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A cached RECONF chunk may contain more than one request parameter. A
duplicate response can therefore find and process the same ADD_OUT request
again while another parameter is still outstanding, rolling back outcnt
twice and possibly underflowing it.
Track outstanding request types as bits and clear each bit after its first
response. Later responses for the same request are then ignored.
Fixes: 11ae76e67a17 ("sctp: implement receiver-side procedures for the Reconf Response Parameter")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: TencentOS Corvus AI <corvus@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260730110225.37371-1-juny24602@gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: tencentos-corvus-ai:kimi-k3
Signed-off-by: Jun Yang <junvyyang@tencent.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260824081832.98717-3-juny24602@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Zero is a valid response sequence after strreset_outseq wraps, but
sctp_chunk_lookup_strreset_param() currently treats it as a wildcard.
Add match_seq so response lookups match zero exactly while the one
type-only lookup can still ignore the sequence.
Fixes: 50a41591f110 ("sctp: implement receiver-side procedures for the Add Outgoing Streams Request Parameter")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Suggested-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Yang <junvyyang@tencent.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260824081832.98717-2-juny24602@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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sctp_process_strreset_outreq(), sctp_process_strreset_addstrm_out() and
sctp_process_strreset_resp() complete a pending stream reconfiguration
request by stopping the reconf timer on the transport it was sent on:
t = asoc->strreset_chunk->transport;
if (timer_delete(&t->reconf_timer))
sctp_transport_put(t);
chunk->transport is assigned by __sctp_packet_append_chunk() when the
chunk is appended to an outbound packet, and sctp_outq_flush_ctrl() arms
the reconf timer at that same point. A request already published in
asoc->strreset_chunk but not yet transmitted has neither, so completing
it dereferences NULL.
Two ways to get there. sctp_send_asconf_del_ip() sets
asoc->src_out_of_asoc_ok without sending anything when the address being
removed is the association's last one, and sctp_outq_flush_ctrl() then
leaves every non-ASCONF control chunk queued; as only
sctp_process_asconf_ack() clears that flag, it persists. An unprivileged
process that removes such an address and then asks for a stream reset
panics the kernel from softirq. A peer needs neither ASCONF nor local
help: sctp_cmd_interpreter() uncorks the outqueue only once the whole
packet has been processed, so a reply built while walking a RECONF chunk
stays untransmitted for the rest of that walk, and one RECONF chunk
carrying [Incoming SSN Reset Request, Outgoing SSN Reset Request,
Response] -- or two RECONF chunks in one packet -- reaches the same
dereference.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000001e8-0x00000000000001ef]
RIP: 0010:timer_delete+0x67/0x110
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
sctp_process_strreset_addstrm_out (net/sctp/stream.c:832)
sctp_sf_do_reconf (net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c:4212)
sctp_do_sm (net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1172)
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv (net/sctp/associola.c:1044)
sctp_rcv (net/sctp/input.c:243)
ip_local_deliver (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:262)
process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6680)
</IRQ>
A response can only acknowledge a request that was actually sent, so do
not match asoc->strreset_chunk while chunk->transport is NULL. Guarding
the lookup covers all three completion sites.
Fixes: 810544764536 ("sctp: implement receiver-side procedures for the Outgoing SSN Reset Request Parameter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Suggested-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260823172857.896146-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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sctp_rcv() resolves the transport once per packet and leaves it in
chunk->transport. The lookup reference, or the one sctp_add_backlog() takes
if the socket is owned by userspace, keeps it around until the chunk has
been processed.
An authenticated ASCONF DEL-IP can remove it in the meantime.
sctp_assoc_rm_peer() takes the transport out of the association and calls
sctp_transport_free(), which tags it dead and drops the reference the
association held. There is a window on both paths: the packet can sit on
the socket backlog, and on the direct path the lookup completes before
bh_lock_sock().
The DATA chunk in that packet puts the removed transport back into
asoc->peer.last_data_from. Once the packet is done that reference goes
away and the transport is freed by RCU, so the next delayed SACK carries
the pointer into the SACK chunk and sctp_outq_select_transport() reads the
freed transport's state.
Drop the chunk in sctp_inq_push(), next to the existing rcvr->dead check.
Both paths reach it with the association's socket lock held. The peer
retransmits it.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aoUJHQmxL0LFIMCw@v4bel
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge in late fixes in preparation for the net-next PR.
Conflicts:
drivers/dpll/dpll_core.c
drivers/dpll/dpll_netlink.c
33f016b23a219 ("dpll: fix NULL deref in dpll_device_ops() during teardown race")
b1d0c412088e3 ("dpll: add STATE_CONNECTED_OVERRIDE pin capability")
https://lore.kernel.org/aoR9YYY2P5--3x0N@sirena.org.uk
https://lore.kernel.org/aoR9VmKllVGwmQn_@sirena.org.uk
No adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() looks the association up only when chunk->asoc is
NULL, and caches the result in chunk->asoc and chunk->transport without
taking a reference.
A packet that matches no association is handed to the endpoint, so a peer
can bundle COOKIE ECHO, SHUTDOWN and SHUTDOWN ACK in one packet. The
COOKIE ECHO creates the association, the SHUTDOWN chunk caches it, and
with the outqueue empty the SHUTDOWN ACK reaches sctp_sf_do_9_2_final(),
so the association and its transports are freed.
The endpoint loop has no counterpart to the asoc->base.dead check in
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv(). The next chunk writes to last_time_heard in the freed
transport and is then passed to sctp_do_sm() with the freed association.
The transport is freed through RCU, so this needs the packet to come off
the socket backlog, where the loop runs in task context.
The endpoint loop cannot do the same check: it holds no reference on the
association, so reading asoc->base.dead would itself be a use-after-free.
Mark the packet for discard in the command interpreter, just before it
deletes the association. That is also before sctp_inq_free() releases the
chunk on the association receive path.
sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook() issues SCTP_CMD_DELETE_TCB for the temporary
association, while the one the packet belongs to stays alive. A restarting
peer can bundle DATA behind its COOKIE ECHO, so compare against
chunk->asoc and leave that case alone.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/an-YYtoqw1QpTXUL@v4bel
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-7.2-rc8).
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes:
drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/ngbe/ngbe_main.c
5f3a13e0bb5e ("net: ngbe: fix NULL pointer dereference in non-MSI-X interrupt enabling")
d661abdc30c2 ("net: ngbe: correct misleading interrupt comment")
drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c
e16e960d55a4 ("ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev")
00a40d809207 ("ipvlan: Support per-netns netdev unregistration.")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Const qualify clt_table arrays in the net directory that always pass a
memory duplicate to sysctl register. The template would then be in
.rodata and the kmemdup'ed array would be outside.
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810-jag-net_const_qualify-v4-2-77e888237c69@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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addip_last_asconf caches the outstanding outbound ASCONF chunk. The normal
ASCONF-ACK completion path releases the chunk and clears the pointer.
However, sctp_asconf_queue_teardown() releases the cached chunk without
clearing addip_last_asconf. During peer restart handling,
sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a() queues SCTP_CMD_PURGE_ASCONF_QUEUE, which invokes
sctp_asconf_queue_teardown() while the association remains alive and leaves
the pointer dangling.
A delayed authenticated ASCONF-ACK can then reach sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(),
which accesses the stale chunk and passes it to sctp_process_asconf_ack(),
causing a use-after-free and a second release.
Clearing the pointer exposes a race with T4 expiry. Peer restart handling
queues the timer stop before the purge, but SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP uses
timer_delete(), which does not wait for a callback already running on
another CPU. Such a callback can reach sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire() after
the purge and dereference NULL.
Clear addip_last_asconf after releasing the cached chunk, and make
sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire() consume a stale T4 expiry if no outstanding
ASCONF remains.
Fixes: a000c01e60e4 ("sctp: stop pending timers and purge queues when peer restart asoc")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuxiang Yang <yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260809043806.2768302-1-yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_process_asconf_param() stores a newly added peer transport in
asoc->new_transport. After all parameters in the ASCONF chunk have been
processed, sctp_sf_do_asconf() uses this pointer to send a HEARTBEAT to the
new transport.
An authenticated ASCONF from a remote SCTP peer can add a transport and
remove it again with a wildcard DEL-IP parameter in the same chunk. The
wildcard deletion preserves the transport on which the ASCONF arrived, but
removes the newly added transport through
sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(). The removal does not clear
asoc->new_transport, leaving it pointing to the removed transport.
sctp_sf_do_asconf() then creates a HEARTBEAT whose chunk->transport points
to the removed transport without holding a transport reference. During
local address replacement, src_out_of_asoc_ok keeps this HEARTBEAT on
control_chunk_list. After the transport is freed by RCU, a successful
ASCONF_ACK for the replacement address releases the queued HEARTBEAT and
sctp_outq_select_transport() reads the freed transport's state.
The issue was found during a static audit of SCTP objects. With an
authenticated peer, the reproducer triggered the same KASAN report in 2
of 2 unpatched runs on a KASAN-enabled netdev/main kernel:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_outq_select_transport
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800b9bd95c by task python3/197
Call Trace:
sctp_outq_select_transport+0x549/0x8b0 [sctp]
sctp_outq_flush+0x306/0x2c60 [sctp]
sctp_transport_immediate_rtx+0xaf/0x260 [sctp]
sctp_process_asconf_ack+0xa48/0xf70 [sctp]
Allocated by task 197:
sctp_transport_new+0x68/0x650 [sctp]
sctp_assoc_add_peer+0x258/0x12a0 [sctp]
sctp_process_asconf+0x5e9/0x1090 [sctp]
Last potentially related work creation:
__call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x77/0xb70
sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers+0x7c/0xd0 [sctp]
sctp_process_asconf+0xd9c/0x1090 [sctp]
The first invalid access was a four-byte read of transport->state at
net/sctp/outqueue.c:833. The same reproducer completed the full
authenticated ASCONF and local-address replacement sequence with this
change without a KASAN report or oops.
Clear new_transport when its peer is removed, before it can be used to
create the HEARTBEAT.
Fixes: 6af29ccc223b ("sctp: Bundle HEAERTBEAT into ASCONF_ACK")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Qing Ming <a0yami@mailbox.org>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811152803.5629-1-a0yami@mailbox.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() can fail when building the association secret
under memory pressure, but its void return silently leaves the HMAC digest
zeroed. On the receive path, sctp_sf_authenticate() compares this zeroed
digest against the peer-supplied one using crypto_memneq(), potentially
accepting an all-zero HMAC from the peer if the allocation failed. On the
send path, sctp_packet_pack() transmits a packet with a zeroed HMAC that
the peer would reject.
Improve error handling by making sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() return int:
- sctp_sf_authenticate() returns SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM instead of accepting
a zero HMAC.
- sctp_packet_pack() drops the packet on failure instead of transmitting
a zeroed HMAC.
Update the declaration in auth.h accordingly.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260807064314.500742-1-l1138897701@163.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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When cookie authentication is disabled, COOKIE_ECHO restores fixed-size
AUTH fields directly from peer-controlled cookie bytes. A forged RANDOM
length, HMAC list, or CHUNKS list can then reach association consumers
with lengths or identifiers that were never validated against the local
backing arrays.
A forged RANDOM length can cause out-of-bounds reads during key-vector
construction. A forged HMAC identifier also caused a 32-byte write past
a zero-length AUTH chunk, providing a primitive for a local privilege
escalation chain.
Validate the cookie's RANDOM, HMACS, and CHUNKS parameters at the cookie
trust boundary before copying them into the association. Reject invalid
types, malformed lengths, unsupported HMAC identifiers, HMAC lists
without SHA1, and forbidden chunk ids.
Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Fixes: 1f485649f529 ("[SCTP]: Implement SCTP-AUTH internals")
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260804200042.2412009-1-Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gouv.fr
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-7.2-rc7).
No conflicts, or adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_make_heartbeat_ack() caches the destination transport in
chunk->transport without taking a reference. When src_out_of_asoc_ok is
enabled, the HEARTBEAT ACK may remain queued on control_chunk_list instead
of being transmitted immediately.
If the peer transport is removed while the chunk is still queued,
sctp_assoc_rm_peer() drops the transport and schedules it for RCU freeing,
but only clears cached transport pointers in out_chunk_list. The queued
control chunk therefore retains a dangling transport pointer.
Once an ASCONF_ACK clears the suppression and the queued control chunk is
transmitted, SCTP dereferences the stale transport pointer, leading to a
use-after-free.
Fix this by also clearing chunk->transport for queued control chunks in
control_chunk_list when removing the transport.
Fixes: 8a07eb0a50ae ("sctp: Add ASCONF operation on the single-homed host")
Reported-by: Daniele Linguaglossa <danielelinguaglossa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7e1168cb722132152a29d47e5eafaeac4a3bf6f3.1785943120.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In sctp_process_asconf(), when sctp_make_asconf_ack() fails to allocate
the ASCONF_ACK chunk due to memory pressure, the code jumps to the
done label where asoc->peer.addip_serial is unconditionally incremented.
This leaves the peer's ASCONF (serial N) unacknowledged while the local
endpoint now expects serial N+1. When the peer retransmits serial N, it
falls into the serial < addip_serial + 1 branch ,
which attempts to look up a cached ACK for serial N. No cached ACK
exists since the allocation failed, so the retransmission is silently
discarded. The peer eventually times out and ABORTs the association.
Move the addip_serial increment inside the if (asconf_ack) block so that
the serial number is only advanced when the ASCONF_ACK is successfully
created and cached. This way, on allocation failure, the serial number
is unchanged and the peer's retransmitted ASCONF will be correctly
re-processed.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260804025514.241767-1-l1138897701@163.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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__sctp_outq_flush_rtx() moves a gap-acked chunk onto another transport's
transmitted list without updating chunk->transport:
if (chunk->tsn_gap_acked) {
list_move_tail(&chunk->transmitted_list,
&transport->transmitted);
continue;
}
The chunk then sits on a live transport's list while chunk->transport still
names a different one. If that transport is removed - sctp_assoc_rm_peer()
from an ASCONF Delete-IP - sctp_transport_free() RCU-frees it and the chunk
is left with a dangling pointer. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() scrubs
peer->transmitted and asoc->outqueue.out_chunk_list, but the chunk is on
neither.
The pointer is not followed while tsn_gap_acked is set. A SACK that
reneges on the TSN clears the flag, and the next SACK reaches
tchunk->transport->flight_size -= sctp_data_size(tchunk);
inside the freed transport. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free read in
sctp_check_transmitted(), freed from sctp_assoc_rm_peer(). Both the
removal and the SACKs come from the association peer.
Set chunk->transport at the move. The ordinary resend path needs nothing:
it reaches its list_move_tail() only after sctp_packet_append_chunk()
returned SCTP_XMIT_OK, and __sctp_packet_append_chunk() has rebound the
chunk by then.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260729160028.54546-1-baul.lee@xbow.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-7.2-rc6).
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes:
net/ipv4/route.c
dbc3791e3b24 ("net: do not send ICMP/NDISC Redirects when peer allocation fails")
7804eaa057fe ("ipv4: snapshot dst.dev in ip_rt_send_redirect() and ip_rt_get_source()")
drivers/net/tun.c
23dad2d088df ("tun: no longer rely on RTNL in tun_fill_info()")
c3da92af07ea ("Revert "tun/tap: add ptr_ring consume helper with netdev queue wakeup"")
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_npc.c
3bd438a58e91 ("octeontx2-af: Block VFs from clobbering special CGX PKIND state")
5ba5611ef946 ("octeontx2-af: reserve 4 PKINDs for skip-size custom use")
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/core.h
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/mac.c
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/peer.c
469d7e6077c1 ("wifi: ath12k: resolve PENDING ML peer ID from MLO_PEER_MAP HTT event")
378e659029d5 ("wifi: ath12k: introduce host_alloc_ml_id hardware parameter")
c42b27336eef ("wifi: ath12k: fix survey indexing across bands")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The Adaptation Layer Indication parameter contains a fixed 32-bit
Adaptation Code Point after its parameter header. However,
sctp_verify_param() accepts a header-only parameter because the generic
parameter walker only requires the header to be present.
sctp_process_param() then reads adaptation_ind beyond the declared
parameter. When the malformed parameter is last in an INIT, the read
starts at the receive skb tail, and the value is copied into the state
cookie returned in the INIT ACK. This may disclose four receive-buffer
tail bytes.
Require the declared parameter length to match the fixed structure size
and abort the association through the existing invalid parameter length
path otherwise.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Charles Vosburgh <trilobyte777@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260727-sctp-adaptation-length-v1-1-0ab58b2810a5@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When processing AUTH + COOKIE-ECHO packets, if skb_clone() fails
due to memory pressure, chunk->auth_chunk is NULL. The original
code still sets chunk->auth = 1 and continues, leaving the
COOKIE-ECHO to be processed without a valid auth_chunk for
deferred verification.
Discard the AUTH chunk early via pdiscard when skb_clone() fails,
so that the receive loop can continue processing remaining chunks
in the inqueue instead of stalling the entire packet.
Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260723061107.384106-1-l1138897701@163.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_assoc_add_peer() increments the association's 16-bit transport_count
for every new unique peer. Adding the 65,536th transport wraps the count to
zero.
SCTP sock_diag uses transport_count to reserve the INET_DIAG_PEERS payload,
then copies one sockaddr_storage for every entry in transport_addr_list.
After the wrap, a diagnostic dump reserves an empty payload and writes
8 MiB of peer addresses past the skb tail.
Reject a new unique peer when transport_count has reached U16_MAX. Perform
the check after the existing-peer lookup so a duplicate address continues
to return its existing transport at the limit.
Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada <manizada@pm.me>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260725032053.521705-1-manizada@pm.me
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_unpack_cookie() skips cookie expiration checks whenever an
association already exists. This is broader than the exception in
RFC 9260 Section 5.2.4.
For an existing association, Section 5.2.4 permits an expired State
Cookie only when both Verification Tags in the cookie match the current
association. Otherwise, the packet SHOULD be discarded and a Stale
Cookie ERROR MUST be sent.
The broad check lets an expired Action A restart cookie reach
sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(). In a runtime test with the default 60 second
cookie lifetime, replaying such a cookie after 65 seconds returned a
COOKIE-ACK and restarted the association.
Check cookie expiration unless both Verification Tags match. This
preserves the Action D exception for a lost COOKIE ACK while rejecting
expired cookies in all other cases.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yuxiang Yang <yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260723225623.2658868-1-yangyx22@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_process_asconf() caches the transport the ASCONF chunk is processed
against in asconf->transport (== chunk->transport, set once in sctp_rcv()).
For an ASCONF located through its Address Parameter by
__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup(), that cached transport corresponds to the
Address Parameter, which need not be the packet's source address.
sctp_process_asconf_param() rejects a DEL-IP for the packet source address
(ADDIP D8, SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP), but nothing protects asconf->transport.
A single ASCONF can therefore carry, in order:
[Address Parameter L] [DEL-IP L] [DEL-IP 0.0.0.0]
where L differs from the source. The DEL-IP for L passes the D8 check and
calls sctp_assoc_rm_peer() on the transport that asconf->transport still
points at, freeing it (RCU-deferred). The following wildcard DEL-IP then
reuses the now-dangling asconf->transport in sctp_assoc_set_primary() and
sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(): set_primary() dereferences the freed
transport (->ipaddr, ->state) and plants the dangling pointer into
asoc->peer.primary_path / active_path, and del_nonprimary_peers(), keeping
only the pointer that is no longer on the list, removes every real
transport, leaving the association with a transport_count of 0 and
primary_path/active_path pointing at freed memory.
Reject a DEL-IP that targets the transport the ASCONF is being processed
against, mirroring the existing source-address guard, so the wildcard
branch can never reuse a freed transport.
Fixes: 42e30bf3463c ("[SCTP]: Handle the wildcard ADD-IP Address parameter")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jun Yang <junvyyang@tencent.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_73762ED1DF08CC9D5F5F61954B01350CFE0A@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_auth_chunk_verify() returns true unconditionally when
chunk->auth_chunk is NULL, silently skipping authentication.
This is incorrect when:
1. skb_clone() failed in the BH receive path, leaving auth_chunk
NULL. In sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() asoc is NULL for new
connections, so the early sctp_auth_recv_cid() check cannot
catch this.
2. No AUTH chunk precedes COOKIE-ECHO, so skb_clone() is never
called and auth_chunk remains NULL.
Fix by checking sctp_auth_recv_cid() when auth_chunk is NULL:
if authentication is required, return false to drop the chunk;
otherwise continue normally.
Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Qing Luo <luoqing@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260721015532.120157-2-l1138897701@163.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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proc_sctp_do_udp_port() starts per-net SCTP UDP tunneling sockets when
net.sctp.udp_port is set, and stops/restarts them when the sysctl value
changes. The netns exit path does not stop these sockets, so a namespace
can be torn down while its SCTP UDP tunnel sockets are still installed.
Close the UDP tunnel sockets from sctp_ctrlsock_exit() after unregistering
the per-net sysctl table. This prevents new sysctl writes from racing in
while the sockets are being released, and closes the sockets before the
control socket is destroyed.
Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/b9f1f02b0780ad6a719e2413f5f0bb8eb7702d94.1782585631.git.roxy520tt%40gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/6dab75f22855cb219e2e30a5497cab03b970ab91.1784033357.git.roxy520tt@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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proc_sctp_do_auth() updates the SCTP control socket after changing
net.sctp.auth_enable. The handler gets the per-net SCTP state from
ctl->data, so an already opened sysctl file can still target a network
namespace while that namespace is being torn down.
SCTP previously registered its per-net sysctls from sctp_defaults_init(),
while the control socket is created later from sctp_ctrlsock_init(). This
exposed a window during initialization where auth_enable was writable
before net->sctp.ctl_sock existed, and a teardown window where auth_enable
stayed writable after inet_ctl_sock_destroy() had released the control
socket.
Move the per-net SCTP sysctl registration into sctp_ctrlsock_init() after
sctp_ctl_sock_init() succeeds, and unregister the sysctl table before
destroying the control socket in sctp_ctrlsock_exit(). If sysctl
registration fails after the control socket was created, destroy the
control socket in the same init path.
Make sctp_sysctl_net_unregister() tolerate a missing header and clear the
saved pointer so init-error and exit paths can safely share the unregister
helper.
Fixes: 15649fd5415e ("sctp: sysctl: auth_enable: avoid using current->nsproxy")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Co-developed-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/390cd5e91ed60eea27b0b64d0468301a9e73b808.1784033357.git.roxy520tt@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When processing a RESET_IN_REQUEST from a peer,
sctp_process_strreset_inreq() derives the stream count from the
parameter length but does not check whether the resulting
RESET_OUT_REQUEST would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN.
The OUT request header (sctp_strreset_outreq, 16 bytes) is 8 bytes
larger than the IN request header (sctp_strreset_inreq, 8 bytes).
Generally, the IP payload is bounded to 65535 bytes, so the stream
list cannot be large enough to trigger the overflow. However, on
interfaces with MTU > 65535 (e.g., loopback with IPv6 jumbograms), a
stream list that fits within the incoming IN parameter can cause a
__u16 overflow in sctp_make_strreset_req() when computing the OUT
request size, leading to an undersized skb allocation and a kernel
BUG:
net/core/skbuff.c:207 skb_panic
net/core/skbuff.c:2625 skb_put
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1535 sctp_addto_chunk
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:3695 sctp_make_strreset_req
net/sctp/stream.c:655 sctp_process_strreset_inreq
The local setsockopt path validates the generated reset request size.
However, for an incoming-only reset, it accounts for the smaller IN
request even though the peer must generate an OUT request with the same
stream list. Such a request cannot be completed successfully by the
peer.
Reject peer IN requests whose corresponding OUT request would exceed
SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. Also tighten the local check so it does not send an
IN request that would require an oversized OUT request from the peer.
Fixes: 7f9d68ac944e ("sctp: implement sender-side procedures for SSN Reset Request Parameter")
Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260707203215.2752-1-blbllhy@gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) <blbllhy@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710010718.20318-1-blbllhy@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_auth_ep_add_chunkid() uses SCTP_NUM_CHUNK_TYPES (20) as the
capacity limit for ep->auth_chunk_list, allowing it to hold up to
20 chunk entries (param_hdr.length up to 24). However, the copy
destination asoc->c.auth_chunks in struct sctp_cookie is only
SCTP_AUTH_MAX_CHUNKS (16) entries (20 bytes). When more than 16
chunks are added, sctp_association_init() memcpy overflows the
destination by up to 4 bytes.
Fix by using SCTP_AUTH_MAX_CHUNKS as the capacity limit, matching
the destination capacity.
Fixes: 1f485649f529 ("[SCTP]: Implement SCTP-AUTH internals")
Signed-off-by: HanQuan <eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260713032021.3491702-1-zhoujian.zja@antgroup.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the
COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure
of Staleness that follows the cause header:
err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data);
stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err)));
err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that
caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is
present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the
4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs
past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value
is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT,
leaking uninitialized memory.
sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so
check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which
reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too
short to hold the staleness field is discarded.
The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into
COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket
in a user and network namespace.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260704033545.2438373-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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sctp_free_addr_wq() previously removed addr_wq_timer using timer_delete()
while holding addr_wq_lock. However, timer_delete() does not guarantee that
a currently running timer handler has completed.
This allows a race with sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler(), where the handler
may still run after addr_waitq has been freed, acquire addr_wq_lock, and
access freed memory, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by calling timer_shutdown_sync() before taking addr_wq_lock. This
guarantees that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents the
timer from being re-armed during teardown, making subsequent cleanup safe.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5dc95f295bdb5c3f60e880dd9aa5112dc5c071cc.1782757874.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In SCTP handshake, the INIT chunk is initially processed by the server
and embedded into the cookie carried in INIT-ACK. The client then
returns this cookie via COOKIE-ECHO, where the server unpacks it and
reconstructs the original INIT chunk.
When cookie authentication is enabled, the cookie contents are protected
against tampering, so reusing the unpacked INIT without re-verification
is safe.
However, when cookie authentication is disabled, the reconstructed INIT
can no longer be trusted. In this case, the INIT must be explicitly
validated after unpacking to avoid processing potentially tampered data.
Add sctp_verify_init() checks after cookie unpacking in COOKIE-ECHO
processing paths (sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook())
when cookie_auth_enable is disabled. On failure, the new association is
freed and the packet is discarded.
Also tighten cookie validation in sctp_unpack_cookie() by verifying the
embedded chunk type is SCTP_CID_INIT before treating it as an INIT
chunk.
Finally, update sctp_verify_init() to validate parameter bounds using
the actual embedded INIT length instead of chunk->chunk_end, since the
INIT stored in COOKIE-ECHO may not span the entire chunk buffer.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ebcbbac574815b0850f371b4bdb02f2e602b94d3.1782341592.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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SCTP_RESET_STREAMS carries a flexible array of u16 stream IDs, but the
optlen clamps treat USHRT_MAX as a byte count and then multiply
sizeof(__u16) by the fixed header size.
That caps the copied and validated option buffer at about 64 KiB, which
rejects valid requests containing more than about half of the u16 stream
ID range.
Use struct_size_t() for the maximum struct sctp_reset_streams layout
instead, so the bound matches the flexible array described by
srs_number_streams.
Fixes: 5960cefab9df ("sctp: add a ceiling to optlen in some sockopts")
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yousef Alhouseen <alhouseenyousef@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625142354.2600-1-alhouseenyousef@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When sctp_verify_init() encounters unrecognized parameters, it allocates an
err_chunk to report them. However, this chunk is leaked in several code
paths:
1. In sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(), if security_sctp_assoc_request() fails after
sctp_verify_init() has populated err_chunk, the function returns
immediately without freeing it.
2. In sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), the same leak occurs on the
security_sctp_assoc_request() failure path.
3. In sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), on the success path after copying
unrecognized parameters to the INIT-ACK, the function returns without
freeing err_chunk, unlike sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() which properly frees
it.
Fix all three leaks by adding sctp_chunk_free(err_chunk) calls before
returning in the error paths and on the success path in
sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init().
Fixes: c081d53f97a1 ("security: pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/0656704f1b0158287c98aec09ba36c83e4a537ab.1781970534.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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SCTP_DIAG endpoint dumping was traversing endpoint address lists without
holding lock_sock(), while those lists could change concurrently via
socket operations (e.g., bindx changes). This creates a race where
nla_reserve() counts addresses under RCU protection, but the subsequent
copy may see fewer entries, potentially leaking uninitialized memory to
userspace.
Fix this by:
- Taking a reference on each endpoint during hash traversal
- Moving socket operations (lock_sock()) outside read_lock_bh()
- Serializing address list access during dump
- Reworking sctp_for_each_endpoint() to support restart-based traversal
with (net, pos) tracking
Also:
- Add WARN_ON_ONCE() for inconsistent address counts
- Fix idiag_states filtering for LISTEN vs association cases
- Skip dumping endpoints being freed (ep->base.dead)
- Move dump position tracking into iterator, removing cb->args[4] and
its comment for sctp_ep_dump().,
- Update the comment for cb->args[4] and remove the comment for unused
cb->args[5] for sctp_sock_dump().
Note: traversal is restart-based and may re-scan buckets multiple times,
but this is acceptable due to small bucket sizes and required to support
sleeping-safe callbacks.
This issue was reported by Nico Yip (@_cyeaa_) working with TrendAI Zero
Day Initiative.
Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative <zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com>
Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/4c1b49ab87e0f7d552ebd8172b364b1994e913c9.1781552190.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge in late fixes in preparation for the net-next PR.
Conflicts:
net/tls/tls_sw.c
406e8a651a7b ("net: skmsg: preserve sg.copy across SG transforms")
79511603a65b ("tls: remove dead sockmap (psock) handling from the SW path")
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c
f8fd56977eeea ("net: mana: guard TX wq object destroy with INVALID_MANA_HANDLE check")
d07efe5a6e641 ("net: mana: Use per-queue allocation for tx_qp to reduce allocation size")
https://lore.kernel.org/ajAPXu-C_PuTgV-a@sirena.org.uk
No adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_verify_asconf() and sctp_verify_param() only validate ADD_IP, DEL_IP,
and SET_PRIMARY parameters against a fixed minimum size of sizeof(struct
sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr). This ensures the outer
parameter is large enough to contain an embedded address parameter header,
but does not verify that the embedded address parameter's declared length
fits within the bounds of the outer parameter.
Later, sctp_process_param() and sctp_process_asconf_param() extract the
embedded address parameter and pass it to af->from_addr_param(), which uses
the address parameter length to parse the variable-length address payload.
A malformed peer can therefore advertise an embedded address parameter
length that exceeds the remaining bytes in the enclosing parameter.
Validate that addr_param->p.length does not exceed the space available
after the sctp_addip_param header before processing the embedded address
parameter. Reject malformed parameters when the embedded address length
extends beyond the enclosing parameter bounds.
This prevents out-of-bounds reads when parsing malformed parameters carried
in INIT or ASCONF processing paths.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7838b86b69f52add28808fb59034c8f992e97b2d.1781043268.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-7.1-rc8).
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/wangxun/txgbe/txgbe_aml.c
f67aead16e85 ("net: txgbe: rework service event handling")
57d39faed4c9 ("net: txgbe: improve functions of AML 40G devices")
net/rds/info.c
512db8267b73 ("rds: mark snapshot pages dirty in rds_info_getsockopt()")
6e94eeb2a2a6 ("rds: convert to getsockopt_iter")
Adjacent changes:
include/net/sock.h
1ee90b77b727 ("net: guard timestamp cmsgs to real error queue skbs")
f0de88303d5e ("net: make is_skb_wmem() available to modules")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_v4_add_protocol() and sctp_v6_add_protocol() register their
address notifiers before registering the SCTP protocol handlers. If
protocol registration fails, the functions return without unregistering
the notifiers.
Unregister the notifiers on the protocol registration failure paths.
Also propagate notifier registration failures instead of ignoring them.
Signed-off-by: Yuho Choi <dbgh9129@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260608162230.46644-1-dbgh9129@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_unpack_cookie() only checked that the embedded INIT chunk length
did not exceed the remaining cookie payload, but did not ensure that the
INIT chunk is large enough to contain a complete INIT header.
A malformed COOKIE_ECHO can therefore carry a truncated INIT chunk whose
length field is smaller than sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk). Later,
sctp_process_init() accesses INIT parameters unconditionally, which may
lead to out-of-bounds reads.
In addition, raw_addr_list_len is not fully validated against the
remaining cookie payload. When cookie authentication is disabled, an
attacker can supply an oversized raw_addr_list_len and cause
sctp_raw_to_bind_addrs() to read beyond the end of the cookie. The
address parser also lacks sufficient bounds checks for parameter headers
and lengths, allowing malformed address parameters to trigger
out-of-bounds reads.
Fix this by:
- requiring the embedded INIT chunk length to be at least sizeof(struct
sctp_init_chunk);
- validating that the INIT chunk and raw address list together fit
within the cookie payload;
- verifying sufficient data exists for each address parameter header and
payload before parsing it.
Note that sctp_verify_init() must be called after sctp_unpack_cookie()
and before sctp_process_init() when cookie authentication is disabled.
This will be addressed in a separate patch.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/75af23a89adf881a0895d511775e4770da367cbf.1780873427.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup() in net/sctp/input.c only checks that the ASCONF
chunk can hold the ADDIP header and a parameter header, then calls
af->from_addr_param(), which reads the full address (16 bytes for IPv6)
trusting the parameter's declared length.
An unauthenticated peer can send a truncated trailing ASCONF chunk that
declares an IPv6 address parameter but stops after the 4-byte parameter
header; reached from the no-association lookup path, from_addr_param() then
reads uninitialized bytes past the parameter.
Impact: an unauthenticated SCTP peer makes the receive path read up to 16
bytes of uninitialized memory past a truncated ASCONF address parameter.
The sibling __sctp_rcv_init_lookup() bounds parameters with
sctp_walk_params(); this path open-codes the fetch and omits the bound.
Verify the whole address parameter lies within the chunk before
from_addr_param() reads it, the same class of fix as commit 51e5ad549c43
("net: sctp: fix KMSAN uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop").
Fixes: df2185771439 ("[SCTP]: Update association lookup to look at ASCONF chunks as well")
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260608122234.459098-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When ADD_OUT_STREAMS is denied, SCTP only shrinks the queued chunks and
then lowers outcnt. That leaves removed stream metadata behind, so a
later re-add can reuse a stale ext and hit a null-pointer dereference in
the scheduler get path.
Fix the rollback by tearing down the removed stream state the same way
other stream resizes do. Unschedule the current scheduler state, drop
the removed stream ext state with sctp_stream_outq_migrate(), and then
reschedule the remaining streams.
This keeps scheduler-private RR/FC/PRIO lists consistent while fully
rolling back denied outgoing stream additions.
Fixes: 637784ade221 ("sctp: introduce priority based stream scheduler")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/d78954ecd94954653ee299400e98d74a03a6f7d3.1780603399.git.bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-7.1-rc7).
Silent conflicts:
net/wireless/nl80211.c
cb9959ab5f99 ("wifi: cfg80211: enforce HE/EHT cap/oper consistency")
a384ae969902 ("wifi: cfg80211: move AP HT/VHT/... operation to beacon info")
https://lore.kernel.org/aiGJDaHV4UlCexIQ@sirena.org.uk
Conflicts:
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mld/ap.c
a342c99cb70d ("wifi: iwlwifi: mld: honor BSS_CHANGED_BEACON_ENABLED")
9bf1b409afc7 ("wifi: iwlwifi: mld: send tx power constraints before link activation")
https://lore.kernel.org/ah2bfedhV45ZxMO8@sirena.org.uk
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/pcie/drv.c
093305d801fa ("wifi: iwlwifi: pcie: simplify the resume flow if fast resume is not used")
e2323929a68a ("wifi: iwlwifi: pcie: add debug print for resume flow if powered off")
https://lore.kernel.org/ah2bfedhV45ZxMO8@sirena.org.uk
Adjacent changes:
drivers/net/ethernet/airoha/airoha_eth.c
b38cae85d1c4 ("net: airoha: Fix use-after-free in metadata dst teardown")
ec6c391bcca7 ("net: airoha: Introduce airoha_gdm_dev struct")
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c
8173d22b211f ("net: lan743x: permit VLAN-tagged packets up to configured MTU")
e3c6508a46f5 ("net: lan743x: avoid netdev-based logging before netdev registration")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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sctp_stream_update() is only invoked when the association is moved into
COOKIE_WAIT during association setup/reconfiguration. In this path, the
outbound stream scheduler state (stream->out_curr) is expected to be
clean, since no user data should have been transmitted yet unless the
state machine has already partially progressed.
However, a corner case exists in sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(): when a
Stale Cookie ERROR is received, the association is rolled back from
COOKIE_ECHOED to COOKIE_WAIT. In this scenario, user data may already
have been queued and even bundled with the COOKIE-ECHO chunk.
During the rollback, sctp_stream_update() frees the old stream table
and installs a new one, but it does not invalidate stream->out_curr.
As a result, out_curr may still point to a freed sctp_stream_out
entry from the previous stream state.
Later, SCTP scheduler dequeue paths (FCFS, RR, PRIO, etc.) rely on
stream->out_curr->ext, which can lead to use-after-free once the old
stream state has been released via sctp_stream_free().
This results in crashes such as (reported by Yuqi):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140
Read of size 8 at addr ff1100004d4d3208 by task mini_poc/9312
CPU: 1 UID: 1001 PID: 9312 Comm: mini_poc Not tainted
7.1.0-rc1-00305-gbd3a4795d574 #5 PREEMPT(full)
sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140
sctp_outq_flush+0x1603/0x33e0
sctp_do_sm+0x31c9/0x5d30
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x392/0x6f0
sctp_inq_push+0x1db/0x270
sctp_rcv+0x138d/0x3c10
Fix this by fully purging the association outqueue when handling the
Stale Cookie case. This ensures all pending transmit and retransmit
state is dropped, and any scheduler cached pointers are invalidated,
making it safe to rebuild stream state during COOKIE_WAIT restart.
Updating only stream->out_curr would be insufficient, since queued
and retransmittable data would still reference the old stream state and
trigger later use-after-free in dequeue paths.
Fixes: 5bbbbe32a431 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations")
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Yuqi Xu <xuyq21@lenovo.com>
Reported-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/94318159b9052907a6cbb7256aee8b5f8dfbfccb.1780510304.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When a listening SCTP server processes a COOKIE_ECHO chunk, the cached
peer INIT chunk embedded after the cookie is parsed and its parameters
are later walked by sctp_process_init() using sctp_walk_params().
However, the chunk header length of this cached INIT chunk was not
validated against the remaining buffer in the COOKIE_ECHO payload. If
the length field is inflated, the parameter walk can run beyond the
actual received data, leading to out-of-bounds reads and potential
memory corruption during later parameter handling (e.g. STATE_COOKIE
processing and kmemdup() copies).
Add a bounds check in sctp_unpack_cookie() to ensure the cached INIT
chunk length does not exceed the available data in the COOKIE_ECHO
buffer before it is used.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/eb60825fa22d6f9e663c7d4dbb69f397b5d34d42.1780362366.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The SCTP exact sock_diag lookup can hold a transport reference, block on
lock_sock(sk), and then resume after sctp_association_free() has marked
the association dead and freed its bind address list.
When that happens, inet_assoc_attr_size() and
inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() can still dereference association state
that is no longer valid for reporting. In particular,
inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill() may read an empty bind-address list as a
real sctp_sockaddr_entry and trigger an out-of-bounds read from
unrelated association memory.
Reject the association after taking the socket lock if it has been
reaped or detached from the endpoint, and report the lookup as stale.
This keeps the exact dump-one path from formatting torn association
state.
Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhang <zzhan461@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/fac6043fa20a2ff68e12958c431836f692c51268.1780113823.git.zzhan461@ucr.edu
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c:
17bfe0a8c014e ("net: mana: Add NULL guards in teardown path to prevent panic on attach failure")
d07efe5a6e641 ("net: mana: Use per-queue allocation for tx_qp to reduce allocation size")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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sctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while
waiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this
window, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via
getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc->base.sk. After
re-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns
success without noticing the migration — the caller then accesses
the association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user().
Add the same sk != asoc->base.sk check that sctp_wait_for_sndbuf()
already has, returning an error if the association was migrated while
we slept.
Fixes: 668c9beb9020 ("sctp: implement assign_number for sctp_stream_interleave")
Signed-off-by: Zhenghang Xiao <kipreyyy@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527032411.60959-1-kipreyyy@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-7.1-rc4).
No conflicts, or adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The SCTP_SENDALL path in sctp_sendmsg() iterates ep->asocs with
list_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next entry in @tmp before
the loop body runs. The body calls sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(), which may
drop the socket lock inside sctp_wait_for_sndbuf().
While the lock is dropped, another thread can SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF the
association cached in @tmp, migrating it to a new endpoint via
sctp_sock_migrate() (list_del_init() + list_add_tail() to
newep->asocs), and optionally close the new socket which frees the
association via kfree_rcu(). The cached @tmp can also be freed by a
network ABORT for that association, processed in softirq while the
lock is dropped.
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() revalidates @asoc (the current entry) on re-lock
via the "sk != asoc->base.sk" and "asoc->base.dead" checks, but nothing
revalidates @tmp. After a successful return, the iterator advances to
the stale @tmp, yielding either a use-after-free (if the peeled socket
was closed) or a list-walk onto the new endpoint's list head (type
confusion of &newep->asocs as a struct sctp_association *).
Both are reachable from CapEff=0; the type-confusion path gives
controlled indirect call via the outqueue.sched->init_sid pointer.
Fix by re-deriving @tmp from @asoc after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc()
returns. @asoc is known to still be on ep->asocs at that point: the
only callers that list_del an association from ep->asocs are
sctp_association_free() (which sets asoc->base.dead) and
sctp_assoc_migrate() (which changes asoc->base.sk), and
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() checks both under the lock before any
successful return; a tripped check propagates as err < 0 and the loop
bails before the re-derive.
The SCTP_ABORT path in sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags() returns 0 and the
loop hits 'continue' before sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() is ever called, so
the @tmp cached by list_for_each_entry_safe() still covers the
lock-held free that ba59fb027307 ("sctp: walk the list of asoc
safely") was added for.
Fixes: 4910280503f3 ("sctp: add support for snd flag SCTP_SENDALL process in sendmsg")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ben Morris <bmorris@anthropic.com>
Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260508001455.3137-1-joycathacker@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Fix a typo in a comment in sctp_endpoint_destroy(): "releated" should
be "related".
Signed-off-by: Md Shofiqul Islam <shofiqtest@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260507105758.25728-1-shofiqtest@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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None of the udp_tunnel users need struct socket in their
fast paths; it is only used for tunnel setup / teardown.
Even setup_udp_tunnel_sock() does not need struct socket.
Let's change setup_udp_tunnel_sock() to take struct sock
instead of struct socket.
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260502031401.3557229-3-kuniyu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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