Merge v7.1.3linux-rolling-stable

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

8 files changed, 101 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
index e5a95dc4da1f..b9de0fdf9ee5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h
@@ -163,6 +163,25 @@ aa_get_profile_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *data)
 	return data;
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0 - get a profile reference count if not zero
+ * @data: reference to get a count on
+ *
+ * Like aa_get_profile_loaddata(), but safe to call on an entry that may
+ * be on a list (e.g. ns->rawdata_list) where the last pcount has already
+ * dropped and the deferred cleanup has not yet run.
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to reference, or %NULL if @data is NULL or its
+ *          profile refcount has already reached zero.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_loaddata *
+aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(struct aa_loaddata *data)
+{
+	if (data && kref_get_unless_zero(&data->pcount))
+		return data;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 void __aa_loaddata_update(struct aa_loaddata *data, long revision);
 bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *l, struct aa_loaddata *r);
 void aa_loaddata_kref(struct kref *kref);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 3491e9f60194..e01efdf50efa 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1422,7 +1422,21 @@ static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
 static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
 				   struct msghdr *msg, int size)
 {
-	return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+	int error = aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
+
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	/* TCP fast open carries connect() semantics in sendmsg(); mediate
+	 * the implicit connect so it cannot bypass the connect permission.
+	 */
+	if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_FASTOPEN) && msg->msg_name &&
+	    (sk_is_tcp(sock->sk) ||
+	     (sk_is_inet(sock->sk) && sock->sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM &&
+	      sock->sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP)))
+		error = aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
+
+	return error;
 }
 
 static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index 44c04102062f..1fc6145ccbb8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -22,12 +22,14 @@
 
 struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open",		1),
 	{ }
 };
 
 struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_unix",	1),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("tcp-fast-open",		1),
 	{ }
 };
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index b6a5eb4021db..e103cce6f4af 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -1223,8 +1223,12 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 			if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) {
 				struct aa_loaddata *tmp;
 
-				tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata(rawdata_ent);
-				/* check we didn't fail the race */
+				/*
+				 * Entries remain on rawdata_list with
+				 * pcount == 0 until do_ploaddata_rmfs()
+				 * runs; only take a live profile ref.
+				 */
+				tmp = aa_get_profile_loaddata_not0(rawdata_ent);
 				if (tmp) {
 					aa_put_profile_loaddata(udata);
 					udata = tmp;
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 2cffa6dc8255..b7b622bc36a1 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -208,6 +208,8 @@ extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target,
 					const void *callout_info,
 					size_t callout_len,
 					struct key *dest_keyring);
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey);
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka);
 
 extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index ef855d69c97a..d14ace88e529 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1197,9 +1197,13 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
 	if (!instkey)
 		goto error;
 
-	rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
-	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
 		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
 	payload = NULL;
@@ -1208,7 +1212,7 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!payload)
-			goto error;
+			goto error_put_rka;
 
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload, plen, from))
@@ -1234,6 +1238,8 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
 
 error2:
 	kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 error:
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1358,15 +1364,19 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
 	if (!instkey)
 		goto error;
 
-	rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
-	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
 		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
 	 * writable) */
 	ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
 	ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
@@ -1379,6 +1389,8 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
 	if (ret == 0)
 		keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
 
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 error:
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index 97bc27bbf079..ba150ee2d4a3 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -138,28 +138,35 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_dec_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_enc_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_enc_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_dec_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
 		    uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}
 
 	params->in_len  = uparams.in_len;
-	params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index a7d7538c1f70..282e09d8fa46 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
 static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
 static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
 static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
+static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *);
 
 /*
  * The request-key authorisation key type definition.
@@ -116,6 +117,31 @@ static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Take a reference to the request-key authorisation payload so callers can
+ * drop authkey->sem before doing operations that may sleep.
+ */
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+
+	down_read(&authkey->sem);
+	rka = dereference_key_locked(authkey);
+	if (rka && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags))
+		refcount_inc(&rka->usage);
+	else
+		rka = NULL;
+	up_read(&authkey->sem);
+
+	return rka;
+}
+
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka)
+{
+	if (rka && refcount_dec_and_test(&rka->usage))
+		call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+}
+
+/*
  * Dispose of the request_key_auth record under RCU conditions
  */
 static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
@@ -136,8 +162,10 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
 	struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key);
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+	if (!rka)
+		return;
 	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
-	call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -150,7 +178,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 	if (rka) {
 		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
-		call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+		request_key_auth_put(rka);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -174,6 +202,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
 	rka = kzalloc_obj(*rka);
 	if (!rka)
 		goto error;
+	refcount_set(&rka->usage, 1);
 	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;