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| author | Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu> | 2026-07-04 14:03:32 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> | 2026-07-13 09:30:18 +0200 |
| commit | 5d9e3bf34fec9a5d237e4b7cef4a707bc2e091bc (patch) | |
| tree | 53f826798095e0cb14fc39b931ed6b7afb04869e | |
| parent | 3f1f755366687d051174739fb99f7d560202f60b (diff) | |
| download | linux-next-5d9e3bf34fec9a5d237e4b7cef4a707bc2e091bc.tar.gz linux-next-5d9e3bf34fec9a5d237e4b7cef4a707bc2e091bc.zip | |
xfrm6: fix out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr() when secpath is full
The depth check in xfrm6_input_addr() is off by one:
if (1 + sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH)
goto drop;
...
sp->xvec[sp->len++] = x;
xfrm_input() can leave sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH, and the transport-mode
receive path re-enters IPv6 input via xfrm_trans_reinject() with that
secpath preserved. If the inner packet carries a destination-options HAO
option or a type-2 routing header, xfrm6_input_addr() is called with
sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH; the check (1 + 6 == 6) is false, so
sp->xvec[sp->len++] writes one slot past the 6-element xvec[]. The write
stays within the sec_path allocation (invisible to KASAN); UBSAN_BOUNDS
flags it and panics under panic_on_warn.
Use "sp->len >= XFRM_MAX_DEPTH", matching xfrm_input(). This also
restores one chain level the old check rejected at sp->len == 5.
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c:309:10
index 6 is out of range for type 'xfrm_state *[6]'
Fixes: 9473e1f631de ("[XFRM] MIPv6: Fix to input RO state correctly.")
Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c index 89d0443b5307..07edef258984 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr, goto drop; } - if (1 + sp->len == XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) { + if (sp->len >= XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) { XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINBUFFERERROR); goto drop; } |