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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux
Pull io_uring updates from Jens Axboe:
- Rework the task_work infrastructure.
Both the local (DEFER_TASKRUN) and the normal (tctx) task_work lists
were llist based, which is LIFO ordered, and hence each run had to do
an O(n) list reversal pass first to restore queue order.
Additionally, to cap the amount of task_work run, each method needed
a retry list as well.
Add a lockless MPCS FIFO queue (based on Dmitry Vyukov's intrusive
MPSC algorithm) and switch both task_work lists to it. It performs
better than llists and we can then also ditch the retry lists as well
as entries are popped one-at-the-time.
On top of those changes, run the tctx fallback task_work directly and
remove the now-unused per-ctx fallback machinery entirely.
- zcrx user notifications.
Add a mechanism for zcrx to communicate conditions back to userspace
via a dedicated CQE, with the initial users being notification on
running out of buffers and on a frag copy fallback, plus
shared-memory notification statistics.
Alongside that, a series of zcrx reliability and cleanup fixes: more
reliable scrubbing, poisoning pointers on unregistration, dropping an
extra ifq close, adding a ctx back-pointer, reordering fd allocation
in the export path, and killing a dead 'sock' member.
- Allow using io_uring registered buffers for plain SEND and RECV, not
just for the zero-copy send path.
This enables targets like ublk's NBD backend to push/pull IO data
directly to/from a registered buffer over a plain send/recv on a TCP
socket.
- Registered buffer improvements: account huge pages correctly, bump
the io_mapped_ubuf length field to size_t, and raise the previous 1GB
registered buffer size limit.
- Restrict the ctx access exposed to io_uring BPF struct_ops programs
by handing them an opaque type rather than the full io_ring_ctx, and
add a separate MAINTAINERS entry for the bpf-ops code.
- Allow opcode filtering on IORING_OP_CONNECT.
- Validate ring-provided buffer addresses with access_ok(), and align
the legacy buffer add limit with MAX_BIDS_PER_BGID.
- Various other cleanups and minor fixes, including avoiding msghdr
async data on connect/bind, dropping async_size for OP_LISTEN, making
the POLL_FIRST receive side checks consistent, re-checking
IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT for each linked work item, and using
trace_call__##name() at guarded tracepoint call sites.
* tag 'for-7.2/io_uring-20260615' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux: (31 commits)
io_uring/bpf-ops: add a separate maintainer entry
io_uring/net: make POLL_FIRST receive side checks consistent
io_uring: remove the per-ctx fallback task_work machinery
io_uring: run the tctx task_work fallback directly
io_uring: switch normal task_work to a mpscq
io_uring: switch local task_work to a mpscq
io_uring/mpscq: add lockless multi-producer, single-consumer FIFO queue
io_uring: grab RCU read lock marking task run
io_uring/zcrx: kill dead 'sock' member in struct io_zcrx_args
io_uring/kbuf: validate ring provided buffer addresses with access_ok()
io_uring/net: support registered buffer for plain send and recv
io_uring/nop: Drop a wrong comment in struct io_nop
io_uring/net: Remove async_size for OP_LISTEN
io_uring/net: Avoid msghdr on op_connect/op_bind async data
io_uring/bpf-ops: restrict ctx access to BPF
io_uring/io-wq: re-check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT for each linked work item
io_uring/kbuf: align legacy buffer add limit with MAX_BIDS_PER_BGID
io_uring/zcrx: add shared-memory notification statistics
io_uring/zcrx: notify user on frag copy fallback
io_uring/zcrx: notify user when out of buffers
...
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Like the local task_work list, the normal (tctx) task_work list is an
llist, and hence needs the O(n) llist_reverse_order() pass before
running entries in queue order. On top of that, capped runs - sqpoll
processing IORING_TW_CAP_ENTRIES_VALUE entries at a time - need the
claimed-but-unprocessed leftovers carried in a separate retry_list,
as they can't be pushed back to the shared list.
Switch tctx->task_list to a mpscq, like what was done for the
DEFER_TASKRUN paths as well.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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io_register_iowq_max_workers() walks ctx->tctx_list under ctx->tctx_lock
and dereferences each node's task->io_uring without a NULL check:
list_for_each_entry(node, &ctx->tctx_list, ctx_node) {
tctx = node->task->io_uring;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!tctx->io_wq))
continue;
...
}
__io_uring_add_tctx_node() installs the node into ctx->tctx_list (via
io_tctx_install_node(), which does the list_add() under tctx_lock) and
only assigns current->io_uring = tctx afterwards. A task doing its first
io_uring operation on a shared ring therefore has a window in which its
node is already visible on ctx->tctx_list while node->task->io_uring is
still NULL. A concurrent IORING_REGISTER_IOWQ_MAX_WORKERS on the same
ring reads that NULL and dereferences tctx->io_wq:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
RIP: io_register_iowq_max_workers io_uring/register.c:423
Publish current->io_uring = tctx before installing the node, so any node
visible on ctx->tctx_list always has a valid task->io_uring.
Fixes: 7880174e1e5e ("io_uring/tctx: clean up __io_uring_add_tctx_node() error handling")
Signed-off-by: Lim HyeonJun <shja0831@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260524110853.115634-1-shja0831@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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__io_uring_add_tctx_node() reads ctx->int_flags and
ctx->iowq_limits[0..1] without holding ctx->uring_lock, while
io_register_iowq_max_workers() writes these same fields under the lock.
Mostly an application problem if you try and make these race, but let's
silence KCSAN by just grabbing the ->uring_lock around the operation.
This is a slow path operation anyway, and ->uring_lock will be grabbed
by submission right after anyway.
Fixes: 2e480058ddc2 ("io-wq: provide a way to limit max number of workers")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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syzbot reports that it's hitting the below condition for exiting an
io_wq context:
WARN_ON_ONCE(!test_bit(IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT, &wq->state))
in io_wq_put_and_exit(), which can be triggered with memory allocation
fault injection. Ensure that the io_wq is marked as exiting to silence
this warning trigger.
Reported-by: syzbot+79a4cc863a8db58cd92b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 7880174e1e5e ("io_uring/tctx: clean up __io_uring_add_tctx_node() error handling")
Reviewed-by: Clément Léger <cleger@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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As with the idling code before it, the error exit path should check for
a NULL tctx->io_wq before calling io_wq_put_and_exit().
Fixes: 7880174e1e5e ("io_uring/tctx: clean up __io_uring_add_tctx_node() error handling")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Clément Léger <cleger@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Refactor __io_uring_add_tctx_node() so that on error it never leaves
current->io_uring pointing at a half-setup tctx. This moves the
assignment of current->io_uring to the end of the function post any
failure points.
Separate out the node installation into io_tctx_install_node() to
further clean this up.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Instead of having io_uring_alloc_task_context() return an int and
assign tsk->io_uring, just have it return the task context directly.
This enables cleaner error handling in callers, which may have
failure points post calling io_uring_alloc_task_context().
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Bitfields cannot be set and checked atomically, and this makes it more
clear that these are indeed in shared storage and must be checked and
set in a sane fashion. This is in preparation for annotating a few of
the known racy, but harmless, flags checking.
No intended functional changes in this patch.
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using
git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' |
xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/'
to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL
argument to just drop that argument.
Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly
more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered:
they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and
the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically.
For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate
conversion.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:
Single allocations: kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)
Array allocations: kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)
Flex array allocations: kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)
(where TYPE may also be *VAR)
The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
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Use a separate 'idx' variable to store the result of array_index_nospec()
instead of modifying the loop variable 'offset' directly. This improves
code clarity by separating the logical index from the sanitized index
used for array access.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Yang Xiuwei <yangxiuwei@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux
Pull io_uring bpf filters from Jens Axboe:
"This adds support for both cBPF filters for io_uring, as well as task
inherited restrictions and filters.
seccomp and io_uring don't play along nicely, as most of the
interesting data to filter on resides somewhat out-of-band, in the
submission queue ring.
As a result, things like containers and systemd that apply seccomp
filters, can't filter io_uring operations.
That leaves them with just one choice if filtering is critical -
filter the actual io_uring_setup(2) system call to simply disallow
io_uring. That's rather unfortunate, and has limited us because of it.
io_uring already has some filtering support. It requires the ring to
be setup in a disabled state, and then a filter set can be applied.
This filter set is completely bi-modal - an opcode is either enabled
or it's not. Once a filter set is registered, the ring can be enabled.
This is very restrictive, and it's not useful at all to systemd or
containers which really want both broader and more specific control.
This first adds support for cBPF filters for opcodes, which enables
tighter control over what exactly a specific opcode may do. As
examples, specific support is added for IORING_OP_OPENAT/OPENAT2,
allowing filtering on resolve flags. And another example is added for
IORING_OP_SOCKET, allowing filtering on domain/type/protocol. These
are both common use cases. cBPF was chosen rather than eBPF, because
the latter is often restricted in containers as well.
These filters are run post the init phase of the request, which allows
filters to even dip into data that is being passed in struct in user
memory, as the init side of requests make that data stable by bringing
it into the kernel. This allows filtering without needing to copy this
data twice, or have filters etc know about the exact layout of the
user data. The filters get the already copied and sanitized data
passed.
On top of that support is added for per-task filters, meaning that any
ring created with a task that has a per-task filter will get those
filters applied when it's created. These filters are inherited across
fork as well. Once a filter has been registered, any further added
filters may only further restrict what operations are permitted.
Filters cannot change the return value of an operation, they can only
permit or deny it based on the contents"
* tag 'io_uring-bpf-restrictions.4-20260206' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux:
io_uring: allow registration of per-task restrictions
io_uring: add task fork hook
io_uring/bpf_filter: add ref counts to struct io_bpf_filter
io_uring/bpf_filter: cache lookup table in ctx->bpf_filters
io_uring/bpf_filter: allow filtering on contents of struct open_how
io_uring/net: allow filtering on IORING_OP_SOCKET data
io_uring: add support for BPF filtering for opcode restrictions
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux
Pull io_uring updates from Jens Axboe:
- Clean up the IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED and submitter task checking,
mostly just in preparation for relaxing the locking for SINGLE_ISSUER
in the future.
- Improve IOPOLL by using a doubly linked list to manage completions.
Previously it was singly listed, which meant that to complete request
N in the chain 0..N-1 had to have completed first. With a doubly
linked list we can complete whatever request completes in that order,
rather than need to wait for a consecutive range to be available.
This reduces latencies.
- Improve the restriction setup and checking. Mostly in preparation for
adding further features on top of that. Coming in a separate pull
request.
- Split out task_work and wait handling into separate files. These are
mostly nicely abstracted already, but still remained in the
io_uring.c file which is on the larger side.
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT in a few more spots, where appropriate.
- Ensure even the idle io-wq worker exits if a task no longer has any
rings open.
- Add support for a non-circular submission queue.
By default, the SQ ring keeps moving around, even if only a few
entries are used for each submission. This can be wasteful in terms
of cachelines.
If IORING_SETUP_SQ_REWIND is set for the ring when created, each
submission will start at offset 0 instead of where we last left off
doing submissions.
- Various little cleanups
* tag 'for-7.0/io_uring-20260206' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux: (30 commits)
io_uring/kbuf: fix memory leak if io_buffer_add_list fails
io_uring: Add SPDX id lines to remaining source files
io_uring: allow io-wq workers to exit when unused
io_uring/io-wq: add exit-on-idle state
io_uring/net: don't continue send bundle if poll was required for retry
io_uring/rsrc: use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT consistently
io_uring/futex: use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for futex data allocation
io_uring/io-wq: handle !sysctl_hung_task_timeout_secs
io_uring: fix bad indentation for setup flags if statement
io_uring/rsrc: take unsigned index in io_rsrc_node_lookup()
io_uring: introduce non-circular SQ
io_uring: split out CQ waiting code into wait.c
io_uring: split out task work code into tw.c
io_uring/io-wq: don't trigger hung task for syzbot craziness
io_uring: add IO_URING_EXIT_WAIT_MAX definition
io_uring/sync: validate passed in offset
io_uring/eventfd: remove unused ctx->evfd_last_cq_tail member
io_uring/timeout: annotate data race in io_flush_timeouts()
io_uring/uring_cmd: explicitly disallow cancelations for IOPOLL
io_uring: fix IOPOLL with passthrough I/O
...
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Currently io_uring supports restricting operations on a per-ring basis.
To use those, the ring must be setup in a disabled state by setting
IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED. Then restrictions can be set for the ring, and
the ring can then be enabled.
This commit adds support for IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS with ring_fd
== -1, like the other "blind" register opcodes which work on the task
rather than a specific ring. This allows registration of the same kind
of restrictions as can been done on a specific ring, but with the task
itself. Once done, any ring created will inherit these restrictions.
If a restriction filter is registered with a task, then it's inherited
on fork for its children. Children may only further restrict operations,
not extend them.
Inheriting restrictions include both the classic
IORING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS based restrictions, as well as the BPF
filters that have been registered with the task via
IORING_REGISTER_BPF_FILTER.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Called when copy_process() is called to copy state to a new child.
Right now this is just a stub, but will be used shortly to properly
handle fork'ing of task based io_uring restrictions.
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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io_uring keeps a per-task io-wq around, even when the task no longer has
any io_uring instances.
If the task previously used io_uring for file I/O, this can leave an
unrelated iou-wrk-* worker thread behind after the last io_uring
instance is gone.
When the last io_uring ctx is removed from the task context, mark the
io-wq exit-on-idle so workers can go away. Clear the flag on subsequent
io_uring usage.
Signed-off-by: Li Chen <me@linux.beauty>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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ctx->tcxt_list holds the tasks using this ring, and it's currently
protected by the normal ctx->uring_lock. However, this can cause a
circular locking issue, as reported by syzbot, where cancelations off
exec end up needing to remove an entry from this list:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Tainted: G L
------------------------------------------------------
syz.0.9999/12287 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88805851c0a8 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline]
ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776
proc_pid_attr_write+0x547/0x630 fs/proc/base.c:2837
vfs_write+0x27e/0xb30 fs/read_write.c:684
ksys_write+0x145/0x250 fs/read_write.c:738
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #1 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}:
percpu_down_read_internal include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:53 [inline]
percpu_down_read_freezable include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:83 [inline]
__sb_start_write include/linux/fs/super.h:19 [inline]
sb_start_write+0x4d/0x1c0 include/linux/fs/super.h:125
mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90 fs/namespace.c:499
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:4529 [inline]
path_openat+0xadd/0x3dd0 fs/namei.c:4784
do_filp_open+0x1fa/0x410 fs/namei.c:4814
io_openat2+0x3e0/0x5c0 io_uring/openclose.c:143
__io_issue_sqe+0x181/0x4b0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1792
io_issue_sqe+0x165/0x1060 io_uring/io_uring.c:1815
io_queue_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2042 [inline]
io_submit_sqe io_uring/io_uring.c:2320 [inline]
io_submit_sqes+0xbf4/0x2140 io_uring/io_uring.c:2434
__do_sys_io_uring_enter io_uring/io_uring.c:3280 [inline]
__se_sys_io_uring_enter+0x2e0/0x2b60 io_uring/io_uring.c:3219
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776
io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179
io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195
io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646
io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline]
begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131
load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010
search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline]
exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline]
bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753
do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859
do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline]
__do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline]
__se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline]
__x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&ctx->uring_lock --> sb_writers#3 --> &sig->cred_guard_mutex
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
lock(sb_writers#3);
lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by syz.0.9999/12287:
#0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: prepare_bprm_creds fs/exec.c:1360 [inline]
#0: ffff88802db5a2e0 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: bprm_execve+0xb9/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1733
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12287 Comm: syz.0.9999 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x2e2/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043
check_noncircular+0x12e/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x15a6/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237
lock_acquire+0x107/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:614 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x187/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:776
io_uring_del_tctx_node+0xf0/0x2c0 io_uring/tctx.c:179
io_uring_clean_tctx+0xd4/0x1a0 io_uring/tctx.c:195
io_uring_cancel_generic+0x6ca/0x7d0 io_uring/cancel.c:646
io_uring_task_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:24 [inline]
begin_new_exec+0x10ed/0x2440 fs/exec.c:1131
load_elf_binary+0x9f8/0x2d70 fs/binfmt_elf.c:1010
search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1669 [inline]
exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1701 [inline]
bprm_execve+0x92e/0x1400 fs/exec.c:1753
do_execveat_common+0x510/0x6a0 fs/exec.c:1859
do_execve fs/exec.c:1933 [inline]
__do_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2009 [inline]
__se_sys_execve fs/exec.c:2004 [inline]
__x64_sys_execve+0x94/0xb0 fs/exec.c:2004
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff3a8b8f749
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ff3a9a97038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 RCX: 00007ff3a8b8f749
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000200000000400
RBP: 00007ff3a8c13f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ff3a8de6038 R14: 00007ff3a8de5fa0 R15: 00007ff3a8f0fa28
</TASK>
Add a separate lock just for the tctx_list, tctx_lock. This can nest
under ->uring_lock, where necessary, and be used separately for list
manipulation. For the cancelation off exec side, this removes the
need to grab ->uring_lock, hence fixing the circular locking
dependency.
Reported-by: syzbot+b0e3b77ffaa8a4067ce5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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struct io_wq stores do_work and free_work function pointers which are
called on each work item. But these function pointers are always set to
io_wq_submit_work and io_wq_free_work, respectively. So remove these
function pointers and just call the functions directly.
Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander Mateos <csander@purestorage.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250329161527.3281314-1-csander@purestorage.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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syzbot triggered the following WARN_ON:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 16 at io_uring/tctx.c:51 __io_uring_free+0xfa/0x140 io_uring/tctx.c:51
which is the
WARN_ON_ONCE(!xa_empty(&tctx->xa));
sanity check in __io_uring_free() when a io_uring_task is going through
its final put. The syzbot test case includes injecting memory allocation
failures, and it very much looks like xa_store() can fail one of its
memory allocations and end up with ->head being non-NULL even though no
entries exist in the xarray.
Until this issue gets sorted out, work around it by attempting to
iterate entries in our xarray, and WARN_ON_ONCE() if one is found.
Reported-by: syzbot+cc36d44ec9f368e443d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/io-uring/673c1643.050a0220.87769.0066.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Rather than store the task_struct itself in struct io_kiocb, store
the io_uring specific task_struct. The life times are the same in terms
of io_uring, and this avoids doing some dereferences through the
task_struct. For the hot path of putting local task references, we can
deref req->tctx instead, which we'll need anyway in that function
regardless of whether it's local or remote references.
This is mostly straight forward, except the original task PF_EXITING
check needs a bit of tweaking. task_work is _always_ run from the
originating task, except in the fallback case, where it's run from a
kernel thread. Replace the potentially racy (in case of fallback work)
checks for req->task->flags with current->flags. It's either the still
the original task, in which case PF_EXITING will be sane, or it has
PF_KTHREAD set, in which case it's fallback work. Both cases should
prevent moving forward with the given request.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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With IORING_REGISTER_USE_REGISTERED_RING, an application can register
the ring fd and use it via registered index rather than installed fd.
This allows using a registered ring for everything *except* the initial
mmap.
With IORING_SETUP_NO_MMAP, io_uring_setup uses buffers allocated by the
user, rather than requiring a subsequent mmap.
The combination of the two allows a user to operate *entirely* via a
registered ring fd, making it unnecessary to ever install the fd in the
first place. So, add a flag IORING_SETUP_REGISTERED_FD_ONLY to make
io_uring_setup register the fd and return a registered index, without
installing the fd.
This allows an application to avoid touching the fd table at all, and
allows a library to never even momentarily install a file descriptor.
This splits out an io_ring_add_registered_file helper from
io_ring_add_registered_fd, for use by io_uring_setup.
Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc8f431bada371c183b95a83399628b605e978a3.1682699803.git.josh@joshtriplett.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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This better describes what it does - it's incremented when the task is
currently undergoing a cancelation operation, due to exiting or exec'ing.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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this is no longer needed, as submitter_task is set at creation time.
Signed-off-by: Dylan Yudaken <dylany@fb.com>
Fixes: 97bbdc06a444 ("io_uring: add IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Remove submitter parameter from __io_uring_add_tctx_node.
It was only called from one place, and we can do that logic in that one
place.
Signed-off-by: Dylan Yudaken <dylany@fb.com>
Fixes: 97bbdc06a444 ("io_uring: add IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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With networking use cases we see contention on the spinlock used to
protect the task_list when multiple threads try and add completions at once.
Instead we can use a lockless list, and assume that the first caller to
add to the list is responsible for kicking off task work.
Signed-off-by: Dylan Yudaken <dylany@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220622134028.2013417-4-dylany@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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This optimisation has some built in assumptions that make it easy to
introduce bugs. It also does not have clear wins that make it worth keeping.
Signed-off-by: Dylan Yudaken <dylany@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220622134028.2013417-2-dylany@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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io_uring/io_uring.h already includes io_uring_types.h, no need to
include it every time. Kill it in a bunch of places, it prepares us for
following patches.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/94d8c943fbe0ef949981c508ddcee7fc1c18850f.1655384063.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Add a new IORING_SETUP_SINGLE_ISSUER flag and the userspace visible part
of it, i.e. put limitations of submitters. Also, don't allow it together
with IOPOLL as we're not going to put it to good use.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4bcc41ee467fdf04c8aab8baf6ce3ba21858c3d4.1655371007.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Hao Xu <howeyxu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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There can be only 16 registered rings, no need to allocate an array for
them separately but store it in tctx.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/495f0b953c87994dd9e13de2134019054fa5830d.1655310733.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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