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authorMichael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>2026-07-07 14:05:59 -0400
committerIlya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>2026-08-26 19:57:27 +0200
commita3eb169ee297aa99670ba927c659990bd1e453f3 (patch)
treec58d885f4062ae63a6fe3ffeca5f856f1050edfa /scripts/const_structs.checkpatch
parent77933e22adfe813be2bd10be08d6e950103c3967 (diff)
downloadlinux-a3eb169ee297aa99670ba927c659990bd1e453f3.tar.gz
linux-a3eb169ee297aa99670ba927c659990bd1e453f3.zip
ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3
ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory. A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info->export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker. Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets field triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel. Add a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing the cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v >= 2, not only info_v >= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for m_data_pg_pools later in the same function. Compute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that checked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled num_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than relying on the later kcalloc() guard. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d463a43d69f4 ("ceph: CEPH_FEATURE_MDSENC support") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/const_structs.checkpatch')
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