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authorStephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>2026-09-11 12:37:35 -0400
committerPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>2026-09-15 17:28:06 -0400
commit8be71e1ba093cb3aee90c7cf6b403d1fd71a77e9 (patch)
treea919095b479eaacb9f4c4b4f0e042d82d2aabae7
parent3b0744a6358624d46f7ee2573faca2b7d92cf32b (diff)
downloadlinux-next-8be71e1ba093cb3aee90c7cf6b403d1fd71a77e9.tar.gz
linux-next-8be71e1ba093cb3aee90c7cf6b403d1fd71a77e9.zip
selinux: mark status and policy inodes as immutable, drop status mmap write checks
The selinuxfs "status" and "policy" files are read-only interfaces that are also mmap'd by userspace. They are created 0444 by simple_fill_super() but a CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE caller can still open them O_WRONLY/O_RDWR, open(O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) them, or truncate(2) them. Mark both inodes S_IMMUTABLE at fill_super time. inode_permission() tests IS_IMMUTABLE before the DAC / capability checks, so all of the above are rejected at the VFS layer without ever reaching the file operations. Since a writable file can no longer exist, do_mmap() clear VM_MAYWRITE for MAP_SHARED mappings on its own, and the sel_mmap_handle_status() write/mprotect guards are dead; drop them. MAP_PRIVATE writable mappings become permitted (they were previously -EPERM) and CoW harmlessly to a private page, matching how sel_mmap_policy() has always treated the private case. The sel_mmap_policy() VM_SHARED guard becomes redundant for the same reason; leave dropping it to the pending "selinux: reject writable opens of policy file, drop mmap shared/write check" patch so that the patches do not conflict. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/aqPUqU3eZeFrykj3@gremlin/ cc: ljs@kernel.org cc: jannh@google.com cc: jack@suse.cz cc: cgzones@googlemail.com cc: brauner@kernel.org Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c19
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 292302eb60f3..0941ce79ea0b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -247,11 +247,6 @@ static int sel_mmap_handle_status(struct file *filp,
/* only allows one page from the head */
if (vma->vm_pgoff > 0 || size != PAGE_SIZE)
return -EIO;
- /* disallow writable mapping */
- if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
- return -EPERM;
- /* disallow mprotect() turns it into writable */
- vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_MAYWRITE);
return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
page_to_pfn(status),
@@ -1818,6 +1813,17 @@ static struct dentry *sel_make_swapover_dir(struct super_block *sb, u64 *ino)
#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
+static void sel_mark_immutable(struct dentry *root, const char *name)
+{
+ struct qstr q = QSTR(name);
+ struct dentry *dentry = try_lookup_noperm(&q, root);
+
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry)) {
+ d_inode(dentry)->i_flags |= S_IMMUTABLE;
+ dput(dentry);
+ }
+}
+
static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
@@ -1857,6 +1863,9 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
if (ret)
goto err;
+ sel_mark_immutable(sb->s_root, "status");
+ sel_mark_immutable(sb->s_root, "policy");
+
fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
fsi->bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &fsi->last_ino);
if (IS_ERR(fsi->bool_dir)) {