); + break; case IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE: revoke_at_handle_epilogue(con); break; @@ -3432,6 +3517,13 @@ void ceph_con_v2_reset_protocol(struct ceph_connection *con) clear_out_sign_kvecs(con); free_conn_bufs(con); + if (con->v2.in_enc_pages) { + WARN_ON(!con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt); + ceph_release_page_vector(con->v2.in_enc_pages, + con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt); + con->v2.in_enc_pages = NULL; + con->v2.in_enc_page_cnt = 0; + } if (con->v2.out_enc_pages) { WARN_ON(!con->v2.out_enc_page_cnt); ceph_release_page_vector(con->v2.out_enc_pages, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 038b8d1d1ab1cce11a158d30bf080ff41a2cfd15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ilya Dryomov Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 15:13:32 +0100 Subject: libceph: optionally use bounce buffer on recv path in crc mode Both msgr1 and msgr2 in crc mode are zero copy in the sense that message data is read from the socket directly into the destination buffer. We assume that the destination buffer is stable (i.e. remains unchanged while it is being read to) though. Otherwise, CRC errors ensue: libceph: read_partial_message 0000000048edf8ad data crc 1063286393 != exp. 228122706 libceph: osd1 (1)192.168.122.1:6843 bad crc/signature libceph: bad data crc, calculated 57958023, expected 1805382778 libceph: osd2 (2)192.168.122.1:6876 integrity error, bad crc Introduce rxbounce option to enable use of a bounce buffer when receiving message data. In particular this is needed if a mapped image is a Windows VM disk, passed to QEMU. Windows has a system-wide "dummy" page that may be mapped into the destination buffer (potentially more than once into the same buffer) by the Windows Memory Manager in an effort to generate a single large I/O [1][2]. QEMU makes a point of preserving overlap relationships when cloning I/O vectors, so krbd gets exposed to this behaviour. [1] "What Is Really in That MDL?" https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/hardware/design/dn614012(v=vs.85) [2] https://blogs.msmvps.com/kernelmustard/2005/05/04/dummy-pages/ URL: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1973317 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton --- include/linux/ceph/libceph.h | 1 + include/linux/ceph/messenger.h | 1 + net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 7 +++++ net/ceph/messenger.c | 4 +++ net/ceph/messenger_v1.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 6 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/libceph.h b/include/linux/ceph/libceph.h index 6a89ea410e43..edf62eaa6285 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/libceph.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/libceph.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #define CEPH_OPT_TCP_NODELAY (1<<4) /* TCP_NODELAY on TCP sockets */ #define CEPH_OPT_NOMSGSIGN (1<<5) /* don't sign msgs (msgr1) */ #define CEPH_OPT_ABORT_ON_FULL (1<<6) /* abort w/ ENOSPC when full */ +#define CEPH_OPT_RXBOUNCE (1<<7) /* double-buffer read data */ #define CEPH_OPT_DEFAULT (CEPH_OPT_TCP_NODELAY) diff --git a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h index 6c6b6ea52bb8..e7f2fb2fc207 100644 --- a/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h +++ b/include/linux/ceph/messenger.h @@ -461,6 +461,7 @@ struct ceph_connection { struct ceph_msg *out_msg; /* sending message (== tail of out_sent) */ + struct page *bounce_page; u32 in_front_crc, in_middle_crc, in_data_crc; /* calculated crc */ struct timespec64 last_keepalive_ack; /* keepalive2 ack stamp */ diff --git a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c index ecc400a0b7bb..4c6441536d55 100644 --- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c +++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c @@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ enum { Opt_cephx_sign_messages, Opt_tcp_nodelay, Opt_abort_on_full, + Opt_rxbounce, }; enum { @@ -295,6 +296,7 @@ static const struct fs_parameter_spec ceph_parameters[] = { fsparam_u32 ("osdkeepalive", Opt_osdkeepalivetimeout), fsparam_enum ("read_from_replica", Opt_read_from_replica, ceph_param_read_from_replica), + fsparam_flag ("rxbounce", Opt_rxbounce), fsparam_enum ("ms_mode", Opt_ms_mode, ceph_param_ms_mode), fsparam_string ("secret", Opt_secret), @@ -584,6 +586,9 @@ int ceph_parse_param(struct fs_parameter *param, struct ceph_options *opt, case Opt_abort_on_full: opt->flags |= CEPH_OPT_ABORT_ON_FULL; break; + case Opt_rxbounce: + opt->flags |= CEPH_OPT_RXBOUNCE; + break; default: BUG(); @@ -660,6 +665,8 @@ int ceph_print_client_options(struct seq_file *m, struct ceph_client *client, seq_puts(m, "notcp_nodelay,"); if (show_all && (opt->flags & CEPH_OPT_ABORT_ON_FULL)) seq_puts(m, "abort_on_full,"); + if (opt->flags & CEPH_OPT_RXBOUNCE) + seq_puts(m, "rxbounce,"); if (opt->mount_timeout != CEPH_MOUNT_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT) seq_printf(m, "mount_timeout=%d,", diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c index 45eba2dcb67a..d3bb656308b4 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -515,6 +515,10 @@ static void ceph_con_reset_protocol(struct ceph_connection *con) ceph_msg_put(con->out_msg); con->out_msg = NULL; } + if (con->bounce_page) { + __free_page(con->bounce_page); + con->bounce_page = NULL; + } if (ceph_msgr2(from_msgr(con->msgr))) ceph_con_v2_reset_protocol(con); diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c index 2cb5ffdf071a..6b014eca3a13 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v1.c @@ -992,8 +992,7 @@ static int read_partial_message_section(struct ceph_connection *con, static int read_partial_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con) { - struct ceph_msg *msg = con->in_msg; - struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor = &msg->cursor; + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor = &con->in_msg->cursor; bool do_datacrc = !ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), NOCRC); struct page *page; size_t page_offset; @@ -1001,9 +1000,6 @@ static int read_partial_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con) u32 crc = 0; int ret; - if (!msg->num_data_items) - return -EIO; - if (do_datacrc) crc = con->in_data_crc; while (cursor->total_resid) { @@ -1031,6 +1027,46 @@ static int read_partial_msg_data(struct ceph_connection *con) return 1; /* must return > 0 to indicate success */ } +static int read_partial_msg_data_bounce(struct ceph_connection *con) +{ + struct ceph_msg_data_cursor *cursor = &con->in_msg->cursor; + struct page *page; + size_t off, len; + u32 crc; + int ret; + + if (unlikely(!con->bounce_page)) { + con->bounce_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO); + if (!con->bounce_page) { + pr_err("failed to allocate bounce page\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + + crc = con->in_data_crc; + while (cursor->total_resid) { + if (!cursor->resid) { + ceph_msg_data_advance(cursor, 0); + continue; + } + + page = ceph_msg_data_next(cursor, &off, &len, NULL); + ret = ceph_tcp_recvpage(con->sock, con->bounce_page, 0, len); + if (ret <= 0) { + con->in_data_crc = crc; + return ret; + } + + crc = crc32c(crc, page_address(con->bounce_page), ret); + memcpy_to_page(page, off, page_address(con->bounce_page), ret); + + ceph_msg_data_advance(cursor, ret); + } + con->in_data_crc = crc; + + return 1; /* must return > 0 to indicate success */ +} + /* * read (part of) a message. */ @@ -1141,7 +1177,13 @@ static int read_partial_message(struct ceph_connection *con) /* (page) data */ if (data_len) { - ret = read_partial_msg_data(con); + if (!m->num_data_items) + return -EIO; + + if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) + ret = read_partial_msg_data_bounce(con); + else + ret = read_partial_msg_data(con); if (ret <= 0) return ret; } diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c index 2ea00489e691..c81379f93ad5 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c @@ -1753,7 +1753,7 @@ static int prepare_read_control_remainder(struct ceph_connection *con) return 0; } -static void prepare_read_data(struct ceph_connection *con) +static int prepare_read_data(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct bio_vec bv; @@ -1762,23 +1762,55 @@ static void prepare_read_data(struct ceph_connection *con) data_len(con->in_msg)); get_bvec_at(&con->v2.in_cursor, &bv); - set_in_bvec(con, &bv); + if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) { + if (unlikely(!con->bounce_page)) { + con->bounce_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOIO); + if (!con->bounce_page) { + pr_err("failed to allocate bounce page\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + } + + bv.bv_page = con->bounce_page; + bv.bv_offset = 0; + set_in_bvec(con, &bv); + } else { + set_in_bvec(con, &bv); + } con->v2.in_state = IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA_CONT; + return 0; } static void prepare_read_data_cont(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct bio_vec bv; - con->in_data_crc = ceph_crc32c_page(con->in_data_crc, - con->v2.in_bvec.bv_page, - con->v2.in_bvec.bv_offset, - con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) { + con->in_data_crc = crc32c(con->in_data_crc, + page_address(con->bounce_page), + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + + get_bvec_at(&con->v2.in_cursor, &bv); + memcpy_to_page(bv.bv_page, bv.bv_offset, + page_address(con->bounce_page), + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + } else { + con->in_data_crc = ceph_crc32c_page(con->in_data_crc, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_page, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_offset, + con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); + } ceph_msg_data_advance(&con->v2.in_cursor, con->v2.in_bvec.bv_len); if (con->v2.in_cursor.total_resid) { get_bvec_at(&con->v2.in_cursor, &bv); - set_in_bvec(con, &bv); + if (ceph_test_opt(from_msgr(con->msgr), RXBOUNCE)) { + bv.bv_page = con->bounce_page; + bv.bv_offset = 0; + set_in_bvec(con, &bv); + } else { + set_in_bvec(con, &bv); + } WARN_ON(con->v2.in_state != IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA_CONT); return; } @@ -1791,14 +1823,13 @@ static void prepare_read_data_cont(struct ceph_connection *con) con->v2.in_state = IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE; } -static void prepare_read_tail_plain(struct ceph_connection *con) +static int prepare_read_tail_plain(struct ceph_connection *con) { struct ceph_msg *msg = con->in_msg; if (!front_len(msg) && !middle_len(msg)) { WARN_ON(!data_len(msg)); - prepare_read_data(con); - return; + return prepare_read_data(con); } reset_in_kvecs(con); @@ -1817,6 +1848,7 @@ static void prepare_read_tail_plain(struct ceph_connection *con) add_in_kvec(con, con->v2.in_buf, CEPH_EPILOGUE_PLAIN_LEN); con->v2.in_state = IN_S_HANDLE_EPILOGUE; } + return 0; } static void prepare_read_enc_page(struct ceph_connection *con) @@ -2699,8 +2731,7 @@ static int __handle_control(struct ceph_connection *con, void *p) if (con_secure(con)) return prepare_read_tail_secure(con); - prepare_read_tail_plain(con); - return 0; + return prepare_read_tail_plain(con); } static int handle_preamble(struct ceph_connection *con) @@ -2856,8 +2887,7 @@ static int populate_in_iter(struct ceph_connection *con) ret = handle_control_remainder(con); break; case IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA: - prepare_read_data(con); - ret = 0; + ret = prepare_read_data(con); break; case IN_S_PREPARE_READ_DATA_CONT: prepare_read_data_cont(con); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b67985be400969578d4d4b17299714c0e5d2c07b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 10:46:40 -0800 Subject: tcp: add missing tcp_skb_can_collapse() test in tcp_shift_skb_data() tcp_shift_skb_data() might collapse three packets into a larger one. P_A, P_B, P_C -> P_ABC Historically, it used a single tcp_skb_can_collapse_to(P_A) call, because it was enough. In commit 85712484110d ("tcp: coalesce/collapse must respect MPTCP extensions"), this call was replaced by a call to tcp_skb_can_collapse(P_A, P_B) But the now needed test over P_C has been missed. This probably broke MPTCP. Then later, commit 9b65b17db723 ("net: avoid double accounting for pure zerocopy skbs") added an extra condition to tcp_skb_can_collapse(), but the missing call from tcp_shift_skb_data() is also breaking TCP zerocopy, because P_A and P_C might have different skb_zcopy_pure() status. Fixes: 85712484110d ("tcp: coalesce/collapse must respect MPTCP extensions") Fixes: 9b65b17db723 ("net: avoid double accounting for pure zerocopy skbs") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Mat Martineau Cc: Talal Ahmad Cc: Arjun Roy Cc: Willem de Bruijn Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Acked-by: Paolo Abeni Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201184640.756716-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index dc49a3d551eb..bfe4112e000c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -1660,6 +1660,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *tcp_shift_skb_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, (mss != tcp_skb_seglen(skb))) goto out; + if (!tcp_skb_can_collapse(prev, skb)) + goto out; len = skb->len; pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb); if (tcp_skb_shift(prev, skb, pcount, len)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4a81f6da9cb2d1ef911131a6fd8bd15cb61fc772 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 20:39:42 +0100 Subject: net, neigh: Do not trigger immediate probes on NUD_FAILED from neigh_managed_work syzkaller was able to trigger a deadlock for NTF_MANAGED entries [0]: kworker/0:16/14617 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8d4dd370 (&tbl->lock){++-.}-{2:2}, at: ___neigh_create+0x9e1/0x2990 net/core/neighbour.c:652 [...] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8d4dd370 (&tbl->lock){++-.}-{2:2}, at: neigh_managed_work+0x35/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:1572 The neighbor entry turned to NUD_FAILED state, where __neigh_event_send() triggered an immediate probe as per commit cd28ca0a3dd1 ("neigh: reduce arp latency") via neigh_probe() given table lock was held. One option to fix this situation is to defer the neigh_probe() back to the neigh_timer_handler() similarly as pre cd28ca0a3dd1. For the case of NTF_MANAGED, this deferral is acceptable given this only happens on actual failure state and regular / expected state is NUD_VALID with the entry already present. The fix adds a parameter to __neigh_event_send() in order to communicate whether immediate probe is allowed or disallowed. Existing call-sites of neigh_event_send() default as-is to immediate probe. However, the neigh_managed_work() disables it via use of neigh_event_send_probe(). [0] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_deadlock_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2956 [inline] check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2999 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3788 [inline] __lock_acquire.cold+0x149/0x3ab kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5027 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5639 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5604 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:202 [inline] _raw_write_lock_bh+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:334 ___neigh_create+0x9e1/0x2990 net/core/neighbour.c:652 ip6_finish_output2+0x1070/0x14f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:123 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:191 [inline] __ip6_finish_output+0x61e/0xe90 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:170 ip6_finish_output+0x32/0x200 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:201 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:296 [inline] ip6_output+0x1e4/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:224 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] ndisc_send_skb+0xa99/0x17f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:508 ndisc_send_ns+0x3a9/0x840 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:650 ndisc_solicit+0x2cd/0x4f0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:742 neigh_probe+0xc2/0x110 net/core/neighbour.c:1040 __neigh_event_send+0x37d/0x1570 net/core/neighbour.c:1201 neigh_event_send include/net/neighbour.h:470 [inline] neigh_managed_work+0x162/0x250 net/core/neighbour.c:1574 process_one_work+0x9ac/0x1650 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x657/0x1110 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 Fixes: 7482e3841d52 ("net, neigh: Add NTF_MANAGED flag for managed neighbor entries") Reported-by: syzbot+5239d0e1778a500d477a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Cc: Eric Dumazet Cc: Roopa Prabhu Tested-by: syzbot+5239d0e1778a500d477a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: David Ahern Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201193942.5055-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/net/neighbour.h | 18 +++++++++++++----- net/core/neighbour.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/neighbour.h b/include/net/neighbour.h index 937389e04c8e..87419f7f5421 100644 --- a/include/net/neighbour.h +++ b/include/net/neighbour.h @@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ static inline struct neighbour *neigh_create(struct neigh_table *tbl, return __neigh_create(tbl, pkey, dev, true); } void neigh_destroy(struct neighbour *neigh); -int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb); +int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb, + const bool immediate_ok); int neigh_update(struct neighbour *neigh, const u8 *lladdr, u8 new, u32 flags, u32 nlmsg_pid); void __neigh_set_probe_once(struct neighbour *neigh); @@ -460,17 +461,24 @@ static inline struct neighbour * neigh_clone(struct neighbour *neigh) #define neigh_hold(n) refcount_inc(&(n)->refcnt) -static inline int neigh_event_send(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb) +static __always_inline int neigh_event_send_probe(struct neighbour *neigh, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const bool immediate_ok) { unsigned long now = jiffies; - + if (READ_ONCE(neigh->used) != now) WRITE_ONCE(neigh->used, now); - if (!(neigh->nud_state&(NUD_CONNECTED|NUD_DELAY|NUD_PROBE))) - return __neigh_event_send(neigh, skb); + if (!(neigh->nud_state & (NUD_CONNECTED | NUD_DELAY | NUD_PROBE))) + return __neigh_event_send(neigh, skb, immediate_ok); return 0; } +static inline int neigh_event_send(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return neigh_event_send_probe(neigh, skb, true); +} + #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER) static inline int neigh_hh_bridge(struct hh_cache *hh, struct sk_buff *skb) { diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c index 6c2016f7f3d1..ec0bf737b076 100644 --- a/net/core/neighbour.c +++ b/net/core/neighbour.c @@ -1133,7 +1133,8 @@ out: neigh_release(neigh); } -int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb) +int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb, + const bool immediate_ok) { int rc; bool immediate_probe = false; @@ -1154,12 +1155,17 @@ int __neigh_event_send(struct neighbour *neigh, struct sk_buff *skb) atomic_set(&neigh->probes, NEIGH_VAR(neigh->parms, UCAST_PROBES)); neigh_del_timer(neigh); - neigh->nud_state = NUD_INCOMPLETE; + neigh->nud_state = NUD_INCOMPLETE; neigh->updated = now; - next = now + max(NEIGH_VAR(neigh->parms, RETRANS_TIME), - HZ/100); + if (!immediate_ok) { + next = now + 1; + } else { + immediate_probe = true; + next = now + max(NEIGH_VAR(neigh->parms, + RETRANS_TIME), + HZ / 100); + } neigh_add_timer(neigh, next); - immediate_probe = true; } else { neigh->nud_state = NUD_FAILED; neigh->updated = jiffies; @@ -1571,7 +1577,7 @@ static void neigh_managed_work(struct work_struct *work) write_lock_bh(&tbl->lock); list_for_each_entry(neigh, &tbl->managed_list, managed_list) - neigh_event_send(neigh, NULL); + neigh_event_send_probe(neigh, NULL, false); queue_delayed_work(system_power_efficient_wq, &tbl->managed_work, NEIGH_VAR(&tbl->parms, DELAY_PROBE_TIME)); write_unlock_bh(&tbl->lock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 87563a043cef044fed5db7967a75741cc16ad2b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 23:08:11 +0800 Subject: ax25: fix reference count leaks of ax25_dev The previous commit d01ffb9eee4a ("ax25: add refcount in ax25_dev to avoid UAF bugs") introduces refcount into ax25_dev, but there are reference leak paths in ax25_ctl_ioctl(), ax25_fwd_ioctl(), ax25_rt_add(), ax25_rt_del() and ax25_rt_opt(). This patch uses ax25_dev_put() and adjusts the position of ax25_addr_ax25dev() to fix reference cout leaks of ax25_dev. Fixes: d01ffb9eee4a ("ax25: add refcount in ax25_dev to avoid UAF bugs") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220203150811.42256-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/net/ax25.h | 8 +++++--- net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 12 ++++++++---- net/ax25/ax25_dev.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- net/ax25/ax25_route.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/ax25.h b/include/net/ax25.h index 50b417df6221..8221af1811df 100644 --- a/include/net/ax25.h +++ b/include/net/ax25.h @@ -294,10 +294,12 @@ static __inline__ void ax25_cb_put(ax25_cb *ax25) } } -#define ax25_dev_hold(__ax25_dev) \ - refcount_inc(&((__ax25_dev)->refcount)) +static inline void ax25_dev_hold(ax25_dev *ax25_dev) +{ + refcount_inc(&ax25_dev->refcount); +} -static __inline__ void ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev *ax25_dev) +static inline void ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev *ax25_dev) { if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ax25_dev->refcount)) { kfree(ax25_dev); diff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c index 32f61978ff29..3e49d28824ed 100644 --- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c +++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c @@ -359,21 +359,25 @@ static int ax25_ctl_ioctl(const unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg) if (copy_from_user(&ax25_ctl, arg, sizeof(ax25_ctl))) return -EFAULT; - if ((ax25_dev = ax25_addr_ax25dev(&ax25_ctl.port_addr)) == NULL) - return -ENODEV; - if (ax25_ctl.digi_count > AX25_MAX_DIGIS) return -EINVAL; if (ax25_ctl.arg > ULONG_MAX / HZ && ax25_ctl.cmd != AX25_KILL) return -EINVAL; + ax25_dev = ax25_addr_ax25dev(&ax25_ctl.port_addr); + if (!ax25_dev) + return -ENODEV; + digi.ndigi = ax25_ctl.digi_count; for (k = 0; k < digi.ndigi; k++) digi.calls[k] = ax25_ctl.digi_addr[k]; - if ((ax25 = ax25_find_cb(&ax25_ctl.source_addr, &ax25_ctl.dest_addr, &digi, ax25_dev->dev)) == NULL) + ax25 = ax25_find_cb(&ax25_ctl.source_addr, &ax25_ctl.dest_addr, &digi, ax25_dev->dev); + if (!ax25) { + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return -ENOTCONN; + } switch (ax25_ctl.cmd) { case AX25_KILL: diff --git a/net/ax25/ax25_dev.c b/net/ax25/ax25_dev.c index 770b787fb7bb..d2a244e1c260 100644 --- a/net/ax25/ax25_dev.c +++ b/net/ax25/ax25_dev.c @@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ void ax25_dev_device_up(struct net_device *dev) spin_lock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); ax25_dev->next = ax25_dev_list; ax25_dev_list = ax25_dev; - ax25_dev_hold(ax25_dev); spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); + ax25_dev_hold(ax25_dev); ax25_register_dev_sysctl(ax25_dev); } @@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ void ax25_dev_device_down(struct net_device *dev) if ((s = ax25_dev_list) == ax25_dev) { ax25_dev_list = s->next; - ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); dev->ax25_ptr = NULL; dev_put_track(dev, &ax25_dev->dev_tracker); ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); @@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ void ax25_dev_device_down(struct net_device *dev) while (s != NULL && s->next != NULL) { if (s->next == ax25_dev) { s->next = ax25_dev->next; - ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_dev_lock); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); dev->ax25_ptr = NULL; dev_put_track(dev, &ax25_dev->dev_tracker); ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); @@ -150,25 +150,35 @@ int ax25_fwd_ioctl(unsigned int cmd, struct ax25_fwd_struct *fwd) switch (cmd) { case SIOCAX25ADDFWD: - if ((fwd_dev = ax25_addr_ax25dev(&fwd->port_to)) == NULL) + fwd_dev = ax25_addr_ax25dev(&fwd->port_to); + if (!fwd_dev) { + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return -EINVAL; - if (ax25_dev->forward != NULL) + } + if (ax25_dev->forward) { + ax25_dev_put(fwd_dev); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return -EINVAL; + } ax25_dev->forward = fwd_dev->dev; ax25_dev_put(fwd_dev); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); break; case SIOCAX25DELFWD: - if (ax25_dev->forward == NULL) + if (!ax25_dev->forward) { + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return -EINVAL; + } ax25_dev->forward = NULL; + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); break; default: + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return -EINVAL; } - ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return 0; } diff --git a/net/ax25/ax25_route.c b/net/ax25/ax25_route.c index 1e32693833e5..9751207f7757 100644 --- a/net/ax25/ax25_route.c +++ b/net/ax25/ax25_route.c @@ -75,11 +75,13 @@ static int __must_check ax25_rt_add(struct ax25_routes_struct *route) ax25_dev *ax25_dev; int i; - if ((ax25_dev = ax25_addr_ax25dev(&route->port_addr)) == NULL) - return -EINVAL; if (route->digi_count > AX25_MAX_DIGIS) return -EINVAL; + ax25_dev = ax25_addr_ax25dev(&route->port_addr); + if (!ax25_dev) + return -EINVAL; + write_lock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); ax25_rt = ax25_route_list; @@ -91,6 +93,7 @@ static int __must_check ax25_rt_add(struct ax25_routes_struct *route) if (route->digi_count != 0) { if ((ax25_rt->digipeat = kmalloc(sizeof(ax25_digi), GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) { write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return -ENOMEM; } ax25_rt->digipeat->lastrepeat = -1; @@ -101,6 +104,7 @@ static int __must_check ax25_rt_add(struct ax25_routes_struct *route) } } write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return 0; } ax25_rt = ax25_rt->next; @@ -108,6 +112,7 @@ static int __must_check ax25_rt_add(struct ax25_routes_struct *route) if ((ax25_rt = kmalloc(sizeof(ax25_route), GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) { write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -116,11 +121,11 @@ static int __must_check ax25_rt_add(struct ax25_routes_struct *route) ax25_rt->dev = ax25_dev->dev; ax25_rt->digipeat = NULL; ax25_rt->ip_mode = ' '; - ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); if (route->digi_count != 0) { if ((ax25_rt->digipeat = kmalloc(sizeof(ax25_digi), GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) { write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); kfree(ax25_rt); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return -ENOMEM; } ax25_rt->digipeat->lastrepeat = -1; @@ -133,6 +138,7 @@ static int __must_check ax25_rt_add(struct ax25_routes_struct *route) ax25_rt->next = ax25_route_list; ax25_route_list = ax25_rt; write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return 0; } @@ -173,8 +179,8 @@ static int ax25_rt_del(struct ax25_routes_struct *route) } } } - ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return 0; } @@ -216,8 +222,8 @@ static int ax25_rt_opt(struct ax25_route_opt_struct *rt_option) } out: - ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); write_unlock_bh(&ax25_route_lock); + ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 77b337196a9d87f3d6bb9b07c0436ecafbffda1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2022 13:13:32 +0100 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: don't refresh sctp entries in closed state Vivek Thrivikraman reported: An SCTP server application which is accessed continuously by client application. When the session disconnects the client retries to establish a connection. After restart of SCTP server application the session is not established because of stale conntrack entry with connection state CLOSED as below. (removing this entry manually established new connection): sctp 9 CLOSED src=10.141.189.233 [..] [ASSURED] Just skip timeout update of closed entries, we don't want them to stay around forever. Reported-and-tested-by: Vivek Thrivikraman Closes: https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1579 Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c index 2394238d01c9..5a936334b517 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c @@ -489,6 +489,15 @@ int nf_conntrack_sctp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct, pr_debug("Setting vtag %x for dir %d\n", ih->init_tag, !dir); ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] = ih->init_tag; + + /* don't renew timeout on init retransmit so + * port reuse by client or NAT middlebox cannot + * keep entry alive indefinitely (incl. nat info). + */ + if (new_state == SCTP_CONNTRACK_CLOSED && + old_state == SCTP_CONNTRACK_CLOSED && + nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)) + ignore = true; } ct->proto.sctp.state = new_state; -- cgit v1.2.3 From a9e8503def0fd4ed89ade1f61c315f904581d439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sat, 29 Jan 2022 17:13:23 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nft_payload: don't allow th access for fragments Loads relative to ->thoff naturally expect that this points to the transport header, but this is only true if pkt->fragoff == 0. This has little effect for rulesets with connection tracking/nat because these enable ip defra. For other rulesets this prevents false matches. Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nft_payload.c | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c b/net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c index dbe1f2e7dd9e..9e927ab4df15 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ nft_tcp_header_pointer(const struct nft_pktinfo *pkt, { struct tcphdr *tcph; - if (pkt->tprot != IPPROTO_TCP) + if (pkt->tprot != IPPROTO_TCP || pkt->fragoff) return NULL; tcph = skb_header_pointer(pkt->skb, nft_thoff(pkt), sizeof(*tcph), buffer); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c b/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c index 940fed9a760b..5cc06aef4345 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_payload.c @@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int __nft_payload_inner_offset(struct nft_pktinfo *pkt) { unsigned int thoff = nft_thoff(pkt); - if (!(pkt->flags & NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO)) + if (!(pkt->flags & NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO) || pkt->fragoff) return -1; switch (pkt->tprot) { @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ void nft_payload_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, offset = skb_network_offset(skb); break; case NFT_PAYLOAD_TRANSPORT_HEADER: - if (!(pkt->flags & NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO)) + if (!(pkt->flags & NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO) || pkt->fragoff) goto err; offset = nft_thoff(pkt); break; @@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static void nft_payload_set_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, offset = skb_network_offset(skb); break; case NFT_PAYLOAD_TRANSPORT_HEADER: - if (!(pkt->flags & NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO)) + if (!(pkt->flags & NFT_PKTINFO_L4PROTO) || pkt->fragoff) goto err; offset = nft_thoff(pkt); break; @@ -728,7 +728,8 @@ static void nft_payload_set_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, if (priv->csum_type == NFT_PAYLOAD_CSUM_SCTP && pkt->tprot == IPPROTO_SCTP && skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { - if (nft_payload_csum_sctp(skb, nft_thoff(pkt))) + if (pkt->fragoff == 0 && + nft_payload_csum_sctp(skb, nft_thoff(pkt))) goto err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From cc4f9d62037ebcb811f4908bba2986c01df1bd50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sat, 29 Jan 2022 17:47:00 +0100 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: move synack init code to helper It seems more readable to use a common helper in the followup fix rather than copypaste or goto. No functional change intended. The function is only called for syn-ack or syn in repy direction in case of simultaneous open. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c index af5115e127cf..88c89e97d8a2 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c @@ -446,6 +446,32 @@ static void tcp_sack(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int dataoff, } } +static void tcp_init_sender(struct ip_ct_tcp_state *sender, + struct ip_ct_tcp_state *receiver, + const struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int dataoff, + const struct tcphdr *tcph, + u32 end, u32 win) +{ + /* SYN-ACK in reply to a SYN + * or SYN from reply direction in simultaneous open. + */ + sender->td_end = + sender->td_maxend = end; + sender->td_maxwin = (win == 0 ? 1 : win); + + tcp_options(skb, dataoff, tcph, sender); + /* RFC 1323: + * Both sides must send the Window Scale option + * to enable window scaling in either direction. + */ + if (!(sender->flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_WINDOW_SCALE && + receiver->flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_WINDOW_SCALE)) { + sender->td_scale = 0; + receiver->td_scale = 0; + } +} + static bool tcp_in_window(struct nf_conn *ct, enum ip_conntrack_dir dir, unsigned int index, @@ -499,24 +525,9 @@ static bool tcp_in_window(struct nf_conn *ct, * Initialize sender data. */ if (tcph->syn) { - /* - * SYN-ACK in reply to a SYN - * or SYN from reply direction in simultaneous open. - */ - sender->td_end = - sender->td_maxend = end; - sender->td_maxwin = (win == 0 ? 1 : win); - - tcp_options(skb, dataoff, tcph, sender); - /* - * RFC 1323: - * Both sides must send the Window Scale option - * to enable window scaling in either direction. - */ - if (!(sender->flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_WINDOW_SCALE - && receiver->flags & IP_CT_TCP_FLAG_WINDOW_SCALE)) - sender->td_scale = - receiver->td_scale = 0; + tcp_init_sender(sender, receiver, + skb, dataoff, tcph, + end, win); if (!tcph->ack) /* Simultaneous open */ return true; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 82b72cb94666b3dbd7152bb9f441b068af7a921b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Sat, 29 Jan 2022 17:47:01 +0100 Subject: netfilter: conntrack: re-init state for retransmitted syn-ack TCP conntrack assumes that a syn-ack retransmit is identical to the previous syn-ack. This isn't correct and causes stuck 3whs in some more esoteric scenarios. tcpdump to illustrate the problem: client > server: Flags [S] seq 1365731894, win 29200, [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 2083035583 ecr 0,wscale 7] server > client: Flags [S.] seq 145824453, ack 643160523, win 65535, [mss 8952,wscale 5,TS val 3215367629 ecr 2082921663] Note the invalid/outdated synack ack number. Conntrack marks this syn-ack as out-of-window/invalid, but it did initialize the reply direction parameters based on this packets content. client > server: Flags [S] seq 1365731894, win 29200, [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 2083036623 ecr 0,wscale 7] ... retransmit... server > client: Flags [S.], seq 145824453, ack 643160523, win 65535, [mss 8952,wscale 5,TS val 3215368644 ecr 2082921663] and another bogus synack. This repeats, then client re-uses for a new attempt: client > server: Flags [S], seq 2375731741, win 29200, [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 2083100223 ecr 0,wscale 7] server > client: Flags [S.], seq 145824453, ack 643160523, win 65535, [mss 8952,wscale 5,TS val 3215430754 ecr 2082921663] ... but still gets a invalid syn-ack. This repeats until: server > client: Flags [S.], seq 145824453, ack 643160523, win 65535, [mss 8952,wscale 5,TS val 3215437785 ecr 2082921663] server > client: Flags [R.], seq 145824454, ack 643160523, win 65535, [mss 8952,wscale 5,TS val 3215443451 ecr 2082921663] client > server: Flags [S], seq 2375731741, win 29200, [mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 2083115583 ecr 0,wscale 7] server > client: Flags [S.], seq 162602410, ack 2375731742, win 65535, [mss 8952,wscale 5,TS val 3215445754 ecr 2083115583] This syn-ack has the correct ack number, but conntrack flags it as invalid: The internal state was created from the first syn-ack seen so the sequence number of the syn-ack is treated as being outside of the announced window. Don't assume that retransmitted syn-ack is identical to previous one. Treat it like the first syn-ack and reinit state. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c index 88c89e97d8a2..d1582b888c0d 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c @@ -571,6 +571,18 @@ static bool tcp_in_window(struct nf_conn *ct, sender->td_maxwin = (win == 0 ? 1 : win); tcp_options(skb, dataoff, tcph, sender); + } else if (tcph->syn && dir == IP_CT_DIR_REPLY && + state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT) { + /* Retransmitted syn-ack, or syn (simultaneous open). + * + * Re-init state for this direction, just like for the first + * syn(-ack) reply, it might differ in seq, ack or tcp options. + */ + tcp_init_sender(sender, receiver, + skb, dataoff, tcph, + end, win); + if (!tcph->ack) + return true; } if (!(tcph->ack)) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From d1ca60efc53d665cf89ed847a14a510a81770b81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2022 12:00:56 +0100 Subject: netfilter: ctnetlink: disable helper autoassign When userspace, e.g. conntrackd, inserts an entry with a specified helper, its possible that the helper is lost immediately after its added: ctnetlink_create_conntrack -> nf_ct_helper_ext_add + assign helper -> ctnetlink_setup_nat -> ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup -> parse_nat_setup -> nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup -> nf_nat_setup_info -> nf_conntrack_alter_reply -> __nf_ct_try_assign_helper ... and __nf_ct_try_assign_helper will zero the helper again. Set IPS_HELPER bit to bypass auto-assign logic, its unwanted, just like when helper is assigned via ruleset. Dropped old 'not strictly necessary' comment, it referred to use of rcu_assign_pointer() before it got replaced by RCU_INIT_POINTER(). NB: Fixes tag intentionally incorrect, this extends the referenced commit, but this change won't build without IPS_HELPER introduced there. Fixes: 6714cf5465d280 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix explicit helper attachment and NAT") Reported-by: Pham Thanh Tuyen Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h index 4b3395082d15..26071021e986 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ enum ip_conntrack_status { IPS_NAT_CLASH = IPS_UNTRACKED, #endif - /* Conntrack got a helper explicitly attached via CT target. */ + /* Conntrack got a helper explicitly attached (ruleset, ctnetlink). */ IPS_HELPER_BIT = 13, IPS_HELPER = (1 << IPS_HELPER_BIT), diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c index ac438370f94a..7032402ffd33 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c @@ -2311,7 +2311,8 @@ ctnetlink_create_conntrack(struct net *net, if (helper->from_nlattr) helper->from_nlattr(helpinfo, ct); - /* not in hash table yet so not strictly necessary */ + /* disable helper auto-assignment for this entry */ + ct->status |= IPS_HELPER; RCU_INIT_POINTER(help->helper, helper); } } else { -- cgit v1.2.3 From f0a6fd1527067da537e9c48390237488719948ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Johannes Berg Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2022 14:09:51 +0100 Subject: cfg80211: fix race in netlink owner interface destruction MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit My previous fix here to fix the deadlock left a race where the exact same deadlock (see the original commit referenced below) can still happen if cfg80211_destroy_ifaces() already runs while nl80211_netlink_notify() is still marking some interfaces as nl_owner_dead. The race happens because we have two loops here - first we dev_close() all the netdevs, and then we destroy them. If we also have two netdevs (first one need only be a wdev though) then we can find one during the first iteration, close it, and go to the second iteration -- but then find two, and try to destroy also the one we didn't close yet. Fix this by only iterating once. Reported-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Fixes: ea6b2098dd02 ("cfg80211: fix locking in netlink owner interface destruction") Tested-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220201130951.22093-1-johannes@sipsolutions.net Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- net/wireless/core.c | 17 ++++------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/wireless/core.c b/net/wireless/core.c index 3a54c8e6b6c6..f08d4b3bb148 100644 --- a/net/wireless/core.c +++ b/net/wireless/core.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * Copyright 2006-2010 Johannes Berg * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH * Copyright 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH - * Copyright (C) 2018-2021 Intel Corporation + * Copyright (C) 2018-2022 Intel Corporation */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt @@ -332,29 +332,20 @@ static void cfg80211_event_work(struct work_struct *work) void cfg80211_destroy_ifaces(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev) { struct wireless_dev *wdev, *tmp; - bool found = false; ASSERT_RTNL(); - list_for_each_entry(wdev, &rdev->wiphy.wdev_list, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(wdev, tmp, &rdev->wiphy.wdev_list, list) { if (wdev->nl_owner_dead) { if (wdev->netdev) dev_close(wdev->netdev); - found = true; - } - } - - if (!found) - return; - wiphy_lock(&rdev->wiphy); - list_for_each_entry_safe(wdev, tmp, &rdev->wiphy.wdev_list, list) { - if (wdev->nl_owner_dead) { + wiphy_lock(&rdev->wiphy); cfg80211_leave(rdev, wdev); rdev_del_virtual_intf(rdev, wdev); + wiphy_unlock(&rdev->wiphy); } } - wiphy_unlock(&rdev->wiphy); } static void cfg80211_destroy_iface_wk(struct work_struct *work) -- cgit v1.2.3 From f8d9d938514f46c4892aff6bfe32f425e84d81cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 3 Feb 2022 14:55:47 -0800 Subject: tcp: take care of mixed splice()/sendmsg(MSG_ZEROCOPY) case syzbot found that mixing sendpage() and sendmsg(MSG_ZEROCOPY) calls over the same TCP socket would again trigger the infamous warning in inet_sock_destruct() WARN_ON(sk_forward_alloc_get(sk)); While Talal took into account a mix of regular copied data and MSG_ZEROCOPY one in the same skb, the sendpage() path has been forgotten. We want the charging to happen for sendpage(), because pages could be coming from a pipe. What is missing is the downgrading of pure zerocopy status to make sure sk_forward_alloc will stay synced. Add tcp_downgrade_zcopy_pure() helper so that we can use it from the two callers. Fixes: 9b65b17db723 ("net: avoid double accounting for pure zerocopy skbs") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Cc: Talal Ahmad Cc: Arjun Roy Cc: Willem de Bruijn Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220203225547.665114-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index bdf108f544a4..02cb275e5487 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -937,6 +937,22 @@ void tcp_remove_empty_skb(struct sock *sk) } } +/* skb changing from pure zc to mixed, must charge zc */ +static int tcp_downgrade_zcopy_pure(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + if (unlikely(skb_zcopy_pure(skb))) { + u32 extra = skb->truesize - + SKB_TRUESIZE(skb_end_offset(skb)); + + if (!sk_wmem_schedule(sk, extra)) + return -ENOMEM; + + sk_mem_charge(sk, extra); + skb_shinfo(skb)->flags &= ~SKBFL_PURE_ZEROCOPY; + } + return 0; +} + static struct sk_buff *tcp_build_frag(struct sock *sk, int size_goal, int flags, struct page *page, int offset, size_t *size) { @@ -972,7 +988,7 @@ new_segment: tcp_mark_push(tp, skb); goto new_segment; } - if (!sk_wmem_schedule(sk, copy)) + if (tcp_downgrade_zcopy_pure(sk, skb) || !sk_wmem_schedule(sk, copy)) return NULL; if (can_coalesce) { @@ -1320,19 +1336,8 @@ new_segment: copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset); - /* skb changing from pure zc to mixed, must charge zc */ - if (unlikely(skb_zcopy_pure(skb))) { - u32 extra = skb->truesize - - SKB_TRUESIZE(skb_end_offset(skb)); - - if (!sk_wmem_schedule(sk, extra)) - goto wait_for_space; - - sk_mem_charge(sk, extra); - skb_shinfo(skb)->flags &= ~SKBFL_PURE_ZEROCOPY; - } - - if (!sk_wmem_schedule(sk, copy)) + if (tcp_downgrade_zcopy_pure(sk, skb) || + !sk_wmem_schedule(sk, copy)) goto wait_for_space; err = skb_copy_to_page_nocache(sk, &msg->msg_iter, skb, -- cgit v1.2.3 From 28f9222138868899c53e00bc1f910faa55f88546 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2022 21:05:16 -0800 Subject: net/smc: fix ref_tracker issue in smc_pnet_add() I added the netdev_tracker_alloc() right after ndev was stored into the newly allocated object: new_pe->ndev = ndev; if (ndev) netdev_tracker_alloc(ndev, &new_pe->dev_tracker, GFP_KERNEL); But I missed that later, we could end up freeing new_pe, then calling dev_put(ndev) to release the reference on ndev. The new_pe->dev_tracker would not be freed. To solve this issue, move the netdev_tracker_alloc() call to the point we know for sure new_pe will be kept. syzbot report (on net-next tree, but the bug is present in net tree) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6019 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6019 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00650-g5a8fb33e5305 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xbf/0x1e0 lib/refcount.c:31 Code: 1d f4 70 a0 09 31 ff 89 de e8 4d bc 99 fd 84 db 75 e0 e8 64 b8 99 fd 48 c7 c7 20 0c 06 8a c6 05 d4 70 a0 09 01 e8 9e 4e 28 05 <0f> 0b eb c4 e8 48 b8 99 fd 0f b6 1d c3 70 a0 09 31 ff 89 de e8 18 RSP: 0018:ffffc900043b7400 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff815fb318 RDI: fffff52000876e72 RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff815f507e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff92000876e85 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88805c1c6600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f1ef6feb700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2d02b000 CR3: 00000000223f4000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:344 [inline] refcount_dec include/linux/refcount.h:359 [inline] ref_tracker_free+0x53f/0x6c0 lib/ref_tracker.c:119 netdev_tracker_free include/linux/netdevice.h:3867 [inline] dev_put_track include/linux/netdevice.h:3884 [inline] dev_put_track include/linux/netdevice.h:3880 [inline] dev_put include/linux/netdevice.h:3910 [inline] smc_pnet_add_eth net/smc/smc_pnet.c:399 [inline] smc_pnet_enter net/smc/smc_pnet.c:493 [inline] smc_pnet_add+0x5fc/0x15f0 net/smc/smc_pnet.c:556 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x228/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x328/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2413 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2496 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Fixes: b60645248af3 ("net/smc: add net device tracker to struct smc_pnetentry") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/smc_pnet.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/smc_pnet.c b/net/smc/smc_pnet.c index 291f1484a1b7..fb6331d97185 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_pnet.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_pnet.c @@ -368,9 +368,6 @@ static int smc_pnet_add_eth(struct smc_pnettable *pnettable, struct net *net, new_pe->type = SMC_PNET_ETH; memcpy(new_pe->pnet_name, pnet_name, SMC_MAX_PNETID_LEN); strncpy(new_pe->eth_name, eth_name, IFNAMSIZ); - new_pe->ndev = ndev; - if (ndev) - netdev_tracker_alloc(ndev, &new_pe->dev_tracker, GFP_KERNEL); rc = -EEXIST; new_netdev = true; write_lock(&pnettable->lock); @@ -382,6 +379,11 @@ static int smc_pnet_add_eth(struct smc_pnettable *pnettable, struct net *net, } } if (new_netdev) { + if (ndev) { + new_pe->ndev = ndev; + netdev_tracker_alloc(ndev, &new_pe->dev_tracker, + GFP_KERNEL); + } list_add_tail(&new_pe->list, &pnettable->pnetlist); write_unlock(&pnettable->lock); } else { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 94fdd7c02a56d0316d20e417a1141b71a8dcee82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Sun, 6 Feb 2022 06:33:48 -0800 Subject: net/smc: use GFP_ATOMIC allocation in smc_pnet_add_eth() My last patch moved the netdev_tracker_alloc() call to a section protected by a write_lock(). I should have replaced GFP_KERNEL with GFP_ATOMIC to avoid the infamous: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:256 Fixes: 28f922213886 ("net/smc: fix ref_tracker issue in smc_pnet_add()") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/smc_pnet.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/smc_pnet.c b/net/smc/smc_pnet.c index fb6331d97185..0599246c0376 100644 --- a/net/smc/smc_pnet.c +++ b/net/smc/smc_pnet.c @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static int smc_pnet_add_eth(struct smc_pnettable *pnettable, struct net *net, if (ndev) { new_pe->ndev = ndev; netdev_tracker_alloc(ndev, &new_pe->dev_tracker, - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_ATOMIC); } list_add_tail(&new_pe->list, &pnettable->pnetlist); write_unlock(&pnettable->lock); -- cgit v1.2.3 From a9c10b5b3b67b3750a10c8b089b2e05f5e176e33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Aloni Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2022 22:06:46 +0200 Subject: xprtrdma: fix pointer derefs in error cases of rpcrdma_ep_create If there are failures then we must not leave the non-NULL pointers with the error value, otherwise `rpcrdma_ep_destroy` gets confused and tries free them, resulting in an Oops. Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni Acked-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c index f172d1298013..7b5fce2faa10 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c @@ -413,6 +413,7 @@ static int rpcrdma_ep_create(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt) IB_POLL_WORKQUEUE); if (IS_ERR(ep->re_attr.send_cq)) { rc = PTR_ERR(ep->re_attr.send_cq); + ep->re_attr.send_cq = NULL; goto out_destroy; } @@ -421,6 +422,7 @@ static int rpcrdma_ep_create(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt) IB_POLL_WORKQUEUE); if (IS_ERR(ep->re_attr.recv_cq)) { rc = PTR_ERR(ep->re_attr.recv_cq); + ep->re_attr.recv_cq = NULL; goto out_destroy; } ep->re_receive_count = 0; @@ -459,6 +461,7 @@ static int rpcrdma_ep_create(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt) ep->re_pd = ib_alloc_pd(device, 0); if (IS_ERR(ep->re_pd)) { rc = PTR_ERR(ep->re_pd); + ep->re_pd = NULL; goto out_destroy; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From b49ea673e119f59c71645e2f65b3ccad857c90ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: NeilBrown Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2022 16:36:53 +1100 Subject: SUNRPC: lock against ->sock changing during sysfs read ->sock can be set to NULL asynchronously unless ->recv_mutex is held. So it is important to hold that mutex. Otherwise a sysfs read can trigger an oops. Commit 17f09d3f619a ("SUNRPC: Check if the xprt is connected before handling sysfs reads") appears to attempt to fix this problem, but it only narrows the race window. Fixes: 17f09d3f619a ("SUNRPC: Check if the xprt is connected before handling sysfs reads") Fixes: a8482488a7d6 ("SUNRPC query transport's source port") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker --- net/sunrpc/sysfs.c | 5 ++++- net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c b/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c index b64a0286b182..05c758da6a92 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/sysfs.c @@ -115,11 +115,14 @@ static ssize_t rpc_sysfs_xprt_srcaddr_show(struct kobject *kobj, } sock = container_of(xprt, struct sock_xprt, xprt); - if (kernel_getsockname(sock->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&saddr) < 0) + mutex_lock(&sock->recv_mutex); + if (sock->sock == NULL || + kernel_getsockname(sock->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&saddr) < 0) goto out; ret = sprintf(buf, "%pISc\n", &saddr); out: + mutex_unlock(&sock->recv_mutex); xprt_put(xprt); return ret + 1; } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c index 69b6ee5a5fd1..0f39e08ee580 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c @@ -1641,7 +1641,12 @@ static int xs_get_srcport(struct sock_xprt *transport) unsigned short get_srcport(struct rpc_xprt *xprt) { struct sock_xprt *sock = container_of(xprt, struct sock_xprt, xprt); - return xs_sock_getport(sock->sock); + unsigned short ret = 0; + mutex_lock(&sock->recv_mutex); + if (sock->sock) + ret = xs_sock_getport(sock->sock); + mutex_unlock(&sock->recv_mutex); + return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_srcport); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5611a00697c8ecc5aad04392bea629e9d6a20463 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 21:34:51 -0800 Subject: ipmr,ip6mr: acquire RTNL before calling ip[6]mr_free_table() on failure path ip[6]mr_free_table() can only be called under RTNL lock. RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (10367) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5890 at net/core/dev.c:10367 unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 5890 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller-11627-g422ee58dc0ef #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many+0x1246/0x1850 net/core/dev.c:10367 Code: 0f 85 9b ee ff ff e8 69 07 4b fa ba 7f 28 00 00 48 c7 c6 00 90 ae 8a 48 c7 c7 40 90 ae 8a c6 05 6d b1 51 06 01 e8 8c 90 d8 01 <0f> 0b e9 70 ee ff ff e8 3e 07 4b fa 4c 89 e7 e8 86 2a 59 fa e9 ee RSP: 0018:ffffc900046ff6e0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff888050f51d00 RSI: ffffffff815fa008 RDI: fffff520008dfece RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff815f3d6e R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff4 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffc900046ff750 R15: ffff88807b7dc000 FS: 00007f4ab736e700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fee0b4f8990 CR3: 000000001e7d2000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: mroute_clean_tables+0x244/0xb40 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1509 ip6mr_free_table net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:389 [inline] ip6mr_rules_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:246 [inline] ip6mr_net_init net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1306 [inline] ip6mr_net_init+0x3f0/0x4e0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1298 ops_init+0xaf/0x470 net/core/net_namespace.c:140 setup_net+0x54f/0xbb0 net/core/net_namespace.c:331 copy_net_ns+0x318/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:475 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 copy_namespaces+0x391/0x450 kernel/nsproxy.c:178 copy_process+0x2e0c/0x7300 kernel/fork.c:2167 kernel_clone+0xe7/0xab0 kernel/fork.c:2555 __do_sys_clone+0xc8/0x110 kernel/fork.c:2672 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f4ab89f9059 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7f4ab89f902f. RSP: 002b:00007f4ab736e118 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000038 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4ab8b0bf60 RCX: 00007f4ab89f9059 RDX: 0000000020000280 RSI: 0000000020000270 RDI: 0000000040200000 RBP: 00007f4ab8a5308d R08: 0000000020000300 R09: 0000000020000300 R10: 00000000200002c0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc3977cc1f R14: 00007f4ab736e300 R15: 0000000000022000 Fixes: f243e5a7859a ("ipmr,ip6mr: call ip6mr_free_table() on failure path") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Cong Wang Reported-by: syzbot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220208053451.2885398-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/ipmr.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/ip6mr.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c index 07274619b9ea..29bbe2b08ae9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ipmr.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ipmr.c @@ -256,7 +256,9 @@ static int __net_init ipmr_rules_init(struct net *net) return 0; err2: + rtnl_lock(); ipmr_free_table(mrt); + rtnl_unlock(); err1: fib_rules_unregister(ops); return err; diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c index 7cf73e60e619..8a2db926b5eb 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6mr.c @@ -243,7 +243,9 @@ static int __net_init ip6mr_rules_init(struct net *net) return 0; err2: + rtnl_lock(); ip6mr_free_table(mrt); + rtnl_unlock(); err1: fib_rules_unregister(ops); return err; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7c759040c1dd03954f650f147ae7175476d51314 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 21:00:26 +0100 Subject: can: isotp: fix potential CAN frame reception race in isotp_rcv() When receiving a CAN frame the current code logic does not consider concurrently receiving processes which do not show up in real world usage. Ziyang Xuan writes: The following syz problem is one of the scenarios. so->rx.len is changed by isotp_rcv_ff() during isotp_rcv_cf(), so->rx.len equals 0 before alloc_skb() and equals 4096 after alloc_skb(). That will trigger skb_over_panic() in skb_put(). ======================================================= CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc8-syzkaller #0 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x16c/0x16e net/core/skbuff.c:113 Call Trace: skb_over_panic net/core/skbuff.c:118 [inline] skb_put.cold+0x24/0x24 net/core/skbuff.c:1990 isotp_rcv_cf net/can/isotp.c:570 [inline] isotp_rcv+0xa38/0x1e30 net/can/isotp.c:668 deliver net/can/af_can.c:574 [inline] can_rcv_filter+0x445/0x8d0 net/can/af_can.c:635 can_receive+0x31d/0x580 net/can/af_can.c:665 can_rcv+0x120/0x1c0 net/can/af_can.c:696 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x114/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5465 __netif_receive_skb+0x24/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:5579 Therefore we make sure the state changes and data structures stay consistent at CAN frame reception time by adding a spin_lock in isotp_rcv(). This fixes the issue reported by syzkaller but does not affect real world operation. Fixes: e057dd3fc20f ("can: add ISO 15765-2:2016 transport protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/d7e69278-d741-c706-65e1-e87623d9a8e8@huawei.com/T/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220208200026.13783-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+4c63f36709a642f801c5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Ziyang Xuan Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/isotp.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/can/isotp.c b/net/can/isotp.c index 02cbcb2ecf0d..9149e8d8aefc 100644 --- a/net/can/isotp.c +++ b/net/can/isotp.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ struct isotp_sock { struct tpcon rx, tx; struct list_head notifier; wait_queue_head_t wait; + spinlock_t rx_lock; /* protect single thread state machine */ }; static LIST_HEAD(isotp_notifier_list); @@ -615,11 +617,17 @@ static void isotp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) n_pci_type = cf->data[ae] & 0xF0; + /* Make sure the state changes and data structures stay consistent at + * CAN frame reception time. This locking is not needed in real world + * use cases but the inconsistency can be triggered with syzkaller. + */ + spin_lock(&so->rx_lock); + if (so->opt.flags & CAN_ISOTP_HALF_DUPLEX) { /* check rx/tx path half duplex expectations */ if ((so->tx.state != ISOTP_IDLE && n_pci_type != N_PCI_FC) || (so->rx.state != ISOTP_IDLE && n_pci_type == N_PCI_FC)) - return; + goto out_unlock; } switch (n_pci_type) { @@ -668,6 +676,9 @@ static void isotp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data) isotp_rcv_cf(sk, cf, ae, skb); break; } + +out_unlock: + spin_unlock(&so->rx_lock); } static void isotp_fill_dataframe(struct canfd_frame *cf, struct isotp_sock *so, @@ -1444,6 +1455,7 @@ static int isotp_init(struct sock *sk) so->txtimer.function = isotp_tx_timer_handler; init_waitqueue_head(&so->wait); + spin_lock_init(&so->rx_lock); spin_lock(&isotp_notifier_lock); list_add_tail(&so->notifier, &isotp_notifier_list); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 8375dfac4f683e1b2c5956d919d36aeedad46699 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oliver Hartkopp Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 08:36:01 +0100 Subject: can: isotp: fix error path in isotp_sendmsg() to unlock wait queue Commit 43a08c3bdac4 ("can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix TX buffer concurrent access in isotp_sendmsg()") introduced a new locking scheme that may render the userspace application in a locking state when an error is detected. This issue shows up under high load on simultaneously running isotp channels with identical configuration which is against the ISO specification and therefore breaks any reasonable PDU communication anyway. Fixes: 43a08c3bdac4 ("can: isotp: isotp_sendmsg(): fix TX buffer concurrent access in isotp_sendmsg()") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220209073601.25728-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ziyang Xuan Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- net/can/isotp.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/can/isotp.c b/net/can/isotp.c index 9149e8d8aefc..d2a430b6a13b 100644 --- a/net/can/isotp.c +++ b/net/can/isotp.c @@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) if (!size || size > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { err = -EINVAL; - goto err_out; + goto err_out_drop; } /* take care of a potential SF_DL ESC offset for TX_DL > 8 */ @@ -897,24 +897,24 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) if ((so->opt.flags & CAN_ISOTP_SF_BROADCAST) && (size > so->tx.ll_dl - SF_PCI_SZ4 - ae - off)) { err = -EINVAL; - goto err_out; + goto err_out_drop; } err = memcpy_from_msg(so->tx.buf, msg, size); if (err < 0) - goto err_out; + goto err_out_drop; dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), so->ifindex); if (!dev) { err = -ENXIO; - goto err_out; + goto err_out_drop; } skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, so->ll.mtu + sizeof(struct can_skb_priv), msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); if (!skb) { dev_put(dev); - goto err_out; + goto err_out_drop; } can_skb_reserve(skb); @@ -976,7 +976,7 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) if (err) { pr_notice_once("can-isotp: %s: can_send_ret %pe\n", __func__, ERR_PTR(err)); - goto err_out; + goto err_out_drop; } if (wait_tx_done) { @@ -989,6 +989,9 @@ static int isotp_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) return size; +err_out_drop: + /* drop this PDU and unlock a potential wait queue */ + old_state = ISOTP_IDLE; err_out: so->tx.state = old_state; if (so->tx.state == ISOTP_IDLE) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 75063c9294fb239bbe64eb72141b6871fe526d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 18:30:43 -0800 Subject: netfilter: xt_socket: fix a typo in socket_mt_destroy() Calling nf_defrag_ipv4_disable() instead of nf_defrag_ipv6_disable() was probably not the intent. I found this by code inspection, while chasing a possible issue in TPROXY. Fixes: de8c12110a13 ("netfilter: disable defrag once its no longer needed") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/xt_socket.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_socket.c b/net/netfilter/xt_socket.c index 5e6459e11605..662e5eb1cc39 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_socket.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_socket.c @@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static void socket_mt_destroy(const struct xt_mtdtor_param *par) if (par->family == NFPROTO_IPV4) nf_defrag_ipv4_disable(par->net); else if (par->family == NFPROTO_IPV6) - nf_defrag_ipv4_disable(par->net); + nf_defrag_ipv6_disable(par->net); } static struct xt_match socket_mt_reg[] __read_mostly = { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7ec02f5ac8a5be5a3f20611731243dc5e1d9ba10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 23:40:00 +0800 Subject: ax25: fix NPD bug in ax25_disconnect The ax25_disconnect() in ax25_kill_by_device() is not protected by any locks, thus there is a race condition between ax25_disconnect() and ax25_destroy_socket(). when ax25->sk is assigned as NULL by ax25_destroy_socket(), a NULL pointer dereference bug will occur if site (1) or (2) dereferences ax25->sk. ax25_kill_by_device() | ax25_release() ax25_disconnect() | ax25_destroy_socket() ... | if(ax25->sk != NULL) | ... ... | ax25->sk = NULL; bh_lock_sock(ax25->sk); //(1) | ... ... | bh_unlock_sock(ax25->sk); //(2)| This patch moves ax25_disconnect() into lock_sock(), which can synchronize with ax25_destroy_socket() in ax25_release(). Fail log: =============================================================== BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000088 ... RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0x7e/0xd0 ... Call Trace: ax25_disconnect+0xf6/0x220 ax25_device_event+0x187/0x250 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x5e/0x70 dev_close_many+0x17d/0x230 rollback_registered_many+0x1f1/0x950 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x133/0x200 unregister_netdev+0x13/0x20 ... Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c index 3e49d28824ed..3d87040d1bfc 100644 --- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c +++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c @@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ again: lock_sock(sk); s->ax25_dev = NULL; ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); - release_sock(sk); ax25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH); + release_sock(sk); spin_lock_bh(&ax25_list_lock); sock_put(sk); /* The entry could have been deleted from the -- cgit v1.2.3 From c7223d687758462826a20e9735305d55bb874c70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 22:22:37 -0500 Subject: tipc: rate limit warning for received illegal binding update It would be easy to craft a message containing an illegal binding table update operation. This is handled correctly by the code, but the corresponding warning printout is not rate limited as is should be. We fix this now. Fixes: b97bf3fd8f6a ("[TIPC] Initial merge") Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/name_distr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/name_distr.c b/net/tipc/name_distr.c index bda902caa814..8267b751a526 100644 --- a/net/tipc/name_distr.c +++ b/net/tipc/name_distr.c @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static bool tipc_update_nametbl(struct net *net, struct distr_item *i, pr_warn_ratelimited("Failed to remove binding %u,%u from %u\n", ua.sr.type, ua.sr.lower, node); } else { - pr_warn("Unrecognized name table message received\n"); + pr_warn_ratelimited("Unknown name table message received\n"); } return false; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From ee534378f00561207656663d93907583958339ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 14:04:33 +0200 Subject: net: dsa: fix panic when DSA master device unbinds on shutdown Rafael reports that on a system with LX2160A and Marvell DSA switches, if a reboot occurs while the DSA master (dpaa2-eth) is up, the following panic can be seen: systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting. Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00a0000800000041 [00a0000800000041] address between user and kernel address ranges Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.16.5-00042-g8f5585009b24 #32 pc : dsa_slave_netdevice_event+0x130/0x3e4 lr : raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x6c Call trace: dsa_slave_netdevice_event+0x130/0x3e4 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x6c call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x54/0xa0 __dev_close_many+0x50/0x130 dev_close_many+0x84/0x120 unregister_netdevice_many+0x130/0x710 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x8c/0xd0 unregister_netdev+0x20/0x30 dpaa2_eth_remove+0x68/0x190 fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c __device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220 device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0 device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100 __device_release_driver+0x94/0x220 device_release_driver+0x28/0x40 bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124 device_del+0x174/0x420 fsl_mc_device_remove+0x24/0x40 __fsl_mc_device_remove+0xc/0x20 device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0 dprc_remove+0x90/0xb0 fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c __device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220 device_release_driver+0x28/0x40 bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124 device_del+0x174/0x420 fsl_mc_bus_remove+0x80/0x100 fsl_mc_bus_shutdown+0xc/0x1c platform_shutdown+0x20/0x30 device_shutdown+0x154/0x330 __do_sys_reboot+0x1cc/0x250 __arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x30 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0 do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x150 el0_svc+0x24/0xb0 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0 el0t_64_sync+0x178/0x17c It can be seen from the stack trace that the problem is that the deregistration of the master causes a dev_close(), which gets notified as NETDEV_GOING_DOWN to dsa_slave_netdevice_event(). But dsa_switch_shutdown() has already run, and this has unregistered the DSA slave interfaces, and yet, the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN handler attempts to call dev_close_many() on those slave interfaces, leading to the problem. The previous attempt to avoid the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN on the master after dsa_switch_shutdown() was called seems improper. Unregistering the slave interfaces is unnecessary and unhelpful. Instead, after the slaves have stopped being uppers of the DSA master, we can now reset to NULL the master->dsa_ptr pointer, which will make DSA start ignoring all future notifier events on the master. Fixes: 0650bf52b31f ("net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown") Reported-by: Rafael Richter Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/dsa/dsa2.c | 25 ++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa2.c b/net/dsa/dsa2.c index 3d21521453fe..dcad3100b164 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa2.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa2.c @@ -1718,7 +1718,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dsa_unregister_switch); void dsa_switch_shutdown(struct dsa_switch *ds) { struct net_device *master, *slave_dev; - LIST_HEAD(unregister_list); struct dsa_port *dp; mutex_lock(&dsa2_mutex); @@ -1729,25 +1728,13 @@ void dsa_switch_shutdown(struct dsa_switch *ds) slave_dev = dp->slave; netdev_upper_dev_unlink(master, slave_dev); - /* Just unlinking ourselves as uppers of the master is not - * sufficient. When the master net device unregisters, that will - * also call dev_close, which we will catch as NETDEV_GOING_DOWN - * and trigger a dev_close on our own devices (dsa_slave_close). - * In turn, that will call dev_mc_unsync on the master's net - * device. If the master is also a DSA switch port, this will - * trigger dsa_slave_set_rx_mode which will call dev_mc_sync on - * its own master. Lockdep will complain about the fact that - * all cascaded masters have the same dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key, - * which it normally would not do if the cascaded masters would - * be in a proper upper/lower relationship, which we've just - * destroyed. - * To suppress the lockdep warnings, let's actually unregister - * the DSA slave interfaces too, to avoid the nonsensical - * multicast address list synchronization on shutdown. - */ - unregister_netdevice_queue(slave_dev, &unregister_list); } - unregister_netdevice_many(&unregister_list); + + /* Disconnect from further netdevice notifiers on the master, + * since netdev_uses_dsa() will now return false. + */ + dsa_switch_for_each_cpu_port(dp, ds) + dp->master->dsa_ptr = NULL; rtnl_unlock(); mutex_unlock(&dsa2_mutex); -- cgit v1.2.3 From feef318c855a361a1eccd880f33e88c460eb63b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Duoming Zhou Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 20:53:45 +0800 Subject: ax25: fix UAF bugs of net_device caused by rebinding operation The ax25_kill_by_device() will set s->ax25_dev = NULL and call ax25_disconnect() to change states of ax25_cb and sock, if we call ax25_bind() before ax25_kill_by_device(). However, if we call ax25_bind() again between the window of ax25_kill_by_device() and ax25_dev_device_down(), the values and states changed by ax25_kill_by_device() will be reassigned. Finally, ax25_dev_device_down() will deallocate net_device. If we dereference net_device in syscall functions such as ax25_release(), ax25_sendmsg(), ax25_getsockopt(), ax25_getname() and ax25_info_show(), a UAF bug will occur. One of the possible race conditions is shown below: (USE) | (FREE) ax25_bind() | | ax25_kill_by_device() ax25_bind() | ax25_connect() | ... | ax25_dev_device_down() | ... | dev_put_track(dev, ...) //FREE ax25_release() | ... ax25_send_control() | alloc_skb() //USE | the corresponding fail log is shown below: =============================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ax25_send_control+0x43/0x210 ... Call Trace: ... ax25_send_control+0x43/0x210 ax25_release+0x2db/0x3b0 __sock_release+0x6d/0x120 sock_close+0xf/0x20 __fput+0x11f/0x420 ... Allocated by task 1283: ... __kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0 alloc_netdev_mqs+0x5a/0x680 mkiss_open+0x6c/0x380 tty_ldisc_open+0x55/0x90 ... Freed by task 1969: ... kfree+0xa3/0x2c0 device_release+0x54/0xe0 kobject_put+0xa5/0x120 tty_ldisc_kill+0x3e/0x80 ... In order to fix these UAF bugs caused by rebinding operation, this patch adds dev_hold_track() into ax25_bind() and corresponding dev_put_track() into ax25_kill_by_device(). Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ax25/af_ax25.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c index 3d87040d1bfc..d53cbb4e2503 100644 --- a/net/ax25/af_ax25.c +++ b/net/ax25/af_ax25.c @@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ again: spin_unlock_bh(&ax25_list_lock); lock_sock(sk); s->ax25_dev = NULL; + dev_put_track(ax25_dev->dev, &ax25_dev->dev_tracker); ax25_dev_put(ax25_dev); ax25_disconnect(s, ENETUNREACH); release_sock(sk); @@ -1116,8 +1117,10 @@ static int ax25_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len) } } - if (ax25_dev != NULL) + if (ax25_dev) { ax25_fillin_cb(ax25, ax25_dev); + dev_hold_track(ax25_dev->dev, &ax25_dev->dev_tracker, GFP_ATOMIC); + } done: ax25_cb_add(ax25); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 37aa50c539bcbcc01767e515bd170787fcfc0f33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 03:19:55 -0500 Subject: vlan: introduce vlan_dev_free_egress_priority This patch is to introduce vlan_dev_free_egress_priority() to free egress priority for vlan dev, and keep vlan_dev_uninit() static as .ndo_uninit. It makes the code more clear and safer when adding new code in vlan_dev_uninit() in the future. Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/8021q/vlan.h | 2 +- net/8021q/vlan_dev.c | 7 ++++++- net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c | 7 ++++--- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan.h b/net/8021q/vlan.h index 1a705a4ef7fa..5eaf38875554 100644 --- a/net/8021q/vlan.h +++ b/net/8021q/vlan.h @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void vlan_dev_set_ingress_priority(const struct net_device *dev, u32 skb_prio, u16 vlan_prio); int vlan_dev_set_egress_priority(const struct net_device *dev, u32 skb_prio, u16 vlan_prio); +void vlan_dev_free_egress_priority(const struct net_device *dev); int vlan_dev_change_flags(const struct net_device *dev, u32 flag, u32 mask); void vlan_dev_get_realdev_name(const struct net_device *dev, char *result, size_t size); @@ -139,7 +140,6 @@ int vlan_check_real_dev(struct net_device *real_dev, void vlan_setup(struct net_device *dev); int register_vlan_dev(struct net_device *dev, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); void unregister_vlan_dev(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head); -void vlan_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev); bool vlan_dev_inherit_address(struct net_device *dev, struct net_device *real_dev); diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c b/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c index 26d031a43cc1..e5d23e75572a 100644 --- a/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c +++ b/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c @@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static int vlan_dev_init(struct net_device *dev) } /* Note: this function might be called multiple times for the same device. */ -void vlan_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev) +void vlan_dev_free_egress_priority(const struct net_device *dev) { struct vlan_priority_tci_mapping *pm; struct vlan_dev_priv *vlan = vlan_dev_priv(dev); @@ -636,6 +636,11 @@ void vlan_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev) } } +static void vlan_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev) +{ + vlan_dev_free_egress_priority(dev); +} + static netdev_features_t vlan_dev_fix_features(struct net_device *dev, netdev_features_t features) { diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c b/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c index 0db85aeb119b..53b1955b027f 100644 --- a/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c +++ b/net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c @@ -183,10 +183,11 @@ static int vlan_newlink(struct net *src_net, struct net_device *dev, return -EINVAL; err = vlan_changelink(dev, tb, data, extack); - if (!err) - err = register_vlan_dev(dev, extack); if (err) - vlan_dev_uninit(dev); + return err; + err = register_vlan_dev(dev, extack); + if (err) + vlan_dev_free_egress_priority(dev); return err; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d6ff94afd90b0ce8d1715f8ef77d4347d7a7f2c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 03:19:56 -0500 Subject: vlan: move dev_put into vlan_dev_uninit Shuang Li reported an QinQ issue by simply doing: # ip link add dummy0 type dummy # ip link add link dummy0 name dummy0.1 type vlan id 1 # ip link add link dummy0.1 name dummy0.1.2 type vlan id 2 # rmmod 8021q unregister_netdevice: waiting for dummy0.1 to become free. Usage count = 1 When rmmods 8021q, all vlan devs are deleted from their real_dev's vlan grp and added into list_kill by unregister_vlan_dev(). dummy0.1 is unregistered before dummy0.1.2, as it's using for_each_netdev() in __rtnl_kill_links(). When unregisters dummy0.1, dummy0.1.2 is not unregistered in the event of NETDEV_UNREGISTER, as it's been deleted from dummy0.1's vlan grp. However, due to dummy0.1.2 still holding dummy0.1, dummy0.1 will keep waiting in netdev_wait_allrefs(), while dummy0.1.2 will never get unregistered and release dummy0.1, as it delays dev_put until calling dev->priv_destructor, vlan_dev_free(). This issue was introduced by Commit 563bcbae3ba2 ("net: vlan: fix a UAF in vlan_dev_real_dev()"), and this patch is to fix it by moving dev_put() into vlan_dev_uninit(), which is called after NETDEV_UNREGISTER event but before netdev_wait_allrefs(). Fixes: 563bcbae3ba2 ("net: vlan: fix a UAF in vlan_dev_real_dev()") Reported-by: Shuang Li Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/8021q/vlan_dev.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c b/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c index e5d23e75572a..d1902828a18a 100644 --- a/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c +++ b/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c @@ -638,7 +638,12 @@ void vlan_dev_free_egress_priority(const struct net_device *dev) static void vlan_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev) { + struct vlan_dev_priv *vlan = vlan_dev_priv(dev); + vlan_dev_free_egress_priority(dev); + + /* Get rid of the vlan's reference to real_dev */ + dev_put_track(vlan->real_dev, &vlan->dev_tracker); } static netdev_features_t vlan_dev_fix_features(struct net_device *dev, @@ -851,9 +856,6 @@ static void vlan_dev_free(struct net_device *dev) free_percpu(vlan->vlan_pcpu_stats); vlan->vlan_pcpu_stats = NULL; - - /* Get rid of the vlan's reference to real_dev */ - dev_put_track(vlan->real_dev, &vlan->dev_tracker); } void vlan_setup(struct net_device *dev) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 029744cd4bc6e9eb3bd833b4a033348296d34645 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kishen Maloor Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 17:25:08 -0800 Subject: mptcp: netlink: process IPv6 addrs in creating listening sockets This change updates mptcp_pm_nl_create_listen_socket() to create listening sockets bound to IPv6 addresses (where IPv6 is supported). Fixes: 1729cf186d8a ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port") Acked-by: Geliang Tang Signed-off-by: Kishen Maloor Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c index 782b1d452269..356f596e2032 100644 --- a/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c +++ b/net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c @@ -925,6 +925,7 @@ out: static int mptcp_pm_nl_create_listen_socket(struct sock *sk, struct mptcp_pm_addr_entry *entry) { + int addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); struct sockaddr_storage addr; struct mptcp_sock *msk; struct socket *ssock; @@ -949,8 +950,11 @@ static int mptcp_pm_nl_create_listen_socket(struct sock *sk, } mptcp_info2sockaddr(&entry->addr, &addr, entry->addr.family); - err = kernel_bind(ssock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, - sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6) + if (entry->addr.family == AF_INET6) + addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); +#endif + err = kernel_bind(ssock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen); if (err) { pr_warn("kernel_bind error, err=%d", err); goto out; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9aa422ad326634b76309e8ff342c246800621216 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Sat, 5 Feb 2022 14:11:18 -0500 Subject: tipc: improve size validations for received domain records The function tipc_mon_rcv() allows a node to receive and process domain_record structs from peer nodes to track their views of the network topology. This patch verifies that the number of members in a received domain record does not exceed the limit defined by MAX_MON_DOMAIN, something that may otherwise lead to a stack overflow. tipc_mon_rcv() is called from the function tipc_link_proto_rcv(), where we are reading a 32 bit message data length field into a uint16. To avert any risk of bit overflow, we add an extra sanity check for this in that function. We cannot see that happen with the current code, but future designers being unaware of this risk, may introduce it by allowing delivery of very large (> 64k) sk buffers from the bearer layer. This potential problem was identified by Eric Dumazet. This fixes CVE-2022-0435 Reported-by: Samuel Page Reported-by: Eric Dumazet Fixes: 35c55c9877f8 ("tipc: add neighbor monitoring framework") Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Reviewed-by: Xin Long Reviewed-by: Samuel Page Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- net/tipc/link.c | 9 +++++++-- net/tipc/monitor.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/link.c b/net/tipc/link.c index 8d9e09f48f4c..1e14d7f8f28f 100644 --- a/net/tipc/link.c +++ b/net/tipc/link.c @@ -2200,7 +2200,7 @@ static int tipc_link_proto_rcv(struct tipc_link *l, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_msg *hdr = buf_msg(skb); struct tipc_gap_ack_blks *ga = NULL; bool reply = msg_probe(hdr), retransmitted = false; - u16 dlen = msg_data_sz(hdr), glen = 0; + u32 dlen = msg_data_sz(hdr), glen = 0; u16 peers_snd_nxt = msg_next_sent(hdr); u16 peers_tol = msg_link_tolerance(hdr); u16 peers_prio = msg_linkprio(hdr); @@ -2214,6 +2214,10 @@ static int tipc_link_proto_rcv(struct tipc_link *l, struct sk_buff *skb, void *data; trace_tipc_proto_rcv(skb, false, l->name); + + if (dlen > U16_MAX) + goto exit; + if (tipc_link_is_blocked(l) || !xmitq) goto exit; @@ -2309,7 +2313,8 @@ static int tipc_link_proto_rcv(struct tipc_link *l, struct sk_buff *skb, /* Receive Gap ACK blocks from peer if any */ glen = tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, true); - + if(glen > dlen) + break; tipc_mon_rcv(l->net, data + glen, dlen - glen, l->addr, &l->mon_state, l->bearer_id); diff --git a/net/tipc/monitor.c b/net/tipc/monitor.c index 407619697292..2f4d23238a7e 100644 --- a/net/tipc/monitor.c +++ b/net/tipc/monitor.c @@ -496,6 +496,8 @@ void tipc_mon_rcv(struct net *net, void *data, u16 dlen, u32 addr, state->probing = false; /* Sanity check received domain record */ + if (new_member_cnt > MAX_MON_DOMAIN) + return; if (dlen < dom_rec_len(arrv_dom, 0)) return; if (dlen != dom_rec_len(arrv_dom, new_member_cnt)) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 58e61e416b5abedcacd32032144b333bca30cf1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Rix Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 07:02:42 -0800 Subject: skbuff: cleanup double word in comment Remove the second 'to'. Signed-off-by: Tom Rix Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/skbuff.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index 0118f0afaa4f..9d0388bed0c1 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ exit: * while trying to recycle fragments on __skb_frag_unref() we need * to make one SKB responsible for triggering the recycle path. * So disable the recycling bit if an SKB is cloned and we have - * additional references to to the fragmented part of the SKB. + * additional references to the fragmented part of the SKB. * Eventually the last SKB will have the recycling bit set and it's * dataref set to 0, which will trigger the recycling */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From c4416f5c2eb3ed48dfba265e628a6e52da962f03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Victor Erminpour Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 16:28:38 -0800 Subject: net: mpls: Fix GCC 12 warning When building with automatic stack variable initialization, GCC 12 complains about variables defined outside of switch case statements. Move the variable outside the switch, which silences the warning: ./net/mpls/af_mpls.c:1624:21: error: statement will never be executed [-Werror=switch-unreachable] 1624 | int err; | ^~~ Signed-off-by: Victor Erminpour Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mpls/af_mpls.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mpls/af_mpls.c b/net/mpls/af_mpls.c index 48f75a56f4ae..d6fdc5782d33 100644 --- a/net/mpls/af_mpls.c +++ b/net/mpls/af_mpls.c @@ -1607,6 +1607,7 @@ static int mpls_dev_notify(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr); struct mpls_dev *mdev; unsigned int flags; + int err; if (event == NETDEV_REGISTER) { mdev = mpls_add_dev(dev); @@ -1621,7 +1622,6 @@ static int mpls_dev_notify(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, return NOTIFY_OK; switch (event) { - int err; case NETDEV_DOWN: err = mpls_ifdown(dev, event); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 2b4e5fb4d3776c391e40fb33673ba946dd96012d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pablo Neira Ayuso Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 10:06:42 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nft_synproxy: unregister hooks on init error path Disable the IPv4 hooks if the IPv6 hooks fail to be registered. Fixes: ad49d86e07a4 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add synproxy support") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c b/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c index a0109fa1e92d..1133e06f3c40 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c @@ -191,8 +191,10 @@ static int nft_synproxy_do_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, if (err) goto nf_ct_failure; err = nf_synproxy_ipv6_init(snet, ctx->net); - if (err) + if (err) { + nf_synproxy_ipv4_fini(snet, ctx->net); goto nf_ct_failure; + } break; } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 1de9770d121ee9294794cca0e0be8fbfa0134ee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wen Gu Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 22:10:53 +0800 Subject: net/smc: Avoid overwriting the copies of clcsock callback functions The callback functions of clcsock will be saved and replaced during the fallback. But if the fallback happens more than once, then the copies of these callback functions will be overwritten incorrectly, resulting in a loop call issue: clcsk->sk_error_report |- smc_fback_error_report() <------------------------------| |- smc_fback_forward_wakeup() | (loop) |- clcsock_callback() (incorrectly overwritten) | |- smc->clcsk_error_report() ------------------| So this patch fixes the issue by saving these function pointers only once in the fallback and avoiding overwriting. Reported-by: syzbot+4de3c0e8a263e1e499bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 341adeec9ada ("net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0000000000006d045e05d78776f6@google.com Signed-off-by: Wen Gu Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/smc/af_smc.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/smc/af_smc.c b/net/smc/af_smc.c index 8c89d0b0ca18..306d9e8cd1dd 100644 --- a/net/smc/af_smc.c +++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c @@ -667,14 +667,17 @@ static void smc_fback_error_report(struct sock *clcsk) static int smc_switch_to_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc, int reason_code) { struct sock *clcsk; + int rc = 0; mutex_lock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); if (!smc->clcsock) { - mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); - return -EBADF; + rc = -EBADF; + goto out; } clcsk = smc->clcsock->sk; + if (smc->use_fallback) + goto out; smc->use_fallback = true; smc->fallback_rsn = reason_code; smc_stat_fallback(smc); @@ -702,8 +705,9 @@ static int smc_switch_to_fallback(struct smc_sock *smc, int reason_code) smc->clcsock->sk->sk_user_data = (void *)((uintptr_t)smc | SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY); } +out: mutex_unlock(&smc->clcsock_release_lock); - return 0; + return rc; } /* fall back during connect */ -- cgit v1.2.3 From dcd54265c8bc14bd023815e36e2d5f9d66ee1fee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Thu, 10 Feb 2022 09:13:31 -0800 Subject: drop_monitor: fix data-race in dropmon_net_event / trace_napi_poll_hit trace_napi_poll_hit() is reading stat->dev while another thread can write on it from dropmon_net_event() Use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() here, RCU rules are properly enforced already, we only have to take care of load/store tearing. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in dropmon_net_event / trace_napi_poll_hit write to 0xffff88816f3ab9c0 of 8 bytes by task 20260 on cpu 1: dropmon_net_event+0xb8/0x2b0 net/core/drop_monitor.c:1579 notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:84 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x53/0xb0 kernel/notifier.c:392 call_netdevice_notifiers_info net/core/dev.c:1919 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1931 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1945 [inline] unregister_netdevice_many+0x867/0xfb0 net/core/dev.c:10415 ip_tunnel_delete_nets+0x24a/0x280 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:1123 vti_exit_batch_net+0x2a/0x30 net/ipv4/ip_vti.c:515 ops_exit_list net/core/net_namespace.c:173 [inline] cleanup_net+0x4dc/0x8d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:597 process_one_work+0x3f6/0x960 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x616/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x1bf/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 read to 0xffff88816f3ab9c0 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0: trace_napi_poll_hit+0x89/0x1c0 net/core/drop_monitor.c:292 trace_napi_poll include/trace/events/napi.h:14 [inline] __napi_poll+0x36b/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:6366 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6432 [inline] net_rx_action+0x29e/0x650 net/core/dev.c:6519 __do_softirq+0x158/0x2de kernel/softirq.c:558 do_softirq+0xb1/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:459 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x68/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:383 __raw_spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:167 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x33/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:210 spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:394 [inline] ptr_ring_consume_bh include/linux/ptr_ring.h:367 [inline] wg_packet_decrypt_worker+0x73c/0x780 drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c:506 process_one_work+0x3f6/0x960 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x616/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x1bf/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 value changed: 0xffff88815883e000 -> 0x0000000000000000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 26435 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: wg-crypt-wg2 wg_packet_decrypt_worker Fixes: 4ea7e38696c7 ("dropmon: add ability to detect when hardware dropsrxpackets") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Neil Horman Reported-by: syzbot Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/core/drop_monitor.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/core/drop_monitor.c b/net/core/drop_monitor.c index 7b288a121a41..d5dc6be2522c 100644 --- a/net/core/drop_monitor.c +++ b/net/core/drop_monitor.c @@ -283,13 +283,17 @@ static void trace_napi_poll_hit(void *ignore, struct napi_struct *napi, rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(new_stat, &hw_stats_list, list) { + struct net_device *dev; + /* * only add a note to our monitor buffer if: * 1) this is the dev we received on * 2) its after the last_rx delta * 3) our rx_dropped count has gone up */ - if ((new_stat->dev == napi->dev) && + /* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in dropmon_net_event() */ + dev = READ_ONCE(new_stat->dev); + if ((dev == napi->dev) && (time_after(jiffies, new_stat->last_rx + dm_hw_check_delta)) && (napi->dev->stats.rx_dropped != new_stat->last_drop_val)) { trace_drop_common(NULL, NULL); @@ -1576,7 +1580,10 @@ static int dropmon_net_event(struct notifier_block *ev_block, mutex_lock(&net_dm_mutex); list_for_each_entry_safe(new_stat, tmp, &hw_stats_list, list) { if (new_stat->dev == dev) { - new_stat->dev = NULL; + + /* Paired with READ_ONCE() in trace_napi_poll_hit() */ + WRITE_ONCE(new_stat->dev, NULL); + if (trace_state == TRACE_OFF) { list_del_rcu(&new_stat->list); kfree_rcu(new_stat, rcu); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 143de8d97d79316590475dc2a84513c63c863ddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hangyu Hua Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:55:10 +0800 Subject: tipc: fix a bit overflow in tipc_crypto_key_rcv() msg_data_sz return a 32bit value, but size is 16bit. This may lead to a bit overflow. Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/tipc/crypto.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c index 9325479295b8..f09316a9035f 100644 --- a/net/tipc/crypto.c +++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c @@ -2276,7 +2276,7 @@ static bool tipc_crypto_key_rcv(struct tipc_crypto *rx, struct tipc_msg *hdr) struct tipc_crypto *tx = tipc_net(rx->net)->crypto_tx; struct tipc_aead_key *skey = NULL; u16 key_gen = msg_key_gen(hdr); - u16 size = msg_data_sz(hdr); + u32 size = msg_data_sz(hdr); u8 *data = msg_data(hdr); unsigned int keylen; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 26394fc118d6115390bd5b3a0fb17096271da227 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ignat Korchagin Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 17:30:42 +0000 Subject: ipv6: mcast: use rcu-safe version of ipv6_get_lladdr() Some time ago 8965779d2c0e ("ipv6,mcast: always hold idev->lock before mca_lock") switched ipv6_get_lladdr() to __ipv6_get_lladdr(), which is rcu-unsafe version. That was OK, because idev->lock was held for these codepaths. In 88e2ca308094 ("mld: convert ifmcaddr6 to RCU") these external locks were removed, so we probably need to restore the original rcu-safe call. Otherwise, we occasionally get a machine crashed/stalled with the following in dmesg: [ 3405.966610][T230589] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead00000000008c: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 3405.982083][T230589] CPU: 44 PID: 230589 Comm: kworker/44:3 Tainted: G O 5.15.19-cloudflare-2022.2.1 #1 [ 3405.998061][T230589] Hardware name: SUPA-COOL-SERV [ 3406.009552][T230589] Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work [ 3406.017224][T230589] RIP: 0010:__ipv6_get_lladdr+0x34/0x60 [ 3406.025780][T230589] Code: 57 10 48 83 c7 08 48 89 e5 48 39 d7 74 3e 48 8d 82 38 ff ff ff eb 13 48 8b 90 d0 00 00 00 48 8d 82 38 ff ff ff 48 39 d7 74 22 <66> 83 78 32 20 77 1b 75 e4 89 ca 23 50 2c 75 dd 48 8b 50 08 48 8b [ 3406.055748][T230589] RSP: 0018:ffff94e4b3fc3d10 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 3406.065617][T230589] RAX: dead00000000005a RBX: ffff94e4b3fc3d30 RCX: 0000000000000040 [ 3406.077477][T230589] RDX: dead000000000122 RSI: ffff94e4b3fc3d30 RDI: ffff8c3a31431008 [ 3406.089389][T230589] RBP: ffff94e4b3fc3d10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 3406.101445][T230589] R10: ffff8c3a31430000 R11: 000000000000000b R12: ffff8c2c37887100 [ 3406.113553][T230589] R13: ffff8c3a39537000 R14: 00000000000005dc R15: ffff8c3a31431000 [ 3406.125730][T230589] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8c3b9fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3406.138992][T230589] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3406.149895][T230589] CR2: 00007f0dfea1db60 CR3: 000000387b5f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 3406.162421][T230589] Call Trace: [ 3406.170235][T230589] [ 3406.177736][T230589] mld_newpack+0xfe/0x1a0 [ 3406.186686][T230589] add_grhead+0x87/0xa0 [ 3406.195498][T230589] add_grec+0x485/0x4e0 [ 3406.204310][T230589] ? newidle_balance+0x126/0x3f0 [ 3406.214024][T230589] mld_ifc_work+0x15d/0x450 [ 3406.223279][T230589] process_one_work+0x1e6/0x380 [ 3406.232982][T230589] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0 [ 3406.242371][T230589] ? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360 [ 3406.252175][T230589] kthread+0x127/0x150 [ 3406.261197][T230589] ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 [ 3406.271287][T230589] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 3406.280812][T230589] [ 3406.288937][T230589] Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: kheaders] [ 3406.476714][T230589] ---[ end trace 3525a7655f2f3b9e ]--- Fixes: 88e2ca308094 ("mld: convert ifmcaddr6 to RCU") Reported-by: David Pinilla Caparros Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/net/addrconf.h | 2 -- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv6/mcast.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/addrconf.h b/include/net/addrconf.h index e7ce719838b5..59940e230b78 100644 --- a/include/net/addrconf.h +++ b/include/net/addrconf.h @@ -109,8 +109,6 @@ struct inet6_ifaddr *ipv6_get_ifaddr(struct net *net, int ipv6_dev_get_saddr(struct net *net, const struct net_device *dev, const struct in6_addr *daddr, unsigned int srcprefs, struct in6_addr *saddr); -int __ipv6_get_lladdr(struct inet6_dev *idev, struct in6_addr *addr, - u32 banned_flags); int ipv6_get_lladdr(struct net_device *dev, struct in6_addr *addr, u32 banned_flags); bool inet_rcv_saddr_equal(const struct sock *sk, const struct sock *sk2, diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index f927c199a93c..3f23da8c0b10 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -1839,8 +1839,8 @@ out: } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ipv6_dev_get_saddr); -int __ipv6_get_lladdr(struct inet6_dev *idev, struct in6_addr *addr, - u32 banned_flags) +static int __ipv6_get_lladdr(struct inet6_dev *idev, struct in6_addr *addr, + u32 banned_flags) { struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp; int err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL; diff --git a/net/ipv6/mcast.c b/net/ipv6/mcast.c index bed8155508c8..a8861db52c18 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/mcast.c +++ b/net/ipv6/mcast.c @@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *mld_newpack(struct inet6_dev *idev, unsigned int mtu) skb_reserve(skb, hlen); skb_tailroom_reserve(skb, mtu, tlen); - if (__ipv6_get_lladdr(idev, &addr_buf, IFA_F_TENTATIVE)) { + if (ipv6_get_lladdr(dev, &addr_buf, IFA_F_TENTATIVE)) { /* : * use unspecified address as the source address * when a valid link-local address is not available. -- cgit v1.2.3 From a2614140dc0f467a83aa3bb4b6ee2d6480a76202 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vladimir Oltean Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 19:45:06 +0200 Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: flush switchdev FDB workqueue before removing VLAN mv88e6xxx is special among DSA drivers in that it requires the VTU to contain the VID of the FDB entry it modifies in mv88e6xxx_port_db_load_purge(), otherwise it will return -EOPNOTSUPP. Sometimes due to races this is not always satisfied even if external code does everything right (first deletes the FDB entries, then the VLAN), because DSA commits to hardware FDB entries asynchronously since commit c9eb3e0f8701 ("net: dsa: Add support for learning FDB through notification"). Therefore, the mv88e6xxx driver must close this race condition by itself, by asking DSA to flush the switchdev workqueue of any FDB deletions in progress, prior to exiting a VLAN. Fixes: c9eb3e0f8701 ("net: dsa: Add support for learning FDB through notification") Reported-by: Rafael Richter Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 7 +++++++ include/net/dsa.h | 1 + net/dsa/dsa.c | 1 + net/dsa/dsa_priv.h | 1 - 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c index 8530dbe403f4..ab1676553714 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c @@ -2284,6 +2284,13 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_port_vlan_del(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port, if (!mv88e6xxx_max_vid(chip)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + /* The ATU removal procedure needs the FID to be mapped in the VTU, + * but FDB deletion runs concurrently with VLAN deletion. Flush the DSA + * switchdev workqueue to ensure that all FDB entries are deleted + * before we remove the VLAN. + */ + dsa_flush_workqueue(); + mv88e6xxx_reg_lock(chip); err = mv88e6xxx_port_get_pvid(chip, port, &pvid); diff --git a/include/net/dsa.h b/include/net/dsa.h index 57b3e4e7413b..85a5ba3772f5 100644 --- a/include/net/dsa.h +++ b/include/net/dsa.h @@ -1187,6 +1187,7 @@ void dsa_unregister_switch(struct dsa_switch *ds); int dsa_register_switch(struct dsa_switch *ds); void dsa_switch_shutdown(struct dsa_switch *ds); struct dsa_switch *dsa_switch_find(int tree_index, int sw_index); +void dsa_flush_workqueue(void); #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP int dsa_switch_suspend(struct dsa_switch *ds); int dsa_switch_resume(struct dsa_switch *ds); diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa.c b/net/dsa/dsa.c index d9d0d227092c..c43f7446a75d 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa.c @@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ void dsa_flush_workqueue(void) { flush_workqueue(dsa_owq); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dsa_flush_workqueue); int dsa_devlink_param_get(struct devlink *dl, u32 id, struct devlink_param_gset_ctx *ctx) diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa_priv.h b/net/dsa/dsa_priv.h index 760306f0012f..23c79e91ac67 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa_priv.h +++ b/net/dsa/dsa_priv.h @@ -147,7 +147,6 @@ void dsa_tag_driver_put(const struct dsa_device_ops *ops); const struct dsa_device_ops *dsa_find_tagger_by_name(const char *buf); bool dsa_schedule_work(struct work_struct *work); -void dsa_flush_workqueue(void); const char *dsa_tag_protocol_to_str(const struct dsa_device_ops *ops); static inline int dsa_tag_protocol_overhead(const struct dsa_device_ops *ops) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5891cd5ec46c2c2eb6427cb54d214b149635dd0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Fri, 11 Feb 2022 12:06:23 -0800 Subject: net_sched: add __rcu annotation to netdev->qdisc syzbot found a data-race [1] which lead me to add __rcu annotations to netdev->qdisc, and proper accessors to get LOCKDEP support. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in dev_activate / qdisc_lookup_rcu write to 0xffff888168ad6410 of 8 bytes by task 13559 on cpu 1: attach_default_qdiscs net/sched/sch_generic.c:1167 [inline] dev_activate+0x2ed/0x8f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1221 __dev_open+0x2e9/0x3a0 net/core/dev.c:1416 __dev_change_flags+0x167/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:8139 rtnl_configure_link+0xc2/0x150 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3150 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3489 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0xf4d/0x13e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3529 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x745/0x7e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5594 netlink_rcv_skb+0x14e/0x250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5612 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x602/0x6d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x728/0x850 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2413 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2467 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x195/0x230 net/socket.c:2496 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2505 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2503 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2503 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff888168ad6410 of 8 bytes by task 13560 on cpu 0: qdisc_lookup_rcu+0x30/0x2e0 net/sched/sch_api.c:323 __tcf_qdisc_find+0x74/0x3a0 net/sched/cls_api.c:1050 tc_del_tfilter+0x1c7/0x1350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2211 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x5ba/0x7e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5585 netlink_rcv_skb+0x14e/0x250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 rtnetlink_rcv+0x18/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5612 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x602/0x6d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x728/0x850 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:725 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x39a/0x510 net/socket.c:2413 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2467 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x195/0x230 net/socket.c:2496 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2505 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2503 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2503 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85dee080 -> 0xffff88815d96ec00 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 13560 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-syzkaller-00116-gf1baf68e1383-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Fixes: 470502de5bdb ("net: sched: unlock rules update API") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Vlad Buslov Reported-by: syzbot Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim Cc: Cong Wang Cc: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- include/linux/netdevice.h | 2 +- net/core/rtnetlink.c | 6 ++++-- net/sched/cls_api.c | 6 +++--- net/sched/sch_api.c | 22 ++++++++++++---------- net/sched/sch_generic.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------------- 5 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/linux/netdevice.h b/include/linux/netdevice.h index e490b84732d1..8b5a314db167 100644 --- a/include/linux/netdevice.h +++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h @@ -2158,7 +2158,7 @@ struct net_device { struct netdev_queue *_tx ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp; unsigned int num_tx_queues; unsigned int real_num_tx_queues; - struct Qdisc *qdisc; + struct Qdisc __rcu *qdisc; unsigned int tx_queue_len; spinlock_t tx_global_lock; diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c index 710da8a36729..2fb8eb6791e8 100644 --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -1699,6 +1699,7 @@ static int rtnl_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, { struct ifinfomsg *ifm; struct nlmsghdr *nlh; + struct Qdisc *qdisc; ASSERT_RTNL(); nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*ifm), flags); @@ -1716,6 +1717,7 @@ static int rtnl_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, if (tgt_netnsid >= 0 && nla_put_s32(skb, IFLA_TARGET_NETNSID, tgt_netnsid)) goto nla_put_failure; + qdisc = rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc); if (nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_IFNAME, dev->name) || nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_TXQLEN, dev->tx_queue_len) || nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_OPERSTATE, @@ -1735,8 +1737,8 @@ static int rtnl_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, #endif put_master_ifindex(skb, dev) || nla_put_u8(skb, IFLA_CARRIER, netif_carrier_ok(dev)) || - (dev->qdisc && - nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_QDISC, dev->qdisc->ops->id)) || + (qdisc && + nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_QDISC, qdisc->ops->id)) || nla_put_ifalias(skb, dev) || nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_CARRIER_CHANGES, atomic_read(&dev->carrier_up_count) + diff --git a/net/sched/cls_api.c b/net/sched/cls_api.c index 5f0f346b576f..5ce1208a6ea3 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_api.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c @@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ static int __tcf_qdisc_find(struct net *net, struct Qdisc **q, /* Find qdisc */ if (!*parent) { - *q = dev->qdisc; + *q = rcu_dereference(dev->qdisc); *parent = (*q)->handle; } else { *q = qdisc_lookup_rcu(dev, TC_H_MAJ(*parent)); @@ -2587,7 +2587,7 @@ static int tc_dump_tfilter(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) parent = tcm->tcm_parent; if (!parent) - q = dev->qdisc; + q = rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc); else q = qdisc_lookup(dev, TC_H_MAJ(tcm->tcm_parent)); if (!q) @@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ static int tc_dump_chain(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) return skb->len; if (!tcm->tcm_parent) - q = dev->qdisc; + q = rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc); else q = qdisc_lookup(dev, TC_H_MAJ(tcm->tcm_parent)); diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c index 179825a3b2fd..e3c0e8ea2dbb 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ struct Qdisc *qdisc_lookup(struct net_device *dev, u32 handle) if (!handle) return NULL; - q = qdisc_match_from_root(dev->qdisc, handle); + q = qdisc_match_from_root(rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc), handle); if (q) goto out; @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ struct Qdisc *qdisc_lookup_rcu(struct net_device *dev, u32 handle) if (!handle) return NULL; - q = qdisc_match_from_root(dev->qdisc, handle); + q = qdisc_match_from_root(rcu_dereference(dev->qdisc), handle); if (q) goto out; @@ -1082,10 +1082,10 @@ static int qdisc_graft(struct net_device *dev, struct Qdisc *parent, skip: if (!ingress) { notify_and_destroy(net, skb, n, classid, - dev->qdisc, new); + rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc), new); if (new && !new->ops->attach) qdisc_refcount_inc(new); - dev->qdisc = new ? : &noop_qdisc; + rcu_assign_pointer(dev->qdisc, new ? : &noop_qdisc); if (new && new->ops->attach) new->ops->attach(new); @@ -1451,7 +1451,7 @@ static int tc_get_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n, q = dev_ingress_queue(dev)->qdisc_sleeping; } } else { - q = dev->qdisc; + q = rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc); } if (!q) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Cannot find specified qdisc on specified device"); @@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ replay: q = dev_ingress_queue(dev)->qdisc_sleeping; } } else { - q = dev->qdisc; + q = rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc); } /* It may be default qdisc, ignore it */ @@ -1762,7 +1762,8 @@ static int tc_dump_qdisc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) s_q_idx = 0; q_idx = 0; - if (tc_dump_qdisc_root(dev->qdisc, skb, cb, &q_idx, s_q_idx, + if (tc_dump_qdisc_root(rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc), + skb, cb, &q_idx, s_q_idx, true, tca[TCA_DUMP_INVISIBLE]) < 0) goto done; @@ -2033,7 +2034,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_tclass(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n, } else if (qid1) { qid = qid1; } else if (qid == 0) - qid = dev->qdisc->handle; + qid = rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc)->handle; /* Now qid is genuine qdisc handle consistent * both with parent and child. @@ -2044,7 +2045,7 @@ static int tc_ctl_tclass(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n, portid = TC_H_MAKE(qid, portid); } else { if (qid == 0) - qid = dev->qdisc->handle; + qid = rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc)->handle; } /* OK. Locate qdisc */ @@ -2205,7 +2206,8 @@ static int tc_dump_tclass(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) s_t = cb->args[0]; t = 0; - if (tc_dump_tclass_root(dev->qdisc, skb, tcm, cb, &t, s_t, true) < 0) + if (tc_dump_tclass_root(rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc), + skb, tcm, cb, &t, s_t, true) < 0) goto done; dev_queue = dev_ingress_queue(dev); diff --git a/net/sched/sch_generic.c b/net/sched/sch_generic.c index f893d9a81b01..5bab9f8b8f45 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_generic.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_generic.c @@ -1164,30 +1164,33 @@ static void attach_default_qdiscs(struct net_device *dev) if (!netif_is_multiqueue(dev) || dev->priv_flags & IFF_NO_QUEUE) { netdev_for_each_tx_queue(dev, attach_one_default_qdisc, NULL); - dev->qdisc = txq->qdisc_sleeping; - qdisc_refcount_inc(dev->qdisc); + qdisc = txq->qdisc_sleeping; + rcu_assign_pointer(dev->qdisc, qdisc); + qdisc_refcount_inc(qdisc); } else { qdisc = qdisc_create_dflt(txq, &mq_qdisc_ops, TC_H_ROOT, NULL); if (qdisc) { - dev->qdisc = qdisc; + rcu_assign_pointer(dev->qdisc, qdisc); qdisc->ops->attach(qdisc); } } + qdisc = rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc); /* Detect default qdisc setup/init failed and fallback to "noqueue" */ - if (dev->qdisc == &noop_qdisc) { + if (qdisc == &noop_qdisc) { netdev_warn(dev, "default qdisc (%s) fail, fallback to %s\n", default_qdisc_ops->id, noqueue_qdisc_ops.id); dev->priv_flags |= IFF_NO_QUEUE; netdev_for_each_tx_queue(dev, attach_one_default_qdisc, NULL); - dev->qdisc = txq->qdisc_sleeping; - qdisc_refcount_inc(dev->qdisc); + qdisc = txq->qdisc_sleeping; + rcu_assign_pointer(dev->qdisc, qdisc); + qdisc_refcount_inc(qdisc); dev->priv_flags ^= IFF_NO_QUEUE; } #ifdef CONFIG_NET_SCHED - if (dev->qdisc != &noop_qdisc) - qdisc_hash_add(dev->qdisc, false); + if (qdisc != &noop_qdisc) + qdisc_hash_add(qdisc, false); #endif } @@ -1217,7 +1220,7 @@ void dev_activate(struct net_device *dev) * and noqueue_qdisc for virtual interfaces */ - if (dev->qdisc == &noop_qdisc) + if (rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc) == &noop_qdisc) attach_default_qdiscs(dev); if (!netif_carrier_ok(dev)) @@ -1383,7 +1386,7 @@ static int qdisc_change_tx_queue_len(struct net_device *dev, void dev_qdisc_change_real_num_tx(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int new_real_tx) { - struct Qdisc *qdisc = dev->qdisc; + struct Qdisc *qdisc = rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc); if (qdisc->ops->change_real_num_tx) qdisc->ops->change_real_num_tx(qdisc, new_real_tx); @@ -1447,7 +1450,7 @@ static void dev_init_scheduler_queue(struct net_device *dev, void dev_init_scheduler(struct net_device *dev) { - dev->qdisc = &noop_qdisc; + rcu_assign_pointer(dev->qdisc, &noop_qdisc); netdev_for_each_tx_queue(dev, dev_init_scheduler_queue, &noop_qdisc); if (dev_ingress_queue(dev)) dev_init_scheduler_queue(dev, dev_ingress_queue(dev), &noop_qdisc); @@ -1475,8 +1478,8 @@ void dev_shutdown(struct net_device *dev) netdev_for_each_tx_queue(dev, shutdown_scheduler_queue, &noop_qdisc); if (dev_ingress_queue(dev)) shutdown_scheduler_queue(dev, dev_ingress_queue(dev), &noop_qdisc); - qdisc_put(dev->qdisc); - dev->qdisc = &noop_qdisc; + qdisc_put(rtnl_dereference(dev->qdisc)); + rcu_assign_pointer(dev->qdisc, &noop_qdisc); WARN_ON(timer_pending(&dev->watchdog_timer)); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0fc95dec096c2133942c382396172ae4487b4d57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alex Maydanik Date: Sat, 12 Feb 2022 12:29:27 +0200 Subject: net: fix documentation for kernel_getsockname Fixes return value documentation of kernel_getsockname() and kernel_getpeername() functions. The previous documentation wrongly specified that the return value is 0 in case of success, however sock->ops->getname returns the length of the address in bytes in case of success. Signed-off-by: Alex Maydanik Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/socket.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index 50cf75730fd7..982eecad464c 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -3448,7 +3448,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_connect); * @addr: address holder * * Fills the @addr pointer with the address which the socket is bound. - * Returns 0 or an error code. + * Returns the length of the address in bytes or an error code. */ int kernel_getsockname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr) @@ -3463,7 +3463,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_getsockname); * @addr: address holder * * Fills the @addr pointer with the address which the socket is connected. - * Returns 0 or an error code. + * Returns the length of the address in bytes or an error code. */ int kernel_getpeername(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr) -- cgit v1.2.3 From 032062f363b4bf02b1d547f329aa5d97b6a17410 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Sun, 13 Feb 2022 20:38:52 -0500 Subject: tipc: fix wrong publisher node address in link publications When a link comes up we add its presence to the name table to make it possible for users to subscribe for link up/down events. However, after a previous call signature change the binding is wrongly published with the peer node as publishing node, instead of the own node as it should be. This has the effect that the command 'tipc name table show' will list the link binding (service type 2) with node scope and a peer node as originator, something that obviously is impossible. We correct this bug here. Fixes: 50a3499ab853 ("tipc: simplify signature of tipc_namtbl_publish()") Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220214013852.2803940-1-jmaloy@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/tipc/node.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c index 9947b7dfe1d2..fd95df338da7 100644 --- a/net/tipc/node.c +++ b/net/tipc/node.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static void tipc_node_write_unlock(struct tipc_node *n) tipc_uaddr(&ua, TIPC_SERVICE_RANGE, TIPC_NODE_SCOPE, TIPC_LINK_STATE, n->addr, n->addr); sk.ref = n->link_id; - sk.node = n->addr; + sk.node = tipc_own_addr(net); bearer_id = n->link_id & 0xffff; publ_list = &n->publ_list; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9d2d38c35e7a3de96340c446f3b0fde7b2e7348e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhang Yunkai Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 03:27:21 +0000 Subject: ipv4: add description about martian source When multiple containers are running in the environment and multiple macvlan network port are configured in each container, a lot of martian source prints will appear after martian_log is enabled. they are almost the same, and printed by net_warn_ratelimited. Each arp message will trigger this print on each network port. Such as: IPv4: martian source 173.254.95.16 from 173.254.100.109, on dev eth0 ll header: 00000000: ff ff ff ff ff ff 40 00 ad fe 64 6d 08 06 ......@...dm.. IPv4: martian source 173.254.95.16 from 173.254.100.109, on dev eth1 ll header: 00000000: ff ff ff ff ff ff 40 00 ad fe 64 6d 08 06 ......@...dm.. There is no description of this kind of source in the RFC1812. Signed-off-by: Zhang Yunkai Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c index 4d61ddd8a0ec..85117b45216d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c @@ -436,6 +436,9 @@ int fib_validate_source(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 src, __be32 dst, if (net->ipv4.fib_has_custom_local_routes || fib4_has_custom_rules(net)) goto full_check; + /* Within the same container, it is regarded as a martian source, + * and the same host but different containers are not. + */ if (inet_lookup_ifaddr_rcu(net, src)) return -EINVAL; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7e5b6a5c8c44310784c88c1c198dde79f6402f7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Rix Date: Mon, 14 Feb 2022 18:05:41 -0800 Subject: mctp: fix use after free Clang static analysis reports this problem route.c:425:4: warning: Use of memory after it is freed trace_mctp_key_acquire(key); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ When mctp_key_add() fails, key is freed but then is later used in trace_mctp_key_acquire(). Add an else statement to use the key only when mctp_key_add() is successful. Fixes: 4f9e1ba6de45 ("mctp: Add tracepoints for tag/key handling") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/mctp/route.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/mctp/route.c b/net/mctp/route.c index 8d9f4ff3e285..e52cef750500 100644 --- a/net/mctp/route.c +++ b/net/mctp/route.c @@ -412,13 +412,14 @@ static int mctp_route_input(struct mctp_route *route, struct sk_buff *skb) * this function. */ rc = mctp_key_add(key, msk); - if (rc) + if (rc) { kfree(key); + } else { + trace_mctp_key_acquire(key); - trace_mctp_key_acquire(key); - - /* we don't need to release key->lock on exit */ - mctp_key_unref(key); + /* we don't need to release key->lock on exit */ + mctp_key_unref(key); + } key = NULL; } else { -- cgit v1.2.3 From c832962ac972082b3a1f89775c9d4274c8cb5670 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Oleksandr Mazur Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 18:53:03 +0200 Subject: net: bridge: multicast: notify switchdev driver whenever MC processing gets disabled Whenever bridge driver hits the max capacity of MDBs, it disables the MC processing (by setting corresponding bridge option), but never notifies switchdev about such change (the notifiers are called only upon explicit setting of this option, through the registered netlink interface). This could lead to situation when Software MDB processing gets disabled, but this event never gets offloaded to the underlying Hardware. Fix this by adding a notify message in such case. Fixes: 147c1e9b902c ("switchdev: bridge: Offload multicast disabled") Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Mazur Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220215165303.31908-1-oleksandr.mazur@plvision.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c index de2409889489..db4f2641d1cd 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c @@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static void br_multicast_find_del_pg(struct net_bridge *br, struct net_bridge_port_group *pg); static void __br_multicast_stop(struct net_bridge_mcast *brmctx); +static int br_mc_disabled_update(struct net_device *dev, bool value, + struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); + static struct net_bridge_port_group * br_sg_port_find(struct net_bridge *br, struct net_bridge_port_group_sg_key *sg_p) @@ -1156,6 +1159,7 @@ struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_multicast_new_group(struct net_bridge *br, return mp; if (atomic_read(&br->mdb_hash_tbl.nelems) >= br->hash_max) { + br_mc_disabled_update(br->dev, false, NULL); br_opt_toggle(br, BROPT_MULTICAST_ENABLED, false); return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 0b0dff5b3b98c5c7ce848151df9da0b3cdf0cc8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willem de Bruijn Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:00:37 -0500 Subject: ipv6: per-netns exclusive flowlabel checks Ipv6 flowlabels historically require a reservation before use. Optionally in exclusive mode (e.g., user-private). Commit 59c820b2317f ("ipv6: elide flowlabel check if no exclusive leases exist") introduced a fastpath that avoids this check when no exclusive leases exist in the system, and thus any flowlabel use will be granted. That allows skipping the control operation to reserve a flowlabel entirely. Though with a warning if the fast path fails: This is an optimization. Robust applications still have to revert to requesting leases if the fast path fails due to an exclusive lease. Still, this is subtle. Better isolate network namespaces from each other. Flowlabels are per-netns. Also record per-netns whether exclusive leases are in use. Then behavior does not change based on activity in other netns. Changes v2 - wrap in IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) to avoid breakage if disabled Fixes: 59c820b2317f ("ipv6: elide flowlabel check if no exclusive leases exist") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/MWHPR2201MB1072BCCCFCE779E4094837ACD0329@MWHPR2201MB1072.namprd22.prod.outlook.com/ Reported-by: Congyu Liu Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Tested-by: Congyu Liu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220215160037.1976072-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/net/ipv6.h | 5 ++++- include/net/netns/ipv6.h | 3 ++- net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h index 3afcb128e064..92eec13d1693 100644 --- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -393,17 +393,20 @@ static inline void txopt_put(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt) kfree_rcu(opt, rcu); } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) struct ip6_flowlabel *__fl6_sock_lookup(struct sock *sk, __be32 label); extern struct static_key_false_deferred ipv6_flowlabel_exclusive; static inline struct ip6_flowlabel *fl6_sock_lookup(struct sock *sk, __be32 label) { - if (static_branch_unlikely(&ipv6_flowlabel_exclusive.key)) + if (static_branch_unlikely(&ipv6_flowlabel_exclusive.key) && + READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv6.flowlabel_has_excl)) return __fl6_sock_lookup(sk, label) ? : ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); return NULL; } +#endif struct ipv6_txoptions *fl6_merge_options(struct ipv6_txoptions *opt_space, struct ip6_flowlabel *fl, diff --git a/include/net/netns/ipv6.h b/include/net/netns/ipv6.h index a4b550380316..6bd7e5a85ce7 100644 --- a/include/net/netns/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/netns/ipv6.h @@ -77,9 +77,10 @@ struct netns_ipv6 { spinlock_t fib6_gc_lock; unsigned int ip6_rt_gc_expire; unsigned long ip6_rt_last_gc; + unsigned char flowlabel_has_excl; #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES - unsigned int fib6_rules_require_fldissect; bool fib6_has_custom_rules; + unsigned int fib6_rules_require_fldissect; #ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES unsigned int fib6_routes_require_src; #endif diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c index aa673a6a7e43..ceb85c67ce39 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c @@ -450,8 +450,10 @@ fl_create(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct in6_flowlabel_req *freq, err = -EINVAL; goto done; } - if (fl_shared_exclusive(fl) || fl->opt) + if (fl_shared_exclusive(fl) || fl->opt) { + WRITE_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv6.flowlabel_has_excl, 1); static_branch_deferred_inc(&ipv6_flowlabel_exclusive); + } return fl; done: -- cgit v1.2.3 From c08e58438d4a709fb451b6d7d33432cc9907a2a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 21:00:09 -0500 Subject: tipc: fix wrong notification node addresses The previous bug fix had an unfortunate side effect that broke distribution of binding table entries between nodes. The updated tipc_sock_addr struct is also used further down in the same function, and there the old value is still the correct one. Fixes: 032062f363b4 ("tipc: fix wrong publisher node address in link publications") Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216020009.3404578-1-jmaloy@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/tipc/node.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c index fd95df338da7..6ef95ce565bd 100644 --- a/net/tipc/node.c +++ b/net/tipc/node.c @@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static void tipc_node_write_unlock(struct tipc_node *n) u32 flags = n->action_flags; struct list_head *publ_list; struct tipc_uaddr ua; - u32 bearer_id; + u32 bearer_id, node; if (likely(!flags)) { write_unlock_bh(&n->lock); @@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ static void tipc_node_write_unlock(struct tipc_node *n) TIPC_LINK_STATE, n->addr, n->addr); sk.ref = n->link_id; sk.node = tipc_own_addr(net); + node = n->addr; bearer_id = n->link_id & 0xffff; publ_list = &n->publ_list; @@ -423,17 +424,17 @@ static void tipc_node_write_unlock(struct tipc_node *n) write_unlock_bh(&n->lock); if (flags & TIPC_NOTIFY_NODE_DOWN) - tipc_publ_notify(net, publ_list, sk.node, n->capabilities); + tipc_publ_notify(net, publ_list, node, n->capabilities); if (flags & TIPC_NOTIFY_NODE_UP) - tipc_named_node_up(net, sk.node, n->capabilities); + tipc_named_node_up(net, node, n->capabilities); if (flags & TIPC_NOTIFY_LINK_UP) { - tipc_mon_peer_up(net, sk.node, bearer_id); + tipc_mon_peer_up(net, node, bearer_id); tipc_nametbl_publish(net, &ua, &sk, sk.ref); } if (flags & TIPC_NOTIFY_LINK_DOWN) { - tipc_mon_peer_down(net, sk.node, bearer_id); + tipc_mon_peer_down(net, node, bearer_id); tipc_nametbl_withdraw(net, &ua, &sk, sk.ref); } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From 5740d068909676d4bdb5c9c00c37a83df7728909 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 15:53:05 -0800 Subject: net: sched: limit TC_ACT_REPEAT loops We have been living dangerously, at the mercy of malicious users, abusing TC_ACT_REPEAT, as shown by this syzpot report [1]. Add an arbitrary limit (32) to the number of times an action can return TC_ACT_REPEAT. v2: switch the limit to 32 instead of 10. Use net_warn_ratelimited() instead of pr_err_once(). [1] (C repro available on demand) rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt self-detected stall on CPU rcu: 1-...!: (10500 ticks this GP) idle=021/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=5592/5592 fqs=0 (t=10502 jiffies g=5305 q=190) rcu: rcu_preempt kthread timer wakeup didn't happen for 10502 jiffies! g5305 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x402 rcu: Possible timer handling issue on cpu=0 timer-softirq=3527 rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 10505 jiffies! g5305 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x402 ->cpu=0 rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior. rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump: task:rcu_preempt state:I stack:29344 pid: 14 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 Call Trace: context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4986 [inline] __schedule+0xab2/0x4db0 kernel/sched/core.c:6295 schedule+0xd2/0x260 kernel/sched/core.c:6368 schedule_timeout+0x14a/0x2a0 kernel/time/timer.c:1881 rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x186/0x810 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1963 rcu_gp_kthread+0x1de/0x320 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2136 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran: Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0: NMI backtrace for cpu 0 CPU: 0 PID: 3646 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-syzkaller-00149-gbf8e59fd315f #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:rep_nop arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/processor.h:13 [inline] RIP: 0010:cpu_relax arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/processor.h:18 [inline] RIP: 0010:pv_wait_head_or_lock kernel/locking/qspinlock_paravirt.h:437 [inline] RIP: 0010:__pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x3b8/0xb40 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:508 Code: 48 89 eb c6 45 01 01 41 bc 00 80 00 00 48 c1 e9 03 83 e3 07 41 be 01 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8d 2c 01 eb 0c 90 41 83 ec 01 0f 84 72 04 00 00 41 0f b6 45 00 38 d8 7f 08 84 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000283f1b0 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1ffff1100fc0071e RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000201 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88807e0038f0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff8ffbf9ff R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000004c1e R13: ffffed100fc0071e R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff8880b9c3aa80 FS: 00005555562bf300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffdbfef12b8 CR3: 00000000723c2000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:591 [inline] queued_spin_lock_slowpath arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:51 [inline] queued_spin_lock include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:85 [inline] do_raw_spin_lock+0x200/0x2b0 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:115 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline] sch_tree_lock include/net/sch_generic.h:610 [inline] sch_tree_lock include/net/sch_generic.h:605 [inline] prio_tune+0x3b9/0xb50 net/sched/sch_prio.c:211 prio_init+0x5c/0x80 net/sched/sch_prio.c:244 qdisc_create.constprop.0+0x44a/0x10f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1253 tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c5/0x1980 net/sched/sch_api.c:1660 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5594 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2413 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2496 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f7ee98aae99 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 41 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdbfef12d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdbfef1300 RCX: 00007f7ee98aae99 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000000d R09: 000000000000000d R10: 000000000000000d R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdbfef12f0 R13: 00000000000f4240 R14: 000000000004ca47 R15: 00007ffdbfef12e4 INFO: NMI handler (nmi_cpu_backtrace_handler) took too long to run: 2.293 msecs NMI backtrace for cpu 1 CPU: 1 PID: 3260 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-syzkaller-00149-gbf8e59fd315f #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 nmi_cpu_backtrace.cold+0x47/0x144 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:111 nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x1b3/0x230 lib/nmi_backtrace.c:62 trigger_single_cpu_backtrace include/linux/nmi.h:164 [inline] rcu_dump_cpu_stacks+0x25e/0x3f0 kernel/rcu/tree_stall.h:343 print_cpu_stall kernel/rcu/tree_stall.h:604 [inline] check_cpu_stall kernel/rcu/tree_stall.h:688 [inline] rcu_pending kernel/rcu/tree.c:3919 [inline] rcu_sched_clock_irq.cold+0x5c/0x759 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2617 update_process_times+0x16d/0x200 kernel/time/timer.c:1785 tick_sched_handle+0x9b/0x180 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:226 tick_sched_timer+0x1b0/0x2d0 kernel/time/tick-sched.c:1428 __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1685 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x1c0/0xe50 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1749 hrtimer_interrupt+0x31c/0x790 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1811 local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1086 [inline] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x146/0x530 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1103 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1097 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:638 RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0xc/0x70 kernel/kcov.c:286 Code: 00 00 00 48 89 7c 30 e8 48 89 4c 30 f0 4c 89 54 d8 20 48 89 10 5b c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 89 f8 bf 03 00 00 00 4c 8b 14 24 <89> f1 65 48 8b 34 25 00 70 02 00 e8 14 f9 ff ff 84 c0 74 4b 48 8b RSP: 0018:ffffc90002c5eea8 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffff88801c625800 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: ffff8880137d3100 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff874fcd88 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88801d692dc0 R13: ffff8880137d3104 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88801d692de8 tcf_police_act+0x358/0x11d0 net/sched/act_police.c:256 tcf_action_exec net/sched/act_api.c:1049 [inline] tcf_action_exec+0x1a6/0x530 net/sched/act_api.c:1026 tcf_exts_exec include/net/pkt_cls.h:326 [inline] route4_classify+0xef0/0x1400 net/sched/cls_route.c:179 __tcf_classify net/sched/cls_api.c:1549 [inline] tcf_classify+0x3e8/0x9d0 net/sched/cls_api.c:1615 prio_classify net/sched/sch_prio.c:42 [inline] prio_enqueue+0x3a7/0x790 net/sched/sch_prio.c:75 dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x40/0x300 net/core/dev.c:3668 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3756 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f61/0x3660 net/core/dev.c:4081 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:533 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:547 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x14dc/0x2170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 __ip_finish_output net/ipv4/ip_output.c:306 [inline] __ip_finish_output+0x396/0x650 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:288 ip_finish_output+0x32/0x200 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:296 [inline] ip_output+0x196/0x310 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:430 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] ip_local_out+0xaf/0x1a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:126 iptunnel_xmit+0x628/0xa50 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82 geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:966 [inline] geneve_xmit+0x10c8/0x3530 drivers/net/geneve.c:1077 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4683 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4697 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3473 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1eb/0x920 net/core/dev.c:3489 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2985/0x3660 net/core/dev.c:4116 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:533 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:547 [inline] ip6_finish_output2+0xf7a/0x14f0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:126 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:191 [inline] __ip6_finish_output+0x61e/0xe90 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:170 ip6_finish_output+0x32/0x200 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:201 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:296 [inline] ip6_output+0x1e4/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:224 dst_output include/net/dst.h:451 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline] mld_sendpack+0x9a3/0xe40 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1826 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2127 [inline] mld_ifc_work+0x71c/0xdc0 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2659 process_one_work+0x9ac/0x1650 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x657/0x1110 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess): 0: 48 89 eb mov %rbp,%rbx 3: c6 45 01 01 movb $0x1,0x1(%rbp) 7: 41 bc 00 80 00 00 mov $0x8000,%r12d d: 48 c1 e9 03 shr $0x3,%rcx 11: 83 e3 07 and $0x7,%ebx 14: 41 be 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%r14d 1a: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax 21: fc ff df 24: 4c 8d 2c 01 lea (%rcx,%rax,1),%r13 28: eb 0c jmp 0x36 * 2a: f3 90 pause <-- trapping instruction 2c: 41 83 ec 01 sub $0x1,%r12d 30: 0f 84 72 04 00 00 je 0x4a8 36: 41 0f b6 45 00 movzbl 0x0(%r13),%eax 3b: 38 d8 cmp %bl,%al 3d: 7f 08 jg 0x47 3f: 84 .byte 0x84 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Cc: Cong Wang Cc: Jiri Pirko Reported-by: syzbot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220215235305.3272331-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/sched/act_api.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/sched/act_api.c b/net/sched/act_api.c index 32563cef85bf..2811348f3acc 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_api.c +++ b/net/sched/act_api.c @@ -1037,6 +1037,7 @@ int tcf_action_exec(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action **actions, restart_act_graph: for (i = 0; i < nr_actions; i++) { const struct tc_action *a = actions[i]; + int repeat_ttl; if (jmp_prgcnt > 0) { jmp_prgcnt -= 1; @@ -1045,11 +1046,17 @@ restart_act_graph: if (tc_act_skip_sw(a->tcfa_flags)) continue; + + repeat_ttl = 32; repeat: ret = a->ops->act(skb, a, res); - if (ret == TC_ACT_REPEAT) - goto repeat; /* we need a ttl - JHS */ - + if (unlikely(ret == TC_ACT_REPEAT)) { + if (--repeat_ttl != 0) + goto repeat; + /* suspicious opcode, stop pipeline */ + net_warn_ratelimited("TC_ACT_REPEAT abuse ?\n"); + return TC_ACT_OK; + } if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP(ret, TC_ACT_JUMP)) { jmp_prgcnt = ret & TCA_ACT_MAX_PRIO_MASK; if (!jmp_prgcnt || (jmp_prgcnt > nr_actions)) { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 35a79e64de29e8d57a5989aac57611c0cd29e13e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Xin Long Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 00:20:52 -0500 Subject: ping: fix the dif and sdif check in ping_lookup When 'ping' changes to use PING socket instead of RAW socket by: # sysctl -w net.ipv4.ping_group_range="0 100" There is another regression caused when matching sk_bound_dev_if and dif, RAW socket is using inet_iif() while PING socket lookup is using skb->dev->ifindex, the cmd below fails due to this: # ip link add dummy0 type dummy # ip link set dummy0 up # ip addr add 192.168.111.1/24 dev dummy0 # ping -I dummy0 192.168.111.1 -c1 The issue was also reported on: https://github.com/iputils/iputils/issues/104 But fixed in iputils in a wrong way by not binding to device when destination IP is on device, and it will cause some of kselftests to fail, as Jianlin noticed. This patch is to use inet(6)_iif and inet(6)_sdif to get dif and sdif for PING socket, and keep consistent with RAW socket. Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi Signed-off-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/ping.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c index bcf7bc71cb56..3a5994b50571 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ping.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c @@ -172,16 +172,23 @@ static struct sock *ping_lookup(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 ident) struct sock *sk = NULL; struct inet_sock *isk; struct hlist_nulls_node *hnode; - int dif = skb->dev->ifindex; + int dif, sdif; if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { + dif = inet_iif(skb); + sdif = inet_sdif(skb); pr_debug("try to find: num = %d, daddr = %pI4, dif = %d\n", (int)ident, &ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, dif); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + dif = inet6_iif(skb); + sdif = inet6_sdif(skb); pr_debug("try to find: num = %d, daddr = %pI6c, dif = %d\n", (int)ident, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, dif); #endif + } else { + pr_err("ping: protocol(%x) is not supported\n", ntohs(skb->protocol)); + return NULL; } read_lock_bh(&ping_table.lock); @@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ static struct sock *ping_lookup(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 ident) } if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if && sk->sk_bound_dev_if != dif && - sk->sk_bound_dev_if != inet_sdif(skb)) + sk->sk_bound_dev_if != sdif) continue; sock_hold(sk); -- cgit v1.2.3 From b9208492fcaecff8f43915529ae34b3bcb03877c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Seth Forshee Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2022 08:13:12 -0600 Subject: vsock: remove vsock from connected table when connect is interrupted by a signal vsock_connect() expects that the socket could already be in the TCP_ESTABLISHED state when the connecting task wakes up with a signal pending. If this happens the socket will be in the connected table, and it is not removed when the socket state is reset. In this situation it's common for the process to retry connect(), and if the connection is successful the socket will be added to the connected table a second time, corrupting the list. Prevent this by calling vsock_remove_connected() if a signal is received while waiting for a connection. This is harmless if the socket is not in the connected table, and if it is in the table then removing it will prevent list corruption from a double add. Note for backporting: this patch requires d5afa82c977e ("vsock: correct removal of socket from the list"), which is in all current stable trees except 4.9.y. Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets") Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220217141312.2297547-1-sforshee@digitalocean.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c index 3235261f138d..38baeb189d4e 100644 --- a/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c @@ -1401,6 +1401,7 @@ static int vsock_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, sk->sk_state = sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED ? TCP_CLOSING : TCP_CLOSE; sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED; vsock_transport_cancel_pkt(vsk); + vsock_remove_connected(vsk); goto out_wait; } else if (timeout == 0) { err = -ETIMEDOUT; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 017b355bbdc6620fd8fe05fe297f553ce9d855ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mans Rullgard Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 12:46:34 +0000 Subject: net: dsa: lan9303: handle hwaccel VLAN tags Check for a hwaccel VLAN tag on rx and use it if present. Otherwise, use __skb_vlan_pop() like the other tag parsers do. This fixes the case where the VLAN tag has already been consumed by the master. Fixes: a1292595e006 ("net: dsa: add new DSA switch driver for the SMSC-LAN9303") Signed-off-by: Mans Rullgard Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216124634.23123-1-mans@mansr.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/dsa/tag_lan9303.c | 21 +++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/dsa/tag_lan9303.c b/net/dsa/tag_lan9303.c index cb548188f813..98d7d7120bab 100644 --- a/net/dsa/tag_lan9303.c +++ b/net/dsa/tag_lan9303.c @@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *lan9303_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) static struct sk_buff *lan9303_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) { - __be16 *lan9303_tag; u16 lan9303_tag1; unsigned int source_port; @@ -87,14 +86,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *lan9303_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) return NULL; } - lan9303_tag = dsa_etype_header_pos_rx(skb); - - if (lan9303_tag[0] != htons(ETH_P_8021Q)) { - dev_warn_ratelimited(&dev->dev, "Dropping packet due to invalid VLAN marker\n"); - return NULL; + if (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb)) { + lan9303_tag1 = skb_vlan_tag_get(skb); + __vlan_hwaccel_clear_tag(skb); + } else { + skb_push_rcsum(skb, ETH_HLEN); + __skb_vlan_pop(skb, &lan9303_tag1); + skb_pull_rcsum(skb, ETH_HLEN); } - lan9303_tag1 = ntohs(lan9303_tag[1]); source_port = lan9303_tag1 & 0x3; skb->dev = dsa_master_find_slave(dev, 0, source_port); @@ -103,13 +103,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *lan9303_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) return NULL; } - /* remove the special VLAN tag between the MAC addresses - * and the current ethertype field. - */ - skb_pull_rcsum(skb, 2 + 2); - - dsa_strip_etype_header(skb, LAN9303_TAG_LEN); - if (!(lan9303_tag1 & LAN9303_TAG_RX_TRAPPED_TO_CPU)) dsa_default_offload_fwd_mark(skb); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9fcf986cc4bc6a3a39f23fbcbbc3a9e52d3c24fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 09:32:16 -0800 Subject: ipv4: fix data races in fib_alias_hw_flags_set fib_alias_hw_flags_set() can be used by concurrent threads, and is only RCU protected. We need to annotate accesses to following fields of struct fib_alias: offload, trap, offload_failed Because of READ_ONCE()WRITE_ONCE() limitations, make these field u8. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in fib_alias_hw_flags_set / fib_alias_hw_flags_set read to 0xffff888134224a6a of 1 bytes by task 2013 on cpu 1: fib_alias_hw_flags_set+0x28a/0x470 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1050 nsim_fib4_rt_hw_flags_set drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:350 [inline] nsim_fib4_rt_add drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:367 [inline] nsim_fib4_rt_insert drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:429 [inline] nsim_fib4_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:461 [inline] nsim_fib_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:881 [inline] nsim_fib_event_work+0x1852/0x2cf0 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1477 process_one_work+0x3f6/0x960 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2370 [inline] worker_thread+0x7df/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2456 kthread+0x1bf/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 write to 0xffff888134224a6a of 1 bytes by task 4872 on cpu 0: fib_alias_hw_flags_set+0x2d5/0x470 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1054 nsim_fib4_rt_hw_flags_set drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:350 [inline] nsim_fib4_rt_add drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:367 [inline] nsim_fib4_rt_insert drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:429 [inline] nsim_fib4_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:461 [inline] nsim_fib_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:881 [inline] nsim_fib_event_work+0x1852/0x2cf0 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1477 process_one_work+0x3f6/0x960 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:2370 [inline] worker_thread+0x7df/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2456 kthread+0x1bf/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 value changed: 0x00 -> 0x02 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 4872 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-syzkaller-00188-g1d41d2e82623-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events nsim_fib_event_work Fixes: 90b93f1b31f8 ("ipv4: Add "offload" and "trap" indications to routes") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Reported-by: syzbot Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216173217.3792411-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- net/ipv4/fib_lookup.h | 7 +++---- net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c | 6 +++--- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 22 +++++++++++++--------- net/ipv4/route.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_lookup.h b/net/ipv4/fib_lookup.h index e184bcb19943..78e40ea42e58 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_lookup.h +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_lookup.h @@ -16,10 +16,9 @@ struct fib_alias { u8 fa_slen; u32 tb_id; s16 fa_default; - u8 offload:1, - trap:1, - offload_failed:1, - unused:5; + u8 offload; + u8 trap; + u8 offload_failed; struct rcu_head rcu; }; diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c index b4589861b84c..2dd375f7407b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c @@ -525,9 +525,9 @@ void rtmsg_fib(int event, __be32 key, struct fib_alias *fa, fri.dst_len = dst_len; fri.tos = fa->fa_tos; fri.type = fa->fa_type; - fri.offload = fa->offload; - fri.trap = fa->trap; - fri.offload_failed = fa->offload_failed; + fri.offload = READ_ONCE(fa->offload); + fri.trap = READ_ONCE(fa->trap); + fri.offload_failed = READ_ONCE(fa->offload_failed); err = fib_dump_info(skb, info->portid, seq, event, &fri, nlm_flags); if (err < 0) { /* -EMSGSIZE implies BUG in fib_nlmsg_size() */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c index 8060524f4256..f7f74d5c14da 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c @@ -1047,19 +1047,23 @@ void fib_alias_hw_flags_set(struct net *net, const struct fib_rt_info *fri) if (!fa_match) goto out; - if (fa_match->offload == fri->offload && fa_match->trap == fri->trap && - fa_match->offload_failed == fri->offload_failed) + /* These are paired with the WRITE_ONCE() happening in this function. + * The reason is that we are only protected by RCU at this point. + */ + if (READ_ONCE(fa_match->offload) == fri->offload && + READ_ONCE(fa_match->trap) == fri->trap && + READ_ONCE(fa_match->offload_failed) == fri->offload_failed) goto out; - fa_match->offload = fri->offload; - fa_match->trap = fri->trap; + WRITE_ONCE(fa_match->offload, fri->offload); + WRITE_ONCE(fa_match->trap, fri->trap); /* 2 means send notifications only if offload_failed was changed. */ if (net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_notify_on_flag_change == 2 && - fa_match->offload_failed == fri->offload_failed) + READ_ONCE(fa_match->offload_failed) == fri->offload_failed) goto out; - fa_match->offload_failed = fri->offload_failed; + WRITE_ONCE(fa_match->offload_failed, fri->offload_failed); if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_notify_on_flag_change) goto out; @@ -2297,9 +2301,9 @@ static int fn_trie_dump_leaf(struct key_vector *l, struct fib_table *tb, fri.dst_len = KEYLENGTH - fa->fa_slen; fri.tos = fa->fa_tos; fri.type = fa->fa_type; - fri.offload = fa->offload; - fri.trap = fa->trap; - fri.offload_failed = fa->offload_failed; + fri.offload = READ_ONCE(fa->offload); + fri.trap = READ_ONCE(fa->trap); + fri.offload_failed = READ_ONCE(fa->offload_failed); err = fib_dump_info(skb, NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index ff6f91cdb6c4..f33ad1f383b6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -3395,8 +3395,8 @@ static int inet_rtm_getroute(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, fa->fa_tos == fri.tos && fa->fa_info == res.fi && fa->fa_type == fri.type) { - fri.offload = fa->offload; - fri.trap = fa->trap; + fri.offload = READ_ONCE(fa->offload); + fri.trap = READ_ONCE(fa->trap); break; } } -- cgit v1.2.3 From d95d6320ba7a51d61c097ffc3bcafcf70283414e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2022 09:32:17 -0800 Subject: ipv6: fix data-race in fib6_info_hw_flags_set / fib6_purge_rt Because fib6_info_hw_flags_set() is called without any synchronization, all accesses to gi6->offload, fi->trap and fi->offload_failed need some basic protection like READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE(). BUG: KCSAN: data-race in fib6_info_hw_flags_set / fib6_purge_rt read to 0xffff8881087d5886 of 1 bytes by task 13953 on cpu 0: fib6_drop_pcpu_from net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1007 [inline] fib6_purge_rt+0x4f/0x580 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1033 fib6_del_route net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1983 [inline] fib6_del+0x696/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:2028 __ip6_del_rt net/ipv6/route.c:3876 [inline] ip6_del_rt+0x83/0x140 net/ipv6/route.c:3891 __ipv6_dev_ac_dec+0x2b5/0x370 net/ipv6/anycast.c:374 ipv6_dev_ac_dec net/ipv6/anycast.c:387 [inline] __ipv6_sock_ac_close+0x141/0x200 net/ipv6/anycast.c:207 ipv6_sock_ac_close+0x79/0x90 net/ipv6/anycast.c:220 inet6_release+0x32/0x50 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:476 __sock_release net/socket.c:650 [inline] sock_close+0x6c/0x150 net/socket.c:1318 __fput+0x295/0x520 fs/file_table.c:280 ____fput+0x11/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313 task_work_run+0x8e/0x110 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:175 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x160/0x190 kernel/entry/common.c:207 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:300 do_syscall_64+0x50/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae write to 0xffff8881087d5886 of 1 bytes by task 1912 on cpu 1: fib6_info_hw_flags_set+0x155/0x3b0 net/ipv6/route.c:6230 nsim_fib6_rt_hw_flags_set drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:668 [inline] nsim_fib6_rt_add drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:691 [inline] nsim_fib6_rt_insert drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:756 [inline] nsim_fib6_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:853 [inline] nsim_fib_event drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:886 [inline] nsim_fib_event_work+0x284f/0x2cf0 drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c:1477 process_one_work+0x3f6/0x960 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x616/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x2c7/0x2e0 kernel/kthread.c:327 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 value changed: 0x22 -> 0x2a Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 1912 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events nsim_fib_event_work Fixes: 0c5fcf9e249e ("IPv6: Add "offload failed" indication to routes") Fixes: bb3c4ab93e44 ("ipv6: Add "offload" and "trap" indications to routes") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Amit Cohen Cc: Ido Schimmel Reported-by: syzbot Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220216173217.3792411-2-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c | 4 ++-- include/net/ip6_fib.h | 10 ++++++---- net/ipv6/route.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c b/drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c index 4300261e2f9e..378ee779061c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c +++ b/drivers/net/netdevsim/fib.c @@ -623,14 +623,14 @@ static int nsim_fib6_rt_append(struct nsim_fib_data *data, if (err) goto err_fib6_rt_nh_del; - fib6_event->rt_arr[i]->trap = true; + WRITE_ONCE(fib6_event->rt_arr[i]->trap, true); } return 0; err_fib6_rt_nh_del: for (i--; i >= 0; i--) { - fib6_event->rt_arr[i]->trap = false; + WRITE_ONCE(fib6_event->rt_arr[i]->trap, false); nsim_fib6_rt_nh_del(fib6_rt, fib6_event->rt_arr[i]); } return err; diff --git a/include/net/ip6_fib.h b/include/net/ip6_fib.h index 40ae8f1b18e5..2048bc8748cb 100644 --- a/include/net/ip6_fib.h +++ b/include/net/ip6_fib.h @@ -190,14 +190,16 @@ struct fib6_info { u32 fib6_metric; u8 fib6_protocol; u8 fib6_type; + + u8 offload; + u8 trap; + u8 offload_failed; + u8 should_flush:1, dst_nocount:1, dst_nopolicy:1, fib6_destroying:1, - offload:1, - trap:1, - offload_failed:1, - unused:1; + unused:4; struct rcu_head rcu; struct nexthop *nh; diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index f4884cda13b9..ea1cf414a92e 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -5753,11 +5753,11 @@ static int rt6_fill_node(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, } if (!dst) { - if (rt->offload) + if (READ_ONCE(rt->offload)) rtm->rtm_flags |= RTM_F_OFFLOAD; - if (rt->trap) + if (READ_ONCE(rt->trap)) rtm->rtm_flags |= RTM_F_TRAP; - if (rt->offload_failed) + if (READ_ONCE(rt->offload_failed)) rtm->rtm_flags |= RTM_F_OFFLOAD_FAILED; } @@ -6215,19 +6215,20 @@ void fib6_info_hw_flags_set(struct net *net, struct fib6_info *f6i, struct sk_buff *skb; int err; - if (f6i->offload == offload && f6i->trap == trap && - f6i->offload_failed == offload_failed) + if (READ_ONCE(f6i->offload) == offload && + READ_ONCE(f6i->trap) == trap && + READ_ONCE(f6i->offload_failed) == offload_failed) return; - f6i->offload = offload; - f6i->trap = trap; + WRITE_ONCE(f6i->offload, offload); + WRITE_ONCE(f6i->trap, trap); /* 2 means send notifications only if offload_failed was changed. */ if (net->ipv6.sysctl.fib_notify_on_flag_change == 2 && - f6i->offload_failed == offload_failed) + READ_ONCE(f6i->offload_failed) == offload_failed) return; - f6i->offload_failed = offload_failed; + WRITE_ONCE(f6i->offload_failed, offload_failed); if (!rcu_access_pointer(f6i->fib6_node)) /* The route was removed from the tree, do not send -- cgit v1.2.3