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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a
parent99aa998dec83ba180822f70e6d48a514fc81c20d (diff)
downloadlinux-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c
index 2a58a5cdd9f5..4d211711f2ba 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_ieee80211.c
@@ -1153,6 +1153,9 @@ int rtw_action_frame_parse(const u8 *frame, u32 frame_len, u8 *category, u8 *act
u8 c;
u8 a = ACT_PUBLIC_MAX;
+ if (frame_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr) + 2)
+ return false;
+
fc = le16_to_cpu(((struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr *)frame)->frame_control);
if ((fc & (IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE | IEEE80211_FCTL_STYPE)) !=