From 1227dd773d8d4e3983b4b751f9ffa0f41402fb7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2012 02:44:49 -0400
Subject: TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME is defined on all targets now

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 security/keys/keyctl.c | 10 ----------
 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index ddb3e05bc5fc..534a634283a4 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1454,7 +1454,6 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
  */
 long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 {
-#ifdef TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
 	struct task_struct *me, *parent;
 	const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
 	struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
@@ -1542,15 +1541,6 @@ not_permitted:
 error_keyring:
 	key_ref_put(keyring_r);
 	return ret;
-
-#else /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
-	/*
-	 * To be removed when TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME has been implemented on
-	 * m68k/xtensa
-	 */
-#warning TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME not implemented
-	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-#endif /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
 }
 
 /*
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 413cd3d9abeaef590e5ce00564f7a443165db238 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 11 May 2012 10:59:08 +1000
Subject: keys: change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add()

Change keyctl_session_to_parent() to use task_work_add() and move
key_replace_session_keyring() logic into task_work->func().

Note that we do task_work_cancel() before task_work_add() to ensure that
only one work can be pending at any time.  This is important, we must not
allow user-space to abuse the parent's ->task_works list.

The callback, replace_session_keyring(), checks PF_EXITING.  I guess this
is not really needed but looks better.

As a side effect, this fixes the (unlikely) race.  The callers of
key_replace_session_keyring() and keyctl_session_to_parent() lack the
necessary barriers, the parent can miss the request.

Now we can remove task_struct->replacement_session_keyring and related
code.

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 include/linux/key.h          |  6 ++---
 security/keys/internal.h     |  2 ++
 security/keys/keyctl.c       | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 security/keys/process_keys.c | 20 +++++---------
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 5231800770e1..2a0ee11584e9 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ typedef uint32_t key_perm_t;
 
 struct key;
 
+#define key_replace_session_keyring()	do { } while (0)
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 
 #undef KEY_DEBUGGING
@@ -308,9 +310,6 @@ static inline bool key_is_instantiated(const struct key *key)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 extern ctl_table key_sysctls[];
 #endif
-
-extern void key_replace_session_keyring(void);
-
 /*
  * the userspace interface
  */
@@ -334,7 +333,6 @@ extern void key_init(void);
 #define key_fsuid_changed(t)		do { } while(0)
 #define key_fsgid_changed(t)		do { } while(0)
 #define key_init()			do { } while(0)
-#define key_replace_session_keyring()	do { } while(0)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index f711b094ed41..3dcbf86b0d31 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/task_work.h>
 
 #ifdef __KDEBUG
 #define kenter(FMT, ...) \
@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
 #define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK	0x04
 
 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
+extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork);
 
 extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
 extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 534a634283a4..2f28126215a2 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1456,47 +1456,55 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 {
 	struct task_struct *me, *parent;
 	const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
-	struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
+	struct task_work *newwork, *oldwork;
 	key_ref_t keyring_r;
+	struct cred *cred;
 	int ret;
 
 	keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
 	if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
 		return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
 
+	ret = -ENOMEM;
+	newwork = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_work), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!newwork)
+		goto error_keyring;
+
 	/* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
 	 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
 	 * our parent */
-	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	cred = cred_alloc_blank();
 	if (!cred)
-		goto error_keyring;
+		goto error_newwork;
 
 	cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
-	keyring_r = NULL;
+	init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring, cred);
 
 	me = current;
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
 
-	parent = me->real_parent;
 	ret = -EPERM;
+	oldwork = NULL;
+	parent = me->real_parent;
 
 	/* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
 	if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
-		goto not_permitted;
+		goto unlock;
 
 	/* the parent must be single threaded */
 	if (!thread_group_empty(parent))
-		goto not_permitted;
+		goto unlock;
 
 	/* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
 	 * there's no point */
 	mycred = current_cred();
 	pcred = __task_cred(parent);
 	if (mycred == pcred ||
-	    mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
-		goto already_same;
+	    mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
 
 	/* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
 	 * SUID/SGID */
@@ -1506,38 +1514,37 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 	    pcred->gid	!= mycred->egid	||
 	    pcred->egid	!= mycred->egid	||
 	    pcred->sgid	!= mycred->egid)
-		goto not_permitted;
+		goto unlock;
 
 	/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
 	if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring &&
 	     pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) ||
 	    mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
-		goto not_permitted;
+		goto unlock;
 
-	/* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
-	 * that */
-	oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
+	/* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
+	oldwork = task_work_cancel(parent, key_change_session_keyring);
 
 	/* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
 	 * restarting */
-	parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
-	cred = NULL;
-	set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
-
-	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (oldcred)
-		put_cred(oldcred);
-	return 0;
-
-already_same:
-	ret = 0;
-not_permitted:
+	ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, true);
+	if (!ret)
+		newwork = NULL;
+unlock:
 	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	put_cred(cred);
+	if (oldwork) {
+		put_cred(oldwork->data);
+		kfree(oldwork);
+	}
+	if (newwork) {
+		put_cred(newwork->data);
+		kfree(newwork);
+	}
 	return ret;
 
+error_newwork:
+	kfree(newwork);
 error_keyring:
 	key_ref_put(keyring_r);
 	return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index d71056db7b67..4ad54eea1ea4 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -834,23 +834,17 @@ error:
  * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when
  * the target  process is about to resume userspace execution.
  */
-void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
+void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork)
 {
-	const struct cred *old;
-	struct cred *new;
-
-	if (!current->replacement_session_keyring)
-		return;
+	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+	struct cred *new = twork->data;
 
-	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-	new = current->replacement_session_keyring;
-	current->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
-	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-
-	if (!new)
+	kfree(twork);
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
+		put_cred(new);
 		return;
+	}
 
-	old = current_cred();
 	new->  uid	= old->  uid;
 	new-> euid	= old-> euid;
 	new-> suid	= old-> suid;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From cc1dad7183e4cb7f5d313b6942f2059fc0eabab6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2012 19:40:47 -0400
Subject: selinuxfs snprintf() misuses

a) %d does _not_ produce a page worth of output
b) snprintf() doesn't return negatives - it used to in old glibc, but
that's the kernel...

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 36 +++++++-----------------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 4e93f9ef970b..3ad290251288 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1259,12 +1259,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 		if (!inode)
 			goto out;
 
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
-		if (len < 0)
-			goto out;
-
 		ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+		len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
 		if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -1557,19 +1553,10 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
 static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	ssize_t rc, len;
-	char *page;
 	unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
-	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!page)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
-	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
-	free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
-	return rc;
+	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
@@ -1580,19 +1567,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
 static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	ssize_t rc, len;
-	char *page;
 	unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
-	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!page)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
-	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
-	free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
-	return rc;
+	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From d007794a182bc072a7b7479909dbd0d67ba341be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 13:11:37 -0400
Subject: split cap_mmap_addr() out of cap_file_mmap()

... switch callers.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 include/linux/security.h   |  3 ++-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c    |  2 +-
 security/commoncap.c       | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |  2 +-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index ab0e091ce5fa..4ad59c9fa731 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
 extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 extern int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
 			 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only);
@@ -2187,7 +2188,7 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 				     unsigned long addr,
 				     unsigned long addr_only)
 {
-	return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
 }
 
 static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 032daab449b0..8430d8937afb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	/* do DAC check */
-	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
 	if (rc || addr_only)
 		return rc;
 
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e771cb1b2d79..ebac3618896e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -958,22 +958,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 }
 
 /*
- * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
- * @file: unused
- * @reqprot: unused
- * @prot: unused
- * @flags: unused
+ * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
  * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
- * @addr_only: unused
  *
  * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
  * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
  * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
  * -EPERM if not.
  */
-int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-		  unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -986,3 +979,24 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
+ * @file: unused
+ * @reqprot: unused
+ * @prot: unused
+ * @flags: unused
+ * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
+ * @addr_only: unused
+ *
+ * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
+ * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
+ * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
+ * -EPERM if not.
+ */
+int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+		  unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+{
+	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fa2341b68331..25c125eaa3d8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3104,7 +3104,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	}
 
 	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
-	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
 	if (rc || addr_only)
 		return rc;
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d583c0545808..a62197718768 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
 	int rc;
 
 	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
-	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
 	if (rc || addr_only)
 		return rc;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 13:30:51 -0400
Subject: split ->file_mmap() into ->mmap_addr()/->mmap_file()

... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 fs/exec.c                  |  4 ----
 include/linux/security.h   | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 mm/mmap.c                  | 12 ++++++++----
 mm/mremap.c                |  4 ++--
 mm/nommu.c                 |  5 ++++-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c    | 15 ++++-----------
 security/capability.c      |  3 ++-
 security/commoncap.c       | 21 +++------------------
 security/security.c        | 12 ++++++++----
 security/selinux/hooks.c   | 15 ++++++++-------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 15 +++++----------
 11 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 52c9e2ff6e6b..a79786a8d2c8 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -280,10 +280,6 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(vma->vm_flags);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vma->anon_vma_chain);
 
-	err = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
-	if (err)
-		goto err;
-
 	err = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
 	if (err)
 		goto err;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4ad59c9fa731..f1bae0963ddc 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -87,9 +87,8 @@ extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
 extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
-extern int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-			 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only);
+extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
 extern int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags);
 extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			  unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
@@ -587,15 +586,17 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	simple integer value.  When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
  *	should never be used by the security module.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_mmap :
+ * @mmap_addr :
+ *	Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
+ *	@addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
+ *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @mmap_file :
  *	Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
  *	if mapping anonymous memory.
  *	@file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
  *	@reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
  *	@prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
  *	@flags contains the operational flags.
- *	@addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
- *	@addr_only contains a boolean: 0 if file-backed VMA, otherwise 1.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @file_mprotect:
  *	Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
@@ -1482,10 +1483,10 @@ struct security_operations {
 	void (*file_free_security) (struct file *file);
 	int (*file_ioctl) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			   unsigned long arg);
-	int (*file_mmap) (struct file *file,
+	int (*mmap_addr) (unsigned long addr);
+	int (*mmap_file) (struct file *file,
 			  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
-			  unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
-			  unsigned long addr_only);
+			  unsigned long flags);
 	int (*file_mprotect) (struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 			      unsigned long reqprot,
 			      unsigned long prot);
@@ -1744,9 +1745,9 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
-int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-			unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only);
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot);
 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
@@ -2182,11 +2183,14 @@ static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 				     unsigned long prot,
-				     unsigned long flags,
-				     unsigned long addr,
-				     unsigned long addr_only)
+				     unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
 }
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 83c56624f1f6..49283da9a2ae 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -1101,7 +1101,11 @@ static unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 		}
 	}
 
-	error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
+	error = security_mmap_addr(addr);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	error = security_mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
@@ -1817,7 +1821,7 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	address &= PAGE_MASK;
-	error = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, address, 1);
+	error = security_mmap_addr(address);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
@@ -2205,7 +2209,7 @@ static unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
 	if (!len)
 		return addr;
 
-	error = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, addr, 1);
+	error = security_mmap_addr(addr);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
@@ -2561,7 +2565,7 @@ int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	vma->vm_ops = &special_mapping_vmops;
 	vma->vm_private_data = pages;
 
-	ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, vma->vm_start, 1);
+	ret = security_mmap_addr(vma->vm_start);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/mm/mremap.c b/mm/mremap.c
index 169c53b87749..ebf10892b63d 100644
--- a/mm/mremap.c
+++ b/mm/mremap.c
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static unsigned long mremap_to(unsigned long addr,
 	if ((addr <= new_addr) && (addr+old_len) > new_addr)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
+	ret = security_mmap_addr(new_addr);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mremap, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, old_len,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
+		ret = security_mmap_addr(new_addr);
 		if (ret)
 			goto out;
 		ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
index de6084e3a046..acfe419785db 100644
--- a/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/mm/nommu.c
@@ -1047,7 +1047,10 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file,
 	}
 
 	/* allow the security API to have its say */
-	ret = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
+	ret = security_mmap_addr(addr);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	ret = security_mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 8430d8937afb..8ea39aabe948 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -490,17 +490,9 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 	return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
 }
 
-static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			      unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-			      unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			      unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	/* do DAC check */
-	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
-	if (rc || addr_only)
-		return rc;
-
 	return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
 }
 
@@ -646,7 +638,8 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.file_permission =		apparmor_file_permission,
 	.file_alloc_security =		apparmor_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security =		apparmor_file_free_security,
-	.file_mmap =			apparmor_file_mmap,
+	.mmap_file =			apparmor_mmap_file,
+	.mmap_addr =			cap_mmap_addr,
 	.file_mprotect =		apparmor_file_mprotect,
 	.file_lock =			apparmor_file_lock,
 
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fca889676c5e..61095df8b89a 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mmap);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_addr);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_file);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ebac3618896e..6dbae4650abe 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -980,23 +980,8 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/*
- * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
- * @file: unused
- * @reqprot: unused
- * @prot: unused
- * @flags: unused
- * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
- * @addr_only: unused
- *
- * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
- * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
- * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
- * -EPERM if not.
- */
-int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-		  unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
-	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5497a57fba01..d91c66d3956b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -657,18 +657,22 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
-int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-			unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+	ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
 }
 
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+}
+
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			    unsigned long prot)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 25c125eaa3d8..372ec6502aa8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3083,9 +3083,7 @@ error:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-			     unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3104,10 +3102,12 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	}
 
 	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
-	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
-	if (rc || addr_only)
-		return rc;
+	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+}
 
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
 	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
@@ -5570,7 +5570,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security =		selinux_file_free_security,
 	.file_ioctl =			selinux_file_ioctl,
-	.file_mmap =			selinux_file_mmap,
+	.mmap_file =			selinux_mmap_file,
+	.mmap_addr =			selinux_mmap_addr,
 	.file_mprotect =		selinux_file_mprotect,
 	.file_lock =			selinux_file_lock,
 	.file_fcntl =			selinux_file_fcntl,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index a62197718768..ee0bb5735f35 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_file_mmap :
+ * smack_mmap_file :
  * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
  * if mapping anonymous memory.
  * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
@@ -1180,10 +1180,9 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
  * @flags contains the operational flags.
  * Return 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 			   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
-			   unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
-			   unsigned long addr_only)
+			   unsigned long flags)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_rule *srp;
@@ -1198,11 +1197,6 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
 	int tmay;
 	int rc;
 
-	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
-	rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
-	if (rc || addr_only)
-		return rc;
-
 	if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -3482,7 +3476,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
 	.file_lock = 			smack_file_lock,
 	.file_fcntl = 			smack_file_fcntl,
-	.file_mmap =			smack_file_mmap,
+	.mmap_file =			smack_mmap_file,
+	.mmap_addr =			cap_mmap_addr,
 	.file_set_fowner = 		smack_file_set_fowner,
 	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
 	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 4f1c28d241d0882f25112d494885cd6084db225b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 16:26:02 -0700
Subject: security/keys/keyctl.c: suppress memory allocation failure warning

This allocation may be large.  The code is probing to see if it will
succeed and if not, it falls back to vmalloc().  We should suppress any
page-allocation failure messages when the fallback happens.

Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index ddb3e05bc5fc..18f29de88fda 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
 	vm = false;
 	if (_payload) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
 		if (!payload) {
 			if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
 				goto error2;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 81ab6e7b26b453a795d46f2616ed0e31d97f05b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 16:26:15 -0700
Subject: kmod: convert two call sites to call_usermodehelper_fns()

Both kernel/sys.c && security/keys/request_key.c where inlining the exact
same code as call_usermodehelper_fns(); So simply convert these sites to
directly use call_usermodehelper_fns().

Signed-off-by: Boaz Harrosh <bharrosh@panasas.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 kernel/sys.c                | 19 ++++++++-----------
 security/keys/request_key.c | 13 +++----------
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 8b71cef3bf1a..6e81aa7e4688 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2114,7 +2114,6 @@ int orderly_poweroff(bool force)
 		NULL
 	};
 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
-	struct subprocess_info *info;
 
 	if (argv == NULL) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s failed to allocate memory for \"%s\"\n",
@@ -2122,18 +2121,16 @@ int orderly_poweroff(bool force)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	info = call_usermodehelper_setup(argv[0], argv, envp, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (info == NULL) {
-		argv_free(argv);
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	call_usermodehelper_setfns(info, NULL, argv_cleanup, NULL);
+	ret = call_usermodehelper_fns(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_NO_WAIT,
+				      NULL, argv_cleanup, NULL);
+out:
+	if (likely(!ret))
+		return 0;
 
-	ret = call_usermodehelper_exec(info, UMH_NO_WAIT);
+	if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+		argv_free(argv);
 
-  out:
-	if (ret && force) {
+	if (force) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "Failed to start orderly shutdown: "
 		       "forcing the issue\n");
 
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index cc3790315d2f..000e75017520 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -93,16 +93,9 @@ static void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)
 static int call_usermodehelper_keys(char *path, char **argv, char **envp,
 					struct key *session_keyring, int wait)
 {
-	gfp_t gfp_mask = (wait == UMH_NO_WAIT) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL;
-	struct subprocess_info *info =
-		call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, gfp_mask);
-
-	if (!info)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	call_usermodehelper_setfns(info, umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
-					key_get(session_keyring));
-	return call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);
+	return call_usermodehelper_fns(path, argv, envp, wait,
+				       umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
+				       key_get(session_keyring));
 }
 
 /*
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From ac34ebb3a67e699edcb5ac72f19d31679369dfaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christopher Yeoh <cyeoh@au1.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 16:26:42 -0700
Subject: aio/vfs: cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector() and
 compat_rw_copy_check_uvector()

A cleanup of rw_copy_check_uvector and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector after
changes made to support CMA in an earlier patch.

Rather than having an additional check_access parameter to these
functions, the first paramater type is overloaded to allow the caller to
specify CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY which means check that the contents of the iovec
are valid, but do not check the memory that they point to.  This is used
by process_vm_readv/writev where we need to validate that a iovec passed
to the syscall is valid but do not want to check the memory that it points
to at this point because it refers to an address space in another process.

Signed-off-by: Chris Yeoh <yeohc@au1.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---
 fs/aio.c               |  4 ++--
 fs/compat.c            |  6 +++---
 fs/read_write.c        |  7 +++----
 include/linux/compat.h |  3 +--
 include/linux/fs.h     | 12 ++++++++++--
 mm/process_vm_access.c | 16 ++++++++--------
 security/keys/compat.c |  2 +-
 security/keys/keyctl.c |  2 +-
 8 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index e7f2fad7b4ce..8c7c8b805372 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -1446,13 +1446,13 @@ static ssize_t aio_setup_vectored_rw(int type, struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
 		ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(type,
 				(struct compat_iovec __user *)kiocb->ki_buf,
 				kiocb->ki_nbytes, 1, &kiocb->ki_inline_vec,
-				&kiocb->ki_iovec, 1);
+				&kiocb->ki_iovec);
 	else
 #endif
 		ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(type,
 				(struct iovec __user *)kiocb->ki_buf,
 				kiocb->ki_nbytes, 1, &kiocb->ki_inline_vec,
-				&kiocb->ki_iovec, 1);
+				&kiocb->ki_iovec);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c
index 0781e619a62a..6556a9ce8a28 100644
--- a/fs/compat.c
+++ b/fs/compat.c
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ out:
 ssize_t compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(int type,
 		const struct compat_iovec __user *uvector, unsigned long nr_segs,
 		unsigned long fast_segs, struct iovec *fast_pointer,
-		struct iovec **ret_pointer, int check_access)
+		struct iovec **ret_pointer)
 {
 	compat_ssize_t tot_len;
 	struct iovec *iov = *ret_pointer = fast_pointer;
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ ssize_t compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(int type,
 		}
 		if (len < 0)	/* size_t not fitting in compat_ssize_t .. */
 			goto out;
-		if (check_access &&
+		if (type >= 0 &&
 		    !access_ok(vrfy_dir(type), compat_ptr(buf), len)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto out;
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ static ssize_t compat_do_readv_writev(int type, struct file *file,
 		goto out;
 
 	tot_len = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(type, uvector, nr_segs,
-					       UIO_FASTIOV, iovstack, &iov, 1);
+					       UIO_FASTIOV, iovstack, &iov);
 	if (tot_len == 0) {
 		ret = 0;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
index ffc99d22e0a3..c20614f86c01 100644
--- a/fs/read_write.c
+++ b/fs/read_write.c
@@ -633,8 +633,7 @@ ssize_t do_loop_readv_writev(struct file *filp, struct iovec *iov,
 ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,
 			      unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned long fast_segs,
 			      struct iovec *fast_pointer,
-			      struct iovec **ret_pointer,
-			      int check_access)
+			      struct iovec **ret_pointer)
 {
 	unsigned long seg;
 	ssize_t ret;
@@ -690,7 +689,7 @@ ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		if (check_access
+		if (type >= 0
 		    && unlikely(!access_ok(vrfy_dir(type), buf, len))) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto out;
@@ -723,7 +722,7 @@ static ssize_t do_readv_writev(int type, struct file *file,
 	}
 
 	ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(type, uvector, nr_segs,
-				    ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov, 1);
+				    ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
 	if (ret <= 0)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
index 5d46217f84ad..4e890394ef99 100644
--- a/include/linux/compat.h
+++ b/include/linux/compat.h
@@ -577,8 +577,7 @@ extern ssize_t compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(int type,
 		const struct compat_iovec __user *uvector,
 		unsigned long nr_segs,
 		unsigned long fast_segs, struct iovec *fast_pointer,
-		struct iovec **ret_pointer,
-		int check_access);
+		struct iovec **ret_pointer);
 
 extern void __user *compat_alloc_user_space(unsigned long len);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 038076b27ea4..cf2c5611b19b 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -173,6 +173,15 @@ struct inodes_stat_t {
 #define WRITE_FUA		(WRITE | REQ_SYNC | REQ_NOIDLE | REQ_FUA)
 #define WRITE_FLUSH_FUA		(WRITE | REQ_SYNC | REQ_NOIDLE | REQ_FLUSH | REQ_FUA)
 
+
+/*
+ * Flag for rw_copy_check_uvector and compat_rw_copy_check_uvector
+ * that indicates that they should check the contents of the iovec are
+ * valid, but not check the memory that the iovec elements
+ * points too.
+ */
+#define CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY -1
+
 #define SEL_IN		1
 #define SEL_OUT		2
 #define SEL_EX		4
@@ -1690,8 +1699,7 @@ struct seq_file;
 ssize_t rw_copy_check_uvector(int type, const struct iovec __user * uvector,
 			      unsigned long nr_segs, unsigned long fast_segs,
 			      struct iovec *fast_pointer,
-			      struct iovec **ret_pointer,
-			      int check_access);
+			      struct iovec **ret_pointer);
 
 extern ssize_t vfs_read(struct file *, char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
 extern ssize_t vfs_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
diff --git a/mm/process_vm_access.c b/mm/process_vm_access.c
index c20ff48994c2..926b46649749 100644
--- a/mm/process_vm_access.c
+++ b/mm/process_vm_access.c
@@ -371,15 +371,15 @@ static ssize_t process_vm_rw(pid_t pid,
 	/* Check iovecs */
 	if (vm_write)
 		rc = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, lvec, liovcnt, UIO_FASTIOV,
-					   iovstack_l, &iov_l, 1);
+					   iovstack_l, &iov_l);
 	else
 		rc = rw_copy_check_uvector(READ, lvec, liovcnt, UIO_FASTIOV,
-					   iovstack_l, &iov_l, 1);
+					   iovstack_l, &iov_l);
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		goto free_iovecs;
 
-	rc = rw_copy_check_uvector(READ, rvec, riovcnt, UIO_FASTIOV,
-				   iovstack_r, &iov_r, 0);
+	rc = rw_copy_check_uvector(CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY, rvec, riovcnt, UIO_FASTIOV,
+				   iovstack_r, &iov_r);
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		goto free_iovecs;
 
@@ -438,16 +438,16 @@ compat_process_vm_rw(compat_pid_t pid,
 	if (vm_write)
 		rc = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, lvec, liovcnt,
 						  UIO_FASTIOV, iovstack_l,
-						  &iov_l, 1);
+						  &iov_l);
 	else
 		rc = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(READ, lvec, liovcnt,
 						  UIO_FASTIOV, iovstack_l,
-						  &iov_l, 1);
+						  &iov_l);
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		goto free_iovecs;
-	rc = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(READ, rvec, riovcnt,
+	rc = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(CHECK_IOVEC_ONLY, rvec, riovcnt,
 					  UIO_FASTIOV, iovstack_r,
-					  &iov_r, 0);
+					  &iov_r);
 	if (rc <= 0)
 		goto free_iovecs;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index fab4f8dda6c6..c92d42b021aa 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
 
 	ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
 					   ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack),
-					   iovstack, &iov, 1);
+					   iovstack, &iov);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 	if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 18f29de88fda..21907ea35b15 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
 		goto no_payload;
 
 	ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
-				    ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov, 1);
+				    ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 	if (ret == 0)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8b3ec6814c83d76b85bd13badc48552836c24839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 17:11:23 -0400
Subject: take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 include/linux/security.h |  7 +++----
 ipc/shm.c                |  5 +++++
 mm/mmap.c                | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
 mm/nommu.c               | 22 ++++++++++++----------
 security/security.c      | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index f1bae0963ddc..4e5a73cdbbef 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1745,8 +1745,8 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
-int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+			unsigned long flags);
 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			   unsigned long prot);
@@ -2183,8 +2183,7 @@ static inline int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-				     unsigned long prot,
+static inline int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 				     unsigned long flags)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 406c5b208193..e3a8063b1768 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -1036,6 +1036,10 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong *raddr)
 	sfd->file = shp->shm_file;
 	sfd->vm_ops = NULL;
 
+	err = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_fput;
+
 	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 	if (addr && !(shmflg & SHM_REMAP)) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
@@ -1058,6 +1062,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong *raddr)
 invalid:
 	up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
 
+out_fput:
 	fput(file);
 
 out_nattch:
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index 49283da9a2ae..34b280f4238d 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -979,7 +979,6 @@ static unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	struct inode *inode;
 	vm_flags_t vm_flags;
 	int error;
-	unsigned long reqprot = prot;
 
 	/*
 	 * Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC?
@@ -1105,10 +1104,6 @@ static unsigned long do_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	error = security_mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
-	if (error)
-		return error;
-
 	return mmap_region(file, addr, len, flags, vm_flags, pgoff);
 }
 
@@ -1130,9 +1125,12 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	unsigned long ret;
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
 
-	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
-	ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, offset);
-	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flag);
+	if (!ret) {
+		down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+		ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, offset);
+		up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	}
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_mmap);
@@ -1168,9 +1166,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mmap_pgoff, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, len,
 
 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
 
-	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
-	retval = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
-	up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	retval = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
+	if (!retval) {
+		down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+		retval = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
+		up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	}
 
 	if (file)
 		fput(file);
diff --git a/mm/nommu.c b/mm/nommu.c
index acfe419785db..8cbfd623b04a 100644
--- a/mm/nommu.c
+++ b/mm/nommu.c
@@ -889,7 +889,6 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file,
 				 unsigned long *_capabilities)
 {
 	unsigned long capabilities, rlen;
-	unsigned long reqprot = prot;
 	int ret;
 
 	/* do the simple checks first */
@@ -1048,9 +1047,6 @@ static int validate_mmap_request(struct file *file,
 
 	/* allow the security API to have its say */
 	ret = security_mmap_addr(addr);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
-	ret = security_mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1492,9 +1488,12 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
 	unsigned long ret;
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
 
-	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
-	ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, offset);
-	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flag);
+	if (!ret) {
+		down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+		ret = do_mmap(file, addr, len, prot, flag, offset);
+		up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	}
 	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(vm_mmap);
@@ -1515,9 +1514,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mmap_pgoff, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, len,
 
 	flags &= ~(MAP_EXECUTABLE | MAP_DENYWRITE);
 
-	down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
-	retval = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
-	up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
+	if (!ret) {
+		down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+		retval = do_mmap_pgoff(file, addr, len, prot, flags, pgoff);
+		up_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem);
+	}
 
 	if (file)
 		fput(file);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d91c66d3956b..3b11b3b72fe2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
@@ -657,11 +660,35 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
-int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+			unsigned long flags)
 {
+	unsigned long reqprot = prot;
 	int ret;
-
+	/*
+	 * Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC?
+	 *
+	 * (the exception is when the underlying filesystem is noexec
+	 *  mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.)
+	 */
+	if (!(reqprot & PROT_READ))
+		goto out;
+	if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+		goto out;
+	if (!file) {
+		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
+	} else if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+		unsigned long caps = 0;
+		struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+		if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info)
+			caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities;
+		if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP))
+			goto out;
+#endif
+		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
+	}
+out:
 	ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 98de59bfe4b2ff6344d9ad8e5296f80de5dcc5b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 19:58:30 -0400
Subject: take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 security/security.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3b11b3b72fe2..3efc9b12aef4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -660,36 +660,46 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
-int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
-			unsigned long flags)
+static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
-	unsigned long reqprot = prot;
-	int ret;
 	/*
-	 * Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC?
-	 *
-	 * (the exception is when the underlying filesystem is noexec
-	 *  mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.)
+	 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
+	 * it to imply PROT_EXEC?  If not, nothing to talk about...
 	 */
-	if (!(reqprot & PROT_READ))
-		goto out;
+	if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
+		return prot;
 	if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
-		goto out;
-	if (!file) {
-		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
-	} else if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
+		return prot;
+	/*
+	 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
+	 */
+	if (!file)
+		return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+	/*
+	 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
+	 * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+	 */
+	if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
 		unsigned long caps = 0;
 		struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
 		if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info)
 			caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities;
 		if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP))
-			goto out;
+			return prot;
 #endif
-		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
+		return prot | PROT_EXEC;
 	}
-out:
-	ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
+	/* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
+	return prot;
+}
+
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+			unsigned long flags)
+{
+	int ret;
+	ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
+					mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3