/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ /* * Shared KUnit test cases for AEAD algorithms, including a benchmark * * Copyright 2026 Google LLC */ /* * This file implements KUnit test cases shared by the different KUnit test * suites for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms. * * Test suites including this file must #define the following: * * Data structs: * - AEAD_KEY: name of key struct * - AEAD_CTX: name of context for incremental computation * * Constants: * - AEAD_VALID_KEY_LENS: array of all valid key lengths in bytes * - AEAD_VALID_NONCE_LENS: array of all valid nonce lengths in bytes * - AEAD_VALID_TAG_LENS: array of all valid authtag lengths in bytes * - AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN: max key length in bytes (assumed to fit on stack) * - AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN: max nonce length in bytes (assumed to fit on stack) * - AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN: max authtag length in bytes (assumed to fit on stack) * - AEAD_MONTE_CARLO_CHECKSUM: checksum of a deterministically generated series * of (ciphertext, authtag) pairs (see test_aead_monte_carlo()) * * Functions: * - AEAD_PREPAREKEY: key preparation * - AEAD_ENCRYPT and AEAD_DECRYPT: one-shot encryption and decryption * - AEAD_INIT, AEAD_AUTH_UPDATE, AEAD_ENCRYPT_UPDATE, AEAD_ENCRYPT_FINAL, * AEAD_DECRYPT_UPDATE, AEAD_DECRYPT_FINAL: functions for incremental * encryption and decryption * * Function prototypes and their behavior must match the AES-CCM API. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "test-utils.h" /* * Allocate a KUnit-managed struct AEAD_KEY and prepare it with a random key, * using a random key length and random authentication tag length. */ static struct AEAD_KEY *aead_alloc_random_key(struct kunit *test, size_t *tag_len_ret) { size_t key_len = AEAD_VALID_KEY_LENS[rand32() % ARRAY_SIZE(AEAD_VALID_KEY_LENS)]; size_t tag_len = AEAD_VALID_TAG_LENS[rand32() % ARRAY_SIZE(AEAD_VALID_TAG_LENS)]; u8 raw_key[AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN]; struct AEAD_KEY *key = alloc_buf(test, sizeof(*key)); int err; rand_bytes(raw_key, key_len); err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(key, raw_key, key_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); *tag_len_ret = tag_len; return key; } /* * Allocate a KUnit-managed slab buffer of length @len bytes and initialize it * with random data. */ static u8 *aead_alloc_random_data(struct kunit *test, size_t len) { u8 *buf = alloc_buf(test, len); rand_bytes(buf, len); return buf; } /* * Allocate a KUnit-managed guarded buffer of length @len bytes and initialize * it with random data. */ static u8 *aead_alloc_random_data_guarded(struct kunit *test, size_t len) { u8 *buf = alloc_guarded_buf(test, len); rand_bytes(buf, len); return buf; } /* Process the given associated data using a random incremental strategy. */ static size_t aead_auth_incrementally(struct AEAD_CTX *ctx, const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len) { size_t num_parts = 0; size_t pos = 0; while (rand_bool()) { size_t part_len = rand_length(ad_len - pos); AEAD_AUTH_UPDATE(ctx, &ad[pos], part_len); pos += part_len; num_parts++; } if (pos < ad_len || rand_bool()) { AEAD_AUTH_UPDATE(ctx, &ad[pos], ad_len - pos); num_parts++; } return num_parts; } /* Process the given en/decrypted data using a random incremental strategy. */ static size_t aead_crypt_incrementally(struct AEAD_CTX *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, bool enc) { size_t num_parts = 0; size_t pos = 0; while (rand_bool()) { size_t part_len = rand_length(data_len - pos); if (enc) AEAD_ENCRYPT_UPDATE(ctx, &dst[pos], &src[pos], part_len); else AEAD_DECRYPT_UPDATE(ctx, &dst[pos], &src[pos], part_len); pos += part_len; num_parts++; } if (pos < data_len || rand_bool()) { if (enc) AEAD_ENCRYPT_UPDATE(ctx, &dst[pos], &src[pos], data_len - pos); else AEAD_DECRYPT_UPDATE(ctx, &dst[pos], &src[pos], data_len - pos); num_parts++; } return num_parts; } struct aead_incremental_info { size_t num_data_parts; size_t num_ad_parts; }; static const char *aead_incr_info_str(struct kunit *test, const struct aead_incremental_info *info) { const size_t max_str_len = 64; char *str = alloc_buf(test, max_str_len); snprintf(str, max_str_len, "num_data_parts=%zu num_ad_parts=%zu", info->num_data_parts, info->num_ad_parts); return str; } /* * Encrypt data using a random incremental strategy. * Return information about the incremental strategy used. */ static struct aead_incremental_info aead_encrypt_incrementally(struct kunit *test, struct AEAD_CTX *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, u8 *tag, const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len, const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const struct AEAD_KEY *key) { struct aead_incremental_info info; int err; err = AEAD_INIT(ctx, data_len, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); info.num_ad_parts = aead_auth_incrementally(ctx, ad, ad_len); info.num_data_parts = aead_crypt_incrementally(ctx, dst, src, data_len, /* enc= */ true); AEAD_ENCRYPT_FINAL(ctx, tag); KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG(test, mem_is_zero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)), "encrypt_final didn't zeroize context"); return info; } /* * Decrypt authentic data using a random incremental strategy. * Return information about the incremental strategy used. */ static struct aead_incremental_info aead_decrypt_incrementally(struct kunit *test, struct AEAD_CTX *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t data_len, const u8 *tag, const u8 *ad, size_t ad_len, const u8 *nonce, size_t nonce_len, const struct AEAD_KEY *key) { struct aead_incremental_info info; int err; err = AEAD_INIT(ctx, data_len, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); info.num_ad_parts = aead_auth_incrementally(ctx, ad, ad_len); info.num_data_parts = aead_crypt_incrementally(ctx, dst, src, data_len, /* enc= */ false); err = AEAD_DECRYPT_FINAL(ctx, tag); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG(test, mem_is_zero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)), "decrypt_final didn't zeroize context"); return info; } /* Return true if key_len is declared to be a valid key length. */ static bool aead_is_key_len_expected_valid(size_t key_len) { for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(AEAD_VALID_KEY_LENS); i++) { if (AEAD_VALID_KEY_LENS[i] == key_len) return true; } return false; } /* Return true if nonce_len is declared to be a valid nonce length. */ static bool aead_is_nonce_len_expected_valid(size_t nonce_len) { for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(AEAD_VALID_NONCE_LENS); i++) { if (AEAD_VALID_NONCE_LENS[i] == nonce_len) return true; } return false; } /* Return true if tag_len is declared to be a valid tag length. */ static bool aead_is_tag_len_expected_valid(size_t tag_len) { for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(AEAD_VALID_TAG_LENS); i++) { if (AEAD_VALID_TAG_LENS[i] == tag_len) return true; } return false; } struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx { struct AEAD_KEY key; struct AEAD_CTX ctx; u8 *raw_key_buf_end; u8 *nonce_buf_end; u8 *tag_buf_end; u8 pt[64]; /* plaintext */ u8 ct[64]; /* ciphertext */ u8 decrypted[64]; u8 ad[16]; /* associated data */ u8 *unused_buf; size_t data_len; size_t ad_len; }; static struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx * aead_alloc_basic_validation_test_ctx(struct kunit *test) { struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx *ctx = alloc_buf(test, sizeof(*ctx)); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); ctx->raw_key_buf_end = aead_alloc_random_data_guarded(test, AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN) + AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN; ctx->nonce_buf_end = aead_alloc_random_data_guarded(test, AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN) + AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN; ctx->tag_buf_end = aead_alloc_random_data_guarded(test, AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN) + AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN; /* * A pointer to this buffer is passed when passing a length that is * expected to be invalid. It should never actually be accessed. */ ctx->unused_buf = alloc_buf(test, max3(AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN, AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN, AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN)); ctx->data_len = sizeof(ctx->pt); ctx->ad_len = sizeof(ctx->ad); return ctx; } /* * Given an expected-valid key_len, nonce_len, and tag_len, verify round-trip * encryption and decryption with them. Use guarded buffers for each of the raw * key, nonce, and tag to detect any buffer overruns in them. Also, verify that * every byte of the tag is actually checked. */ static void aead_do_basic_checks(struct kunit *test, struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx *ctx, size_t key_len, size_t nonce_len, size_t tag_len) { /* Set up exact-size guarded buffers for (raw_key, nonce, tag). */ const u8 *raw_key = ctx->raw_key_buf_end - key_len; const u8 *nonce = ctx->nonce_buf_end - nonce_len; u8 *tag = ctx->tag_buf_end - tag_len; int err; /* Key preparation should succeed. */ err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(&ctx->key, raw_key, key_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, 0, err, "key_len=%zu, tag_len=%zu wasn't accepted", key_len, tag_len); /* Encryption should succeed. */ err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(ctx->ct, ctx->pt, ctx->data_len, tag, ctx->ad, ctx->ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, &ctx->key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG( test, 0, err, "Encryption failed with key_len=%zu, nonce_len=%zu, tag_len=%zu", key_len, nonce_len, tag_len); /* Decryption should succeed and give the original data. */ err = AEAD_DECRYPT(ctx->decrypted, ctx->ct, ctx->data_len, tag, ctx->ad, ctx->ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, &ctx->key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG( test, 0, err, "Decryption failed with key_len=%zu, nonce_len=%zu, tag_len=%zu", key_len, nonce_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ_MSG( test, ctx->pt, ctx->decrypted, ctx->data_len, "Decryption gave wrong output with key_len=%zu, nonce_len=%zu, tag_len=%zu", key_len, nonce_len, tag_len); /* * Every byte of the tag should actually be checked. * And on authentication failure, the dst buffer should be cleared. */ for (size_t i = 0; i < tag_len; i++) { memset(ctx->decrypted, 0xff, ctx->data_len); tag[i] ^= 1; err = AEAD_DECRYPT(ctx->decrypted, ctx->ct, ctx->data_len, tag, ctx->ad, ctx->ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, &ctx->key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG( test, -EBADMSG, err, "Decryption with bad auth tag with key_len=%zu, nonce_len=%zu, tag_len=%zu didn't fail with -EBADMSG", key_len, nonce_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG( test, mem_is_zero(ctx->decrypted, ctx->data_len), "dst wasn't cleared on authentication failure"); tag[i] ^= 1; } } /* Verify that the given expected-invalid key_len is actually rejected. */ static void aead_verify_invalid_key_len(struct kunit *test, struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx *ctx, size_t key_len) { int err; /* * The preparekey function should reject the key_len. It should do so * before writing to the key struct. */ memset(&ctx->key, 0, sizeof(ctx->key)); err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(&ctx->key, ctx->unused_buf, key_len, AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, -EINVAL, err, "key_len=%zu wasn't rejected with -EINVAL", key_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG( test, mem_is_zero(&ctx->key, sizeof(ctx->key)), "Key struct was written to before length validation"); } /* * Test that every valid key length is accepted and basic checks pass with it, * and test that invalid key lengths are rejected. */ static void test_aead_all_key_lens(struct kunit *test) { struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx *ctx = aead_alloc_basic_validation_test_ctx(test); for (size_t key_len = 0; key_len <= AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN; key_len++) { if (aead_is_key_len_expected_valid(key_len)) aead_do_basic_checks(test, ctx, key_len, AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN, AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN); else aead_verify_invalid_key_len(test, ctx, key_len); } aead_verify_invalid_key_len(test, ctx, AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN + 1); aead_verify_invalid_key_len(test, ctx, AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN * 2); aead_verify_invalid_key_len(test, ctx, U32_MAX); aead_verify_invalid_key_len(test, ctx, SIZE_MAX); } /* Verify that the given expected-invalid nonce_len is actually rejected. */ static void aead_verify_invalid_nonce_len(struct kunit *test, struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx *ctx, size_t nonce_len) { static const u8 raw_key[AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN]; int err; /* Key preparation should succeed, as nonce_len isn't given yet. */ err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(&ctx->key, raw_key, sizeof(raw_key), AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); /* The init function should reject the nonce_len. */ memset(&ctx->ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx->ctx)); err = AEAD_INIT(&ctx->ctx, ctx->data_len, ctx->ad_len, ctx->unused_buf, nonce_len, &ctx->key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, -EINVAL, err, "nonce_len=%zu wasn't rejected with -EINVAL (init)", nonce_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG( test, mem_is_zero(&ctx->ctx, sizeof(ctx->ctx)), "Context struct was written to before length validation"); /* The encrypt function should reject the nonce_len. */ err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(ctx->ct, ctx->pt, ctx->data_len, ctx->unused_buf, ctx->ad, ctx->ad_len, ctx->unused_buf, nonce_len, &ctx->key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG( test, -EINVAL, err, "nonce_len=%zu wasn't rejected with -EINVAL (encrypt)", nonce_len); /* The decrypt function should reject the nonce_len. */ err = AEAD_DECRYPT(ctx->pt, ctx->ct, ctx->data_len, ctx->unused_buf, ctx->ad, ctx->ad_len, ctx->unused_buf, nonce_len, &ctx->key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG( test, -EINVAL, err, "nonce_len=%zu wasn't rejected with -EINVAL (decrypt)", nonce_len); } /* * Test that every valid nonce length is accepted and basic checks pass with it, * and test that invalid nonce lengths are rejected. */ static void test_aead_all_nonce_lens(struct kunit *test) { struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx *ctx = aead_alloc_basic_validation_test_ctx(test); for (size_t nonce_len = 0; nonce_len <= AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN; nonce_len++) { if (aead_is_nonce_len_expected_valid(nonce_len)) aead_do_basic_checks(test, ctx, AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN, nonce_len, AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN); else aead_verify_invalid_nonce_len(test, ctx, nonce_len); } aead_verify_invalid_nonce_len(test, ctx, AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN + 1); aead_verify_invalid_nonce_len(test, ctx, AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN * 2); aead_verify_invalid_nonce_len(test, ctx, U32_MAX); aead_verify_invalid_nonce_len(test, ctx, SIZE_MAX); } /* Verify that the given expected-invalid tag_len is actually rejected. */ static void aead_verify_invalid_tag_len(struct kunit *test, struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx *ctx, size_t tag_len) { static const u8 raw_key[AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN]; int err; /* * The preparekey function should reject the tag_len. It should do so * before writing to the key struct. */ memset(&ctx->key, 0, sizeof(ctx->key)); err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(&ctx->key, raw_key, sizeof(raw_key), tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG(test, -EINVAL, err, "tag_len=%zu wasn't rejected with -EINVAL", tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG( test, mem_is_zero(&ctx->key, sizeof(ctx->key)), "Key struct was written to before length validation"); } /* * Test that every valid authentication tag length is accepted and basic checks * pass with it, and test that invalid authentication tag lengths are rejected. */ static void test_aead_all_tag_lens(struct kunit *test) { struct aead_basic_validation_test_ctx *ctx = aead_alloc_basic_validation_test_ctx(test); for (size_t tag_len = 0; tag_len <= AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN; tag_len++) { if (aead_is_tag_len_expected_valid(tag_len)) aead_do_basic_checks(test, ctx, AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN, AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN, tag_len); else aead_verify_invalid_tag_len(test, ctx, tag_len); } aead_verify_invalid_tag_len(test, ctx, AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN + 1); aead_verify_invalid_tag_len(test, ctx, AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN * 2); aead_verify_invalid_tag_len(test, ctx, U32_MAX); aead_verify_invalid_tag_len(test, ctx, SIZE_MAX); } /* * Test that one-shot encryption and decryption are consistent with each other * and with incremental encryption and decryption. */ static void test_aead_incremental_updates(struct kunit *test) { const size_t max_data_len = 1024; const size_t max_ad_len = 512; const size_t nonce_len = AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN; size_t tag_len; struct AEAD_KEY *key = aead_alloc_random_key(test, &tag_len); struct AEAD_CTX *ctx = alloc_buf(test, sizeof(*ctx)); u8 *pt = aead_alloc_random_data(test, max_data_len); u8 *ad = aead_alloc_random_data(test, max_ad_len); u8 *nonce = aead_alloc_random_data(test, nonce_len); u8 *ct = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *ct2 = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *decrypted = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *tag = alloc_buf(test, tag_len); u8 *tag2 = alloc_buf(test, tag_len); int err; for (int i = 0; i < 500; i++) { /* Select the lengths to test. */ const size_t data_len = rand_length(max_data_len); const size_t ad_len = rand_length(max_ad_len); struct aead_incremental_info incr_info; /* Try one-shot encryption and decryption. */ err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(ct, pt, data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_DECRYPT(decrypted, ct, data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ_MSG( test, pt, decrypted, data_len, "Decryption didn't invert encryption; data_len=%zu, ad_len=%zu", data_len, ad_len); /* Try incremental encryption and decryption. */ incr_info = aead_encrypt_incrementally(test, ctx, ct2, pt, data_len, tag2, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ_MSG( test, ct, ct2, data_len, "One-shot and incremental encryption gave different ciphertexts; data_len=%zu ad_len=%zu %s", data_len, ad_len, aead_incr_info_str(test, &incr_info)); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ_MSG( test, tag, tag2, tag_len, "One-shot and incremental encryption gave different auth tags; data_len=%zu ad_len=%zu %s", data_len, ad_len, aead_incr_info_str(test, &incr_info)); incr_info = aead_decrypt_incrementally(test, ctx, decrypted, ct2, data_len, tag2, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ_MSG( test, pt, decrypted, data_len, "One-shot and incremental decryption gave different plaintexts; data_len=%zu ad_len=%zu %s", data_len, ad_len, aead_incr_info_str(test, &incr_info)); } } /* * Test using guarded buffers for the plaintext, ciphertext, and associated * data. This detects out-of-bounds accesses, even in assembly code. * * Note: other test cases cover overrun of raw_key, nonce, and tag. */ static void test_aead_data_buffer_overruns(struct kunit *test) { const size_t max_data_len = 1024; const size_t max_ad_len = 512; const size_t nonce_len = AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN; size_t tag_len; struct AEAD_KEY *key = aead_alloc_random_key(test, &tag_len); const u8 *nonce = aead_alloc_random_data(test, nonce_len); const u8 *pt_end = aead_alloc_random_data_guarded(test, max_data_len) + max_data_len; const u8 *ad_end = aead_alloc_random_data_guarded(test, max_ad_len) + max_ad_len; u8 *ct_end = alloc_guarded_buf(test, max_data_len) + max_data_len; u8 *decrypted_end = alloc_guarded_buf(test, max_data_len) + max_data_len; u8 *tag = alloc_buf(test, tag_len); for (int i = 0; i < 200; i++) { /* Select the lengths to test. */ const size_t data_len = rand_length(max_data_len); const size_t ad_len = rand_length(max_ad_len); /* Set up exact-size guarded buffers. */ const u8 *pt = pt_end - data_len; const u8 *ad = ad_end - ad_len; u8 *ct = ct_end - data_len; u8 *decrypted = decrypted_end - data_len; int err; /* Encrypt and decrypt. */ err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(ct, pt, data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_DECRYPT(decrypted, ct, data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ_MSG( test, pt, decrypted, data_len, "Decryption didn't invert encryption; data_len=%zu, ad_len=%zu", data_len, ad_len); } } /* * Test that encryption and decryption produce the same results regardless of * how the buffers are aligned in memory. */ static void test_aead_alignment_consistency(struct kunit *test) { const size_t max_data_len = 4096; const size_t max_ad_len = 4096; const size_t max_offset = 128; const size_t nonce_len = AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN; const size_t key_len = AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN; const size_t tag_len = AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN; u8 *raw_key1_buf = alloc_buf(test, key_len + max_offset); u8 *raw_key2_buf = alloc_buf(test, key_len + max_offset); u8 *nonce1_buf = alloc_buf(test, nonce_len + max_offset); u8 *nonce2_buf = alloc_buf(test, nonce_len + max_offset); u8 *pt1_buf = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *pt2_buf = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *ct1_buf = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *ct2_buf = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *ad1_buf = alloc_buf(test, max_ad_len); u8 *ad2_buf = alloc_buf(test, max_ad_len); u8 *tag1_buf = alloc_buf(test, tag_len + max_offset); u8 *tag2_buf = alloc_buf(test, tag_len + max_offset); struct AEAD_KEY *key = alloc_buf(test, sizeof(*key)); int err; for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) { /* Generate lengths. */ size_t data_len = rand_length(max_data_len); size_t ad_len = rand_length(max_ad_len); /* Generate two sets of alignments. */ u8 *raw_key1 = raw_key1_buf + rand_offset(max_offset); u8 *raw_key2 = raw_key2_buf + rand_offset(max_offset); u8 *nonce1 = nonce1_buf + rand_offset(max_offset); u8 *nonce2 = nonce2_buf + rand_offset(max_offset); u8 *pt1 = pt1_buf + rand_offset(max_data_len - data_len); u8 *pt2 = pt2_buf + rand_offset(max_data_len - data_len); u8 *ct1 = ct1_buf + rand_offset(max_data_len - data_len); u8 *ct2 = ct2_buf + rand_offset(max_data_len - data_len); u8 *ad1 = ad1_buf + rand_offset(max_ad_len - ad_len); u8 *ad2 = ad2_buf + rand_offset(max_ad_len - ad_len); u8 *tag1 = tag1_buf + rand_offset(max_offset); u8 *tag2 = tag2_buf + rand_offset(max_offset); /* * Generate inputs in the first set of buffers using the first * set of alignments. */ rand_bytes(raw_key1, key_len); rand_bytes(nonce1, nonce_len); rand_bytes(pt1, data_len); rand_bytes(ad1, ad_len); /* * Copy the inputs to the second set of buffers using the second * set of alignments. */ memcpy(raw_key2, raw_key1, key_len); memcpy(nonce2, nonce1, nonce_len); memcpy(pt2, pt1, data_len); memcpy(ad2, ad1, ad_len); /* Verify encryption consistency. */ err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(key, raw_key1, key_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(ct1, pt1, data_len, tag1, ad1, ad_len, nonce1, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(key, raw_key2, key_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(ct2, pt2, data_len, tag2, ad2, ad_len, nonce2, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ(test, ct1, ct2, data_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ(test, tag1, tag2, tag_len); /* Verify decryption consistency. */ err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(key, raw_key1, key_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_DECRYPT(pt1, ct1, data_len, tag1, ad1, ad_len, nonce1, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(key, raw_key2, key_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_DECRYPT(pt2, ct2, data_len, tag2, ad2, ad_len, nonce2, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ(test, pt1, pt2, data_len); } } static void test_aead_inplace(struct kunit *test) { const size_t max_data_len = 1024; const size_t max_ad_len = 512; const size_t nonce_len = AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN; size_t tag_len; struct AEAD_KEY *key = aead_alloc_random_key(test, &tag_len); u8 *data = aead_alloc_random_data(test, max_data_len + tag_len); u8 *data2 = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len + tag_len); u8 *ad = aead_alloc_random_data(test, max_ad_len); const u8 *nonce = aead_alloc_random_data(test, nonce_len); for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) { size_t data_len = rand_length(max_data_len); size_t ad_len = rand_length(max_ad_len); int err; /* Encrypt out-of-place. */ err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(data2, data, data_len, data2 + data_len, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); /* Encrypt in-place. */ err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(data, data, data_len, data + data_len, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); /* Compare the results. */ KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ(test, data2, data, data_len + tag_len); /* Decrypt out-of-place. */ err = AEAD_DECRYPT(data2, data, data_len, data + data_len, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); /* Decrypt in-place. */ err = AEAD_DECRYPT(data, data, data_len, data + data_len, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); /* Compare the results. */ KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ(test, data2, data, data_len); } } /* * Monte-Carlo test for AEAD algorithms. This deterministically generates * random AEAD inputs, encrypts them, verifies decryption, and computes and * verifies the checksum of all computed (ciphertext, tag) pairs. */ static void test_aead_monte_carlo(struct kunit *test) { const size_t max_data_len = 1024; const size_t max_ad_len = 293; u8 raw_key[AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN]; u8 nonce[AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN]; u8 tag[AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN]; u8 *pt = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *ct = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *decrypted = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); u8 *ad = alloc_buf(test, max_ad_len); struct AEAD_KEY *key = alloc_buf(test, sizeof(*key)); struct blake2s_ctx checksum_ctx; u8 actual_checksum[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE]; int err; blake2s_init(&checksum_ctx, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE); for (size_t data_len = 0; data_len <= max_data_len; data_len++) { size_t ad_len = data_len % max_ad_len; size_t key_len = AEAD_VALID_KEY_LENS[data_len % ARRAY_SIZE(AEAD_VALID_KEY_LENS)]; size_t nonce_len = AEAD_VALID_NONCE_LENS[data_len % ARRAY_SIZE(AEAD_VALID_NONCE_LENS)]; size_t tag_len = AEAD_VALID_TAG_LENS[data_len % ARRAY_SIZE(AEAD_VALID_TAG_LENS)]; rand_bytes_seeded_from_len(pt, data_len); rand_bytes_seeded_from_len(ad, ad_len); rand_bytes_seeded_from_len(raw_key, key_len); rand_bytes_seeded_from_len(nonce, nonce_len); err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(key, raw_key, key_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(ct, pt, data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG( test, 0, err, "Encryption failed with data_len=%zu, ad_len=%zu", data_len, ad_len); err = AEAD_DECRYPT(decrypted, ct, data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ_MSG( test, 0, err, "Decryption failed with data_len=%zu, ad_len=%zu", data_len, ad_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_MEMEQ_MSG( test, pt, decrypted, data_len, "Decryption didn't invert encryption; data_len=%zu, ad_len=%zu", data_len, ad_len); blake2s_update(&checksum_ctx, ct, data_len); blake2s_update(&checksum_ctx, tag, tag_len); } blake2s_final(&checksum_ctx, actual_checksum); KUNIT_EXPECT_MEMEQ_MSG(test, actual_checksum, AEAD_MONTE_CARLO_CHECKSUM, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, "Monte-Carlo checksum mismatch"); } #define IRQ_TEST_DATA_LEN 256 #define IRQ_TEST_NUM_BUFFERS 3 /* matches max concurrency level */ struct aead_irq_test_slot { /* Fields written only at test case initialization time */ u8 raw_key[AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN]; u8 nonce[AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN]; u8 pt[IRQ_TEST_DATA_LEN]; u8 ct[IRQ_TEST_DATA_LEN + AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN]; u8 ad[IRQ_TEST_DATA_LEN]; /* Fields written throughout the test case */ struct AEAD_KEY key; u8 scratch_buf[IRQ_TEST_DATA_LEN + AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN]; int phase; atomic_t in_use; }; struct aead_irq_test_state { struct aead_irq_test_slot slots[IRQ_TEST_NUM_BUFFERS]; }; static bool aead_irq_test_func(void *state_) { struct aead_irq_test_state *state = state_; struct aead_irq_test_slot *slot; size_t data_len; bool ok = true; /* * Find a free slot. This should always succeed, since the number of * slots is equal to the max concurrency level of kunit_run_irq_test(). */ for (slot = &state->slots[0]; slot < &state->slots[ARRAY_SIZE(state->slots)]; slot++) { if (atomic_cmpxchg(&slot->in_use, 0, 1) == 0) break; } if (WARN_ON_ONCE(slot == &state->slots[ARRAY_SIZE(state->slots)])) return false; /* * This execution context now has exclusive access to 'slot'. * Next, execute the next operation that the slot is set to perform. */ data_len = sizeof(slot->pt); if (slot->phase == 0) { /* Phase 0: Prepare slot's key in current context. */ ok = ok && AEAD_PREPAREKEY(&slot->key, slot->raw_key, sizeof(slot->raw_key), AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN) == 0; } else if (slot->phase == 1) { /* * Phase 1: Encrypt plaintext using key that may have been * prepared in a different context. */ ok = ok && AEAD_ENCRYPT(slot->scratch_buf, slot->pt, data_len, &slot->scratch_buf[data_len], slot->ad, sizeof(slot->ad), slot->nonce, sizeof(slot->nonce), &slot->key) == 0; /* Verify the ciphertext (with concatenated auth tag) matches */ ok = ok && memcmp(slot->scratch_buf, slot->ct, sizeof(slot->ct)) == 0; } else { /* * Phase 2: Decrypt ciphertext using key that may have been * prepared in a different context. */ ok = ok && AEAD_DECRYPT(slot->scratch_buf, slot->ct, data_len, &slot->ct[data_len], slot->ad, sizeof(slot->ad), slot->nonce, sizeof(slot->nonce), &slot->key) == 0; /* Verify the plaintext matches. */ ok = ok && memcmp(slot->scratch_buf, slot->pt, data_len) == 0; } slot->phase = (slot->phase + 1) % 3; atomic_set_release(&slot->in_use, 0); return ok; } /* * Test that encryption and decryption produce the correct results in task, * softirq, and hardirq contexts running concurrently -- including with keys * prepared in other contexts. This is needed to cover fallback code paths that * execute in contexts where FPU or vector registers cannot be used. */ static void test_aead_interrupt_context(struct kunit *test) { struct aead_irq_test_state *state = alloc_buf(test, sizeof(*state)); memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state)); /* * For each slot, generate a set of AEAD inputs: a key, a nonce, a * plaintext, and some associated data. Then generate the corresponding * ciphertext with concatenated auth tag. */ for (int i = 0; i < IRQ_TEST_NUM_BUFFERS; i++) { struct aead_irq_test_slot *slot = &state->slots[i]; int err; rand_bytes(slot->raw_key, sizeof(slot->raw_key)); rand_bytes(slot->nonce, sizeof(slot->nonce)); rand_bytes(slot->pt, sizeof(slot->pt)); rand_bytes(slot->ad, sizeof(slot->ad)); err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(&slot->key, slot->raw_key, sizeof(slot->raw_key), AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(slot->ct, slot->pt, sizeof(slot->pt), &slot->ct[sizeof(slot->pt)], slot->ad, sizeof(slot->ad), slot->nonce, sizeof(slot->nonce), &slot->key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); } kunit_run_irq_test(test, aead_irq_test_func, 100000, state); } /* Benchmark AEAD encryption and decryption on various data lengths. */ static void benchmark_aead(struct kunit *test) { static const size_t data_lens_to_test[] = { 16, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 1420, 4096, 16384, }; const size_t max_data_len = 16384; const size_t ad_len = 16; const size_t key_len = AEAD_MAX_KEY_LEN; const size_t nonce_len = AEAD_MAX_NONCE_LEN; const size_t tag_len = AEAD_MAX_TAG_LEN; const u8 *raw_key, *nonce, *ad; u8 *pt, *ct, *tag; struct AEAD_KEY *key; int err; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BENCHMARK)) kunit_skip(test, "not enabled"); raw_key = aead_alloc_random_data(test, key_len); nonce = aead_alloc_random_data(test, nonce_len); ad = aead_alloc_random_data(test, ad_len); pt = aead_alloc_random_data(test, max_data_len); ct = alloc_buf(test, max_data_len); tag = alloc_buf(test, tag_len); key = alloc_buf(test, sizeof(*key)); err = AEAD_PREPAREKEY(key, raw_key, key_len, tag_len); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); /* Warm-up */ for (size_t i = 0; i < 10000000; i += max_data_len) { err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(ct, pt, max_data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); err = AEAD_DECRYPT(pt, ct, max_data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, 0, err); } for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(data_lens_to_test); i++) { size_t data_len = data_lens_to_test[i]; size_t num_iters = 10000000 / (data_len + 128); u64 t_enc, t_dec; bool ok = true; KUNIT_ASSERT_LE(test, data_len, max_data_len); preempt_disable(); t_enc = ktime_get_ns(); for (size_t j = 0; j < num_iters; j++) { err = AEAD_ENCRYPT(ct, pt, data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); ok &= (err == 0); } t_enc = ktime_get_ns() - t_enc; t_dec = ktime_get_ns(); for (size_t j = 0; j < num_iters; j++) { err = AEAD_DECRYPT(pt, ct, data_len, tag, ad, ad_len, nonce, nonce_len, key); ok &= (err == 0); } t_dec = ktime_get_ns() - t_dec; preempt_enable(); KUNIT_ASSERT_TRUE_MSG(test, ok, "data_len=%zu", data_len); kunit_info(test, "data_len=%zu: enc %llu MB/s, dec %llu MB/s", data_len, div64_u64((u64)data_len * num_iters * 1000, t_enc ?: 1), div64_u64((u64)data_len * num_iters * 1000, t_dec ?: 1)); } } /* clang-format off */ #define AEAD_KUNIT_CASES \ KUNIT_CASE(test_aead_all_key_lens), \ KUNIT_CASE(test_aead_all_nonce_lens), \ KUNIT_CASE(test_aead_all_tag_lens), \ KUNIT_CASE(test_aead_incremental_updates), \ KUNIT_CASE(test_aead_data_buffer_overruns), \ KUNIT_CASE(test_aead_alignment_consistency), \ KUNIT_CASE(test_aead_inplace), \ KUNIT_CASE(test_aead_monte_carlo), \ KUNIT_CASE(test_aead_interrupt_context), \ KUNIT_CASE(benchmark_aead)